Does the United States enter WWII? Do the Nazis take control of Europe?
The main general point about subs v high speed ships in WWII was already given: subs had little chance against them if they maintained their high speed continuously, like ~30kt type speed as maintained by the British high speed liners used as unescorted troopships. However large warships travelling at more typical cruising speeds in the teens of knots, as they usually did since escorting destroyers had a very limited range at top speed, inability to maintain top speed at all in rougher seas also, were a more practical though still difficult target.
And the more so if they weren’t just going from point A to B but instead looping around in a given area. The Japanese sub successes against US carriers in the Guadalcanal campaign (sinking Wasp, damaging Saratoga for the second time in 1942) were felt in retrospect on USN side to be due to the carriers hanging around too predictably in a particular area near the island. In such a case a sub might sight a warship formation and not be able to get into position for a shot because of the target’s speed…but then the target would turn around and come back.
When it comes to USN subs v large Japanese warships they had a level of success, by 1944, not matched by subs v any other navy’s big warships. However, in almost every case the subs had codebreaking information about the likely whereabouts and destination of the warships. A series of subs might be ordered to lay themselves out along that likely course, raising the odds against otherwise still difficult teens kt targets. Japanese subs never so far as is known had such info against US warships.
What do the Japanese do? They are as screwed as they can possible be. Now they’ve got to decide if they are going to proceed with their plans or not. Not a lot of good options at the moment.
They’ve lost all of their large carriers. Do they have the ability to do anything?
Well, they didn’t need their large carriers to invade all the various islands they did in late 1941.
Did they use “jeep” carriers for air support?
I guess it’s all in good fun but almost every post in this thread is about something other than the OP’s question which was:
“How many WW2-era aircraft could a single modern fighter jet shoot down with guns only?”
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I forget how the movie ends. How and when in 1941 does the Nimitz get back to the 1980s?
If we assume it simply slips back into the future around noon on Dec 7 after having nuked the IJN, even the Americans would have no idea what happened or how or why. There is no NuDet detection network. No aerial radiation sampling. They might never even figure out that a really, really, large explosion had occurred. Much less that there had been a Japanese fleet conveniently located right in it.
The Japanese would face an interesting problem: do they complain to the Americans that somehow their fleet vanished so it must have been US combat action that did it? And thereby tell the Americans that the Japanese had been driving a carrier fleet into the Hawaiian island region?
Does everybody just quietly slink away from the event and Japan tries a totally different method, say economic or diplomatic, to break the oil embargoes?
Interesting alt-history indeed.
There were only two smaller Japanese carriers of any combat value at the beginning of the war, Ryujo and Zuiho. The former played a minor role in the invasion of the Philippines and again the Dutch East Indies, the latter saw no combat action in the opening phases. Predominantly the Japanese used land based fighters for air cover in the early conquests, which was in some cases shocking to the Allies due the great distances over which land based Zeroes were able operate, for example initially from Formosa to central Luzon. And relatively short ranged obsolescent Army Type 97 Fighters (later called ‘Nate’) proved adequate against the fighter units the Allies could muster in the theater in Malaya quickly setting up bases there and in Thailand, in northern Luzon also. The Army Type 1 Fighter (later called ‘Oscar’), available in smaller numbers than the other two, was also quite long ranged as it proved in operations from Malaya to the Dutch East Indies in the second phase.
The six big carriers were in fact not the key to any really major operation between the Hawaii operation and the raid to the Indian Ocean in April 1942 then Coral Sea/Midway in May/June. They were used to some degree: in the second, successful, operation against Wake, helping seize Rabaul against minimal resistance, raiding Darwin Australia, attacking Allied shipping fleeing Java, and a few other small operations. But the Japanese could have gotten by without their carriers, that is strictly holding them in reserve, if necessary insofar as the opposition they actually met in the major conquests through March '42. However, actually losing the ships in combat might have been different. That might have had a knock on effect from raising Allied confidence and morale and lowering that of the Japanese.
Thanks, Corry El.
I don’t know how the rules work. Would the USA have begun WWII by attacking first? Would the diplomats still deliver a late declaration of war?
As I recall the Japanese Zero’s guns were just 20 mm. Would a 20 mm bullet be able to damage a modern fighter? Dont they have some sort of armor?
“Just” 20 mm? Most firearms in that calibre are usually referred to as “cannons”.
It’s also the calibre you will find in the guns mounted on modern fighter aircraft.
So, yes, it would most definitely be able to damage a modern aircraft, if they manage to hit it.
They had 7mm machine guns and two 20 mm cannon. That’s .78".
After I wrote – but didn’t post the following-- Corry El added his answer but have different information as well
Land based aircraft for the most part. The invasion of the Malayan peninsula was protected by attacks on British air bases on Singapore and Malaysia by bases in Vietnam. The invasion of the Philippines was covered from Formosa which destroyed US fighters and bombers on the ground.
They captured the DEI in hops, using captured airbases then would attack areas within the limits of their land-based aircraft then hop to the next, building airstrips as needed. MacArthur utilized the same strategy taking New Guinea back while the marines used carriers to island hops.
The Japanese then covered their moves into what they called the South East Pacific, (the islands to the south east of Philippines) from their base in Truk.
They used their fleet carriers on their failed attack on Port Moresby, but withdrew after the Battle of the Coral Sea in which they lost one light carrier, had one of their fleet carriers damaged and lost a bunch of pilots. The US lost a carrier as well.
Because of how badly the Allies were disorganized, the Japanese forces possibly could have captured much of the territory they actually did, but it would have become much, much riskier, even if they elected to continue.
They were completely wedded to the Decisive Battle Doctrine and still thought that battleships were king, long after they should have realized the importance of the carriers. The believed that carriers, cruisers, destroyers and subs would help whittle down the US forces before the final decisive battle.
Japan was out of diplomatic options at that stage. The US was rapidly preparing for war and believed that it would happen in the late spring or summer of '42 rather than '41. This belief – of course – was driven by their schedule of trying to catch up after years of being asleep rather than any basis in fact.
For the Japanese, the preparations underway in the Philippines would have been the worst of their problems. By spring of '42 it would have been much, much more difficult to conquer.
They had been under a ticking time bomb since the oil embargo started. While they had some oil reserves, they could not wait much longer.
Yet, they had lost their entire First Air Fleet with all of their fleet carriers as well as two of their battleships. The US had not lost any.
This misses the point, of course.
The leadership of IJN would be completely frozen. The open insurrection of the Combined Fleet leadership against the Navy Ministry and the Chief of Staff had resulted in subordinates running the war strategy.
With the loss of the Kidobutai combined with the failure to sink any ships, Yamamoto would have absolutely no idea of how to proceed and there would be a power vacuum after the shit hit the fan.
The conquest of DEI, Malay, Singapore and British Borneo could very well have proceeded.
The more interesting question for people who actually understand the the strategic picture is what would happen in the Philippines, the key to the Pacific War in '41 and '42.
It would not have taken much for the situation to have changed there. For example in real history the US only needed to have taken more supplies on their already planned retreat down the Bataan Peninsula in order to have be able to hold out.
The US actually turned back supply ships already headed to the Philippines. The decision was made to sacrifice the Philippines in order to protect Hawaii.
With the Kidobutai gone and all threats to Hawaii erased, the US could safely throw more assets to the Philippines.
That is, if the Japanese could reach a decision of what to do and went ahead on the attacks.
This is a common misconception but the diplomatic note was not a declaration of war but rather breaking off negotiations. The formal declaration of war happened on the 8th, Tokyo time after the attack.
The US would not have attacked first. There would be no reason.
The Japanese 20 mm cannons were actually not particularly effective at long distance, either. Low muzzle rate. They were also not
Didn’t get the last part right.
The Japanese 20 mm cannons were actually not particularly effective at long distance. Low muzzle rate. They were also not on the same trajectory as the 7 mm machine guns which made aligning their shots more difficult.
They were more effective at short distances such as coming up from behind an enemy but they would not have that chance against a modern fighter.
20mm is larger than 30 caliber
and 30 caliber would hurt a modern fighter jet.
30 caliber AP can penetrate something like 11mm of homogeneous armor
Modern fighter jets are not flying M1 tanks after all
they could not just fly face first into a pack of Zeros claiming immunity to fire from either ammunition
They would in the face, which is probably where you’d most shoot a modern jet with a Zero, since you can not chase the jet at all, even trying for a side shot would be hard due to the jets speed.
Sometimes wonder if your English is rusty or something?
I said
Originally Posted by Corry El View Post
TBut the Japanese could have gotten by without their carriers, that is strictly holding them in reserve, if necessary insofar as the opposition they actually met in the major conquests through March '42. However, actually losing the ships in combat might have been different. That might have had a knock on effect from raising Allied confidence and morale and lowering that of the Japanese.
I have no idea how your post relates to any point ‘missed’ in this. The IJN could have held its carriers strictly in reserve between the Hawaii Operation and the Indian Ocean Raid had it felt the need, and sacrificed little. OTOH if the carriers had been lost, that could have had a more serious effect because of the morale impact on both sides. Can’t for the life of me see what’s ‘missed’ that you corrected. Is it quibbling with me saying ‘might’ when you’re certain it would be a huge effect? That seems silly if so. Nobody can prove what exact effect of hypotheticals like that.