Are you kidding me - he handed Napoleon his arse all through the Peninsula War, knowing exactly when to engage and when to hang fire.
He still had to contend with the very large Armies of the Austrians and the Russians who were still moving up West when Waterloo occured.
At best he could hope for a repeat of the 1814 campaign. Which was, stand, thrash enemies, retreat in face of overwhelming numbers, repeat on a different axis, and continue until you are out of space.
His aim seems to have been the same as in the early part of the 1813 campaign, which was to go on the offensive and inflict casualties inside enemy territory. Unrealistic IMO.
The problem was that France could no longer fight, she was throughly exhausted by about 25 years of war and revolution.
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Are you kidding me - he handed Napoleon his arse all through the Peninsula War, knowing exactly when to engage and when to hang fire.
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Never faced Napoleon in Iberia. Or anywhere else except Waterloo
Probably. And also a greater determination to get rid of him (and of post-revolutionary France in general). The time wasn’t anymore to sign a separate peace treaty because you had been handed your ass by Napoleon a couple times. And on top of it, he had already beaten thoroughly once.
I too don’t believe a different outcome at Waterloo would have changed anything. Napoleon won plenty of battles in 1814, and none of it mattered in the end, he still lost the campaign. It would have been the same if he had won at Waterloo.
Napoleon was defeated in the campaign of Russia and in Leipzig. Waterloo was essentially irrelevant. It just matters symbolically because it was the last battle he fought and lost.
Also emphatized because a British general was in charge, which makes it particularly important for British people and as a result for American people because they’re culturally more familiar with British history (look at how often the sideshow of the peninsular war is mentioned on this board by comparison with the real decisive campaigns in the rest of Europe).
I know you have, different opinions with respect to the Peninsula War ;); but I cannot agree with your assessment of Waterloo. Yes, France was ultimatkey beaten by the battles on 1813/14, which of course happened because of the Russian debacle etc etc. Waterloo’s military impact was fairly limited; France still maintained powerful field forces.
Its political and diplomatic outcomes were far reaching. Before the 100 Days, the Congress of Vienna had been deadlocked and the parties there saw Britain with a wary eye. Post Waterloo, which was seen as a British victory, the final settlement was one which was much more favorable to Britain. It left France a much more reduced power than Talleyrand had managed to obtain earlier and confirmed the transfer of lucrative overseas colonies to Britain.
And vice versa.
How bout that - never knew.
Junction (and others), may I recommend Wellington: The Years of the Sword, by Elizabeth Longford. Covers Wellington’s campaigns and battles in Spain along with a large dose of Waterloo. Detailed but a very pleasant read, IMHO.
For a recent academic (positive) assessment of Wellington as a general and how Waterloo fitted in to his list of battles see Huw Davies’s article in the British Journal for Military History. Essentially he doesn’t see Waterloo as Wellington’s “greatest” battle - he argues that Assaye 13 years before is the battle that actually shows Wellington’s brilliance.
The same issue of the BJMH also has an interesting exchange of letters between two military historians (Andrew Roberts and Charles Esdaile) on “Was Napoleon Great?”