How does free will exist? Where does it come from?

Great Debates
21

Mange, I would still caution you against the notion that “the universe is compelling you to do things”. I am attempting to impress upon you the importance of this “feedback” component. You are not merely a wind-up toy who would keep banging up against the same wall if left unattended. Your brain is an incredible device: it learns. It experiences emotion. It sifts through random permutations of words, shapes or musicals notes with almost supernatural efficiency, a process we might call creativity. Most importantly, if your future actions are based both on the past and on utterly random inputs, then since it is impossible to make any prediction as to what exactly it is you are going to do, you might as well live as though you had free will.

Like I do!

22

i’m very curious as to how you would define “choice” then, without the illusory aspect of it. you provide the mechanism of the choice. that is your “will”, as you see it.

when you make a decision, there are two possible things that can happen:

  1. you choose the best option for you.
  2. you choose an option based on some probability distribution and randomness.

in case 1, clearly there is only one choice to be made. in case two, clearly you are not making the choice. i don’t think either of these cases fit your idea of a choice, and therefore no one can ever actually make a choice. which is why i go by a someone refined definition.

23

Of course - fear not; I’m not about to go on some killing spree, depressed at the bleak inevitability of it all, then try to argue that the universe made me do it.

Is it possible then, that the chaotic inputs (from the deterministic, but hellishly complex aspects of the universe) and the truly random ones (from the quantum aspects, which may in turn be seeding the chaotic elements) provide instability that my brain is able to actively filter in such a way as to make true volition possible?

24

I find it odd that this thread has gone on this long without any mention of the Supreme Bieng, God etc…

If you believe in an omnipotent God then your life has been detemined and God already is aware of eveything you will do, including writing three fleas. If God did not know this then He is not all knowing.

If you do not believe in a superior being then determinism has no meaning to you. You are living your life making free choices all along. Ther is no hand forcing, guiding, or determining your fate.

My problem with a deterministic world is that it seems too much like rats running in a maze that has only one solution and you really are just going through the motions of solving the maze, but will always be at the same end point. Why bother with living if your actions are pre-determined? Help!!!

25

You’re sort of losing me now; on the one hand, you’re unhappy with me describing choice as illusory, but on the other hand, you seem to be saying that no such thing as choice exists.

26

Damn! the board is flaky today - I just lost another post; here is goes again:

** that would be because I requested that we steer clear of such pointless speculation and argument - invoking an unknowable is no less distracting and no more helpful than saying “I have absolutely no idea”.

With respect, that isn’t the kind of determinism we’re discussin here - consider an ideal pool table - the interactions of the balls in motion can be completely understood and predicted - there should be no surprising collisions and for any given starting configuration and set of force inputs, the behaviour and end configuration should be identical every time - that’s the kind of determinisim we’re exploring here, although your closing question still holds, regardless.

27

Just reading my own post there and it looks snippy or terse, which wasn’t my intention at all - sorry.

28

Theres a thread that discusses and has links to a theory that attempts to explain the randomness of quantum mechanics in order to explain free-will (and consciousness). Penrose and Hameroff have put forth a “theory” (which is actually pretty much pure conjecture right now) that the microtubules within neurons can act as a brain within themselves. Because these structures are on the molecular level (albeit very large molecules) the possibility of random quantum influence dictating free-will comes ever closer.

I’ve just started reading “The Conscious Mind” by David Chalmers. Chalmers, a materialist, attempts to excogitate a fundamental theory and mentions in his introduction that a materialist one isn’t possible. I don’t know if his statement will hold true to the end but it should be interesting to see what he proposes.

29

This one’s easy. We know we have consciousness (or something that’s close enough to fake it) just by observing our own minds. So any theory of mind, if we hope for it to be an accurate model of the Universe, has to account for consciousness. We don’t know if we really have free will, so a theory of mind which is otherwise useful and internally consistent but which rejects free will not only could be an accurate model, it could actually convince us that free will does not exist.

–Cliffy

30

The future where no piece of paper with “three free fleas” on it is “free will or choice”, not to be confused with random, because of the process involved in your decision to do the act. History, with the paper in your hand indicates there is no choice. It just is. We make it complicated by our dual frame of reference. Future events have no relevance to what really is. The future is simply an abstract concept, only given meaning by writing on the piece of paper and becoming history. Could my post have been any different? Looking at it, evidence points to “no”, because it’s not. When I was typing it, “yes”. The hamsters made me type it three times :(. Four.

31

Greetings debators,

One can have the will do to something that one does not have the freedom to do. Instead of moving right along, I should probably give an example of something that can be willed but not implimented by that will, for the sake of politeness.

A person could will the absense of whatever conditions are necessary in order to perceive the idea of will.

Does one then have the freedom to do what one does not will to do?

That seems to be the critical question here. Thoughts?
The answer is not forthcoming to me.

32

Are you saying the person would have to forget the idea of will and the process that led them to such a perception? This idea seems very similar to Self-Deception, in that you need to know what you’re forgetting even when you’re forgetting and have forgotten it. Its confounded many a philosopher and I have no answer.

But in a general sense, free will to me applies to everything except your own self. How can you will-fully change yourself when you are doing the changing? Its the classic problem of perspective- you can never view yourself from an external position since that new position would become your own.

33

hmm let me try to be more clear this time around.

i was using two definitions of choice. one is the one that i would use (as in, there are many options, each a choice, though you were unable to choose one that you didn’t choose), and the other, which i perceive to be your definition, and which, i tried to demonstrate, has no extension.

so it would seem like a revision of that definition of choice would be in order.

in my mind, the concept of “choice” still fits with the intuitive version, since you are the program that goes through the switch statement. the program is free to choose only one option, which it does, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t have anything else that it could’ve considered.

34

The problem of free will is always confusing, as linguistic and empirical considerations get boiled in the same pot.

The term “free will” existed before any conception of the universe as deterministic existed, just as the word “water” existed before we understood that it’s made of hydrogen and oxygen.

Hence, the term “free will,” at least in theory, is pointing to something in our experience that we can learn more about, just as we could learn more about water.

The question really becomes, What is the term “free will” pointing toward? I’m not asking for a definition; I’m asking whether there are any phenomena that we associate with this term.

Obviously, they would have to be psychological phenomena, things that pertain to introspection and consciousness. I think when you really get down to it, “free will” refers to the fact that our biological and mental lives require us to choose between alternatives. As you know, you can’t set your brain on autopilot. You can’t just tune out for a week while your body studies for the
SATs, goes to the test site, and wakes “you” up for an enjoyable weekend. No, it’s always you, whatever that “you” might turn out to be.

So, we’re compelled to think, to make choices. Likewise, we are able to think and make choices, even when not compelled; or at least there is no pain or distaste associated with the choice. I can choose strawberry or chocolate ice cream.

Hence, whatever consciousness or personhood is in your worldview, you have to think and make choices. You are forced to be conscious.

Now let’s advance the argument one level. Even if we decide that consciouness is 100% deterministic, that fact is irrelevent to the question of whether we are free. Why? Because, again, free/unfree is a concept originally applied to the phenomena of consciousness by that consciousness, so the concept can only be superficially voided by information external to that system.

In other words, if you say “But it’s not really me that is deciding if the universe is deterministic,” that’s wrong, since the terms “me” and “deciding” were originally applied to the decision-making system (consciousness), regardless of what we could further learn about that system.

As a counterexample, suppose I believe in a soul. I taste some ice cream and say, “I really feel this tastes sweet.” But later on I determine that the soul doesn’t exist. Does it make sense at that point to say, “I guess this ice cream doesn’t really taste sweet to me, since there is no soul in me really to taste it.” Nonsense, of course, since “sweet” originally applied to an introspective phenomenon.

35

Mangetout,

I don’t think anyone can know the answer to your question.

Certainly, it seems science has no need for free will to explain consciousness albeit to this day it can’t explain consciousness as we know it anyway. While science is very good at analyzing and predicting the sorts of things that are easily predictable it has no business asserting that cause and effect are anything more than an efficacious methodology for explaining phonomena.

Some are so moved by the results of science that they see no need to posit anything outside of it’s realm of knowledge, but this decision is not dictated by science itself, since by definition, it falls outside of science’s scope.

My own take on this is that the universe itself has no cause and we are a part of the universe. This is not the sort of free will we that most people think of, but it works for me. To me, we do have “choices”, but it happens on a scale beyond our comprehension and in a way that has no relationship to our perception of self direction. You could of course substitute “god” for universe, but I have yet to see a need for that.

36

Fair enough, but I suppose it boils down to the question of whether there is ever such a thing as an arbitrary choice.

37

Might I just interject that that is a beautifully concise summary of how I am suggesting the brain works.

This last part threw me a little. What are you saying is “true volition”? Is it that which you would do every single time given the same situation - the “perfect decision” if you will? That does not sound like “volition” to me; quite the opposite (your brain would surely be a simple calculator, churning out the same result every single time?).

Or is “true volition” the random element?: If you could somehow train your brain to think of a number between 1 and 10 without any bias to any number, thus providing a truly random sample, is this an example of true “free will”? Again, I would say not, any more than the dice “chooses” the face it shows.

I suggest that the illusion of free will is produced by a combination of these two types of operation: An impossibly advanced calculator, built over years and years from birth, acting on environmental inputs, random inputs and inputs from itself (ie. feedback) to produce thousands of “results” every second which are themselves filtered and fed back, and so on.

I am strongly drawn in this respect towards an idea espoused by Chris Frith, Professor of Neurocognition at UC London. He suggests that we enter different “modes” based largely on what our situation or environment appears to require, such as “social”, “heroic” and so on. When the situation does not require any particular “mode”, such as idly sitting at your desk or lying in bed, the “default mode” might be to bubble away with fairly random thoughts and ideas until the brain latches onto one of those bubbles, for whatever reason, and brings to bear the full arsenal of consciousness to explore it. He further points out that a fair amount of this “bubbling” might be necessary in preventing us from reacting solely to our environment, citing patients suffering from environmental dependancy syndrome (Lhermitte 1986) who eg. upon being shown around somebody’s house, see the bed and immediately undress, climb in and go to sleep.

In your case, Mange, you might have sat, bubbling away, until the notion of free will was latched onto. Your consciousness explored it further, and the result of the “calculation” was that it might be worthwhile to enter some kind of random mode wherein the brain tried to come up with something to write down. Hey presto; three free fleas appears on the paper.

Again I must ask which of these elements (the situation, the randomness or the super-calculator) points towards a “will”?

38

I don’t know.

I think my whole problem with the concept is that I can’t dismiss the attractive idea that ‘I’ am in control and that things happen because ‘I’ initiate them, but as you and others keep pointing out, the ‘I’ isn’t something that exists independently of the universe and the immersive environment.

The idea of anything that I consider to be ‘creative’ actually being an inevitable outcome of a deterministic system horrifies me - that’s what this is all about and it seems like we’re mostly in agreement that this isn’t the case, although it seems also to be true that these ‘creative’ impulses are invariably ‘inspired’ by something, even though we don’t necessarily perceive it that way.

39

Of course you are “in control” to a large extent, in the same way that Rama’s thermostat is “in control” of the room temperature. Over the course of your life that kilogram of offal in your skull has learned what is necessary to “initiate” in a given environment in order for you to stay alive and, indeed, have a fulfilling life at that.

You are, perhaps understandably, trying to push me into a corner with these yes/no’s about inevitability and the like, and I hope I have not been too evasive. However, I would implore you to remember that there is a vast step between neural impluses and everyday human activity, and I am only trying to flesh out an incredibly simple (probably oversimple) model of the almost miraculous wonder which is your brain.

40

I really appreciate your explanations; I wouldn’t want you to think that my repeated rephrasing of questions was motivated by anything more than a deep desire to probe this topic from a variety of angles. The biggest problem in this thread is my limited ability to grasp the concepts.