How do theists reconcile disbelief in predestination with an omniscient deity?

Only if by “observing” you mean the kind of thing that human beings do when we observe something.

The idea of God being outside time (and space) predates modern science, and definietly predates Einstein (I think Augustine may have been the first to seriously discuss it from a philosophical point of view); but if space-time is as modern relativitity theory describes, I don’t see how God could transcend space (i.e. not be confined to one particular physical location) without also transcending time as well.

By “observing”, I mean the dictionary definition of “observing”. For the benefit of conversation if you mean something other than the commonly used definition, you might want to use another word that actually fits what you are trying to say.

More or less this. But I think the apparent contradiction comes from the idea of putting God in the context of space-time, by saying he “knows something before it happens” implies that he is constrained by order of events, which I think most theists, including myself, would say he is not.

As an analogy to this, let’s imagine existence as a story where God is the author. Now say that a particular plot point doesn’t really work out, or that a character isn’t developing in the way the the author likes. The author simply goes back and revises parts of the story to correct these things. And so, to those of us reading the finished product, these sorts of interventions, while obvious from the perspective of the author, are absolutely transparent because, from our perspective, they’ve simply always been that way.
Further, I also tend to view God’s knowledge as a combination of several different properties. First, a particular lesson or end can be achieved in many ways. For instance, someone can learn that fire is hot simply be being told, others need to see a demonstration of this fact, and yet another set has to get burned to believe it. To this end, one could say that free will isn’t necessarily a matter of choosing what lessons to learn, but could be more in choosing the manner in which they will be learned. As such, we can have a particular destiny, but that destiny can potentially be achieved in multiple ways.

Second, I also view destiny as more of an emergent property rather than an individual property. For a particular event, all the knowledge we have is about the odds of the various outcomes. However, if we were to repeat that event a sufficiently large number of times, say some odd billion times as for each person alive, then we start to see certain properties arise. That is to say, that a particular lesson may be learned in various ways for various individuals, or perhaps not at all for others, but what is more important is the emergent property of humanity as a whole in our understanding of these various lessons.

How this all works together for me is very well illustrated as if we’re all part of an extremely complex simulation and God is the programmer. Obviously, he is fully knowledgable about the code; he wrote it. And he can take a given set of input, even random, put it into the simulation and be able to make accurate predictions about the outcome. Or, if one prefers, he can simply skip ahead, look at the results, and then go back and analyze how those results are achieved. This is qualitatively no different, from the perspective internal to the simulation, from him being omniscient.

Moving thread from IMHO to Great Debates.

A lack of belief in predestination is entirely reconcilable with an omniscient deity; the problem is not a conflict between the two, but a fundamental issue with the idea of free will. Being able to know what will happen in advance only means that it must happen by definition, not that it must happen by lack of choice, unless we define free will to include an element of randomness.

Would we not? Not perhaps the exact choices made, but their outcomes.

It was your choice to accelerate through the intersection without checking sufficiently, but your peripheral vision isn’t perfect because of that softball injury from when you were 8, and the dress shoes you were wearing slid off the brake pedal – and while you usually wear gym shoes when driving you were running late this morning because the alarm didn’t go off due to a power-cut caused by a cascade failure beginning several hundred miles away – and the road was slippery because of the old Chevy that had leaked oil there, leakage caused by damage to its underside from the de-icing salt that had to be laid because last winter was so bad…

Who says there’s only one future? There could be trillions of them for every one of us, with a different fate in each.

I’m talking about true randomness. Those are all, with perfect knowledge, predictable cause-and-effect reactions, against which we have no free will (as I would define it) because we have no choice but to act as we are “programmed” by those various things in our life to do.

If we include randomness (and free will) by your definition, then there is zero conflict between predestination and omniscience; it’s perfectly possible for both to exist at the same time.

In this scenario, not only does the being not change, this God character is incapable of taking any action at all.

If I were to try to defend the idea of an omniscient God with a lack of predestination, I’d say that God knows all there is to know now, but that doesn’t include the future. People have the ability to make their own choices, and these choices affect the future. Further, this God can make a prophecy of a future event, but that’s just putting the people on notice that at this time in the future, God will take a certain action to make something happen.

If I tell my kid that I’m going to buy him an ice cream cone tomorrow, that doesn’t mean I have knowledge of which exact cone is going to be available in the ice cream shop, or which specific blob of ice cream is to be placed in it. That can be decided in the future, but I can still say today that I’ll get him ice cream tomorrow.

Now I need to go wash - pretending to be a theist makes me feel all yucky.

I had chicken casserole for lunch today. I know this, and now, so do you all. There is nothing that could possibly happen that would make it not true that I had chicken casserole for lunch on Thursday, March 3, 2011. And yet, it was my own free choice that I had chicken casserole for lunch. Does this present a paradox? How is my certain knowledge of my lunch on this date any different from God’s certain knowledge of the same fact?

I don’t think anyone is disputing that knowledge of the past inhibits free will. Knowledge of the future, on the other hand…

But, if God is not located/restricted within time (as some claim), for God there is no “past” or “future.”

Jesus had a past and a future, and he knew his past and future, and Jesus is God, so …

As a direct response to the OP’s question, I remember reading Augustine’s dialogue On the Free Choice of the Will in college, in which he specifically addresses this question. I’ve managed to find the part I remember online. I’ve quoted it below, but you can find the full text here; the part I quote is from the section “TO FORESEE SIN IS NOT TO CAUSE IT” which starts on p. 150.

[QUOTE=St. Augustine]
But I should
like to know how it can be just to punish sins
which are bound to occur, or how future events
which He has foreknown, are not bound to occur,
or how we can avoid holding the Creator responsible
for what is bound to happen in His creature.
A. On what grounds do you think our free will
contradicts God’s foreknowledge? Because it is
foreknowledge or because it is God’s foreknowledge?
E. More because it is God’s foreknowledge.
A. Is that so? If you foreknew someone would
sin, would he be bound to sin?
E. Yes, he would be bound to sin. I should not
have foreknowledge, unless what I foreknew was
certain.
A. Then it is not because God foreknows it that
what He foreknows is bound to happen, but only
because it is foreknowledge. If what is foreknown
is not certain, there is no foreknowledge.
E. I agree. But what does this imply?
A. It implies, unless I am mistaken, that you
would not necessarily compel a man to sin by
foreknowing his sin. Your foreknowledge would
not be the cause of his sin, though undoubtedly he
would sin; otherwise you would not foreknow
that this would happen. Therefore these two are
not contradictory, your foreknowledge and someone
else’s free act. So too God compels no one to
sin, though He foresees those who will sin by their
own will.
Why, then, should not one who is just punish
what he does not compel, though he foreknows it?
When you remember past events you do not compel
them to have happened, and in the same way
God does not compel future events to happen by
His foreknowledge of them. You remember
actions you have performed, but you have not
done all the actions you remember, and in the same
way God foreknows everything of which He is
the cause, but He is not Himself the cause of
everything He foreknows. He is not the cause of
evil actions, but He is their just avenger.
[/QUOTE]

“Not located within time” is a fantasy term without meaning in science-can we just stick to one fantasy element at a time(knowledge of the future) without using this other meaningless term to explain it?

No, I can’t. If you want to talk about a God who is located within time, you’re not thinking of the same God I’m thinking of.

Where is “outside of time”?

Two entities living on a geometric line might just as well ask “what is ‘outside of the line’?”.

The line is a location-time is not. The do not equate. “Outside time” is a placefiller name for “I don’t know where that is”, and as such it makes even less sense than “outside of space”, which is at least a location.

Outside of space and outside of time should make equally as much or as little sense because space and time are intrinsically linked as space-time. The idea that is intended to be conveyed by these concepts is simply that God, as the creator of the universe, is (necessarily?) separate from the universe. Therefore, if the universe consists of all space-time, God must exist outside of it.

Moreso, I don’t even really see how it doesn’t make sense. Analogies of higher spatial dimensions are not terribly difficult to come by. The obvious simple example is a flat-world, where a plane extends infinitely, and to all internal, it is impossible to see how it can consist of everything, and there being something beyond it, yet we can easily construct countless other objects that exist outside of that frame of reference by taking advantage of the third spatial dimenion.

As such, how does it not make sense to imagine that there might be additional dimensions beyond space-time that we simply cannot perceive. Hell, as I understand, doesn’t modern M-Theory predict higher dimensions and possibilities for parallel dimensions and such?