This is what my father called the right of weight. As in
“Rick you may have the right of way, but that semi headed toward you has the right of weight, and if he hits you you are going to regret it.”
Supertanker is a layman’s term not used in the industry. The *Mogamigawa * (not Mogamikawa, incidentally) at 300,000 dwt is big, but not very big. It is a VLCC (very large crude carrier). It is not a ULCC (ultra large crude carrier). I think over about 250,000 dwt they get called supertankers, but there is no strict definition, I don’t think.
To give this “gargantuan” terminology some perspective, the *Mogamikawa * at 300m long, 60m wide and about 30m in moulded depth is about 3 times longer, six times wider and 3 times deeper than a Los Angeles class sub. I know which one I’d rather be on in a collision.
Many, many years ago (so I can talk about it) I was in the Master’s cabin of a merchant vessel as his lawyer. Also in the cabin were a couple of government investigators interviewing him concerning the cause and circumstances of a collision the vessel had allegedly had with a fishing vessel a few days earlier. As you can imagine, the Master’s attitude to risk and speed were a potential issue. The Master was Korean, I think. In the middle of the interview the ship’s agent sticks his head in (not realising there was an interview going on) and the Master jumps up and the conversation goes like this:
Master: “Agent, I want talk to you about pilot. We not use that pilot again. Don’t like him”
Agent: “Why, what’s wrong with him?”
Master: “He want use MDO all the time.”*
Agent: “Well that’s OK isn’t it?”
Master: “Too slow, too slow. How long did the [Sister Ship] take to do pilotage last time?”
Agent: “Oh, 2 hours 10 minutes I think”
Master: “We take 2 hours 20 minute. I lose bet. Too slow, too slow. We not use this pilot again, OK agent? Get faster pilot”
As you can imagine at this point I jumped in to try to change the subject, while attempting by sheer force of will (but without actually saying anything) to make the Master shut the *%$# up. The damage was however done and the investigators formed their view of the Master right then and there!
*MDO or marine diesel oil is used by large ships when at manouevering speed because their usual fuel, IFO or intermediate fuel oil, doesn’t work well at lower speed because insufficient heat is generated to overcome its high viscosity
Just a tiny hijack.
If as robby says the Co is responsible 24/7 does this responsibilty also extend to all branches of the military or is it peculiar to the navy only
Well, certainly not to the CIC! 
So if the Allies had screwed up on D- Day Ike would have been in the clear and coulda blamed Monty 
chowder, it applies to all branches of the military, in that, a Commanding Officer is ultimately responsible for the readiness and morale of the personnel and equipment placed under his command. He can, and must, delegate some of these duties to the other officers and NCO’s, but the buck stops with him/her.
Based on my experience skippering a sailboat in a crowded port I can attest to this. A very important part of watchkeeping for us is looking behind our boat as we sail - those big ass tankers and container ships move a lot faster than they look, and they’re deadly quiet, at least from where we are. A few minutes inattention at the helm and you can turn around and get a really nasty surprise.
I have a lot of sympathy for the crew of the sub. I’m just glad no one got hurt, which is amazing given the size of the vessels involved.
I’ve been sailing in Block Island Sound (which submarines from Groton have to transit to get to the open ocean) in a crossing situation with a submarine proceeding on the surface. I initially thought it was a large black powerboat with a small dingy on a very long tow, but eventually realized that I was looking at the conning tower and tail fin of a nuke.
At about the time I relalized what I was crossing, and that there was a possibility that were on a close to a collision course (though we were more than a mile apart at that time), I saw the sub make a significant turn to avoid me. After a moment of WTF, I realized that as a vessel under sail, I had right of way over the powered vessel, nuclear warship though it was. I certainly would have gotten the heck out of its way had we gotten much closer, but the sub made the first move to avoid (or at least so it appeared to me).
This reminded me of a story 9told to me by the captain of a fishing boat out of point Judith, RI: he was fishing (dragging0 in Block Island Sound one day-while at the wheel, he noticed his speed dropping-and pushed the throttle up. just then, the mate yelled “Captain-were going backwards!”. Then, behind them, a sub surfaced! (It had fouled their net). He filed a claim against the US Navy, for the loss of his gear-the Navy ignored him, till he sent a polaroid photo (of the sbu’s crew chopping his $7000 net away!
OK I can handle all that.
Now then: Let us assume that soldier “A” commits some heinous crime against soldier “B” or against a member of the civilian population.
From there it goes to Courts Martial and soldier “A” is found guilty.
So far so good.
But If the CO is responsible for the actions of the men under his command, then isn’t the CO then bound under the given rules and regulations to shoulder some burden of responsibilty.
As you say the buck stops with him…or am I nitpicking here?.
If I am tell me not to be so daft
In the example you gave (Soldier “A” murders somebody), Soldier “A” is violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ article 918.118 as seen here: SUBCHAPTER X. PUNITIVE ARTICLES - Military-network.com ), as well as the civilian criminal code of the jurisdiction the murder occured in.
In short, Soldier “A” is always under the standing order to obey the UCMJ, local laws, and any lawful orders of the superiors appointed over him/her.
A single case of a sailor raping a woman out in town is not held against the unit CO.
However, it might be possible that, if there appears to be a “morale issue” (some kind of “rape culture” ? ) prevelant in the unit, than that issue might become something that the CO(s) are expected to address.
I think I’ll bow out whilst I’m still sane
I’m not a military man, you appear to have far more knowledge in these matters than I’ll ever have.
Thanks for the clarification
If you doubted robby’s pedigree, [URL=]this should confirm it for you.
I’ve traversed the Straits of Hormuz many times, on the surface. I don’t remember it being too deep at all.
Update
This article:
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=27259
says that the sub was making it’s transit submerged.
I just don’t see any way around it. It was the submarine’s fault.
As a former submarine sonarman, there are a few thoughts I have about how this collision may have occurred. Looking for information about the bathymetry of the area, I ran across the following:
Hydrology and Circulation in the Strait of Hormuz
Water Mass Formation and Circulation in the Persian Gulf
From the above, it seems that sonar conditions in the Strait of Hormuz (where, admittedly, I’ve never operated) could potentially be pretty confusing. The temperature in the water column is nothing out of the ordinary for 100m of water, but the salinity profile is interesting in that it appears to be a layer of high-salinity Persian Gulf water beneath of layer of lower-salinity Indian Ocean surface water. Naturally, salinity affects water density, which in turn affects the behavior of sound in the water.
It alarms me a little, to be honest, because as sonarmen we typically develop sound speed profiles based on temperature at various depths in the water column (be these temperatures historical or emperical) and generally assume salinity to be uniform in a given area. I cannot recall much emphasis ever being placed on vertical variations in salinity and the resulting effect on sonar performance. A training deficiency? Possibly.
Anyway, it’s unfortunate, but it happens. Sound can be terribly unpredictable, and I think there must have been some confusion in that sonar shack, simply because I cannot believe this would have happened under optimal sonar conditions.
When the Type 42 destroyer HMS Nottingham ran aground on the well-charted Wolf Rock in 2002 the Captain stood trial, even though he was ashore at the time. He was sentenced to be reprimanded, and the First Lieutenant and the Officer Of The Watch were dismissed.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/hampshire/dorset/3098902.stm
Looks like the Navy’s official word IS venturi effect.
Navy says speed of tanker sucked submarine up to surface.
As I’m certain robby can attest to, getting zoofed (having a contact pass directly overhead) is never fun. Many times I’ve seen it bring the CO out of his stateroom to chew out the OOD, who in turn would give Sonar a fair helping of grief.
Can’t say I’ve ever heard of it sucking a boat to the surface, though.
That makes some sense, particularly considering the relative displacements of the vessels, 300,000 tons for the tanker and 6,900 tons for the sub.
It is well known that a small (surface) vessel following a large ship too closely can get sucked into the stern of the ship because of the venturi effect of the ship’s wake (fortunately something I’ve managed to personally avoid). I hadn’t considered that the effect extends underwater, and that a large ship’s wake could suck a sub up (or otherwise affect a submerged sub).
I think “zoofed” is my new favorite word of the day.
Hehe. Normally, I am not a conspiracy theory buff…
In regards to my suggestion in post #30, page 1, with the sub attempting to mask it’s own noise by following along behind a surface ship:
If that was indeed what they were trying to do, and they collided with the tanker, wouldn’t they not try the Venturi Effect explanation if they move into CYA mode? 
Again, this layman is asking more experienced folks’ opinions.
The linked article describes the Straits’ shipping channel as 2 miles wide with a 2 mile buffer zone. 2 miles + sounds pretty wide to me. Are subs restricted to shipping lanes?
Also says it won’t disclose the sub’s depth or speed, and tho it describes the tanker as going “very fast”, doesn’t say how fast that was.
How fast is “very fast” for a tanker? Are there any generalities for rates of speed for subs. Apparently, they say this one was heading south - does that mean it could have been just sitting there pointed in that direction?
And how much vertically could a ship passing overhead jerk a sub down and/or up?
Just seems to my ignorant mind that for this to truly be an “unavoidable” incident, a significant number of factors would have to coincide.
And if this really were a reasonably foreseeable outcome, I would expect them to take steps to avoid it.