Nope - I started my reply before your post appeared. These things happen in the wee hours of my imagined existence
I was just indicating my stance that the simulation dilemma is simply a special case of solipsism and that solipsism has only ever had 2 paths out of the naval.
Even if you are “real”, your perceptions are not real, for your brain interprets what it receives from your senses and thereby creates figments in your mind. In other words, even if you and the world around you is "real’, it cannot be real for you.
I think it can be taken as read that your mind, at least, is real. Right?
That means that figments of your imaginations have a basis in reality - specifically, your mind is their basis. And your mind is taken as read as being real.
This means that if you have imaginary friends, they are as real as your “main mind” is - you simply have multiple personality disorder. All the minds in your head are equally real, and ‘their’ feelings are as real as ‘yours’ are - because they are based in the same source.
Also, what do you mean by “it will not last”? Even if the world is real nothing “lasts”, at least not indefinitely. And your solipsistic imaginary friends have as much reliable existence as they would have if they were real, no more and no less.
I believe there are more than that. For one I heard the just because it cannot be verified that something is real or not does not imply that it isn’t real.
Second the whole concept of language blows a big hole in solipsism, of which it doesn’t have an answer to.
I think there are others, but as he said it has zero predictive power for in order to claim all this is illusion you need something real to compare it to (something that does give me some comfort).
Fair enough - but neither of the examples you offer is particularly compelling. I suppose it might help to be explicit as to whether we want to discuss solipsism in an epistemological or a metaphysical context, but given the OP it seems that epistemology is the right zip code. Given that:
[ol]
[li]Yes, an undetermined truth value does not imply FALSE. Neither does it imply TRUE. Therefore, it does not provide any solid footing to escape solipsism. In fact - the indeterminate truth value of perceptual input is pretty fundamental to solipsistic thought.[/li][li]I have no idea what concept of language you think blows a hole in solipsism. The barrier to certainty underlies all perception - so simply because my mind supplies perceptions of sensory structures encoding meaning in repeatable patterns isn’t a proof of, well . . . anything really. But perhaps you meant something else. If so, please expand your argument.[/li][/ol]
Spiritus Mundi, I’ve been meaning to ask - when you said that “ignorance and a conscious disregard for proof” are the only two ways out of solipsism, which one does “shrugging and saying you don’t care whether you’re living a fantasy life or not” fall into?
It doesn’t really give any solid footing for considering solipsism either. We can accept that we can’t be 100% certain, but that doesn’t immediately follow that only we exist.
The objection with language is the language is a public form of communication that only makes sense in that other minds exist. A private language would be utterly meaningless.
A private language would be arbitrary, but it wouldn’t be meaningless. For example I could invent a word that only I know the meaning of, and use it to take notes for myself to read at a later date. When I read these notes later they would remind me of whatever my special word means - demonstrating that the word has meaning.
That would be a conscious disregard for proof. (My own answer as well, though perhaps nuanced in slightly different emotional context.)
Now - once we are out of the solipsistic box, we can care as much as we choose about proofs based upon whatever immaterial ladders we used to climb over the walls.
Ah - so now we are talking about metaphysical solipsism. Epistemological solipsism makes no such leap. It only argues that we cannot find a well-founded reason for believing that referents exist on the other side of our perceptual context. My standard response to metaphysical solipsists is “who do you think you’re talking to?” But metaphysical solipsism would seen off-topic from the OP, which asks about not being 100% certain. Though the irony of a thread to ask others how they feel about not existing outside of my mind does have a certain perverse appeal.
In truth, outside of freshman philosophy majors I’ve rarely found anyone who cares to argue for metaphysical solipsism. They either outgrow the fascination or recognize the futility of such efforts.
I honestly cannot find the thread you are trying to pull, here. There are so many assumptions in defining language as a public form of communication that it can hardly have any implications at all. What form do you imagine your private thoughts take?
It eludes me how dismissing the merit of solipsistic navel-gazing disregards any proofs of any kind. One need not deny or disregard that it’s possible that everything is a surprisingly self-consistent hallucination to move on to other lines of thought.
Honestly, what with the whole “surprisingly self-consistent” aspect of it, solipsism isn’t even really a bar to anything, up to and including hard science. Science isn’t predicated on the assumption that the universe is self-consistent; science determined that by observation and moved on from there. I honestly have no idea what the substrate underlying all of reality is; it could be my imagination and that would literally change nothing at all.
Last Thursdayism is a way, *way *bigger challenge to things than solipsism is. One can simply shrug about solipsism, but one has to actively (if tentatively) reject Last Thursdaysim in order to get other things done.
My phrasing has confused you. I did not say it was necessary to disregard proofs of any kind. What is necessary is to disregard the need for a proof that solipsism is incorrect. Call it a leap of faith (or to faith if such is your bent) or a first certainty or an axiomatic assumption or acceptance of uncertainty or begbert’s apathetic shrug . . . they all describe the same path. One moves beyond solipsism by consciously denying the need to disprove it. Or through ignorance, of course.
Precisely - though I think hallucination is a misleading way to describe the concern raised by the unreliability of perception.
Ah, okay. Of course to me it’s not that I’m denying a need to disprove it - it’s because I don’t have a need to disprove it, and never did. Similar to the cases of alien abduction, conspiracy theories, and gods, it’s not my job to prove that wild claims are wrong; it’s the dude making the claim’s job to prove it’s right.
My idea of solipsism goes far beyond perceptions being unreliable - it is premised on the idea that perceptions are false. You’re not seeing things wrong; there is actually nothing to see at all and you’re not even capable of seeing at all - you just think you are because your own mind is deceiving you and creating your imagined senses whole cloth. I believe this fits the definition of hallucination well enough.