# How often does has modern commander (US/other) ordered a strike on his own position? (Spetnaz/ISIS) **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [April 13, 2016, 4:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065 "2016-04-13T04:40:57Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 16\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Leo\_Bloom](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/leo_bloom/32/10377_2.png) [@Leo\_Bloom](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Leo_Bloom)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 4:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/1 "2016-04-13T04:40:57Z")
Extraordinary. Moving beyond words. See query: [Duty. Honor. Country. -- Transcript of Final Moments of Russian Spetznaz Officer @ AMERICAN DIGEST](http://americandigest.org/mt-archives/terrorwar/transcript_of_final_momen.php) ETA: Sorry about illiterate title. If a mod drops in, maybe he can fix it for the honor of SD. ---
**Author:** ![bob\_2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bob_2/32/3341_2.png) [@bob\_2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bob_2)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 10:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/2 "2016-04-13T10:16:55Z")
Like many others, I suspect Russian propaganda. ---
**Author:** ![Leo\_Bloom](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/leo_bloom/32/10377_2.png) [@Leo\_Bloom](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Leo_Bloom)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 12:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/3 "2016-04-13T12:58:29Z")
In light of day, I think so too. ---
**Author:** ![md2000](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/73ab20/32.png) [@md2000](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/md2000)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 2:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/4 "2016-04-13T14:50:59Z")
I saw a description of a battle in Afghanistan. The special forces and the Afghan friendlies were trying to take a fortress from the Taliban during the initial invasion. The US forces had a gizmo that would use GPS and an indicated direction and distance to pass a target to air force bombers. They were in the process of calling in an air strike when the batteries died. They swapped batteries and called in the strike, and the bombs dropped right on them. Apparently when you swap batteries or restart the device, the indicated target returns to the device’s current location. (Try to spot the design flaw in that concept). ---
**Author:** ![Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/e8c25b/32.png) [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Really_Not_All_That_Bright)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 2:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/5 "2016-04-13T14:59:50Z")
That doesn’t seem like a particularly credible source. It’s basically just some dude’s blog. ---
**Author:** ![Gunslinger](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/4491bb/32.png) [@Gunslinger](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gunslinger)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 4:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/6 "2016-04-13T16:46:02Z")
[It’s a thing that happens sometimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_R._Fox). I remember reading of a similar incident in Vietnam, but can’t find it at the moment. [It is a practiced-for thing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Final_protective_fire) to drop rounds right on the wire, potentially fragging the outer line of defenders, if a position is in danger of being overrun. Anecdote: My pa was a Green Beret radioman in Vietnam, one time his team was in a firefight with a vastly superior enemy force and he called for arty. A guy replied with a callsign he didn’t recognize, Dad gave the guy his coordinates and the enemy’s, &c. Guy said “Confirm danger close.” (i.e., “you’re a lil’ bit in the blast radius, are you sure you want to risk us hitting you?”) Dad ofc said “yes” without stopping to think. Once the rounds were in the air, he realized he was well outside danger close for any Army/USMC artillery shell. He gave the order for his guys to become one with the ground anyway. And then the world exploded. Turns out he hadn’t been talking to a USMC firebase with 155mm howitzers. It was _USS New Jersey_’s 16" guns. ---
**Author:** ![Chefguy](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/chefguy/32/138_2.png) [@Chefguy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Chefguy)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 10:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/7 "2016-04-13T22:15:13Z")
> [@Gunslinger](#): > > [It’s a thing that happens sometimes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_R._Fox). I remember reading of a similar incident in Vietnam, but can’t find it at the moment. [It is a practiced-for thing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Final_protective_fire) to drop rounds right on the wire, potentially fragging the outer line of defenders, if a position is in danger of being overrun. > > Anecdote: My pa was a Green Beret radioman in Vietnam, one time his team was in a firefight with a vastly superior enemy force and he called for arty. A guy replied with a callsign he didn’t recognize, Dad gave the guy his coordinates and the enemy’s, &c. Guy said “Confirm danger close.” (i.e., “you’re a lil’ bit in the blast radius, are you sure you want to risk us hitting you?”) Dad ofc said “yes” without stopping to think. > > Once the rounds were in the air, he realized he was well outside danger close for any Army/USMC artillery shell. He gave the order for his guys to become one with the ground anyway. > > And then the world exploded. > > Turns out he hadn’t been talking to a USMC firebase with 155mm howitzers. It was _USS New Jersey_’s 16" guns. I’ve heard stories like that before about the Jersey, not that I’m casting any aspersions on your father. I remember one story when I was there about her dropping a round on top of a sniper position. I believe the accepted notion is that a shell from a battleship can pretty much flatten a grid square, so being anywhere in the vicinity would likely be lethal. There was a “Broken Arrow” call made at the Battle of Ia Drang very early in the war (this was the subject of the book and movie “We Were Soldiers Once”). This meant that all available aircraft should come to the defense of the Americans who were under extremely heavy attack. Napalm dropped on the perimeter line killed and wounded a number of American soldiers. ---
**Author:** ![chacoguy](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/50afbb/32.png) [@chacoguy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/chacoguy)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 10:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/8 "2016-04-13T22:35:09Z")
The Australians called fire on themselves during the Battle of Long Tan, but the guy coordinating the fires wouldn’t do it. He brought it in really close, but not actually on the position. ---
**Author:** ![Chronos](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/chronos/32/134_2.png) [@Chronos](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Chronos)\ **Post date:** [April 13, 2016, 10:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/9 "2016-04-13T22:50:50Z")
Maxim 20: If you’re not willing to shell your own position, you’re not willing to win. And apropos to **Gunslinger** ’s story, Maxim 34: If you’re leaving scorch marks, you need a bigger gun. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [April 14, 2016, 12:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/10 "2016-04-14T00:33:04Z")
> [@Gunslinger](#): > > [It is a practiced-for thing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Final_protective_fire) to drop rounds right on the wire, potentially fragging the outer line of defenders, if a position is in danger of being overrun. Outside of Hollywood, that isn’t what final protective fire actually is. FPFs are not deliberately placed on top of defensive positions or right on the wire of defended positions. [FM 101-5-1](http://fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/fm101-5-1/f545-f.htm) defines final protective fire as: > [@](#): > > final protective fire (FPF) (JP 1-02, NATO) - An immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas. (See also battle position (BP), defend, and final protective line (FPL).) See FMs 7-7, 7-8, 7-10, 7-20, 7-30, and 71-123. The USMC Fire Support Handbook defines it [thusly](https://www.scribd.com/doc/19881476/7/FINAL-PROTECTIVE-FIRE): > [@](#): > > FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRE > > PLANNING INFORMATION > > - Final Protective Fire (FPF), in fire support operations, is continuous artillery and/or mortar fires on a preplanned target. A FPF is fired to stop and destroy an enemy force crossing into a defensive area. Artillery and/or mortar FPFs should be integrated with the maneuver direct fire FPLs/PDFs. > - A FPF is fired at the maximum rate of fire until the firing unit is requested to stop, ammunition is exhausted, or the firing unit is forced to move. > - The regimental commander normally allocates artillery FPFs to the maneuver battalions, which may allocate them to the company level. > - The battalion commander normally allocates battalion mortar FPFs to the company level.- Authority to shoot an FPF is that of the lowest maneuver commander in whose area the FPF is placed or his authorized representative. > - The FO has the responsibility to adjust in the FPF when the tactical situation permits. The FO may adjust one gun or all guns designated to fire the FPF. > - The FPF is cancelled when it is no longer required. > - A unit cannot be laid on both an FPF and a priority target. > - The FPF data table below is neither precise nor restrictive; it is merely derived from the bursting diameter of rounds. And here’s the definition from [FM 23-65](http://www.biggerhammer.net/manuals/23-65/ch6.htm#s2p8) BROWNING MACHINE GUN CALIBER .50 HB, M2 > [@](#): > > 6-8. FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES > > These are types of fire that are placed on a predetermined line along which grazing fire is placed to stop an enemy assault. This fire is fixed in direction and elevation; however, a few mils of search are employed during firing to compensate for irregularities in the terrain. FPLs are always laid in using the extreme left or right of the tripod, causing the T&E to move to the extreme left or right on the traversing bar. The FPFs can be delivered in any visibility conditions. When terrain permits, final protective lines are assigned to machine guns along the forward line of troops as a part of the FPFs of the defending unit. The signal used to call for FPFs is normally prescribed in the company operation order. The authority to call for these fires may be delegated to the platoon leader of a forward rifle platoon. Final protective fires are ceased on order. > > a. Signals. Arm-and-hand signals, voice commands, or pyrotechnic devices may be used in calling for these fires. > > b. Rates of Fire. When firing FPFs, the rapid rate of fire is used unless it is obvious that a different rate is necessary to accomplish the mission. When engaging other preselected target areas, the rapid rate of fire is used until commanded to cease fire. ---
**Author:** ![lisiate](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/f05b48/32.png) [@lisiate](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/lisiate)\ **Post date:** [April 14, 2016, 1:36am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/11 "2016-04-14T01:36:01Z")
> [@Really\_Not\_All\_That\_Bright](#): > > That doesn’t seem like a particularly credible source. It’s basically just some dude’s blog. There’s a bit out there, his name was Alexander Prokhorenko. [This article](http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-04-05/facts-behind-russian-rambo-story)looks into the story in a bit more detail. I don’t know anything about the credibility of Public Radio International but the attached radio interview doesn’t seem pro-Russian at all. ---
**Author:** ![rbroome](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/838e76/32.png) [@rbroome](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rbroome)\ **Post date:** [April 15, 2016, 10:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/12 "2016-04-15T22:40:33Z")
I haven’t looked this up, but I remember that very early in the first gulf war, some US soldiers were in a Saudi town on the border that was attacked by Iragi troops. As I remember it, they called in artillery fire on their own position. They were in buildings so that helped their decision a bit. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [April 16, 2016, 9:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/13 "2016-04-16T21:38:21Z")
> [@rbroome](#): > > I haven’t looked this up, but I remember that very early in the first gulf war, some US soldiers were in a Saudi town on the border that was attacked by Iragi troops. As I remember it, they called in artillery fire on their own position. They were in buildings so that helped their decision a bit. You’re thinking of the Battle of Al-Khafji; 2 USMC observation teams remained in the city when it was occupied by the Iraqis. They attempted to direct artillery fire _from_ their positions in the city, not **on** their positions; the Iraqis apparently were never aware they were there. Their presence in the city turned out to be more a liability than an asset in the end, from [The Battle of al-Khafji](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwielu6Rh5TMAhVCMz4KHW51CJkQFggtMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mcu.usmc.mil%2Fhistorydivision%2FPages%2FPublications%2FPublication%2520PDFs%2FKhafji%2520Battle%2520Study.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGDKzEPB9RwZ_Slu1_YBfCmwIr7LA&bvm=bv.119745492,d.dmo) (pdf) > [@](#): > > Although the Iraqis occupied al-Khafji, they were not alone. The 3d Marines had a pair of reconnaissance teams in the city on 29 January; they had not left with the air-naval gunfire and special operations forces. They were in contact with their platoon commander, Captain Daniel K. Baczkowski, at 3d Marines’ headquarters, who had informed the 3d Marines commander, Colonel John Admire, of the teams’ locations. Colonel Admire ordered the teams to remain in place.128 > Corporal Lawrence M. Lentz commanded a seven-man team comprising Corporals Scott A. Uskoski, Scott A. Wagner, Lance Corporals Marcus C. Slavenas, Alan L. Cooper, Jr., Jude A. Woodarek, and Hospital Mate Carlos Dayrit. Corporal Charles H. Ingraham III commanded a six-man team consisting of Corporal Jeffery D. Brown, Lance Corporals Harold S. Boling, David S. McNamee, Patrick A. Sterling, and Hospital Mate 1st Class Kevin Callahan. The teams were part of 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Company A had been attached to 1st Reconnaissance Battalion for Operations Desert Shield and Storm.129 > The intent of the 3d Marines’ staff was that these teams, hidden within the town, would provide a valuable view of the city during a counterattack. However, in practice they were a liability, as Captain Molofsky later explained. Their presence affected the “ability to conduct the counter-attack, because we’re not even sure where they’re at,” he said. “They did not even have restricted fire areas around them. Well, maybe they did, maybe they didn’t. But that wasn’t translated to us, so that when we want to do this counterattack and want to prep it with artillery; we don’t know where the Recon teams are.”130 > The teams were not aware of these issues. They carefully prepared their observation posts, set out claymore mines in case the Iraqis discovered their positions, and attempted to call artillery fire and airstrikes on the Iraqi forces they observed. They were not always successful; artillery support was sometimes refused because the teams did not know where Saudi or air-naval gunfire units were, and air support was still being sent primarily to the fight at Observation Post4. 131 ---
**Author:** ![rbroome](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/838e76/32.png) [@rbroome](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rbroome)\ **Post date:** [April 17, 2016, 1:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/14 "2016-04-17T13:16:04Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > You’re thinking of the Battle of Al-Khafji; 2 USMC observation teams remained in the city when it was occupied by the Iraqis. They attempted to direct artillery fire _from_ their positions in the city, not **on** their positions; the Iraqis apparently were never aware they were there. Their presence in the city turned out to be more a liability than an asset in the end, from [The Battle of al-Khafji](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwielu6Rh5TMAhVCMz4KHW51CJkQFggtMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mcu.usmc.mil%2Fhistorydivision%2FPages%2FPublications%2FPublication%2520PDFs%2FKhafji%2520Battle%2520Study.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGDKzEPB9RwZ_Slu1_YBfCmwIr7LA&bvm=bv.119745492,d.dmo) (pdf) thanks! I remember some of the early news reporting-which always seems to be significantly wrong no matter what the subject! ---
**Author:** ![BuckChongo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/ee7513/32.png) [@BuckChongo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BuckChongo)\ **Post date:** [April 17, 2016, 9:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/15 "2016-04-17T21:45:04Z")
Audie Murphy did it in front of witnesses during the action for which he won the Medal of Honor. His book To Hell and back is much better than the movie. ---
**Author:** ![Gray\_Ghost](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/c0e974/32.png) [@Gray\_Ghost](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gray_Ghost)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2016, 12:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/how-often-does-has-modern-commander-us-other-ordered-a-strike-on-his-own-position-spetnaz-isis/752065/16 "2016-04-18T00:35:48Z")
This [guy’s Master’s thesis at the NPS](http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA405987), citing Trainor’s, “_The General’s War_,” claimed the Marines called down danger close arty on the streets adjacent to the buildings they were hiding out in, to frighten off the Iraqis that were in the process of occupying the lower floors of the buildings the Marines were holed up in. > [@](#): > > Corporal Ingraham immediately established communications with his higher headquarters and began to feed valuable situational updates of the Iraqi activities in the city. The situation grew tense as Iraqi soldiers cleared the bottom floors of the buildings in which the Marines were located. The Marines were barely, just barely, managing to keep themselves hidden from the Iraqis. From the roof of one of Khafji’s building, Corporal Ingraham had watched the Iraqis enter the structure and had seen the tops of their helmets in the stairwell as they searched the rooms below. To encourage the Iraqis to move away from the building, he had called for artillery fire and air strikes on the street around him. > > Concern for the trapped Marines intensified in the 3rd Marine Regimental headquarters when shrapnel from the American artillery wounded one of Corporal Ingraham’s men… Not quite what I think the OP was asking for, but pretty close. I too vaguely remember reading about some incidents during the Vietnam War too, where U.S. forces ordered their own positions to be fired upon. When I find the specific incident, I’ll point it out.