My knowledge is pretty limited, but as I recall in the movie The Longest Day, the Rangers scaled a cliff to take out a big gun that wasn’t even there.
It could have been a disaster. Obviously, had the specific landing sites been more reinforced, the firepower brought to bear could have been many times larger and the landing stopped. If the Germans knew for a fact nobody was coming to PAs-de-Calais, they could have taken all their artillery from there and doubled or tripled their ability to put indirect fire on the beaches, thus killing an immense number of Allied men.
Conversely, however, the Allies have complete air and sea supremacy. So you can’t do that in a vacuum; moving all those men and guns to Normandy cannot be done in secret, and would invite the Allies to do things differently. Having Germans shoulder-to-shoulder on Utah Beach sounds like a great idea to the Allies because it’s such an inviting target for naval gunfire or aerial bombardment. Hell, hold the landing off awhile; you could blow up most of Army Group West right there on the beach.
The problem both armies have is that troops are limited within a constrained space. You cannot simply pump more divisions into the same width of front; beyond a certain number of men, vehicles and guns, density of troops doesn’t increase your army’s effectiveness and can in fact reduce it, while simply giving the other guy more to shoot at.
The Allies had nothing like “infinite troops and supplies”. All through the campaign Eisenhower and his subordinates (particularly the British Generals) were desperately short of troops, particularly infantry. Even if they had had overwhelming numbers and supplies back in the Britain and the United States, as with all amphibious operations, the problem is getting them across the sea and safely ashore faster than the enemy can build up their strength in the battle zone. The number of troops that could be landed on D Day was strictly limited by the availability of landing ships and landing craft (don’t get me started on the numbers being used to take small Pacific Islands compared to the numbers available for Overlord!).
As to why they landed on OMAHA, well, it was somewhat worse terrain than the other beaches but it was well within the limits of what was acceptable. The troops that landed on OMAHA could not have been landed on the other beaches that day without causing hopeless confusion (traffic jams were bad enough as it was). It would also have left a 20 mile gap between the British forces near the mouth of the Orne and north of Bayeux and the Americans landed on UTAH at the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Not a brilliant idea.
It is also worth bearing in mind that although the casualties on OMAHA were higher than elsewhere they amounted to only around 10% of those landed on landed on D Day. Not actually a massively high figure for any attack on a prepared position and significantly less than seemed possible before the assault.
If the bulk of the German Army in the west had been based on the Normandy beaches the Allies would not have landed there! As simple as that. The operation was hazardous enough against the forces that were there, it could not have been attempted if they had been massively greater. On the other hand, if the Germans had flooded Normandy with troops they would have left a hole somewhere else.
[QUOTE
Nevertheless, the Allies made it through. It is a testament to the truly awesome force they brought to bear, really.[/QUOTE]
Actually, it is probably true that the Allies made it through because the bulk of the German army had been destroyed on the Eastern front where battles could involve 50-100 divisions or maybe more.
Ah, the old “all the troops were in Russia.”
That’s simply not true; the German force in France was very considerable, and was much larger than the initial Allied landing force. Army Group West (B) consisted of 55-60 divisions, depending on when exactly you start counting, and some 400,000 men equipped with over five thousand tanks. Practically speaking, Germany was putting about as many men into the battlespace as an army could put, and for several months the Allies were quite outnumbered. At the same time Germany had about 150 divisions in the East, but they were mostly quite understrength. There were more troops there but the difference isn’t as great as it’s made out to be.
What allowed the Allied invasion to succeed was their overwhelming firepower (especially in the early stages of the invasion) superior mobility (in the latter stages) and vast advantages in intelligence and deception. Germany was terribly outgunned in artillery, totally blown out of the sky, and of course completely unable to challenge Allied control of the sea, so even with superior numbers early on the Allies just ground them down.
It is worth noting, of course, that the invasion of France was made a lot easier than it could have been as a result of the staggeringly ill-advised counteroffensive of August 7-14, and the subsequent Battle of the Falaise Pocket, an amazing strategic disaster that basically knocked Germany out of France in one fell swoop. It’s conceivable a different, more competent strategy could have extended the war in France well beyond August of 1944. Fortunately, Germany’s efforts the time were characterized by competent soldiers being confounded by strategic blundering.