I would not say quite unlikely, but it is less than 50% likely. Before Trump, I would have went with quite unlikely. But Trump increases the odds.
But not high enough to “unpredictable.” The best money is still on no war, at least, this soon. It becomes more likely as time goes on and the situation doesn’t resolve by other means–though it drops once Trump is out of office.
Unlikely. We now know how long Trump’s attention span lasts, and the run-up to an actual war would last longer than that. And Xi Jinping now knows that he can control Trump with a chocolate cake from Mar-a-Lago.
I have to say if I were a disinterested Alien viewing this from Proxima Centauri, I would see a small entity which is surrounded by and beholden to the ever-changing whims of the Planets three greatest powers. I’d be mad too.:eek:
South Korea is the one country which needs to keep the statue quo more than anyone. It’s their country which gets wrecked in a war and their economy which would die if reunification were to happen.
They can live with a nuclear NK and some shelling back and forth. As you say, if things were to change too much but that’s hard to know what would be worth risking a war over.
China is the current winner in the status quo. Remember back on the campaign trail that Trump was going to sock it to China. Then he discovered he needed their help.
I don’t see him as a madman. He too over at age 28 and he’s survived five years. Don’t underestimate him.
He needs to survive and he could be quite aware of what could happen if there were a war. However, in the short term, he’s got to keep his general off balance so they don’t become too powerful. Having an aircraft carrier and a missile platform sub off his shores provide wonderful job security in the short term.
I also really question the notion of him believing he can be the dictator of the world.
My bet is that it’s all about how he can remain in power.
The two possible scenarios are possible red lines by the US on a nuke-tipped working intercontinental ballistic missile and skirmishes which get out of hand.
Good points all. With any country you always have to assess capabilities and attitudes separately. As a very clear example, US capabilities didn’t change whit one the day Trump was inaugurated. But attitudes *seem *to have shifted a lot.
As you say, Kim is *probably *mostly interested in staying in power. Which involves both not getting invaded and not getting deposed. As you suggest, those two are different concerns and sometimes improving one harms the other and vice versa. An external threat, such as US/UN/SK pushing too hard, is one way to split those concerns. Perhaps past their breaking point.
One thing that changes once NK has an unequivocal nuclear delivery capability is the risk to SK, Japan, and perhaps the US & China in the event of a purely domestic upset / coup / famine / legit heart attack / etc. Because once NK has the capability, now we’re depending on just attitude for stability. And attitudes can change more quickly and more radically than capabilities can.
This whole thread is exploring the idea that changed attitudes (mostly on the US side) have already created a changed risk environment.
My point being that SK is 99.9% a status quo power. Because as you say, the war will be fought on their territory and they’ll inherit the NK basket case unless China decides to take it off their hands. My reason for the 0.1% reservation is that SK may conclude that the incremental harm to them from a mature NK nuclear capability becomes existential rather than merely very, very bad.
Israel is not SK. But, ref AK84’s cogent comment about small countries surrounded by larger, existential threats are often treated differently than big threats.
In all I don’t see a battle of words leading to a shooting war. Not even a little bit. Despite some folks’ feverish imaginings up-thread.
But the calendar tells us it’s likely NK will cross the threshold to a true reasonably reliable deliverable nuclear capability during the current US administration. That *will *be destabilizing whenever and however it emerges into view.
Not going to happen. Cost in American lives would be too high. North Korea is no joke.
There isn’t AFAIK any clear pattern of behavior which would make one conclude Kim Jung Un is ‘crazy’. The problem is more in the difficulty of proving he is not, as well as determining the degree to which he makes even rational decisions based on realistic information. The first limit is important in judging the risk of simply allowing NK to perfect nuclear strike capability against the US mainland and simply deterring it the conventional way, by greater US nuclear strike capability against NK, along perhaps with some capability to intercept a presumably limited number of missiles NK could launch*. The second is important in judging whether Kim can see that pursuing BM/nuke capability past a certain point might not in fact improve the chances of his survival as leader, which it might not.
Also back on deterring a nuclear ICBM (or SLBM with subs with credible ability to get within firing range of the US) NK, a lot of discussion of this in US is just political tit for tat, Obama did nothing v. Trump is just creating more risk, etc. The real question is the level of risk (and/or concession to China/NK) the US should accept to avoid NK capability to strike the US with nukes. That has little to do with which party is in power in the US.
*though a couple or problems there, one being again SLBM’s which could come from different angles, same problem in that regard with ROK’s or Japan’s BM defenses from missiles coming from NK territory. And the other is fractional orbit nuclear EMP attack which could come from a different angle even if launched from land in NK. Terminal defense at least is called into question by those factors.
How much real risk of there being a rogue leader suddenly launching a nuclear missle at Tokyo or LA? Obviously higher than 0.0%, but all but a truly suicidal leader would know that an American responce means that their country will glow in the dark for a couple of centuries and their personal survial is at stake. This is an obvious exaggeration, but still the US retalitory strikes would finish them.
Both ROK and the US have the same problem with trying to decide when to launch an attack. ROK wants to maintain the status quo, but as you point out, the this will become untenable once DPRK has the means to deliver more than a single nuclear bomb.
Once they have that, then ROK can’t launch a conventional war and we’re back to a standoff. Will ROK decide that they can no longer depend on the US and develop their own nuclear weaons or will the US bring back its short range nukes?
No easy choices here.
I agree with this. Perhaps NK actually attacks us, (or a Trump tower somewhere in the world) but are they that stupid? And Trump seems too lazy to do all the work needed to actually start a war. And the same would go for a war with anybody.
Possible but unlikely. Kim Jong Un may be a ruthless bastard, but he is in no hurry to take a dirt nap. He will not be the one to strike first because he knows it just seals his doom. To play devil’s advocate, the next nuclear test may just make an already unstable White House strike first and then all bets are off.