(But, importantly, it would be an obvious mistake to argue from our knowledge of the future of a particular playthrough of the film that the director didn’t have free will. And I’m saying that the same mistake is being made by those who reason that there is no free will from the fact that there are truths concerning the future.)
That’s straightforwardly incorrect.
Does the following make sense: “I know the sun is bright, but I don’t believe it”?
Of course not–and the reason it doesn’t make sense is, knowing is a kind of believing. If you know something, you believe it.
Classically, we say that knowing X requires that you believe X, that X be true, and that you believe X for good reasons. (There turn out to be more requirements but it hasn’t been resolved yet what those requirements are.)
You’re focusing to much on you, though. Unfortunately, you’re not the arbiter of what could have happened. God is the arbiter. You only think things could have been different.
Once God created you, he already knew what you were going to do because he’s not bound by time. So in effect you’re no different than Darth Vader in Star Wars, when it comes to his knowledge of what you’re capable of.
If Darth was a sentient being instead of a fictional character, he’d very well be under the impression that he had free will to keep his mouth shut about being Luke’s father. But he of course didn’t have free will.
(And if George Lucas is a bad example, insert any other person, geeze! My point stands.)
Your argument is still just that God’s knowledge entails lack of choice. I’ve already explained what’s wrong with that argument a few times.
No, it doesn’t make sense. But this sentence doesn’t follow from what I wrote. Belief and knowledge are separate things.
You explained it using arguments about what you’re capable of doing. Which is silly. You have imperfect knowledge. God does not.
Why does Darth Vader not have free will, but you do? Explain your answer without referring back to your vantage point, please. Because I find that…silly (for a lack of a better word).
You said that when you believe, you don’t know. Belief implies lack of knowledge.
But that’s false. You can believe and know at the same time. My evidence that you can believe and know at the same time is this: I know the sun is shining, and I also believe the sun is shining.
Darth Vader doesn’t have free will because someone caused him to do all the things he does.
The question of importance is what are you communicating with the word “belief” that you aren’t communicating with “know”.
I mean, I can construct a sentence that expresses any ole crazy thing, that doesn’t mean I’m saying something meaningful.
“I believe and know that a boa constriction is thinking of me right now.”
Seriously, what does this even mean?
It means exactly what it says. It says you have a belief that a boa constrictor is thinking of you right now, and it also says that you not only believe this, but that you have evidence sufficient to render your belief an example of knowledge.
I have no problem understanding that sentence. It’s very clear. It’s true we don’t usually say we both believe and know something–because by saying we know it, we already imply that we believe it–but that doesn’t make it unclear at all.
Sorry what was your point again?
Okay, that’s one part of it, true. But let’s go back to the viewer’s POV, not the creator’s.
The geek who has watched Star Wars 400 times knows that the next time he watches the movie, Darth Vader will say “I am your father”. He knows this because he knows Star Wars with expert knowledge. There is no way that Darth Vader will not say this line at the expected point in the film.
To this you might say, well Darth could have said something differently if the script was written differently. And that would be true. But then we wouldn’t be taking about the Star Wars as we know it. We’d be talking about a different movie.
Do you disagree?
Well I called into question your argument that God “believes”. He has access to evidence by virtue of having perfect knowledge, so your usage of “belief” is questionable here. That was all what my point was.
The first part is deleted, since I agree with it. If “has to happen” in the second sense means that a logically consistent universe exists even if it doesn’t, then true in a sense. That is why the present and past examples work. But if a logically consistent universe includes both an omniscient God and this kind of free will, ( in the sense of it not having to happen in your second sense) then we have problems.
Let’s assume for a moment a weaker sort of omniscient god, who only sees the future when he chooses to, and has no knowledge if it before. At 3:00 pm today he looks into tomorrow and sees the person going into the break room. Before this, there are alternate possible futures where the person goes or does not go. After, they collapse into a single future where the person does go. For us, this collapse does not happen until the event of course.
However, an eternal and omniscient god in the generally accepted sense has seen this person go into the break room from before the beginning of time. In this case there never has been a time where he didn’t have to go into the break room (except before God, whatever that means) and so there is no time where you can say that he didn’t have to go. I think that resolves your apparent contradiction.
Clearly this problem depends on their being an omniscient and eternal God. Require that these things don’t have to happen (in the sense I just used) and there goes God. If you have God, there goes uncertainty.
Keynes covered this in his first book, which I read for a Theory of Knowledge course. Given that we want to attach the term know to things which we are not 100% certain of, we need some sort of cutoff where we can apply it. The probability, in a loose sense, can be estimated from history. Clearly there is more history of the sun coming up than your wife coming home at 2, so that probability is higher. If you want to say you know things that are only 99% probable, not 99.9999999%, that is your right, but everyone else should be aware of your definition. It means that at some point you are likely to have claimed to know something untrue, but that happens even for things with higher probabilities of occurring. To bring it back, God has the certainty we all lack, and can be said to truly know the future 100%
True, but Greedo did decide to shoot first. 
Actually, it is a good analogy. There is a book out of some fragments of the earlier versions of the SW scripts. You can see the many possibilities for who Vader was and what he did. To use my analogy, these did their final collapse into one possibility in the editing room, where Lucas knew for sure what was going to happen. Now, before I saw it the first time, about a month after it opened, there was some degree of freedom. I might have “known” that Obi-wan would live, as he did in an earlier script, but my knowledge would have been wrong. SW could have been written so he lived, but at that point it was fully determined that I would see Alec Guiness go into the force when I finally saw the movie. Lucas finishing the editing is equivalent to God seeing the future I mentioned in my last post. After that, no more free will for the characters.
Actually, I don’t!
I could have eaten eggs instead of cereal this morning–but that wouldn’t have made me a different person.
And Darth Vader could have said something different than what he did–but that(by itself) wouldn’t have made it a different movie.
I can imagine changes so drastic that they make it natural to think we’re not talking about the same movie anymore. If Darth Vader had been Luke Skywalker’s pet rabbit, we almost certainly aren’t talking about the same movie anymore. Really, we’re not talking about Vader and Luke anymore–just characters from a different movie who happen to have the same names.
But then, if someone named Frylock had had a gay S&M orgy in his living room this morning while eating bowls and bowls of natto with gusto, then whatever that person’s name is, it isn’t me. Freedom doesn’t imply the freedom to do anything. Character puts constraints on freedom–indeed, constitutes it in large part, since character determines just exactly what freedoms you do have.
Who said anything about a different person?
All I can say is think about the analogy some more. Sure, you could have eaten eggs this morning instead of cereal. But God knew you were going to eat cereal in the reality that he knows, so that is the only choice you had.
The only way you would have been able to have had eggs is if you’d taken this choice in a different version of reality. Since God has expert knowledge on this alternative version as well, though, the conclusion here is the same: you’re destined to do what God knows you’ll do.
God has supreme knowledge concerning both versions. In each version he knows exactly what I will do. But that doesn’t mean I’m destined to do what God knows I’ll do–rather, exactly the reverse; God is destined to know what I’ll do.
God has supreme knowledge concerning both versions. In an alternative universe, I eat eggs, and God knows ahead of time that I will eat eggs. In this universe, I eat cereal and God knows ahead of time that I will eat cereal. I get to choose which I do–and in either case, God knew ahead of time which one I would do.
In one possible history, God knows I will eat eggs and I do eat eggs. In another possible history, god knows I will eat cereal, and I do eat cereal. I get to choose which possible history gets actualized, and whichever one gets actualized, God knew which choice I would make ahead of time. Doesn’t mean I couldn’t have chosen otherwise–it just means that if I had chosen otherwise, God would have known that instead.
Questions about who’s point of view we’re talking about etc. are immaterial. If god’s foreknowledge is a kind of “fore-vision,” then God’s foreknowledge is no more incompatible with free will than is vision in general. It’s simple: Seeing things does not make them necessary.
You get to choose just as much as Darth Vader gets to choose. Which is to say not at all. You just think you do.
God wrote the script, remember? Not only does he know what you’ll do because he’s seen it already, but he laid the groundwork so that it would happen. Only he can say if you really could have chosen eggs or not. Just because an option theoretically exists doesn’t mean you could have taken it. Darth Vader could have squawked like a bird instead of delivered his “Luke, I am your father” line, but I’m fairly certain George Lucas never entertained this as a possibility. When he finalized the screenplay, Darth Vader was locked into saying one thing and one thing only.
You have no idea what you could have really done. You only have that perception, but it could very well be illusory. Not all theoretical options are equally likely, and in some (if not all) situations there very well may not be any choices except one; only the arbiter of truth would really know this.
And let’s say that for every possible action that could be taken, there was a version of reality representing every permutation imagineable. God would have expert knowlege about all these realities, but at least you would in theory be capable of having free will by virtue of exisiting simultaneously in all of these different realities.
In one reality you make a chain of choices that leads you death and destruction. In another reality, your path leads you to self-actualization. And between the two extremes, there are an infinite number of realities that have you in the gray area between annihilation and nirvana (which is what most of us experience in life). In one reality, Adam and Eve eat the apple. In another, they abstain.
What would be the point of this experiment?
As I said before, this is a different argument against free will. Here you’re arguing that since God is the author of each action, we don’t act freely. I think that’s a good argument.
But it’s a completely different argument than the one being discussed in this thread. In this thread, the argument I’m giving a refutation for is the one that concludes we have no free will because God is omniscient.
Omniscience doesn’t imply lack of free will, as I’ve argued several times.
Meanwhile, universal authorship does (at least, more plausibly) imply lack of free will.
But that’s a different argument. Authorship and omniscience, and their implications for free will, are two separate issues, which can for the most part be treated independently.