It seems to me that the biggest problem in the current “Soviet” invasion is that they assumed they could simply roll into Kyiv and it would be a fait accompli like Crimea. So they did no serious planning for “what if we get held stalled?” let alone planning for a protracted battle. Along with no planning, no preparation - “We’ll roll in Kyiv using the first tank of gas, and for refueling just call up their local fuel supply company and requisition more fuel. We should not need more than one or two loads of ammunition per tank…” Presumably troop tactics training matched their supply planning. I assume the generals are out being targets because nobody has a preplanned playbook on how to handle the assorted messes they find themselves in, and nobody lower down can (is authorized to) make a decision.
The question too, is that not having had a full scale action in decades, did they even have the functional equipment for such a war? Syria, Crimea, Georgia, even Chechnya - presumably these were low number operations, and much of those troops have cycled through and returned to civilian life. Did anyone decide to get enough basic equipment like up to date radios for an operation probably 10 times bigger than any the army had done since Afghanistan? Radios aren’t sexy - hypersonic missiles and advanced tech tanks are. Nobody gets promoted because “I was the one who got us a few dozen warehouses full of radios, field kitchen trucks and spare tires”.
Even the organization of supply lines is a critical factor. If you have to deliver the following load of spare parts, ammo, and meals to Company B - where the F*** are they today? Who generated that order from the battlefield -either by phone to HQ or from their mobile laptop requisition system? Who picked it? Who gave the driver a map and directions? Who makes sure the supply gets through and triggers a re-order if the truck is destroyed en route? (Or gets a flat tire, or stuck in the mud, or…) A tank with a broken fuel pump is a piece of immobile artillery with a giant “kick me” sign taped on it.
Even the 1973 Yom Kippur war basically devolved within a week or two into “whose sugar daddy can supply their client faster?” (Hint - the USA). Without that, even the best fighters in the world would be hard pressed to win.
Even if jamming meant they were reduced to using cell phones for comms, that’s still no excuse for transmitting in the clear. There are free encrypted text messaging apps for all cellphone OSes, and once you have them set up, they’re just as easy to use as the texting programs high schoolers use worldwide.
The only plausible explanation I can see for communicating in the clear is that they really are just that incompetent, or possibly even deliberately sabotaging themselves.
I watched a similar video by a former USMC who made similar caution about drawing wrong conclusions from snippets of videos without the larger strategic context.
Although the consistent opinion does seem to be the Russians are not performing well. It is hard to get a real sense of the real picture for both sides. What are their capabilities in terms of combat-ready troops, aircraft, and equipment? What are the actual casualties (between 1000 and 15000 Russians is a pretty wide spread. What are the Ukraine losses)? How fast can each side replenish loses?
Or possibly Prague in 1968. Send in the tanks, seize the airport near the capital with paratroopers, use the airport to send in more troops and supplies, capture the members of the government and cart them off to Moscow where they “freely sign” declarations of support, and then install a new government. Done and done.
The success of the Bayraktar TB2 (which follows the success of the more expensive Predator in other conflicts) will result in a surge of the world’s armed forces investing in drone tech. TB2 is to this war as Exocet was to the Falklands war… a shocking demonstration of the vulnerability of a modern military to a specific kind of weapon.
It is stunningly difficult to convince soldiers of the importance of proper radio discipline. Even in the very professional Canadian Armed Forces, our post-exercise reports on the conduct of our forces in radio discipline could always be summarized as “it sucked.” If we were on exercise with the US Army, their radio discipline sucked, too.
I would expect, at the least, that in a competent military, there would be some competent folks who were in charge of comms discipline, and who would have the authority and capability to make it easier for the ignorant grunts to do it right, and harder for them to do it wrong. Say, get a bunch of cell phones, install the approved secure texting app on all of them, set them up (including setting the keys and contacts lists), uninstall the insecure texting apps, and then distribute them to the troops. It still wouldn’t be idiotproof, of course, because idiots are so ingenious, but I’d think that that’d at least prevent a large share of the idiocy.
Two American military officials said that many Russian generals are talking on unsecured phones and radios. In at least one instance, they said, the Ukrainians intercepted a general’s call, geolocated it, and attacked his location, killing him and his staff.
There was some report of an intercepted call where someone was reporting one of the killed generals. Apparently there was a long pause followed by a curse word.
