Personally, I regard the issue as arguable but unproveable. It’s been years since the subject was of such interest to me that I would spend time to read an entire book. I have read some, with diametrically opposed views that were proven beyond any possible rebuttal, so far as the author was concerned. Enough, already. My opinion leans toward the air campaign was a waste of resource, but I don’t hold that opinion with any real commitment.
And what, if anything, has this to do with Nagasaki/Hiroshima?
In light of my comments above, I can see my challenge to Smiling as an invitation to a massive hijack, as well as admittedly unproveable. I withdraw said challenge, hardly fair to demand proof of something you regard as unproveable, even with the best of intentions.
That sure disqualifies them from being classified as tactical weapons…
One result of Strategic bombing, as advertised, is the “terror” aspect, in that, the proponents of strategic airpower claim that the enemies population will pressure their leaders to reach a negotiated end to the hostilities. In reality, it tends to harden their resolve. (Something “bomber” Harris seems to have ignored from the Blitz.)
I think that the debate about the effectiveness of strategic bombing, the effectiveness of targeting civilians specifically, is a tangent of the Abomb question. Is mass slaughter of civilains legitimate, or effective?
“Legitimate” is unpalatable for me say yes to, but then, I did not have to grow up in an environment (or a whole world) gone insane.
“Effective”? Only as a single part of a combined arms, total war situation.
So the Abomb did not end the war all on it’s own, but it did contribute in a measurable way, by convincing the Japanese leaders to accept the unconditional surrender terms.
The OP asked if a demonstration burst would have been as effective, and I replied that I don’t think so.
Whether strategic bombing is worth it might well be unprovable, but we know that it never ended a war. Boots on the ground have always done that - except in the case of Japan. Whether the bombings were justified or not, and whether strategic bombings or blockades would have worked or not, the fact is that two and only two atomic bombs made the Japanese surrender without an invasion. So I think the answer to your question is whether strategic bombing could have been as effective.
But that depends on something that cannot actually be proven: that the Japanese only surrendered because of the atomic bombs being dropped, and would not have surrendered otherwise. For instance, the entry of the Soviets into the equation has been much discussed (I am not offering an opinion on that, merely noting it). Because they surrendered after the bombs were dropped does not mean it was the reason they surrendered, though it could not have been irrelevent.
When you are discussing the unprovable, it is best to shrug and accept it.
So, if we can’t come to a definite position, even with the benefit of sixty years of hindsight, doesn’t that nullify claims that using the bomb in 1945 was immoral, when there was even less certainty and the war was ongoing?
Realisitically, IMO, yes. But we are talking about subjective opinions, here.
It seems to me that some of those folks who claim that using the Abomb was an immoral act are probably arriving at that conclusion while holding the opinion that using atomic/nuclear weapons can never be justified.
Some weapons are seen as too horrific to ever be used, like nuclear, biological, and some types of chemical weapons, etc.
As long as we can afford to debate these old decisions, and never have to actually use them in anger again, I’ll be (moderately) happy.
Well, while it’s not a total absolute instance of proof, the Emperor’s address to Japan announcing the surrender explicitly noted the impact of the bombs and gave that as his reasn. The bombng deifintely prompted the Emepror to do so, as he and his courtiers decided on surrender (after having previously made no moves for it) very quickly after the second bomb drop. Frankly, there’s no greater proof to be had. If you don’t believe the man himself, who will you believe?
It might actually be provable, but it’d take at least fo couple of years going though old records which may no longer exist to do it mathematically. But If you actually consider the sum total cost of creating hardened factories, labor unrest, moving populations, transporttion disruption, and so on, the cumulative effect of strategic bombing on the German economy and war effort was gargantuan - far more so than the effect on Britain or America. But of course, we can never know exactly how much it cost either side.
In my OP I asked whether or not a high altitude airburst would have convinced the Japanese to surrender. Obviously it would not, they were prepared to defend the Japanese home islands even at the cost of tens of thousands of deaths on both sides.
From the reading of the replies in this thread it would appear that the dropping of the bombs convinced the Japanese that unless they agreed to unconditional surrender they stood the very real threat not only of having their country invaded by the USA but also by Soviet Russia.
IMO the threat of the Soviets contributed greatly towards their decision to surrender, the A bomb even more so.
The question I was answering was what strategic bombing had to do with the thread. I agree that what would have happened if we used conventional bombs is unprovable. I don’t know of any examples of conventional bombing causing a surrender, but there’s always a first time.
I’m not sure I agree and I’m not sure there’s a difference in any event, but we can continue retrospectively blowing up the Japanese Imperial family until we’ve reached my point of interest, which is whether a mass social construct is capable of being subjugated in the absence of a designated and acceptable leadership, where acceptable is defined as any government that does not immediately inspire armed and successful rebellion among the populace. I believe smiling bandit and I would agree that the preservation of the Emperor et al. was absolutely essential to the American subjugation of Japan, though we may have arrived at the conclusion for different reasons.
But did not for George W. Bush in Iraq. It is more subtle than that.
Remember that the Soviets had renounced their non-aggression pact with Japan in April…and they didn’t attack the Japanese in Manchuria until 2 days after the first atomic bomb fell. It was the twin hammer blows of the US demonstrating the capability to wipe out an entire city with a single blow coupled with the Soviets attack (and I think the psychological blow that the Japanese finally realized that their back channel peace proposals were never going to happen) that finally made SOME people in the Japanese government decide enough was enough. I think that the Soviet engagement and destruction of the Japanese northern army would not have been enough, by itself, to cause the Japanese to surrender.
I think that all of these things factored into some elements in the Japanese government finally deciding that enough was enough. Also, the shock of so many hammer blows hitting at once was a huge factor. Take out the atomic bombs demonstrating the capability to destroy an entire city at a time and I don’t thing the Japanese would have been willing to throw in the towel.
Take out the Soviets attack into Manchuria AND the lightning fast destruction of the northern Japanese army and I think some elements, along with the realization that there would be no peace on favorable terms for Japan and I think some elements of the Japanese government would have continued to fight on despite two of their cities being destroyed almost instantly (until we destroyed several more cities with atomic fire). Both things were crucial in forcing the Japanese to finally give up…and even THEN it took the Emperor taking a direct hand in things (which is pretty rare in Japanese history btw) before it finally happened.
One under-discussed aspect of the strategic bombing campaigns that was touched on by John Keegan is the classist assumptions that lay behind some of the logic. “Bomber” Harris and others argued that “the working classes” would be “maddened” and rise up after losing their housing. When trying to sell this strategy, he was talking to the elite, and he not-too-subtly played to the elite’s age-old fear of mass uprisings by the poor/downtrodden. The British upper class government types were all too ready to believe the worst of the German underclass, and that the German political class would fear its own underclass in the same way.
Of course things didn’t work out that way…partly because the “underclass” was more stoic and patriotic than the “elite” had been prepared to believe.
I think the effectiveness of the atomic bombs were due as much to the surprise of their existence as to their actual destructive capability. Japan was facing a lot of really bad problems in 1945; a blockade, the cutting off of fuel supplies, starvation, conventional bombings, invasion - but they could foresee these problems and brace themselves. But they hadn’t expected the atom bomb. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that for all the problems they had already taken into consideration they faced the possibility that their position was much worse than they had anticipated.
I agree that what would have happened if we used conventional bombs is unprovable. I don’t know of any examples of conventional bombing causing a surrender, but there’s always a first time.
Someone should do a movie about this.