I think his point (that I agree with btw) is that strategic bombing doctorine at the time was flawed. The carpet bombing of civilian targets was thought to be effective at breaking their will to fight and their moral, as well as denying the enemy the use of their civilian population to feed the war machine. I’m sure there was some effect on the civilian population, however that effect was grossly over empahsized by the various air force thinkers of the time. The only real effect it had was the slaughtering of a lot of civilians. The majority of the countries under this kind of attack simply masked the locations of their industries, or in the case of Germany and Japan they spread it out into a lot of smaller plants instead of a couple of large ones (that would be easier to hit), moved them under ground or masked them from the air. The strategic doctorine of attacking the civilians, afaik, had no real noticable effect on civilian morale, nor did it have a major effect on production.
This was a lesson our own Air Force failed to learn at the time, btw.
This will be a good thread to remember the next time a thread comes up on the subject of a moral equivalence between intentionally killing civilians and unintentionally killing them as a direct result of policy.
Are you seriously proposing that the Japanese might have rendered the blockade moot with a massive fleet of submarine freighters?
No, my contention is pretty straightforward, and I can supply it myself without your assistance, thanks, but no thanks.
Speculation, founded firmly upon conjecture, all supported by your opinion. Is it funny that “I think” they only built three because that’s all they could build? Once again, I can make my own arguments, please don’t trouble yourself any further. I don’t know why they only built three, were I to guess, I would guess its because its such a dumb idea. But that would be nothing more than a guess.
Again, conjecture. You have no way of knowing how long it would last, and neither have I. Yes, blockades cost money, you are on very firm ground there. Invasions cost lives. I note that as your argument crumbles, you become increasingly personal.
If you can replace argument and citation with derision, you will carry the day.
No need to apologize, you’ve done no such thing.
We have a Pit for this sort of thing. Any chance that you will return to the argument at hand after you catalog my character flaws?
Never said they didn’t know how, only that it is not a practicable solution. Do let me make my own arguments, won’t you? The words you stuff into my mouth don’t fit very well.
Then why did they? On the one hand, you contend that such a blockade (which was already in effect) would have starved the children (arguable, but wouldn’t they have been starving already, if a blockade would have done it?..) and on the other suggest that the warlords were immune to the people’s suffering. Then why would an atomic bombing have accomplished a surrender when the firebombing of Tokyo did not?
On this point, we are in complete agreement. But as I noted to Voyager above, why should we expect an atomic bombing to accomplish what the firebombing of Tokyo could not? Might we not be safe to conjecture that it was the cumulative effect as well as their utter helplessness to counter such bombings? Because if such is the case, waiting them out might well have acheived our purpose in very short order.
Conquest becomes possible only with the submission or virtual extinction of the conquered. A victory proclaimed is nothing without the willing subjugation or effective annihilation of the opposition, undefeated or otherwise. Total victory therefore requires not necessarily the physical deployment of forces or the winning of battles, but the ability to effect a change in the enemy’s desire for resistance. Excellence in aggressive war is expressed by an adherence to the most succinct and least destructive possible path between the initiation of hostilities and this total victory.
I have often found it difficult not to credit the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as examples of this perfect mastery. I cannot believe that airburst threats would be sufficient, as clearly, the loss of one city was not enough. But two cities suddenly was. What internal social process, what sudden shift in the collective consciousness was effected by the bombing of the second city? Was it already underway with the bombing of the first? Before that? How many of their sons had to die before unconditional and enthusiastic surrender became preferrable to more violence? Is the collective social construct more responsive to sudden, impressive violence than the slow grind of attrition war?
A fascinating and rarely witnessed moment in history: what would appear to be a near instant change from a society hungry for total war to a society desirous of peace at any cost. Can anyone recommend any good books or other sources on political life in wartime Japan?
For rather obvious reasons, military production, including atomic weapons, took a sharp downturn in late 1945. If Japan had keep fighting, it’s safe to assume we would have built more atomic bombs on an accelerated schedule.
Nitpick: USS Oklahoma was never restored to active duty either. She capsized during the attack. Set back upright in '44, sank while under tow to the US West Coast.
Yes, mostly. The Japanese merchant fleet was stretched to the limit doing what it needed to do in the DEI, Phillippines, Malaya. Hawaii is kinda far out on a limb, with the long resupply routes vulnerable to raiders. In the Western Pacific, Japan was able to advance under the cover of lots of land based air power.
As I wrote above, you can’t ascribe too much power to Japanese public opinion during the war. It wasn’t a sudden shift in public opinion that prompted the surrender; it was a sudden shift in the opinions of a handful of government leaders.
There were several factors. One was the general background; military defeats and the loss of territory, the growing economic difficulties, Germany’s surrender, and the immanence of an Allied invasion of the home islands. Then there was the immediate triggers; the two atomic bombings and the realization that Japan faced whole new unexpected levels of destruction, the Soviet declaration of war and the realization that the peace negotiations that had been going on via Moscow were a sham, and the semi-official Allied declaration that Emperor Hirohito would not be held personally accountable for wartime activities. These factors, in combination, made it possible for Hirohito to choose to give surrender orders and have the majority of the Japanese armed forces accept those orders.
Nope, I’m not saying that at all…and I note with some little amusement that you didn’t answer the question I asked there.
IOW you aren’t going to answer the question.
Well…they DID build 3. And the DID lay down the hulls for 20. So, its not exactly like its wild eyed conjecture or speculation that they might build a few more.
Um…what do you have as a counter point to YOUR conjecture there 'luci? I must have missed it.
Yup…its conjecture. I have no way of knowing how long it would have lasted. My contention that it would have lasted for years without either an invasion or the atomic strikes we had in our own universe however is not exactly baseless. For instance, I know of no evidence that the military government in Japan was close to the brink of collapse before the nuclear attacks…in fact, I think there is pretty good evidence that it had a very firm grip on things. I know of now real opposition to that government from the people. Even AFTER the second atomic bomb was dropped the Emperor had to basically stage a coup to surrender.
Its amusing that you think my arguments are crumbling…or that you fail to see who was getting personal first. I shall, however, try and back away from that kind of sniping.
So, any way…what do YOU offer as counter point to my own speculations? As yet you haven’t given much, simply going after my arguments.
You want a citation that there were hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers in China and SE Asia? Or do you want a citation that those soldiers were prepared to fight to the death as long as Japan held out? You didn’t bother to make any kind of meaningful reply to my post before, and this one makes no sense in the context of that part of the discussion. Exactly WHAT do you want a cite for 'luci?
Feel free to take me there if you feel you must. You have, after all, been doing the same thing to me for several posts now. I, however, am backing away from that…there really is no need. You aren’t debating here…you aren’t really doing much of anything except sniping from the shadows. You’ve made no real points, have made no real arguments to support even conjecture. I’ve asked you several times to do so and have gotten back nothing from you.
I’m trying to get you to actually engage in the debate instead of doing what you are doing. Can you perhaps take the time out from these attacks to expand a bit? WHY do ‘they’ say its not practicable? The Germans after all were doing it. What about the Japanese efforts made it impractical? What does that mean exact that it wasn’t practical? Economically? Militarily?
:rolleyes: Avoiding the indiscrimate killing of civilians isn’t the same as not killing people. We do what actually works; destroy the infrastructure and military targets. Don’t blow up the homes of people that the rulers don’t even care about; blow up refineries and factories and bridges, armories and bases. You’ll kill some people of course, but certainly not as many as you would nuking or firestorming a city.
Excellent point. I was going to mention the sudden onset of hostilities between the Soviets and Japan, as well as their fading hopes of a peace settlement on their own terms. This completely shocked the Japanese leaders and coupled with the atomic bombs pretty much stunned them into paralysis enough to allow the Emperor to sneak in a surrender.
“Thank God men cannot as yet fly and lay waste the sky as well as the earth!”
— Henry David Thoreau
“Bombardment from the air is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, the destruction or injury of which would constitute a distinct military disadvantage to the belligerent.”
— The Hague Convention of Jurists, 1923.
“War is a nasty, dirty, rotten business. It’s all right for the Navy to blockade a city, to starve the inhabitants to death. But there is something wrong, not nice, about bombing that city.”
— Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris.
“Whatever the lengths to which others may go, His Majesty’s Government will never resort to the deliberate attack on women and children and other civilians for purposes of mere terrorism.”
— Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, House of Commons, 14 September 1939.
“We are going to scourge the Third Reich from end to end. We are bombing Germany city by city and ever more terribly in order to make it impossible for her to go on with the war. That is our object, and we shall pursue it relentlessly.”
— Arthur “Bomber” Harris, RAF.
“We’re going to bomb them back into the stone Age.”
But still this was a collective process, whether it involved millions or dozens of individual actors. After Cannae, Rome had every reason to submit but did not. After Nagasaki, Japan had every reason to submit and did. One day they were ready to die with a shitty bamboo stick clutched in their hands, and the next day they weren’t. Perhaps the factual particulars are all that matter, but I’m haunted by the idea that some elusive but universal factor suddenly brought an entire society to its knees.
Actually, that was tried, too. But the technology wasn’t there: they simply couldn’t deal substantial damage in a tight enough spot, hence carpet bombing. And while the firebombing of Dresden didn’t work as well as they hoped, the general principle did: population had become a resource to be used by tyrants, just as they did iron or oil. Destroying the populace, demoralizing, or crushing them became one more tool in the war. They simply should have done it sooner (but didn’t have the capacity). If they could have pulled that off in Berlin it certainly would have shortened the war.
Nothing in and of itself broke anyone’s back, including general military operations. It took the resources of entire civilizations locked in mortal combat to break one or another, including espionage, guerrillas, ridiculous amounts of airpower, vast conventional military forces, propaganda, blockades, complete industrial reworking, political realignment, and outright obliteration of resources.
People today want to make it into a big adventure, a moral war, or something. It was about not becoming a total monster while doing everything you had to in order to win. And that meant some pretty awful things. If you’re the kind of person who can’t stomach the fact that terribly evil men can often only be stopped with slightly lesser cruelties, then fine. But please have the deceny to retire to a monastery where you may contemplate your moral perfection away from the harsh realty the rest of us may sometimes have to deal with in order to leave a world not consumed by evil for our children.
No, it wasn’t a universal decision. It was essentially one man’s decision. The populace didn’t just give up because the Emperor said to; the only reason they kept fighting was because they saw no other option. When the Emperor gave them one, they simply collapsed. It was no longer a matter of fighting for survival; there was no goal to fight for, even glory. The Emperor took that away, and knew he could take it away, and chose to do so. They just fell down afterward.
Because they couldn’t? Because the raw materials were simply not available?
So why didn’t they? Even had they built all twenty three, is there the slightest chance they could have offered a way to supply sufficient raw material? For that matter, from where? Where was Japan going to get rubber, tin, petroleum? San Francisco? Even if they had the means to ship the raw material, they couldn’t buy it!
My understanding (from the comic books I’ve read) is that the Japanese were willing to consider surrender so long as the Emperor could remain. Which is how it turned out, point of fact.
Splendid.
Well, yeah, I am going after your arguments. That’s what we do here.
Really, any would do, about the only cite you’ve offered thus far is one provided to you.
So you claim. I simply don’t find your declarations of victory convincing.
Sure, the Germans were doing it. Nonetheless, they were still starved for gasoline. As Patton famously noticed, the Germans were using horse-drawn carts at the Battle of the Bulge.
I doubt that. And as I recall, bombing the infrastructure worked quite well; one reason that the Germans collapsed is that they were running out of things like fuel. Not because they suddenly ran out of willpower. Firebombing Dresden just killed lots of people and besmirched the Allies, it didn’t help win the war.
Except that I see no reason to believe that bombing civilians, except in the special case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, contributed to winning.
And if you are the sort who thinks that indiscriminate killing doesn’t mean you are as bad or worse than your enemies, perhaps you should spend your time reading war novels instead of trying to impose your ruthlessness = effective fantasies on real life.
There’s a pretty fine line between bombing “infrastructure” and bombing people. It’s hard to blow up a train or a factory or a bridge without blowing up the people inside it. And bombing accuracy was non-existent during WWII - the Germans actually had a unit during the war whose job was to analyze where the Allied bombs had fallen and then try to figure out what target they were trying to hit. In some cases the bomb pattern was so loose they couldn’t even pinpoint the “target” down to a specific city.
In reality, the strategic bombing campaigns of WWII served mainly as a form of attritional warfare. We kept building bombs and planes and aircrews and the Germans had to keep building fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns and new cities. The side that quits first loses.