How do we know, that what we know, is what we REALLY know?

Great Debates
21

I’ll do what I can, but the topic is not small and requires that we set aside “common sense” which really only gets in the way of philosophical elucidation at these levels. What I will outline will be a rough sketch of what is called transcendental idealism. It is by no means the only way to conceive of knowledge and reality, but I find it the most lucid and, not coincidentally, the one I am most comfortable with.

First, though…

This really does well enough, does it not? But in explaining it you’ve already indicated some of the issues we can raise. Solipsism indicates whether we can know if other subjects exist. Objective reality indicates that things exist without us (this is a strange claim to make if one starts with the primacy of sensation, if you think about it!). The accuracy of sensation can lead us to doubt just about anything, seemingly. Something unmentioned but what I would ask that you consider is, if you know exclusively from sensation, what does (for example) a camera know? A touch-screen monitor? Most importantly, if that’s a silly question, then why? How do you sense that these things don’t perceive? (Do you have to “create” new senses to do it?)

Where to begin in this tangled mess? Unfortunately I cannot construct an entire epistemology here; the task is best left for entire books spanning mutliple volumes. However, we needn’t let that deter us from trying to flesh out the basic ideas.

First, let’s toss aside this “objective reality” for a moment and focus on sensation. Do you see objects? Don’t focus on what you’re looking at, just try and take in your entire visual field. Really we don’t see objects like this, we have a sea of colors in front of us. This is the utility of vision: the impressionists’ paintings. Splotches. Something more is required to “get” objects from this. Our natural inclination is to divide things by colors, but if you think on what object “my monitor” is, you’ll see that color-seperation is not the best indicator (my monitor is awash with colors from the text on the screen, its background, the plastic frame, etc…). Still, we might find some patterns.

Moving slightly will give us (what we naively call) a different perspective. Trying to stay away from our normal practices, though, we see that the visual field is alive with change as we move, yet the patterns we saw before still seem to be there, albeit changed in some way. Notice, of course, that we don’t sense these patterns: they are a function of our mind trying to make sense of the visual field. Our eyes aren’t seeing patterns. To test this, close them. Can you still “grasp” patterns? Then how are they from your senses?

Here we see the action of memory. It is a placeholder for sensation (among other things!), but it is not sensation (think about it: we do not sense memory, we remember sensation (mostly, though, we remember objects we’ve grasped)). Between movment, pattern-recognition, and memory, we can begin to visually discern what appear to be discrete elements of our visual field. We aren’t “grasping” (I’m not going to put the word in quotes anymore, but I don’t mean “with hands”) the objects with our senses, we are sorting the senses with the mind. Objects exist beyond sensation as the collective action of mind and memory. [Skips over using other senses to “grasp” objects as essentially similar to the treatment of vision…]

At this point it is not clear that we have left solipsism at all, but at least we can grasp objects through perception. (But again, realize none of them exist in perception—perception tells almost none of the story! If you only knew what you perceived, you’d only know this mess of colors (which you couldn’t even name). “Monitor” is nowhere in there.) We are also not certain of the duration or identity of these objects: how reliable is our memory? Can we check current object-perception to memory of object perception to test it?[sup]1[/sup]

One of the apparent-objects we’ve grasped is that-which-grasps: ourself. (I’m sorry, but to make a general case I am using “we” even though other people haven’t been shown yet, I hope this isn’t terribly confusing.) Actually, ourself-as-object. The body as an object, but as an extention of the mind. We can relate this object to our mental activity via self-stimulation. When I touch “my left hand” with “my right hand” I not only am acquiring a [literal] sense of “my left hand”, but also a sense of being touched. This reflexive stimulation is what indicates that this object is [part of] me.[sup]2[/sup]

At this point, external reality gains a focus. We can now distinguish between object-as-perceiver (self) and object-as-perceived (that which is touched but not felt-as-being-touched). It is important to note, however, that the objectivity of all of this is still in question. The veracity of our memory, sensation, and grasping is still completely internalized… that is, everything is subjective and, more importantly, unbounded. “True” and “false” don’t apply: this is the direct action of the mind on perception, and the mind on its own.

Now let us turn our attention towards objects that are like us in how we grasp them, but which do not elicit reflexive sensation. Here we grasp other people through sensation. But what of their mind? Are they really just like me? [Skips the step where bare communication is attempted, which will be successful[sup]3[/sup]…] By all appearances, these like-mes are really like me. Here is the first inference: they are like me because they are the only objects that act like me. We infer that they have a grasping mind because of the seemingly successful communication and their similarity to us. At this point we no longer have to rely on the veracity of our own memory, now we share it with another subject. When our communication elicits similar body-as-subject responses, we can continue to form inter-subjective confirmation of objects. That is, the purely subjective grasping I have been doing can now be based on grasping between subjects. The apparent object duration and objectivity is apparently shared by this other subject. Now there exists a grasping creature able to work with my worries about the reliability of my memory. Even more encouraging is the fact that we are naturally keeping each other’s use of communication in line. More subjects entering the fray would aid this purpose even further.[sup]4[/sup] The only possibility of error[sup]5[/sup] is that all subjects are all failing in memory and/or sensation the same way at the same time. We do not need to appeal to probability to exclude this case since we already have grasped the different-ness of the others: we are not perfectly alike. Because of the link we’ve grasped between body-as-object and mind, we have grasped in the others a differentness that precludes mirror-imaging.[sup]6[/sup]

Objects now gain a special sense that they previously failed to have. Whereas before they could have remained only an object of my mind (not of sensation!!), now they appear as an object of inter-subjective minds. Now they transcend subjectivity. Now I find that they are not only different from me, they are different from all subjects. We will call this collection of non-subjects to be the objective world.

Let us summarize the position so far. There is the raw sense manifold which contains no things, the subjective mind which serves to grasp objects (and in doing so, grasps a subject-body) on account of this meaningless manifold of experience, the inter-subjective arena where subjects share subjective graspings, and in doing so delineate the objective world. We have left solipsism[sup]7[/sup] and created a relatively reliable world.

To knowledge. The possibility of knowledge now comes into light. With rudimentary communication and shared graspings of the objective world[sup]8[/sup], the possibility now presents itself for one subject to report a grasping to another subject that is not already contained in the conceptual graspings that delineate the objective world, inter-subjective world, and subjective world. To do this, a subject names something it has subjectively grasped and tries to share it with other subjects. To do this, it will demonstrate activity through words, motions, or combinations thereof, waiting for our own subjective reports.[sup]9[/sup] This is knowledge: the demonstration of something (an object, an activity, etc). The subject gains certainty through the feedback of showing. If a subject knows something, it can show/teach someone else, and in doing so, appraise not only the objectivity (or inter-subjectivity, as the case may be) of the knowledge but whether another subject knows it.[sup]10[/sup] It might serve to note, here, that knowledge isn’t necessarily the construction of theories; description of previously un-grasped objects can also be known.[sup]11[/sup]

I would like to stess how terribly sparse this construction really is, even given its length for a message board.[sup]12[/sup] I would also make a few generalized comments. “Transcendental idealism” is called such because all objects and knowledge thereof is a consequence of the mind’s activity, and that this knowledge and these objects (and knowledge of objects etc) transcend (that is, go beyond) the subject. To the transcendental idealist that is me, the statement “there are physical objects” is not descriptive, it expresses a relationship.[sup]13[/sup] Another view, for example, is realism, which asserts the existence of mind-independent objects. Traditionally, natural science adopts this view, but it is not necessary to do so. As it stands, the largest difference between transcendental idealism as it is known in phenomenology and realism is that the former feels that the idea of a world without subjects is impossible, while the latter considers us lucky to be here.

The “objective” world then might mean something different to a realist than it would to (any brand of) idealist. But ask yourself: on what point of consequence do they differ? Is there any way you see to solve the issue of whether or not the objective world exists without the senses?

The approach given above is my own ideas based on my reading of (primarily) two philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Edmund Husserl, though I’ve had a bit of influence from (surprisingly to some) Rand, Quine, Hume, and even Descartes (if only as someone to rally against!). I cannot claim any accuracy of interpretation of them; I am not a philospher, I only play one on TV. YMMV, not a step, etc.

Maybe this was a lot to swallow, maybe you breezed through it, but I welcome any concerns, questions, critiques, or even (if you really feel it is necessary) compliments. :stuck_out_tongue: This post is not meant to drown anyone out from contribution. For all I know, I’ve just made an enormous ass of myself! :wink: (If philosophy isn’t like that, then I don’t think you’re doing it right!)
1 [sub]No, because memory is required for perception of objects in the first place! It would be a circular argument.[/sub]
2 [sub]This works easily for touch. How could we extend it for vision, smell, taste, or hearing? Can we extend it for all of them at this point? Can we ever extend it to all of them? Try not to think about what you “already know” about how your senses work when doing so. Just try to plain old sense yourself with all your senses. Would motion “count” as touch as well? Would shouting count for hearing? What would mirrors tell us about our eyes?[/sub]
3 [sub]What would this “communication” consist of? Would a reflex at what hurts me be a good example to try on others? Try to not immediately think of words, and think of how people try to teach babies language in order to get to the point where we use words.[/sub]
4 [sub]While we are no longer in the realm of abject subjectivity, we have not attained objectivity. If pure subjectivity involves circular justification, we’ve only widened the circle.[/sub]
5 [sub]Excluding the possibility of inter-subjective error is not an indication of knowledge; see (6)[/sub]
6 [sub]This is not knowledge, as you might have guessed from my earlier post. It will be, however, shown to be a condition of knowledge. This is why if we try to question whether it is “really” knowledge, we have nowhere to turn and run in nonsensical circles![/sub]
7 [sub]Note solipsism is never disproven! It cannot be, and I will defend this view from any metaphysical system one cares to imagine. Anyone who has told you so or who tries to demonstrate it lacks imaginative powers for “explaining away” what we’ve just gone over. ;**) Solipsism is the ultimate trump card. However, what we can note is that if there are other subjects, there are other minds that are not my own since if we were all part of a collective consciousness, I would be unable to distinguish their subjective grasping from my own due to reflexive stimulation.[/sub]
8 [sub]It is no small matter that basic communication already exists. You’ll note this is part (2) of my previous post. You’ll also note that since this is a condition of knowledge it cannot be called such as its demonstration is impossible. This is also a point of great contention; what I outline here is called “coherentism” and indicates that knowledge is only possible in a broad context, it is not “immediately obvious in itself” as earlier philosophers tried to indicate. Why is it a point of great contention? Because it is not clear how broad the base needs to be, or indeed what makes a base coherent. As you might guess, if this is a “good” description of knowledge, such investigation will be impossible to completely elucidate, though a trial and error methodology could certainly serve to tighten down the otherwise ambiguous claim here.[/sub]
9 [sub]This sentence is incredibly vague. I would cautiously suggest that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s book “Philosophical Investigations” tackles this subject thoroughly, including a description of what “meaning” means, what is subjectively public and subjectively private, and what value reporting on various subjective qualities is (and how they differ). Next time you’re at a library, if this topic seems interesting to you, take a few moments and glance through it and see if it is to your liking. It is difficult in its simplicity, and mostly approachable by mostly anyone (Wittgenstein was called one of the “common language philosophers” for a reason).[/sub]
10 [sub]Why isn’t this circular (apart from the afore-mentioned widened circle of inter-subjectivity)? Because knowledge is shown by showing. When I demonstrate for another subject, I show them what I know. When they demonstrate it for me, they show that they know it. At no point is the knowing subject checking itself for correctness. Notice, here, that “knowing” something is a condition not just of my subjectivity (and so arguably linked to my sensation, even if it isn’t strictly found “in” it), but of inter-subjectivity. Since my knowing is dependent on subjects whose sensation I cannot have (remember the lack of reflexive sensation), knowledge cannot be purely based on my sensation. Since I do not have access to others’ sensation and have only inferred it, it cannot be based on theirs, either. Ultimately, knowledge breaks from sensation, even if sensation is necessary for knowledge. A strange place to be![/sub]
11 [sub]This is no small point. While our theory of microwave radiation might be subtly or not-so-subtly altered in the future, no one would seriously suggest that we throw away our microwaves! Descriptive knowledge is very important, but lacks any explanatory power. As, I believe, many post-Popper philosophers have shown, there is no unambiguous line between explanatory knowledge and descriptive knowledge. I find this to be intuitive evidence that the point mentioned in (8) is correct, but I will not say that it serves as a demonstration of it.[/sub]
12 [sub]Earlier in my time here at the SDMB, I once requested someone work with me on constructing an epistemology. At the time, I had not realize how daunting the task was. That thread, which I still have a link to, went on for a very long time and had essentially the very same topic as this one. I feel this post is an homage to the other poster’s refusal to do so, and a splash of cold water at the disappointment I felt at the time. I shall endeavor to not be so eager in the future. :**D[/sub]
13 [sub]“A is a physical object” is a statement made to someone who doesn’t know what “A” is, or doesn’t know what “a physical object” is. It is a guide/rule/suggestion for the mental treatment of an object of the mind, not a metaphysical assertion.[/sub]

22

The important point I failed to properly make or emphasize here is that, though it is almost like progression through a story, it is not meant to be descriptive of a specific sequence of behavior but a methodology. What we are doing is temporarily suspending normal inclinations and easing them back into play, as little at a time as we can to progress through a partly-really-experimenal, partly-thought-experimental method.

Compare this to Descartes, who rejected the possibility of any knowledge he could seemingly reject in order to get to the supposed bedrock of knowledge. Similar, but not the same! To get back to the real world, we simply stop suspending judgment of it. Perhaps our method clarifies some things, perhaps it got us nowhere in others (the passage of time is especially difficult, but not impossible). Unfortunately for Descartes, after rejecting all that knowledge he had to create a god to get him back to normal existence. While I don’t knock others’ religion, I think he was more than a little out of line. :slight_smile:

23

Well, thank you so much, erislover. I think we have a subject for the after Thanksgiving chat.

In your paragraph re knowledge I am reminded of my brother’s med school mantra for acquiring new skills:

See one.
Do one.
Teach one.

Thanks again.

24

erislover, is there any connection between “a world without subjects is impossible” and the interpretation of quantum mechanics that says the wave function does not collapse until someone observes it?

In The Quark and the Jaguar, Murray Gell-Mann argues that there has to be some sort of interpretation that allows the universe to evolve without observers (assuming there are no observers for the first x billion years).

But is there a connection with your argument about transcendental idealism?

25

Only superficially, vknowles. The indication of a subjectless world is impossible because everything we know about the world is that we know it. The reference of entities apart from us is impossible because all entities we can discuss are grasped by our consciousness. Without our conscious activity there is no object. This is really linked to the idea of perspectives more than the insistence that an actual subject actually exists.

In Husserl’s Phenomenology, Dan Zahavi writes,

Perhaps more importantly, it wouldn’t be what we call knowledge that he knows. We cannot divorce objects we’ve grasped from our consciousness or they cease to be what we’ve grasped.

If it is a property of conceptual entities called electrons that they sometimes manifest themselves as points on a screen, and sometimes as an aggregate wavefront, then this is just the ways the objects are perceived. How they “show themseves” to us is as much a property as whether they have charge, mass, etc.

I believe the current theory has given up this strange metaphysic and adopted the notion that “observation” only entails the use of quantum states in an interaction. Waves can collapse each other in the absence of a scientist trying to decide if an electron passed between one crystal lattice or another if their interactions would involve quantum states like spin etc. Given this, it does seem reasonable to assert that current theory dictates that the world existed before subjects did. But in what way? —sneakily, since the theory is built by our observations, it is almost as if we are asserting a subject backwards through time to describe things back then in the same terms we use to describe them now. We can’t conceive of the past without a subject because all of our descriptions depend on a subject. True, the theory doesn’t explicitly posit a subject, but it does describe things in terms only subjects know.

For a less technical example, picture your bedroom without anyone in it. Is there any way to describe it or imagine it without an implied or implicit perspective? Or even, really, series of perspectives (to relate space, for instance, and relative position)?

26

Along the lines of the OP, erislover, I think you have shown that there are a number of ways to assert that something can be known.

As I understand it, you have stated that despite all your (or anyone’s) arguments, there is no absolutely valid argument to “defeat” solipsism. But your line of reasoning is to work your way out of solipsism using incremental steps that are as plausible as possible.

In that case, why do you stop with transcendental idealism? Would it not be just as reasonable to take a few more incremental and plausible steps and say that objects (or wave functions, or whatever) do exist independently of a subject (or at least, independently of sentient subjects like ourselves)?

It seems to me the leap from solipsism depends on the hypothesis that the “like-me” objects are actually other subjects.

I guess I don’t understand why it should be an insurmountable philosophical hurdle to hypothesize other properties of objects. If a number of us (subjects) perform a series of agreed-upon measurements and report the same results (within a margin of error), is it not reasonable to suppose that certain objects exist and have some properties, whether or not we observe them every second?

Even though I have difficulty conceiving of my bedroom without an implied perspective(s), I don’t see why I’m prevented from hypothesizing its existence/persistence outside of anyone’s perception.

To me, it’s just another of the inferences that can one can make. The only question is, is that inference less plausible than the ones that allow me to assume (1) that reflexive stimulation indicates that I exist as an object or (2) that “like-me” objects are actually subjects that experience in a similar way to me (and so on…)?

The further we go in the series of inferences, the shakier the argument becomes, I suppose. If we could assign a likelihood that each inference is sound, then each probability would have to be less than 1, so the statistical likelihood that the entire series is sound goes down as each inference is added.

But just as you can depend on reflexive stimulation to support one step, it seems to me you accept procedures designed to verify inferences at each step. And the verification is repeatable – you can (and do) always check that you exist, that others exist, that the objects you perceive continue to show the same behaviors, that the kettle is still where you left it heating a few minutes ago, that electrons exhibit both particle and wave properties, and so on…

The scientific method is such a procedure. So long as science seems to confirm many, many regularities in the universe, it makes sense to me to make the inferential leap that objects in the universe exist and persist (and have done so for billennia) whether actively observed or not. With the weight of apparent evidence, I think we can assume the likelihood of an “objective reality” is fairly high. I have a good degree of confidence in it, anyway.

But I’ll be on the lookout for exceptions, and I’m ready to change my opinion if necessary.

27

I don’t intend to deny this. The point I’m attempting to make might be subtle, but I don’t intend to assert that “everything that is is only a product of the mind.” Existence is more than we know; that is why we investigate. It would be perplexing if we thought existence was only a product of the mind (that the mind creates rather than just acts in or upon (choose your preposition, it makes no difference to me)) and yet to still assert that there are objects that aren’t me or another subject.

The point of my brand of idealism is to note that whatever we wish to say, or assert, or investigate is subsumed under our consciousness. If it weren’t, how would you describe it, explain it, or study it? The brand of transcendental idealism I outline above shies away from the historical compulsion to discuss the objective world as something hidden by our senses, a world that we struggle hard and against impossible odds to understand. The world we understand is right there. If I am observing a page in a book, I am not concentrating on the various sensations and trying to discover what lies behind them (so to speak); I am directed towards the very object my consciousness grasps. Perspectival impressions are not a human limitation that we need to overcome, it is an irreducable component of existence. When we ignore it, we then are no longer studying what we are directed at. God must have a perspective, or he’s not able to direct himself at what we are directed at. And our sciences must also work with these perspectives; without it, there is no verification (or, if we follow modern science, corroboration/falsification).

Hypothesizing what’s existence? That which you have come to know, or something else? And how did you come to know it? That was why I quoted that passage about the hypothetical god. Husserl isn’t saying, nor am I, that these objects are literally created by the mind, but that if we try to consider them apart from the ways that we know them, they are no longer identical with what we know. It is at once a deceptively simple and yet complex notion. To know about things, I study them in how they appear to me.

What meaning do the properties you grasp have apart from you grasping them? The property “red”, for example, requires the consciousness able to grasp red. Do we get away from this by mathematics? No, because mathematical objects are also grasped by the mind and are given in ways to the mind. Do we get away from this through specificity of simultaneous properties? No, the simultaneousness does not add ungrasped properties. If I am not there, does the object cease to exist? No, because permanence is a quality of objects I’ve grasped, and difference objects have different levels of permanence.

That is all science requires. First, the ability to grasp the objective world. Second, the ability to know things. From then on it is a matter of methodology.

What does it mean to say, “That isn’t really red, that is just how it appears to our senses”? Should I say, correspondingly, “That isn’t really existing without my mind, that is only how it appears”? How do we get to realism? Most importantly, what does it add to our investigations?

28

knowing, suspecting and believing are 3 different things.

we live in a world of lies and information hiding and delusion. people say they know when actually they believe.

know little, suspect much, believe nothing.

Dal Timgar

29

erislover, my brain is sore. Mainly, from trying to figure out what we’re arguing about, and I think you put your finger on something:

Today, I’m thinking, “what difference does it make?”

And, if it makes no significant difference, why are we sweating over it? Why should you or I or anyone care?

That’s a real question for you: What’s the point of all this, especially if (1) you can’t really defeat solipsism anyway and (2) you produce a system that is operationally indistinguishable from realism?

I think we should say “It really doesn’t matter after all” and go take a walk in the park (or some such pleasant diversion).

Eh? :wink:

30

Alice, obviously erislover didn’t suceed in not letting it get to him. Rather oddly serious for a Discordian.

31

dropzone, it’s the best way to keep people on their toes. :wink: I was in true discordian form just the other day, though (in GD no less), deriving “Eris exists” from “I am watching an aspirin commercial.” It wasn’t well-received. :smiley:

vknowles

Then I think you see where I’m coming from. I see absolutely no need for it. It is gristle we can throw to the dogs.

Well, I don’t usually care, of course, except when people start touting the natural science-cum-realism horn, or we’re in a thread that involves philosophy. :slight_smile:

Second part first, most of the time we don’t consider operational equivalence to be the sole criteria of comparing things. It is some philosopher’s opinion that transcendental idealism contains both realism and idealism (or makes the distinction silly or pointless), but significantly, only those that are already predisposed to it if you catch my drift. Realism is really the default position, so much so that it even has its own name: naive realism. So overcoming it is conceptually significant.

For the first point, solipsism is just “one of those things,” like skepticism of the senses, that just can’t be beat—yet which no one ever really promotes anyway. It is something to be addressed in whatever way you can, but, apart from philosophy101 students, no one seriously maintains it (arguing for solipsism is silly since you’re only arguing with yourself—that’s how I shut it down when I grow weary of it). So I take care to keep my limitations in mind, and solipsism is just one of them.

:slight_smile:

32

This is like an itch that won’t go away! :slight_smile:

Okay, let me speculate a little on operational equivalence. There are many examples, particularly in mathematics, in which two ways of formalizing a problem are equally valid and can be shown to be truly equivalent (duals), but when formalized one way a particular question may be easy to answer and when formalized the other way the same question may be difficult (but not impossible) to answer.

So, in that case, even though you have two logically equivalent formalizations (in the sense that any result from one can also be shown in the other), there are times when it is highly advantageous to use one and other times when it is much more efficient to use the other.

With that in mind, could you venture an example or two that show some problem or issue that distinguishes transcendental idealism from naive realism as a problem-solving tool?

Beyond that, in what ways are the two viewpoints significantly not equivalent (i.e., are there results you can obtain with one that you cannot obtain with the other)?

Just wondering…

33

As far as operational equivalence goes, that’s exactly what I mean: there’s usually one way that’s better. I can get to the same place by walking three steps east or millions of steps west. Each only involves stepping, and stopping at a certain point. But most wouldn’t consider the difference negligible. :slight_smile:

Well, pretty much that mind-independent objects have a real existence. Here’s some excerpts from the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy about idealism:

Here’s a bit on realism:

As you might guess, (b) and (c) are what I have problems with, so long as “real” in (a) is properly construed by the theory in question.

It would seem to me that realism would afford an individual the ability to be certain about the world without association with others (so inter-subjectivity need never be a part of or criterion for knowledge; and granted, not all idealisms require inter-subjectivity for knowledge anyway), and would afford an individual to believe in things that he cannot know (to wit: “There are properties objects have that I have not, and possibly cannot ever perceive/discover/know/etc”). Granted, they wouldn’t be specified in any way, but that doesn’t make me any more inclined to find it reasonable. If I may be so bold as to make a slur against realism, it is the metaphysic of the madman. :wink:

However, to be serious for one small moment, it is in fact the most popular metaphysic. But then, we already knew philosophers were a little bit crazy… :smiley:

34

No leap of faith is required. The world with which we interact is what we want to know about – it follows that our perceptions can be “trusted”, since they’re precisely what we’re interested in predicting.

Before we can concern ourselves with what exists “outside of ourselves”, don’t we need a concept of self? You people seem to be jumping the gun a bit…

35

Not a rigorous one, no. Why would you?

36

Because if we don’t have any way of defining ‘inside’ vs. ‘outside’, we can’t think about what’s “outside of ourselves”.

37

I developed that point (briefly). The criteria is reflexive stimulation of an object; that object becomes the (physical/bodily) self. But since all objects are mind-correlative, there is no “out there”, only the divisions between objective, inter-subjective, and subjective.

38

erislover, I am continuing to have a difficult time figuring out why you’re objecting to everything everyone is saying. :slight_smile:

Really, I’m having a hard time understanding the difference between your viewpoint and several others that I have run into, both in this forum and in some brief reading I have done on epistemology.

For instance:

That sounds a lot like your position. The problem I have is reconciling the two pieces “must somehow be due to realities” and “knowledge can only arise in the course of synthesizing ideas of sense”.

(Frankly, it was also hard for me to distinguish this viewpoint from phenomenology in the brief description I read. Anyway…)

Well, of course we can only know our own mental constructs. But if, using my mental interpretations of sense data and comparing them with my mental interpretations of what appear to be the communication acts of other subjects about their mental interpretations of their sense data, I am able to notice some regularities about these sense data that seem to imply the existence of objects-in-themselves, why is it inadvisable for me to suppose they exist?

I mean, I should keep in mind that my hypotheses about objects-in-themselves are tentative. But that doesn’t stop me from building elaborate theoretical models to explain the patterns in my sense data, theoretical models that would be ridiculously silly if there were no objects-in-themselves that serve as the source of sense data.

And, to take it the one step further that I want to go, I see no problem in looking at what appears to be the history of such theoretical models, and noticing another pattern. That is, historically, I find there are sorts of objects that were not present in my sense data until fairly recently. Yet there is no reason to believe that they were not present-in-themselves for the indefinite past. I, and other subjects, were just unable to perceive them until recently. Examples: microwave background radiation, viruses, molecules, most of the moons in the solar system, the deep seabed – the list is rather long.

I can make essentially the same argument about properties of objects that were not detectable until recently, but may well have been present for the indefinite past. Examples: solar radiation at any wavelengths other than infrared and visible, radiation from naturally radioactive materials, bioelectrical activity of neurons – and so on.

From those two arguments, it seems to follow without difficulty that there are probably more objects “out there”, and more unknown properties of objects, that we do not know about yet but will find ways to sense in the future. (Or we might not – but what difference would that make? It’s just a gamble.)

So far, I really don’t see why you would object to any of this. I’m still saying that what we manipulate in our logic are the mental interpretations of sense data. That is the only way we know anything.

Yet, to me, the key is that we always go back to the sense data. Suppose I said that you and I could invent an entire world that is not related to any sense data other than the communication acts that we use to match up our mental images of it. Would you say that world has the same status as the world we theorize about based on our primary sense data?

I believe you would say these two are different. And if they are different, what makes them different?

To me, they are different because what we naively think of as “real” always goes back to sense data. If we have a theory about it, we always check it back to sense data.

So, if you agree with Kant that ideas “must somehow be due to realities existing independently of human minds”, then I think you don’t have a problem. Objects and their properties – in themselves – exist independently of human minds. Our sense data are somehow correlated with some of these objects and their properties. What we know consists exclusively of our ideas about the sense data, but our ideas (unless we be madmen ;)) constantly “bounce off of” objects-in-themselves – via our sense data and our memories.

To put it another way, our sense data (to the extent they are reliable) are bounded by the properties of the objects that trigger the sense data. Our mental task is to “make sense” of the sense data and in order to do so, our theoretical models have to remain consistent with our sense data.

The only leap here is the assumption about where our sense data come from. But, again, I see nothing dangerous in assuming such a thing.

And I say, you’re right, but so what? I know that all I can know is my theoretical model of the world. My theoretical model happens to include a hypothesis that “things” are “out there” and that those things and their properties are responsible for my sense data. But I can’t know those things directly. On the other hand, I can hypothesize that they exist and persist and that there are probably other things that I currently can’t perceive but are out there hanging around waiting for me cleverly to discover them.

Well, maybe I still don’t understand your perspective on this, but I think I started with your basic set of assumptions and used a reasonable argument to show that there have been and probably will be properties objects have that were/are unknown and have become/will become known. Always dependent on referring back to the sense data to look for new stuff. Where’s the problem with that?
:confused:

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About as tenative as god existing or the IPU. If we accept the realist/Kant route, we posit the existence of things, that is the “things-in-themselves”, that we admit we can never know.

So what of the statement, “There are things-in-themselves”? Can I know it? How? Can I demonstrate it? No. Can I put it to any use? Not that I can see.

So what are you gaining from it that you continue to move there?

Unstated notion: if I were there to see them. I did mention that assertion of the objective past implies a subject (in my perspective). So I don’t think we gain anything more (again).

Same status? You mean do they both exist? Yes. In the same way? Ehhh, no? No, I wouldn’t say so. This “world” would be more like math. But note we’d describe it to each other in terms of what it would be like to see (know, not necessarily visualize) it; that is, we could only give it properties we have conceptually grasped.

I don’t agree with Kant. He’s just wrong. That which we grasp with our mind is the mind-correlative object. Discussions of any other object are nonsensical because they aren’t known or grasped. For Kant, we transcend subjectivity to understand the world as revealed by our senses, and what we understand is but a shadow of the things-in-themselves. For me, we transcend the senses to grasp the world in/with our mind through our senses, and what we understand is the very thing we discuss. One insists on unknowable things-in-themselves, one has no use for it. I am not directed at the thing-in-itself-that-only-reveals-itself-to-me-as-a-monitor, I’m directed toward the very thing my consciousness grasps as a monitor (that is just what I mean by “monitor”). There’s nothing “behind” it.

No, I suppose it isn’t dangerous, but epistemologically misleading, entirely unfounded, and itself not based in sense or reason. Accepting such propositions has not demonstrated itself as entirely beneficial throughout human history, but it needn’t be dangerous, no.

So not only are things-in-themselves unsupported, but nonsensical.

You are, like many people, free to do so. I find the idea troublesome and open to rampant skepticism. I know Kant felt he went beyond Hume, but from what I have read of Kant he hasn’t in any significant way, other than asserting answers to questions Hume felt were unanswerable. IMHO, the empiricist-realist line ends with Hume. If you would like, I can find some time in the coming days to dig up some of his discussions (like causality, infinite divisibility, and self) and see what you think, but he’s an easy read as far as most philosophers go. His treatise is a motherlode of ideas and challenges.

Sure. We are not omniscient beings. This does little to impact the notion that in order to be directed at an object, that object must be mind-correlative. We cannot refer to that which is not grasped by the mind.

Let me ask you a question. Do you think mathematical objects have a real existence, too? After all, we don’t know theorems in advance, yet we do come to know them…

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Hi, again, erislover.

It’s obvious that (1) I’m a novice at technical philosophy and (2) I really haven’t understood your position.

Part of my confusion has to do with labels. Apparently not everyone uses “transcendental idealism” the same way. My reading of the Britannica article on epistemology suggests that your position is closer to phenomenalism (especially as that view includes the “coherence” of perceptual experiences that you mentioned earlier).

Anyway, however you want to label your viewpoint, I think I now understand that what you are calling “objects” are really shared inter-subjective experiences. Knowledge consists of the demonstration or communication of subjective experience. If there are “things-in-themselves,” they are not knowable as such and so it is meaningless to talk about them.

Does that express your position accurately?

If not, I don’t want to proceed until I do have it.