How did Japan industrialize so early?

[Hari_Seldon]

Let me return to the zombie OP. The Meiji revolution was a real revolution. As one minor instance, there had been a tabu on eating mammal meat (except for squirel and whale, the former classified as birds and the latter as fish). The emporer broke the tabu.

But here is an interesting story relevant to the OP. I was in a textile museum in Kyoto and I saw a Jacquard loom in operation. Since I knew that the Jacquard loom, dating back to about 1800, was the earliest instance of automated control using punch cards, I spent a half hour watching it in operation until I kind of understood how the holes in the cards controlled which heddles were lifted through a linkage. Most of the time I spent on a balcony overlooking the loom from which I could see the mechanism, but then I came down to the main floor to watch some more. The elderly gentleman operating it then turned to me and explained in excellent English that within a few years of the Meiji revolution, the emporer had sent a delegation to Paris to study the loom and bring back the design. Then Japanese engineers had studied, made a few improvements and then they spread through the countries. This one on display had been electrified, but I could see how it might have operated without power. Multiply this one anecdote by hundreds and you see how Japan could have industrialized so quickly.

Although not relevant to the story, let me add a coda. I could see that the stack of punch cards was several hundred deep. I said to him that preparing all those cards must have been a major task. He chuckled and explained to me, somewhat sheepishly, that the deck had been prepared by a computerized card punch!

[Northern_Piper]

@ernest

Guess we didn’t give them 4 billion a year or tax exempt on most there products either lol

Cite, please. What 4 billion a year are you talking about? And what tax exemption?

(And, just to cut it off in advance, saying “I heard it somewhere” isn’t a cite on these boards. )

[Northern_Piper]

And while we’re at it: “there” != “their”. As well, it is customary to use periods to indicate the end of a sentence.

[sooku]

You miss the point. I was talking about Japan’s inner perceptions/ motivation. Their national character is all about honor and “face”. The idea that Japan would remember humiliation, strengthen itself in order to avenge it, and attempt said revenge, ready or not, does make sense.

The United States was in a unique position having escaped the destruction of WWI and enjoyed a very long peace due to the huge moat on both sides. Plus America had the resources, manpower and organization to rapidly mobilize and produce/develop materiel and weaponry. Japan was weaker in all these areas.

[sooku]

To Exapno Mapcase: Right on. That explains why China was anxious to become a modern nation, but not why it managed to do so. That resulted primarily from American companies’ search for a cheap, high-quality and proven manufacturing partner. Japan was too expensive, Taiwan too small, and S. Korea still unproven. China was proven by Hong Kong businessmen who took the initial risk to mass produce modern products in mainland China when no ole else would touch them. And China proved up to the challenge and scaled up easily when the US came calling.

[Dissonance]

@sooku

You miss the point. I was talking about Japan’s inner perceptions/ motivation. Their national character is all about honor and “face”. The idea that Japan would remember humiliation, strengthen itself in order to avenge it, and attempt said revenge, ready or not, does make sense.

Your point isn’t being missed, it just doesn’t jibe with reality. Japan went to war with the US, UK, Dutch, etc on December 7th 1941 for very specific reasons, and revenge for the humiliation of Matthew Perry’s black ships opening Japan to foreign trade in 1854 wasn’t one of them. Just to reiterate, Japan didn’t industrialize without foreign aid; the reason it was able to industrialize so rapidly was its willingness to adopt foreign ideas and help. Japan’s expansion was in the form of Japan wanting to set itself up as a colonial power. Formosa and Korea were both taken as colonies, and the war with Russia in 1904-05 was essentially a colonial war over who would have Manchuria in their sphere of influence. Japan sided with the Entente in WWI in 1914 and immediately went about taking all of Germany’s colonial possessions in the Pacific, most of which it was able to keep after the war. Unfortunately for Japan it had arrived rather late in the colonial game, which was on its way out. Colonialism and imperialism had never been very popular in the US, which had already promised to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946. Japan’s invasion of China was extremely antagonistic to the US, which had a long standing Open Door policy with regard to China, wanting to keep China’s markets open to all rather than sliced up between colonial powers. The sinking of the river gunboat Panay shortly after Japan went to war with China in 1937 caused a great deal of outrage in the US, even though Japan could not apologize quickly enough or often enough over the sinking. The entire reason Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and went to war with the US was the US reaction to Japan’s war with China. It had nothing to do with a long term plan by Japan so seek revenge over the humiliation of US ships showing up and opening Japan to trade 90 years prior.

The United States was in a unique position having escaped the destruction of WWI and enjoyed a very long peace due to the huge moat on both sides. Plus America had the resources, manpower and organization to rapidly mobilize and produce/develop materiel and weaponry. Japan was weaker in all these areas.

The United States was hardly unique in this position, apart from being a much smaller country it perfectly describes Japan’s position at the time. Japan had not suffered from a foreign invasion since the failed Mongol attempts in 1274, had industrialized fairly rapidly once it decided to do so, was able to organize itself to become a colonial power in sort order, escaped any destruction of WWI, didn’t even suffer the casualties that the US did in its participation in WWI and gained a large number of former German possessions in the Pacific as a reward for its siding with the Entente.

[sooku]

I think your view of history is entirely US-centric and represents the version of history accepted in America. But that’s not the only possible point of view. In Asia, 90 years is not a long time, and national humiliation is not something you forget. There are some scholars who recognize this; for example, see this editorial.

[Mijin]

@sooku

To Exapno Mapcase: Right on. That explains why China was anxious to become a modern nation, but not why it managed to do so. That resulted primarily from American companies’ search for a cheap, high-quality and proven manufacturing partner. Japan was too expensive, Taiwan too small, and S. Korea still unproven. China was proven by Hong Kong businessmen who took the initial risk to mass produce modern products in mainland China when no ole else would touch them. And China proved up to the challenge and scaled up easily when the US came calling.

The US is definitely a big trading partner, but still only amounts to about 17% of exports, about the same as exports to the EU (and less than exports to all of Europe).
As much as we’d all like to take all the credit away from China for their economic growth, and imagine a bunch of US businessmen sticking a pin in a map…cite?

[Dissonance]

@sooku

I think your view of history is entirely US-centric and represents the version of history accepted in America. But that’s not the only possible point of view. In Asia, 90 years is not a long time, and national humiliation is not something you forget. There are some scholars who recognize this; for example, see this editorial.

In what possible way is my view of history ‘US-centric’ and only 'representative of the ‘version of history accepted in America’, particularly when I presented how the situation was viewed by the Japanese at the time? 90 years is just as long of a time outside of Asia as it is inside of Asia, and countries outside of Asia are capable of holding grudges just as long as those inside Asia, but a 90 year old grudge about Matthew Perry was in no way the reason Japan attacked the United States in 1941. The “scholar” you cite not only says nothing that I didn’t already say; from Japan’s expansion as a colonial power which it felt it had as much right to do as any country in the West, to the US reaction to the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 leading to relations between the two countries taking a steep nosedive to the point of the US imposing economically crippling embargoes on Japan; the one on oil which was going to destroy the Japanese economy and their ability to continue to wage war in China unless they took a new source of oil by force, and the only practical nearby source of oil was the Dutch East Indies, which meant war with the US and UK. Your “scholar” is also nothing of the sort, as one can easily glean from the “SUBSIM Review Editorial” at the top of the page and his signing of the article with

Neal Stevens
Editor,
SUBSIM Review

SUBSIM Review makes no claims at being a scholarly source or publication, rather it is “the resource for all the news, reviews, tactics, mods, patches, forum discussions, custom missions, playing & troubleshooting tips for every naval game & subsim made, gathered together, to enhance the sim experience. Good hunting!”

[Exapno_Mapcase]

sooku, how about a non-U.S.-centric view.

Japan recently put out a 61 volume official biography of Emperor Hirohito. If you are correct, then as Emperor he would be the one most anxious to revenge earlier humiliations. Yet it turns out the opposite was true.

Japan’s Imperial Household Agency has compiled a 61-volume biography of former Emperor Hirohito that portrays him as being distressed that he could not stop his country from going to war, according to Japan’s Kyodo News agency.

The 12,000-page record says he complained in July 1939 to Army Minister Seishiro Itagaki about the military’s “predisposition” as it strengthened its relationship with Germany, Kyodo reported. He also warned against the navy’s call for war with the United States, predicting in July 1941 that it would be “nothing less than a self-destructive war.”

What’s a better explanation for Japan’s behavior? How about this?

   In the summer of 1941, the Roosevelt administration imposed an embargo on exports to Japan. Britain and Holland followed suit. Their intentions were to force Japan to withdraw from the occupied Chinese mainland and to deter future expansion. The colonial powers did not want Japan to join their club. Faced with the onset of shortages that would cripple their nation's defense, the Japanese government approved of a military plan to destroy the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. This would buy them time to occupy and reinforce the oil-rich Dutch Indies and remove the American threat in the Philippine Islands. Many in the Japanese military felt this would also serve to discourage further interference from the West. Thus, Japan figured their control of the South Pacific would be impervious to Western intervention. 

Oops. That paragraph comes from YOUR link.

In brief, the events of the present played a far larger role than attitudes from the past.

[bump]

@beowulff

PS - it’s Perot.

And his ears really aren’t noticeably big in person either. (no shit- actually met him once at a party!)

So it sounds to me like long story short, the very homogenous nature of Japanese society and the very strong Imperial central control let the Japanese go about industrializing in a deliberate way, rather than haphazardly as the Western countries did. In other words, they could more or less pick and choose what worked rather than developing industrialization as they went.

[TokyoBayer]

@sooku

Are there views too heretical for the audience? Maybe they sound completely off the wall, even biased. I would like to hear your feedback. (PS I am Indian)

I’m sure your too young to catch the joke, but using Shogun as primary source material for research for understanding Japanese culture isn’t necessarily the best.

@sooku

You miss the point. I was talking about Japan’s inner perceptions/ motivation. Their national character is all about honor and “face”.

See previous comment.

@sooku

In Asia, 90 years is not a long time, and national humiliation is not something you forget.

See previous comment.

You have to understand that Japan is not India and that Indians in Japan are as out of their culture as Americans are. Living there for 25 years, speaking the language and doing business with them, being married to one for a while, and whatever else.

On a scale of one to 100, your understanding of Japan culture is around a six. At least you know that Japan was involved in WWII, so I’ll give you extra credit for that.

Oh wait, you got them in the right continent, and even are aware the very basics of history. Not that you get any of the rational correct, but knowing that they don’t walk around carrying swords should bump your score up to 10.

Thanks for playing!

@Exapno_Mapcase

Japan recently put out a 61 volume official biography of Emperor Hirohito. If you are correct, then as Emperor he would be the one most anxious to revenge earlier humiliations. Yet it turns out the opposite was true.

It will be interesting to see what the series contains, but you can be sure that it will continue to whitewash his role. It worked out best for both the occupied and the occupying countries to create a fiction which largely absolved Hirohito of any responsibility for the war.

[Exapno_Mapcase]

@TokyoBayer

It will be interesting to see what the series contains, but you can be sure that it will continue to whitewash his role. It worked out best for both the occupied and the occupying countries to create a fiction which largely absolved Hirohito of any responsibility for the war.

I’m sure this is true. But it’s my understanding that the extent of his opposition was not, in fact, known before and that most sources, at least in the U.S., portrayed him as being a supporter of the military.

Is any of that accurate? Can you expand on what the Japanese have been taught?

[TokyoBayer]

@Exapno_Mapcase

I’m sure this is true. But it’s my understanding that the extent of his opposition was not, in fact, known before and that most sources, at least in the U.S., portrayed him as being a supporter of the military.

Is any of that accurate? Can you expand on what the Japanese have been taught?

Last question first. The Japanese have not been taught anything. All that most Japanese know about WWII are the atomic bombs.

(As as aside, I first moved to Japan in '81 in Nagasaki, in a small house about 700 meters from the center. The Day After was released in the theaters in Japan and I was it with a friend from the neighborhood who had survived the blast. That was intense.)

The Japanese picked themselves up and worked their way out of the mess. During the war, the secret police made sure that people didn’t criticize the government, and that attitude continued. Very few people discussed the war, and pretty much all of the documentaries on NHK (the BBC of Japan) completely side-stepped the role of Hirohito.

(As a note, in Japanese, the reigning emperor is referred to as "“his Majesty the Emperor” and not with a personal name. After he dies, his name is changed to the name of his reign, so he is called Emperor Showa.)

By all indications, there was a great deal of ambivalence (in the sense of deep contractions) in Hirohito toward the war. He had direct pipelines to the various commands as the nominal commander-in-chief, but was limited in his constitutional role to “accepting” the advice of those who reported to him.

Japan had loosely based the Meiji Constitution on the German model and had the Ministers of War (Army) and Navy, both report directly to the emperor and not to the Prime Minister. The respective chiefs of staff also reported directly to the emperor and not even to the Ministries of War and Navy.

Hirohito had his personal aide-de-camp, and there were members of the imperial family in important political and army leadership.

The wiki article on Hitohito contain a fairly good summary of what many scholars believe.

As war preparations continued, Prime Minister Konoe found himself more and more isolated and gave his resignation on October 16. He justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita :

"Of course His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: 'You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much.' Thus, gradually, he began to lean toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: my prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more. In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and navy high commands.[18]"

The army and the navy recommended the candidacy of Prince Higashikuni, one of the Emperor’s uncles. According to the Shōwa “Monologue”, written after the war, the Emperor then said that if the war were to begin while a member of the imperial house was prime minister, the imperial house would have to carry the responsibility and he was opposed to this.[19]

Instead, the Emperor chose the hard-line General Hideki Tōjō, who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution, and asked him to make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the Imperial Conferences. On November 2, Tōjō, Sugiyama and Nagano reported to the Emperor that the review of eleven points had been in vain. Emperor Hirohito gave his consent to the war and then asked: “Are you going to provide justification for the war?”[20] The decision for war (against United States) was presented for approval to Hirohito by General Tōjō, Naval Minister Admiral Shigetarō Shimada, and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō.

If you are interested, the best book I’ve read on the matter is Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. It’s reviewed here.

After Japan’s surrender in 1945, Gen. Douglas MacArthur and some of his officers, who imagined themselves experts on Japanese politics and culture, hurriedly decided that it was vital to the success of the American occupation that the emperor be retained as a means of ensuring control of the population and giving sanction to the far-reaching reforms planned for Japanese society. Without the emperor’s authority, MacArthur warned Washington, a million troops might be needed for an indefinite number of years to maintain order in Japan.

If the emperor had to stay, however, he would have to be repackaged quickly for the American public, most of whom still regarded him as the man behind Pearl Harbor, a war criminal on a par with Mussolini and Hitler. This necessary rewrite of the emperor’s role in history began almost immediately, with the enthusiastic cooperation of court officials, MacArthur’s headquarters and former Japanese military and civilian leaders. Even those officials on trial for war crimes loyally adapted their testimony so as to shield the throne from any blame.

The emperor now emerged as a kind of closet pacifist, a mainly symbolic head of state, a constitutional monarch who was legally powerless to resist the military and may even have been coerced by them. His only important role in the war was to end it, by stepping in to settle a deadlock among the top leadership and throwing his support behind those who wished to surrender.

It was a good story line and suited the needs of both Japanese and Americans. If the emperor had been powerless to halt the warmongers in the army, how could ordinary Japanese have done so? Thus the people of Japan, like the Chinese or the Filipinos, could also be considered the victims of the militarists. Although there were some weaknesses and inconsistencies, the story came to be widely accepted in both the United States and Japan.

But following Hirohito’s death in 1989, additional documents on his long reign became available, and Japanese scholars and journalists began to re-examine the emperor’s role in history. In his important and provocative new book, ‘‘Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan,’’ Herbert P. Bix presents one of the first complete biographies of the emperor in English based on this new Japanese scholarship, as well as on extensive research of his own. Bix’s Hirohito is neither a Hitler nor a pacifist but a deeply flawed statesman. Above all, he was no passive symbolic monarch but a behind-the-scenes wheeler-dealer whose words could make or break cabinets.

As was written, the war criminals agreed to cover their emperor. Tojo took personal responsibility.

Hideki Tōjō accepted full responsibility in the end for his actions during the war, and made this speech:

It is natural that I should bear entire responsibility for the war in general, and, needless to say, I am prepared to do so. Consequently, now that the war has been lost, it is presumably necessary that I be judged so that the circumstances of the time can be clarified and the future peace of the world be assured. Therefore, with respect to my trial, it is my intention to speak frankly, according to my recollection, even though when the vanquished stands before the victor, who has over him the power of life and death, he may be apt to toady and flatter. I mean to pay considerable attention to this in my actions, and say to the end that what is true is true and what is false is false. To shade one's words in flattery to the point of untruthfulness would falsify the trial and do incalculable harm to the nation, and great care must be taken to avoid this.

My personal, non-professional opinion is that Hirohito was guilty of war crimes and bore an enormous responsibility for the war. However, Japan was rebuilt, the citizens cooperated with America and they became a relatively peaceful society. Who knows how much different that would have been had he been tried.

[The_Second_Stone]

I get my views of Japan from Pulp Fiction and sushi restaurants twice a week. Do I get at least a 12? It would be interesting to find out how much Hirohito led his country, or was led by its military. I get the sense he was a bit entranced by the trappings of military conquest with China, Korea and Mongolia and went along a lot because he was not a strong figure, which is understandable in that he had a sheltered upbringing and the military government were very strong willed veterans of war. It would have required enormous strength of character and wile for him to have stopped war with the US. If Yamamoto couldn’t stop it being the most powerful naval figure, how could the boy king?

[Dissonance]

He wasn’t without his own political savvy and could be pulled both in favor of and against military action; but with internal politics in Japan being what they were it often didn’t matter. When Hirohito was convinced by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to order the Kwantung Army not to take any provocative action in Manchuria, the Army made a point of having the orders delivered personally by a general who sailed for Manchuria by ship rather than flying over by plane and making sure the contents of the orders the general was carrying to them were known by the hotheads in the Kwantung Army so that they could act in defiance of them in carrying out the Manchurian Incident before they had officially received said orders. He seemed to have been entranced by the idea of conquering China, but was not so enthusiastic about war by the time the Pacific War came along at the end of 1941. He had a conversation with Army Chief of Staff General Sugiyama at the start of the war where the General was to provide an estimate of how long the fighting would last which allegedly started with Hirohito complaining “Last time you said it would only be three months.” Sugiyama explained “China is bigger than we thought,” to which Hirohito replied “The Pacific is also big.”

[TokyoBayer]

@The_Second_Stone

I get my views of Japan from Pulp Fiction and sushi restaurants twice a week. Do I get at least a 12?

As the self-appointed, arbitrary judge of Japanese cultural awareness (JCA), you get more because you didn’t mention Rising Sun. As much as I enjoyed the Torantino classic I am mystified as to why you watch it twice a week.

It would be interesting to find out how much Hirohito led his country, or was led by its military.

When discussing this, we have to remember that nothing which will come out of the Japan’s Imperial Household Agency is likely to ever give an accurate picture of Hirohito, so scholars are limited to reading between the lines. One problem with taking individual quotes is that if WWII were limited to 18 snapshots, how well could the war be portrayed? Likewise, releasing carefully selected documents will likely not give an accurate portrait of the complexity of Hirohito’s involvement, even at 81 volumes. I donno, maybe they will be refreshingly honest, but I wouldn’t bet the ranch on it.

The question of who was in charge in 1937 to '45 in Japan cannot be answered because no one was in charge. It was in someways like an unofficial version of the checks and balances of the US constitution, but all done by informal rules and not by clearly delineated responsibilities.

Some of the key players:

By far, the driving force was the IJA, and specifically the ultra nationalistic factions. Note the plural, they didn’t all speak with one voice. Field generals were making decisions first and informing HQ later. Not little decisions, but things such as setting up the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukden_IncidentMukden Incident, which lead to the invasion of Manchuria and Marco Polo Bridge Incident which lead to direct war with China.

The fear that a local commander could take steps which would drag the West into war was real, as can be seen in the warning message to Washington by the US Ambassador to Japan in early 1941.

The IJA generals were crazy, at one time some were thinking they could attack Russia at the same time they were fighting the Allies. They were also woefully uninformed about anything outside of Japan.

The PM and other important leaders were from the military. The Meiji constitution and later rules make it that such that both the Ministers of War (Army) Navy had to be active duty flag officers, as well as not reporting to the PM. They were in the cabinet but (nominally) reported directly to the emperor. The position of Minister of War was in reality more powerful that that of the PM. Tojo was a powerful PM because he simultaneously held the more powerful position of the Minister of War

Either one of these military ministers could cause a government to fall simply by resigning and for the branch of the service to not allow one of the flag officers to become a replacement. This was a real concern at times, especially at the end of the war.

Were I an historian looking for an interesting topic to research, my first pick would be the end of the war when they were discussing surrendering or not, why didn’t General Anami, the Minister of War and the most powerful person in Japan leave the conference room in the bunker beneath the Imperial Palace to take a piss and keep on walking out the door? The government would fail; Hirohito would be unable to name a successor to the toothless prime minister, Admiral Suzuki (ret); and the IJA would declare martial law. Hirohito could either agree to support them or be replaced by one of his hard-core relatives.

Japanese ultra rightists had become increasingly violent and intimidating in the years leading up to the war. Even Admiral Yamamoto needed to go into hiding at one point to escape possible assassination.

Most of the IJN was less fanatical and more people who were more realistic about the industrial power of the West. However, many leaders were wanting part of the action when the IJA was carving up China.

Civilian politicians. What civilians? The Minister of Foreign Affairs would be a civilian, and some of the lesser cabinet members, but none of the other key players.

The backroom dealers. The elder statesmen had been give a certain degree of influence during the Meiji period although that was waning and by the war would be much less.

Hirohito. Westerns used to the concept of an all-powerful God do not understand how the emperor could be considered divine, but without actual power, which is the situation for most of Japanese history. The Meiji Restoration had placed the emperor in a position of some political power. Even so, there were real limits and not much actual power.

Emperor Meiji died in 1912 when Hirohito was 11. Hirohito’s father became the next emperor, but suffered from mental illness and Hirohito was named as regent at age 20, forcing him to learn on-the-job with no real role model.

Around the emperor would be Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, with a lot of the functions of a chief of staff including limiting access to the emperor; the Household Agency and other advisers.

It would probably take someone with far greater skill to have significantly changed events, and it’s likely that Hirohito didn’t have that skill.

Leading up to the war, Roosevelt critically underestimated Japanese will and abilities; completely misjudging their response. The US Secretaries of State and Navy opposed several of the key measures taken in the fateful summer of 1945 because the US wasn’t prepared for war, and they understood that the sanctions put Japan into a position where they would feel that they had choice but to go to war.

So, to answer your question. We really don’t know and I don’t believe that the further releases will really answer the question. I hope to be proved wrong, though, but doubt it.

[Exapno_Mapcase]

Thanks for the detailed information, TokyoBayer.

One typo may be confusing though. I assume “in the fateful summer of 1945” should be “in the fateful summer of 1941”.

[Crafter_Man]

And then after WWII, Japanese manufacturing was heavily influenced by the techniques and philosophies of W. Edwards Deming.