How did the ancient computers in 60's era nukes aim to multiple targets?

This isn’t quite true. The LM used the same type of computer–theApollo Guidance Computer, an early version of what would become the IBM AP-101–as the core of the Primary Guidance, Navigation and Control System (PGNS or ‘pings’). This was, in fact, an early integrated circuit computer programmed in HAL/S. (Trivia: the error code used to indicate null or bad data coming from the IMU–code 00404–is the basis for the “404: Page Not Found” error code in HTTP.) The LM also had a backup computer, the TRW-designed Abort Guidence System, used for ascent if PGNS failed. The Autonetics D-37C used in Minuteman II was an entirely different system, as was the D-37D and Honeywell HDC-701 used on Minuteman III. Minuteman I and II used rotating disc storage, not because it was more robust, but because it was faster than ferrite core memory storage of the day. MM-III went to a solid-state storage system.

That would be the vaunted MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’. The main purpose in using vacuum tubes in avionics and ECM systems was not that it was resistant to EMP but because they were easier to test and replace in rough field conditions the MiG-25 was likely to operate in, and because Soviet manufacturing technology had substantial quality control problems in producing reliable IC circuits.

Part of the drive for larger warheads was greater coverage to accomodate less accurate targeting, but in large measure it was to strike on hardened missile silos; whereas previous systems were “soft” (above ground) or “semi-hardened” (below ground but elevated and fueled before launch) the newest generation of ICBMs were stored essentially ready to launch in hardened underground silos, making a near-miss of a missile facility with a smaller weapon useless. With the advent of more precise targeting and MIRV capability (which led to a new and even more disturbing proliferation of weapons) and a reduced likelyhood of being able to launch a disarming strike due to increased early warning capability by both parties, large warheads were found to be inefficient and marginally useful for most deterrent purposes, especially under the (Mutually) Assured Destruction philosophy of American strategists. (The Soviets never adopted the tenets of Assured Destruction as a whole and thus maintained a larger arsenal of multi-megaton weapons while also fielding massive boosters with comparatively huge throw weight, eventually frightening the US into fielding the LGM-118A ‘Peacekeeper’ in response.)

MIRVs also had the side effect of making terminal-phase ABM against a strategic full-on attack essentially useless. When the enemy was targeting two or three massive RVs toward a known target it was feasible (if just but) to effect an ABM interceptor system with a reasonable (although hardly assured) probability of intercept. When the enemy can afford to pitch a dozen or more RVs at a target area, the probability that at least one or more will penetrate is almost certain versus any realistic probability of intercept.

Stranger

My bad, I misremembered. For some reason I thought that ICs were introduced in 1972; I think that I was off by a decade.

They didn’t use any Microsoft products. :smiley:

That’s when the first microcomputer (Intel’s 4004) was introduced, or, rather, at the end of 1971.

Someone once told me that a substantial amount of resources were spent on the development of star sensors, which were small devices that could be used to obtain accurate mid-flight navigation fixes by using known stars as position references.

From Danlan’s guidance computer link