How to fix the DOJ

I was suggesting a way to make the DOJ more independent from external pressure, like the Executive or Billionaires or Congress, etc - from outside the DOJ. Improper contact with DOJ would be criminal. This is also usually how AGs become corrupt - it’s the pressure.

But if the AG is corrupt, or we suspect it, they can be called to testify in front of Congress. They can be impeached. The President can fire the AG / appoint a special prosecutor to investigate their corrupt acts.

If the President/AG are both corrupt, like we have now, we need to rely on Congress (or States). It’s a longer process (years) and requires voting/people caring. It’s a pretty big stress on our system but we can manage it.

But again, laws can be changed, and they must be implemented by the people in charge. When they can just decide to not do their jobs, you’re stuck.

I’ve often thought that the US needs a “Do Your Damn Job!” amendment to the Constitution. A lot of what’s happening now is because the majority party has just decided to not do their jobs. The took away Obama’s SC appointment because the Senate majority leader just decided to not hold a vote. The Speaker of the House decided to not seat a newly elected Representative by just not convening the House for a few months. They let popular legislation die by just not putting it on the docket.

Okay, the majority can stop anything they want to stop, but they should have to actually go on record actively voting against things, rather than just letting it slide, and then deflecting blame by saying, “Hey, I never voted to do that! It was someone else!”

Make a rule that such actions must be taken up in an expeditious manner, and must be voted on. If the majority party leaves it sitting too long, that inaction is taken as approval, and the appointment stands, or the legislation is considered passed. They can drag their feet a little bit for performative reasons, but if they actually want to kill something, they’ve got to take a public stand.

As it is now, the majority party, even if it’s a razor thin majority, has all the power, and the minority party can do essentially nothing. This re-balances thing a bit.

We could consider ways to expand this to other parts of the Government, like the DoJ.

In theory, laws can be reversed by a later Congress. Agreed. Is that normal, though? Is that an actual reason to not pass a law in the first place? I don’t know, but I’d doubt it. Feels defeatist. I’d guess once something hangs around a bit, it’s hard to get rid of. I think of Obamacare and it’s still around. Even a decades long fix is a fix.

Yes, laws must be implemented. This is a tool that DOJ could use, or not, to force it’s own independence. I’d bet if this happened, this board would have a thread on How to Fix an Independent DOJ…“They won’t listen to anyone!

Pass a law at first, because that’s easier, but don’t act like that’s the end, and it’s fixed. You must go beyond the easier, temporary solution and try to pass an amendment. That can still be changed, but it’s a lot harder to do that, especially if it’s for something unpopular, like 90% of the Republican agenda.

First thing I will do when they elect me president is fire all six Republicans on Scotus for “behaving badly”. The constitution does not define “good behaviour” nor say who is to judge it. Every assumes it would require impeachment and conviction but it doesn’t say that. The president has been granted royal powers, so use them. The word “petard” might be relevant here.

You only have to look a couple of miles north of the 49th parallel to see a viable working example of how to appoint and maintain a non-partisan High Court. There’s another one on the other side of that large puddle to your west. And indeed to your east over the ditch. Quite a lot actually.

And if that’s an innovative bridge too far, there’s all those global best practice US institutions like the FDA.

So the only reason you haven’t thought of another way to do it is that you haven’t thought about it much at all.

The only difference I see between SCOTUS and the Supreme Court of Canada is a mandatory retirement age of 75. Both are appointed by the head of state. If anything the Canadian Court seems like it could be more partisan since the legislature is not involved. Both can only be removed by the legislature or retirement (other than the age 75 requirement). There seems to be a few requirements that they come from different provinces, which seems like a good idea (almost all of the SCOTUS justices come from Ivys), but I don’t really know why that would change partisanship.

What am I missing, structurally, that insulates the Supreme Court of Canada from partisanship?

Easy ideas to fix partisan courts is:

fixed staggered terms - no strategically retiring (or failing to strategically retire that is catastrophic), etc. It becomes less of a prize, and less feasible, to “capture” the court by certain parties since it won’t last very long.

more than a simple majority to confirm the nomination - you’d require bi-partisan nominees.

Well maybe it could, but it emphatically is not.

Now I could bore you rigid with the procedure that the Australian High Court justices are selected (The Attorney-General gives their recommendation to the Prime Minister, who then advises the Governor-General. The Governor-General formally appoints the judge. There is no parliamentary involvement) and yet the Australian High Court is most definitely non-partisan. It hangs so non-partisan over the heads of Australians that most couldn’t tell you how many sit on the High Court bench. Much less their names or which government appointed them.

The first trick being the Head of State isn’t partisan.
But they act on the advice of a Prime Minister who by definition is.
On the advice of the Attorney-General who also is.
But the second trick, and the biggie, is who provides, and on what basis, the advice to the AG.

But for the best explaination of how the appointment of a Justice by the Canadian GG on the advice of the Canadian Prime Minister does not produce a partisan court then I’ll need to call upon the SDMB resident Canadian constitutional expert of @Northern_Piper .

I can only counsel patience, but this is their long suit and probably well worth the wait.

There’s not a simple answer as to the difference between the US Supreme Court and the Supreme Courts in Commonwealth countries like Canada. It flows from some basic differences in the constitutional organisations of the countries.

One of those basic differences is that Canadians and citizens of other Commonwealth countries accept that part of the government structure, particularly the courts and public service, can be non-partisan. I’ve found from experience that American posters on this board question and reject that principle. Canadians don’t.

And the basic reason you reject the idea of non-partisan public officials is because your system is set up so that public officials are partisan appointments (or elections) in every case. The combination of presidential nomination, coupled with Senate confirmation, means that appointments are partisan, with the Senate confirmations sometimes highly so, not so much about the merits of the particular nominee, but because for the party out of power, this is an opportunity to oppose and criticise the President. For example, all US attorneys have to be appointed by the President and then approved by the Senate. That by definition politicises the DOJ, in my opinion, because if approved, the US Attorney is the President’s man or woman, and has been heavily criticised for political reasons. That’s pretty much the definition of partisan.

That’s not the case in Canada and other Commonwealth countries. The way to depoliticise prosecutions is to keep the entire appointment process AWAY from the partisan grandstanding. The regional Crown prosecutors are non-partisan, public service employees, nominated by the public service / Prosecutions office, and then appointed by the Prosecutions service, the public service commission or in some cases the Cabinet. By having a non-partisan appointment system, prosecutions are depoliticised. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognised that a non-partisan prosecutions service is part of our constitutional structure, under our equivalent of the due process clause.

Now move up to the judiciary. That same principle of non-partisanship is entrenched in our judicial system. The idea of electing judges is crazy. I’m not keen on electing DAs, either. You want a politicised prosecution and judiciary? Elect them, in a system where candidates for prosecutions and the judiciary have to be affiliated to some degree with the political parties. (This is not meant as a critique of individual judges in that system. They do their best to be judicially independent.) But electing DAs and judges, in my view, is inherently a partisan, political process.

Or, have every judge subject to a highly partisan confirmation hearing, where the party opposed to the president will do whatever they can to challenge the appointment, and the supporters of the president will defend it to the hilt, not on merits, but because that’s the political process.

By keeping the appointment process out of the political area, in Canada the appointments are depoliticised as much as possible. Yes, the Cabinet will make policy choices when choosing judges. But the judges, once appointed, are completely independent of the Cabinet and the PM. That’s a job requirement. And they don’t have the stink of the highly partisan confirmation hearings hanging over them.

For examples of how the non-partisanship principle works: remember that Trump tried to have the New York judge hearing his criminal case disqualified because the judge had made a donation to Biden and some other anti-Republican cases? And the judge said it was such a small amount it didn’t matter, and the judicial ethics board agreed with him? In our system, that would get a judge disqualified from the case and hauled up before the Judicial Council of Canada, which polices the judiciary for ethical failings. It happened recently in one case in Ontario, where a judge made a donation. She was investigated by the Council, which issued a condemnation and held that ANY political donations are highly improper, no matter how small. The Council didn’t recommend removal because it was a new judge, who hadn’t appreciated that such donations are not allowed, and had voluntarily enrolled in a judicial ethics course, and asked a Court of Appeal judge to mentor her. But, that’s the grim warning for any federally appointed judge. Make a political donation, even a small one, and your job may be in jeopardy.

Similarly, the day after the 2016 election, one very stupid Provincial Court judge in Ontario came into court wearing a MAGA hat. He later said he was celebrating the historic victory of Donald Trump. He got 80 complaints to the Ontario Judicial Council, calling for his removal, on the basis that individuals appearing before him could not trust that he would be neutral and impartial, particularly on matters involving racial and sexual issues. After all, he was cheering on someone caught on tape saying guys can just grab women by the pussy. How could a woman who was the complainant in a sexual assault case trust his judgment and fairness? The Judicial Council of Ontario condemned his actions and suspended him for 30 days. Judges DO NOT make political statements, ESPECIALLy in the courtroom.

And that same set of judicial ethics applies to judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. A couple of years ago, a judge of the SCC was at a high-end resort in Arizona. The allegation is that he got drunk in the bar, followed some women up to their room, was acting “handsy” and “creepy”, and got into a fist fight with a guy in the group. No criminal charges were laid, but a complaint was made to the Canadian Judicial Council. He’s no longer a Supreme Court judge; he resigned after the initial stages of the complaint process.

That doesn’t happen in your system, with the highly entrenched separation of powers. It’s apparently not even clear if Congress can pass a judicial ethics law. We don’t have a strict separation of powers, and there’s never been any question that Parliament can create the Judicial Council and give it the power to review ethical complaints against judges, all the way up to the Supreme Court of Canada.

(And don’t even get me started on judges accepting “gifts” from wealthy people who happen to have an interest in cases in the court. Unlike SCOTUS, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted our federal criminal bribery offence strictly against public officials who happen to have been given some money by a “friend”. There are also very strict restrictions in the federal Judges Act, barring judges from accepting money from anyone.)

To my mind, it’s an entirely different ethos and approach to the very concept of judging, and what makes a justice system non-partisan. Your system has partisanship baked into it, from the appointment of the prosecutor all the way up to the confirmation hearings of the Supreme Court judges, with a side of partisan elections for district attorneys and judges in the state courts.

(Apologies for the length, but as I said at the outset, in my view it’s a systemic difference, not something as simple as mandatory judicial retirement.)

Up until 2016, almost every SC Justice would pass with 60,70,80, and several with 90+ votes. Not unusual to get every vote with 0 voting against (Scalia, Stevens, O’Connor, etc).

The partisanship nominees/confirmations is new. Part of the reason is doing away with the structural filibuster that prevented partisan nominees.

I think Republicans would argue that it started with the confirmation hearings for Robert Bork. Of course, Democrats will counter that it started with the nomination of Robert Bork.

Republicans will whine about Bork long after the last person alive at the time is dead.

The Senate majority leader should not be able to refuse to consider a nomination. If the nominee doesn’t get a floor vote in two months, then the confirmation should be automatic. Mitch McConnell broke the system

As dumb as I think term limits are, perhaps the Supreme Court would be a worthy exception. I’d favor 18 year terms staggered so that every other year one is forced out. That way every president gets two picks. Not sure how to handle deaths, it wouldn’t be fair if a president got lucky and have two deaths plus two retirements to fill.

I’d like to see the president not nominate the AG or the FBI head. Let the Senate Judiciary Committee make the nominations by 2/3 vote so that we don’t get someone reprehensible in either spot. It’s ridiculous that we have never had a Democratic FBI head- the Democrats don’t choose one of their own to avoid the appearance of partisanship while the Republicans don’t give a shit about partisanship and always choose one of their own. Ditto for Special Counsels- they’re invariably Republicans for the same reason.

Or course, most of my ideas require constitutional amendments which are impossible to pass.

This is an easy fix that only requires modification of the Senate rules. The constitution only says that the Senate shall “advise & consent”, and as the saying goes, qui tacit consentit.

Thank you @penultima_thule and @Northern_Piper for the excellent answers to my questions. Many aspects of that system are clearly preferable to what we have in the states.

And this is another difference between your system and Commonwealth parliamentary systems. Because of the division between the two houses and the President, your system works best when there is a spirit of bipartisanship; a recognition that “we’re all in this together” and a willingness to work across the aisle.

However, as history over the past couple of decades has shown, there is no institutional way to ensure bipartisanship. That is one of the fundamental changes in the US political environment, and it is what makes it difficult to have reasonable government right now.

By contrast, parliamentary systems in the Westminster model embrace partisanship. We elect a government, whose job is to govern, and we elect an opposition, whose job is to criticise and oppose the government. The reason that works and doesn’t create gridlock is that we don’t have the separation between the government (the PM and Cabinet), and the legislative branch. The PM and Cabinet normally have a majority in the Commons and can get their legislation passed, so paradoxically, partisanship can go strong. If they have a minority (as is currently the case in Canada at the federal government), there is greater need to work with the opposition parties, but ultimately, either the government can get its agenda through, or there has to be a new general election. Gridlock is not a thing with us, which means partisanship can be strong in the House, but for government decisions outside the House, the government has greater flexibilty to be non-partisan – as in the appointments of judges, boards, commissions, etc.

(Note that I’m not talking about European parliaments, because I only know enough about them to know they operate differently from the Westminster system.)

That breakdown in bipartisanship in the US scares me, as an outside observer. Juan Linz, a noted Harvard professor of political science, studied presidential / congressional political systems, not just the US federal government, but in all the other countries in the Americas that have that system. He concluded that one of the key things that make presidential / congressional systems work is that the politicians have to have a sense of bipartisanship. If bipartisanship breaks down and there are strong partisan divisions, the system hits gridlock. When carried on too long, that gridlock can make people lose faith in their elected system and turn to other types of autocratic governments, or even civil war.

He noted that the last time there was a serious breakdown in bipartisanship in the United States was in the 1850s.

He’s dead now, so can’t comment on the current situation. But you can see where his analysis leads. And it scares me.

You’re very welcome.

Thanks for posting that. Good read. I’ll read up on Linz.

I don’t know about parliamentary systems except they kinda combine the executive and legislature, while the US separates those powers.

How does that make it harder to keep out a tyrant? In my simplistic view, it seems like it would be easier. If a simple majority controls everything, you’d need the MPs to vote against their party/with their consciousness, etc or your stuck with a tyrannical PM/ Govt. Or no?

Which is easier: for a small group to assume dictatorial powers, or a large group?

Right now, you have one person with all executive authority, including control of the military. That’s what the unitary executive is all about. And he currently has all that power. One person needing to assume dictatorial powers. Doesn’t need a vote in the Congress, just start ordering the military.

The current prime minister of Canada needs the support of 173 MPs to stay in power. He currently has a minority government, with 170 MPs. So to change the current system, he needs the support of at least 3 opposition members.

Of course, the PM could just do an auto-coup, and circumvent Parliament. But he doesn’t have commander-in-chief powers. The military takes its orders from the Minister of Defence. The Mounties take their orders from the Minister of Public Safety. Normally, the ministers make those orders on the direction of Cabinet, chaired by the PM. But what if they refuse to join the auto-coup?

Plus, the House doesn’t meet at the call of the PM, it meets at the call of the Speaker. If the PM tries an auto-coup, the Speaker could recall the House, which could vote the PM out of office. So he needs the get the Speaker on side with his assumption of dictatorial powers.

I’m not saying it couldn’t happen; just that it’s a lot easier for one person who already has complete control over the military, as a matter of the Constitution, to start giving them orders, than somebody who has to get other officials to sign up for the coup.

Another way to look at it: the US President has one of the most secure tenures of any political leader in a western democracy. The only constitutional way to remove him is by impeachment, or the 25th Amendment. In 237 years since the Constitution came into force, the President has not been removed by either the full impeachment process, or the 25th. The closest it came was Nixon. So even if we say that’s close enough to count as impeachment, it means the constitutional mechanism to remove the president has only worked once in 237 years.

In the Westminster system, the Prime Minister has no constitutional status. The PM only holds office so long as they have the confidence of the Commons. As mentioned, right now that means that the PM needs to hold the support of every single one of his 170 caucus members, plus at least 3 opposition MPs. It would only take a few to realise that something hinky is going on and vote against him in the Commons. That’s the way to remove the PM: a simple vote of confidence in the Commons, on a couple of days notice. No impeachment vote, no Senate trial; no formal notice from the Cabinet that then has to get voted on in the two Houses, as in the US under the 25th.

In the 159 years of Confederation, we’ve had 24 PMs, counting the current one. Of those, 7 lost their position as PM becasue they lost the confidence of the House, or there was a party revolt that forced them out. That happened just last year, when PM Justin Trudeau lost the support of his party and had to resign.

So compare those odds:

1 President out of 47 in 237 years got removed by the constitutional mechanism.

7 PMs out of 24 in 149 years got removed by the constitutional mechanism.

Which system gives the leader greater constitutional tenure, and makes it harder to remove them when they go rogue?

Personally, I think the Westminster system is superior. When your party gets in power, you actually can get things done. Stray too far from what the public wants, and they boot you out. But I don’t think it could ever work in the US because of gerrymandering.