How long would combat forces last in WW3?

[davekhps]

@Mr.Excellent

Well, if you’ve not yet even touched the enemy yet, one assumes they’ll follow up their nuclear attack with a conventional invasion unless stopped. Nuking those conventional forces certainly sounds useful.

Indeed. The problem there is, where are those conventional forces?

After a first strike, your command & control system is in a shambles. Your strategic forces certainly can hit enemy bases, ports and the such, but you’re not going to have nearly as much luck finding and destroying deployed forces.

[Anne_Neville]

@davekhps

Again, however, the kind of robust U.S. missile defense system required to upset Russian second-strike calculations doesn’t exist, not in practice, and not even on paper, contrary to what Putin’s propagandists parrot.

But have any of them claimed the New York Times as their source?

[Lust4Life]

N.A.T.O. did a study on the life expectancy of Long Range Reconnaissance Troops and the Warsaw Pact did a similar one based on the pre Nuke phase of the Bears coming over the hill, and both seperatley arrived at the conclusion that 50% of all those troops would be killed in the first 24 hrs.

L.R.R.P. troops in that scenario are NATO and War Pact special forces (SAS, SEALS,Delta, Jager Korp, Willy Sangar, Spetznatz, etc type troops) operating behind enemy lines, either inserted, or as "stay behind "patrols.

Interestingly enough our employers "forgot "to tell us this, though we had pretty much guessed it anyway.

We were told however, that if caught alive the bad guys would question us for three days max and then get rid of us, because after three days our info would be out of date, and we’d be gottten rid of as we were considered too dangerous to keep alive.

Melodramatic I know, but thats what they told us.

Never knew what the death rate for the second 24 was though.

[Dissonance]

@davekhps

You perhaps grossly underestimate the number of nuclear warheads the U.S. and Soviet Union planned on lobbing at each other. There were plenty to spare for anything of military significance. Lackland, 29 Palms, pretty much any regular military base (and many reserve bases) in the U.S. had kilotonnage dedicated to it. Conversely, by all accounts the U.S. SIOP simply ran out of useful targets to hit-- I recall stories of U.S. planners dedicating multiple warheads to cement factories by the end there.

Absolutely, you beat me to saying the same thing. SIOP

As part of SIOP planning, SAC or USSTRATCOM developed a set of plans and a series of options based on a target set known as the National Target Base (NTB). The number of targets in the NTB varied over time, from 16,000 in 1985 to 12,500 at the end of the Cold War in 1992, to 2,500 by 2001.

16,000 targets far more than comfortably covers every single military base and major population center in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and the US had a lot more than 16,000 warheads in 1985 so each of them was going to get at least one.

[msmith537]

@FoieGrasIsEvil

And probably neither would the morale or desire to do so.

Not to mention the lack of anything substantial to invade.

[lisiate]

@Dissonance

Absolutely, you beat me to saying the same thing. SIOP16,000 targets far more than comfortably covers every single military base and major population center in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and the US had a lot more than 16,000 warheads in 1985 so each of them was going to get at least one.

Note that that graph shows the total number of warheads stockpiled, including non-operational ones. From the graph’s caption:

These numbers are total stockpiles, including warheads that are not actively deployed (that is, including those on reserve status or those that may be scheduled for dismantlement). The numbers of active/operational warheads could be much smaller in the present time, circa 5,700 for the United States and 5,800. Inadequate historical data prohibits long-term distiction between the two, hence lumping all numbers together.

Those lower figures (for operational warheads) are for 2006, the 1985 ones aren’t readily available. So there may have been a shortfall.

[Dissonance]

@lisiate

Note that that graph shows the total number of warheads stockpiled, including non-operational ones

True enough, there’s a pdf file here put out by the DoD in 2010 with then recently declassified info. It lists “Stockpile Numbers – End of Fiscal Years 1962‐2009” 1985 - 23,368 with the note “* Does not include weapons retired and awaiting dismantlement (several thousand as of Sept. 30, 2009)” and “Definitions
*The nuclear stockpile includes both active and inactive warheads. Active warheads include strategic and nonstrategic
weapons maintained in an operational, ready-for-use configuration, warheads that must be ready for
possible deployment within a short timeframe, and logistics spares. They have tritium bottles and other Limited Life
Components installed. Inactive warheads are maintained at a depot in a non-operational status, and have their
tritium bottles removed.
*A retired warhead is removed from its delivery platform, is not functional, and is not considered part of the nuclear
stockpile. It is put in the queue for dismantlement.
*A dismantled warhead is a warhead that has been reduced to its component parts.”

[lisiate]

So there was a pretty comfortable margin over the 16,000 odd targets identified? Nice work by the planners there…

[Stranger_On_A_Train]

@Anne_Neville

I’m not so sure about this. I’ve been to the Titan Missile Museum in Arizona, which is an old Titan missile site. The underground part of the site was designed to be able to be closed off and survive a hit by a nuclear weapon. I don’t know if this design was ever tested, though. Obviously it never was in a war, but I don’t know if any of the nuclear tests were used to test this kind of thing.

“Hardened” missile silos (Titan II, Minuteman, Peacekeeper) were designed to withstand a near-miss blast. No feasible silo system could withstand a direct hit (within 500 m ground impact). This assessment was done purely by analysis, as above ground testing was banned prior to the construction of such facilities. This became a serious concern in the 'Seventies and 'Eighties when Soviet missile systems started demonstrating the kind of precision that would potentially allow for a deliberate disarming strike. This was the genesis of the “dense pack” proposal for LGM-118A Peacekeeper (assuming that fratricide between incoming weapons would neutralize each other), the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison program (rail-deployed Peacekeeper), the road-mobile single warhead LGM-134 Small ICBM “Midgetman”, and the various and progressively bizarre basing proposals by the Scowcroft Commission, which included basing PK missiles in sealed neutrally buoyant cannisters deep in the ocean or Lake Michigan, drilling silos more than a mile deep into the Rocky Mountains, and putting missiles in permanent orbit.

@Craz3d117

I honestly don’t even think a full ICBM attack on the United States would work nowadays, at least not to the extent during the Cold War. Missile Defense capabilities are extremely advanced, given that we’ve had quite a few decades to figure out how to defend our self against them. I mean, hell, we’ve shot down a satellite in space traveling 17,000mph. I think we can take out a few nukes. Granted, the satellite was at a relative low altitude (250km) compared to a mid-course ICBM altitude (~1,000km), but we have othersuitable defenses in place.]

Even the most ardent proponents of the GMD system acknowledge that it is strictly intended to protect against a very limited lauch by a “rogue state”, and would be totally inadequate to protect against even the limited missile arsenal maintained by Russia. The satellite intercept that you reference was actually performed by a modified Aegis-based SM-3 missile, which is a theatre-level defense system design to protect fleet assets, and was launched against a known target in a very well defined orbit.

@Craz3d117

We would also be aware of, and thus be able to launch against said Russian ICBMs much more quickly then the Russians could to us. Hawaii in this case is our ace in the hole.

I really don’t know what you are talking about, and suspect that you do not, either. Russian ICBMs would be launched in trajectories running roughly over the North Pole, and would be tracked by the PAVE PAWS installations. You appear to be referring to the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX), which has failed several tests and is currently in a limited test support role. Regardless, being able to retaliate in a timely fashion is not “defense”, except in the dubious sense of a priori deterrence.

As far as ground troops, whether they are taken out directly by nuclear strikes or suffer famine and depletion of supplies due to the loss of logistical support, they aren’t going to survive long. To modify Napoleon’s dictum, a modern army moves on its fuel tanks, and is not going to be able to pursue much in the way of strategic goals once it is out of fuel, food, and ammo.

Stranger