# How much 'sovereignty' will Iraq have after June 30? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [April 12, 2004, 9:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670 "2004-04-12T21:39:37Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 8\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [April 12, 2004, 9:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/1 "2004-04-12T21:39:37Z")
I know, I know: Manuel Garcia O’Kelly Davis reminds us that ‘sovereign’ is just a word in between ‘sober’ and ‘sozzled’. But still. [Naomi Klein in _The Nation_](http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040419&c=2&s=klein) says that we’re remaining in control of Iraq in a number of ways past June 30: > [@](#): > > As the June 30 “handover” approaches, Paul Bremer has unveiled a slew of new tricks to hold on to power long after “sovereignty” has been declared. > > Some recent highlights: At the end of March, building on his Order 39 of last September, Bremer passed yet another law further opening up Iraq’s economy to foreign ownership, a law that Iraq’s next government is prohibited from changing under the terms of the interim constitution. Bremer also announced the establishment of several independent regulators, which will drastically reduce the power of Iraqi government ministries. For instance, the Financial Times reports that “officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority said the regulator would prevent communications minister Haider al-Abadi, a thorn in the side of the coalition, from carrying out his threat to cancel licenses the coalition awarded to foreign-managed consortia to operate three mobile networks and the national broadcaster.” > > The CPA has also confirmed that after June 30, the $18.4 billion the US government is spending on reconstruction will be administered by the US Embassy in Iraq. The money will be spent over five years and will fundamentally redesign Iraq’s most basic infrastructure, including its electricity, water, oil and communications sectors, as well as its courts and police. Iraq’s future governments will have no say in the construction of these core sectors of Iraqi society. Retired Rear Adm. David Nash, who heads the Project Management Office, which administers the funds, describes the $18.4 billion as “a gift from the American people to the people of Iraq.” He appears to have forgotten the part about gifts being something you actually give up. And in the same eventful week, US engineers began construction on fourteen “enduring bases” in Iraq, capable of housing the 110,000 soldiers who will be posted here for at least two more years. Even though the bases are being built with no mandate from an Iraqi government, Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy chief of operations in Iraq, called them “a blueprint for how we could operate in the Middle East.” > > The US occupation authority has also found a sneaky way to maintain control over Iraq’s armed forces. Bremer has issued an executive order stating that even after the interim Iraqi government has been established, the Iraqi army will answer to US commander Lieut. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez. In order to pull this off, Washington is relying on a legalistic reading of a clause in UN Security Council Resolution 1511, which puts US forces in charge of Iraq’s security until “the completion of the political process” in Iraq. Since the “political process” in Iraq is never-ending, so, it seems, is US military control. > > In the same flurry of activity, the CPA announced that it would put further constraints on the Iraqi military by appointing a national security adviser for Iraq. This US appointee would have powers equivalent to those held by Condoleezza Rice and will stay in office for a five-year term, long after Iraq is scheduled to have made the transition to a democratically elected government. So, I read the [the Iraqi ‘Constitution’](http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html) (technically, the “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period”) to see how it would empower such things. Here’s what I saw: Article 2: > [@](#): > > The transitional period shall consist of two phases. > > (1) The first phase shall begin with the formation of a fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004. This government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations. This government shall exercise authority in accordance with this Law, including the fundamental principles and rights specified herein, **and with an annex that shall be agreed upon and issued before the beginning of the transitional period and that shall be an integral part of this Law**. > > (2) The second phase shall begin after the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government, which will take place after elections for the National Assembly have been held as stipulated in this Law, provided that, if possible, these elections are not delayed beyond 31 December 2004, and, in any event, beyond 31 January 2005. This second phase shall end upon the formation of an Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution. The ‘annex’ is mentioned nowhere else in the Law. We don’t know what will be in it, or who decides what is. It _appears_ that its authority ends when the National Assembly is elected in January, but who’s to say for sure? Article 3: > [@](#): > > This Law is the Supreme Law of the land and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception. No amendment to this Law may be made except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council. A high bar, but it applies only to stuff _in this document, and the ‘annex’_. And the National Assembly gets to draft a real Constitution that will put this Law out of business. The only other potentially worrisome part I can see is Article 26: > [@](#): > > Article 26. > > (A) Except as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with this Law. > > (B) Legislation issued by the federal legislative authority shall supersede any other legislation issued by any other legislative authority in the event that they contradict each other, except as provided in Article 54(B). > > © The laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law. Section A says that laws from before June 30, other than this Law, shall still be good until the Transitional Government kills them. Section B is the usual boilerplate about national laws superseding local ones. Section C applies to laws and directives issued by the CPA, and the language is different from that of Section A. Nothing about the Transitional Government this time; it says those directives “shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.” Knowing that legal biolerplate has its uses - if you use the same phrase in the same way in two different places, you expect it to mean the same thing - one has to believe this means something different than Section A. What it must mean, therefore, is that the CPA’s directives stand as law _until a government established under the new Constitution, whenever that happens, is in place_. I still don’t see how any of this empowers Bremer to write laws that stay in effect once Iraqis ratify a constitution of their own. And if al-Sadr chases us out of there (or at least, back to our ‘enduring bases’ in the desert), I fail to see how anyone’s gonna make _him_ regard Bremer’s directives as binding. But if we hand over power to some subset of the IGC on June 30, it sounds like they will dance to the tune of the purse-strings for quite some time, and will regard Bremer’s directives as law. Not to mention, it doesn’t sound like there’ll be much difference in our military presence until the ‘enduring bases’ are ready for habitation. So, let’s open it up. Assuming the US actually hands ‘sovereignty’ over to somebody on June 30, how much or little will that actually mean? ---
**Author:** ![rjung](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/45deac/32.png) [@rjung](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rjung)\ **Post date:** [April 12, 2004, 10:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/2 "2004-04-12T22:02:08Z")
Iraq will have as much sovereignty after June 30, 2004 as George W. Bush had a mandate after January 20, 2001 – that is, diddly/squat. ---
**Author:** ![elucidator](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/8edcca/32.png) [@elucidator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/elucidator)\ **Post date:** [April 12, 2004, 11:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/3 "2004-04-12T23:31:54Z")
There is considerable suspence on that issue. For instance, will the newly soverign Iraqi government invite and beseech the American military to remain in order to provide security immediatly, or will they break for lunch first? Will President Chalabi be willing to entrust the security of the government to native Iraqi forces for as long as an hour, or would this be too risky? ---
**Author:** ![RTFirefly](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/c77e96/32.png) [@RTFirefly](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RTFirefly)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2004, 2:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/4 "2004-04-13T02:03:29Z")
> [@elucidator](#): > > There is considerable suspence on that issue. For instance, will the newly soverign Iraqi government invite and beseech the American military to remain in order to provide security immediatly, or will they break for lunch first? Will President Chalabi be willing to entrust the security of the government to native Iraqi forces for as long as an hour, or would this be too risky? Now that I’ve stopped laughing long enough to type, I think it _would_ be too risky of him - he’d probably get overthrown in that hour. Besides, it’s gonna be _Prime Minister_ Chalabi - apparently there are supposed to be three co-Presidents, but the PM will have the real power. ---
**Author:** ![PatriotX](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/c4cdca/32.png) [@PatriotX](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PatriotX)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2004, 2:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/5 "2004-04-13T02:29:31Z")
> [@rjung](#): > > Iraq will have as much sovereignty after June 30, 2004 as George W. Bush had a mandate after January 20, 2001 – that is, diddly/squat. Because… And… And… …? ---
**Author:** ![London\_Calling](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/49beb7/32.png) [@London\_Calling](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/London_Calling)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2004, 2:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/6 "2004-04-13T02:42:41Z")
Reposting this from before the weekend: [30 June Iraq handover questioned](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3600813.stm): " . . . the interim government to be in charge until elections for a transitional national assembly by next January; the assembly to draw up a permanent constitution upon whose basis elections to a full Iraqi government will be held by the end of 2005. However, the reality behind the plan is more complex. - security after 30 June will remain in the hands of a four-star American general who will command all military forces, foreign and Iraqi. - the format of the interim government is far from agreed. There is likely to be a prime minister under a revolving three-person presidency. The prime minister will have to have the approval of the United States. - the interim government will administer but it will not rule. It will have very little power. Many of its ministers will probably be the same as those now running the Iraqi Governing Council. - financial decisions will largely remain with the US since $8bn of reconstruction aid will be flowing in. The new US embassy will be the power in the land. . . . " ---
**Author:** ![PatriotX](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/c4cdca/32.png) [@PatriotX](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PatriotX)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2004, 3:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/7 "2004-04-13T03:31:58Z")
> [@Klein](#): > > As the June 30 “handover” approaches, Paul Bremer has unveiled a slew of new tricks to hold on to power long after “sovereignty” has been declared. Could’ve skipped this part. The quotation marks and the odd diction, slew and tricks don’t do much to enhance the piece or the excerpt. > [@Klein](#): > > For instance, the Financial Times reports that “officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority said the regulator would prevent communications minister Haider al-Abadi, a thorn in the side of the coalition, from carrying out his threat to cancel licenses the coalition awarded to foreign-managed consortia to operate three mobile networks and the national broadcaster.” Depending on the terms and powers of these regulators, ( I can’t get into the CPA site very well tonight), this might be a good thing. These are just licenses. They expire. They need to be renewed. Whoever heard of a govt calling a tax a license and not saying it has to be renewed. Even simple ID cards “expire.” If the regulator has the sole power to issue/renew licenses to whichever companies he chooses, the Iraqi government be damned, then there’s some problems. However, if this regulator is just there to safeguard the investments of the current license holders then it’s probably a good thing. The license holders, (presumably), paid a fee and in return they just want to conduct their business in Iraq. These guys are, (presumably), going to come in and provide some sorts of services to the Iraqi people. W/o such a guarantee, these companies, (presumably), would’ve been more reluctant to invest their capital in Iraq. Iraq needs the capital. International businesses need assurances. Iraq’s an unstable place. > [@Klein](#): > > The CPA has also confirmed that after June 30, the $18.4 billion the US government is spending on reconstruction will be administered by the US Embassy in Iraq. That the $18bil will be administered by the US embassy’s uncontroversial, yes? The presence of that much foreign aid could be turned into an argument against a country being quite as sovereign as it could be The presence of that much foreign aid. But only til the money tapers off. (It will won’t it?) > [@Klein](#): > > The money will be spent over five years and will fundamentally redesign Iraq’s most basic infrastructure, including its electricity, water, oil and communications sectors, as well as its courts and police. This is a good thing. IIRC, most of these things have gone to complete shit in recent times. For example, some power plants were from the sixties held together with makeshift replacement parts. > [@Klein](#): > > Iraq’s future governments will have no say in the construction of these core sectors of Iraqi society. It depends what “no say” _actually_ means. Regardless though it’s only for five years worth of construction. > [@Klein](#): > > And in the same eventful week, US engineers began construction on fourteen “enduring bases” in Iraq, capable of housing the 110,000 soldiers who will be posted here for at least two more years. The presence of an overwhelming, foreign, armed force inside of its borders could be turned into an argument against a country being quite as sovereign as it could be without an overwhelming, foreign, armed force inside its borders. But it’s only until the troop levels are drastically reduced. > [@Klein](#): > > The US occupation authority has also found a sneaky way to maintain control over Iraq’s armed forces. Bremer has issued an executive order stating that even after the interim Iraqi government has been established, the Iraqi army will answer to US commander Lieut. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez. In order to pull this off, Washington is relying on a legalistic reading of a clause in UN Security Council Resolution 1511, which puts US forces in charge of Iraq’s security until “the completion of the political process” in Iraq. Since the “political process” in Iraq is never-ending, so, it seems, is US military control. This seems to remove the Iraqi army as a political force, (though not the individual members of the army), during the highly unstable period while Iraq’s government is negotiated amongst the Iraqis. Again, could be a pretty good idea. > [@Klein](#): > > In the same flurry of activity, the CPA announced that it would put further constraints on the Iraqi military by appointing a national security adviser for Iraq. This US appointee would have powers equivalent to those held by Condoleezza Rice and will stay in office for a five-year term, long after Iraq is scheduled to have made the transition to a democratically elected government. Again, who chooses the next one? Official discussion of [powers equivalent to those held by Condoleezza Rice"](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html) and the wide variation it implies. The phrase doesn’t have to mean that much power. ---
**Author:** ![rjung](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/45deac/32.png) [@rjung](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rjung)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2004, 5:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-much-sovereignty-will-iraq-have-after-june-30/239670/8 "2004-04-13T05:53:27Z")
> [@SimonX](#): > > Because… > And… > And… > …? Oh, I didn’t realize the OP was looking for reasons. Short answer: There is no way in hell the “Iraqi government” will be able to stand on its own two feet come July 1, 2004. Upon receiving national control from the United States, the only way Chalibi _et al_ can try to prevent the place from degenerating (further) into total anarchy is to turn right around and work out a deal where the Americans stick around and help “stabilize” the country – even if that means sticking around for another two, three, or seventeen years. It’s rumored that a photographer specializing in high-speed photography and armed with ISO 64000 film will be on standby, to capture the historic nanosecond when Mr. Chalibi actually ruled Iraq on his own without American aid. 😃