There’s no specific statute that forbids it, but it has been commonly understood, or part of common law, to be not the done thing, unless and until Parliament puts through an explicit statute saying otherwise.
See, for example, the Supreme Court’s slapdown of Boris Johnson’s attempt to prorogue parliament.
There’s the written Constitution, set out in the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982. However, the Constitution assigns powers to the monarch that only make sense if exercised by the democratic process, as developed in Canada prior to 1867 and in the UK over the same period. In fact, the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, says that Canada is to have a “constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.”
That includes the unwritten, non-codified parts, the constitutional conventions that turn what on paper looks like a near absolute monarchy into a modern democratic state, where the monarch only exercises his powers on the constitutional advice of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Those constitutional conventions are equally part of the Constitution. They aren’t law, but they have normative force, as stated by the SCC in the Patriation Reference. If a government acts contrary to the constitutional conventions, it is acting unconstitutionally, even if it has a law that gives it a certain power. The government (and the monarch) must exercise their legal authority consistent with the constitutional convention.
What was in issue in the Patriation Reference was whether the federal government could unilaterally ask the British Parliament to pass the Canada Act to patriate the Constitution, giving Canada full power to amend it and ending Britain’s last bit of authority over Canada. The issue there didn’t involve the monarch’s power, but whether there was a constitutional convention that applied to the amending process as it existed at that time.
The Supreme Court held, 7-2, that the two houses of the Canadian Parliament had the legal authority to pass the resolution asking the British Parliament to act. The two houses of the Canadian Parliament did not need the consent of any of the provinces to do so; they could act unilaterally, as a matter of law.
However, in the same case, a differently constituted majority held, 6-3, that the federal principle is basic to the Canadian constitutional structure, and therefore, based on the history of prior amendments, there was a constitutional convention that the two houses of the Canadian Parliament could not act unilaterally. A sufficient degree of provincial consent was necessary. If the two houses of the Canadian Parliament were to act without substantial provincial consent, they would be acting unconstitutionally.
Thus, the SCC held, by a majority, that the two houses of the Canadian Parliament had the legal authority to pass the resolutions unilaterally.
And, the SCC held, also by a majority, that if the two houses of Parliament did so, they would be in breach of the constitutional convention.
You folks down south have no equivalent.
That’s a good example.
The answer is that the crown-in-parliament can make anybody monarch, and can remove any monarch, and can abolish the monarchy, but for legitimacy under the current constitution each of these actions would require the assent of the then-current monarch (even if it was their last act as monarch).
As a matter of practical politics, parliament-without-the-monarch could also do any of these things, and do it successfully, but it would be a revolutionary act.
So, can the Lords and Commons pass, and the King assent to, a Bill for an Act to provide that, upon the demise of his current majesty, Little_Nemo will succeed to the throne, that the throne will therafter pass to the heirs of Little_Nemo’s flesh, being Protestants? Yes.
Emphasis added. Ah, the wonderful ambiguity of English pronouns c. 2024! James II and VII of course were, er, was the same human being.
Heck, let’s go whole hog and consider the hypothetical that Parliament says the throne passes to Little_Nemo, provided he is in good standing as a member of the Church of Satan!
If you refer to yourself as we, you should expect this kind of thing.
By my comment, I meant the same as this:
I assumed that “legal” is oxymoronic to “unconstitutional”, I.E., that it something is found unconstitutional, then it is ultra vires. However, following your comment, I had another look at the Patriation Reference. I reproduce two quotes:
It should be borne in mind however that, while they are not laws, some conventions may be more important than some laws. Their importance depends on that of the value or principle which they are meant to safeguard. Also they form an integral part of the constitution and of the constitutional system. … That is why it is perfectly appropriate to say that to violate a convention is to do something which is unconstitutional although it entails no direct legal consequence. But the words “constitutional” and “unconstitutional” may also be used in a strict legal sense, for instance with respect to a statute which is found ultra vires or unconstitutional…
And, quoting a Professor Peter W. Hogg:
If a convention is disobeyed by an official, then it is common, especially in the United Kingdom, to describe the official’s act or omission as “unconstitutional”. But this use of the term unconstitutional must be carefully distinguished from the case where a legal rule of the constitution has been disobeyed. Where unconstitutionality springs from a breach of law, the purported act is normally a nullity and there is a remedy available in the courts. But where “unconstitutionality” springs merely from a breach of convention, no breach of the law has occurred and no legal remedy will be available…
OK, now I see your point. As I read this, “unconstitutional” is distinguished into two senses here: 1) in the sense that I (and @Pleonast) saw it, I.E., legally invalid as it violates a constitutional rule; 2) something that goes against a constitutional convention, but is nevertheless legal.
I didn’t realize “unconstitutional” could be used in the second sense.
I will also concede that yes - constitutional conventions are, as you say, normative, as they form part of the proper functioning of government and are assumed to be in operation by judges and lawmakers. Nonetheless, they are not laws that will be enforced by the courts.
Therefore, I would argue that King Charles refusing to sign a bill into law would not be ultra vires for him, despite there being a constitutional convention binding him to sign all bills.
It would not be ultra vires for him and there would be no legal sanction, but there would nevertheless be dramatic political consequences.
The monarch acts on the advice of ministers and, if he doesn’t accept the minister’s advice, the constitutionally proper course for the minister is to resign; nobody can be comfortable acting as adviser to a principal whose confidence they do not enjoy. Since the Prime Minister ultimately depends on the support of a majority in Parliament, the PM will always advise the king to accede to the wishes of Parliament and assent to whatever legislation Parliament enacts. If the king refuses the PM should resign, and no other MP will accept office unless the king will accept the advice that the new PM must inevitably give, which is to assent to the legislation.
In short, if the king opposes Parliament, he finds himself without a government. This is not a battle the king can win.
I encourage anyone interested in this stuff to see S1 of the original British House of Cards, and then go directly to S2, called To Play the King. Ian Richardson is wonderful as a scheming British Prime Minister, and Michael Kitchen, in S2, plays a very Charles-esque monarch who clashes with him. The irony is that the PM, although evil, is entirely in the right legally, while the well-meaning, reform-minded, do-gooder King, for whom most in the audience would root, is entirely in the wrong.
Here’s a nice summary from one of Canada’s leading constitutional scholars, the late Peter Hogg:
Conventions are rules of the constitution which are not enforced by the law courts. Because they are not enforced by the law courts they are best regarded as non-legal rules, but because they do in fact regulate the working of the constitution they are an important concern of the constitutional lawyer. What conventions do is to prescribe the way in which legal powers shall be exercised. Some conventions have the effect of transferring effective power from the legal holder to another official or institution. Other conventions limit an apparently broad power, or even prescribe that a legal power shall not be exercised at all.