Was there independent confirmation that those offensive things were said to his son?

Was there independent confirmation that those offensive things were said to his son?
Are you saying that you don’t think that the jury was told that Houck shoved the man down?
I started this thread as there is very little information about this, and I was looking to get more. A few posters have given useful information that creates plausible reasons as to why the jury would have acquitted, and while I see flaws in the law and the enforcement of it, I understand why a jury wouldn’t convict on the current wording of the FACE act.
The idea that the jury was not informed as to why they were even there doesn’t seem all that plausible to me.
Not that I am aware of, but it shouldn’t be a valid defense either way. I only include it to point out that even the most biased outlets acknowledge that Houck responded to mere words with violence.
The Heritage Foundation article says:
Emphasis mine.
Maybe the jury just felt the guy deserved to get his ass kicked? As Jimmy Chitwood pointed out, a jury can acquit for any reason it wants, or for no reason at all, and there really isn’t anything that anyone can do about it. My guess is that that’s what happened here.
So, you think the jury was instructed that it is acceptable to meet vulgar speech with violence*? That seems to set an interesting precedent. Lotta bigots say far worse things, and deserve to get their asses kicked. Is your guess that it’s now a free for all on them?
Personally, I agree with the posters that say it comes down to the limitations of the FACE act, and that there was reasonable doubt that the assault took place while the volunteer was acting as a patient escort to help women through the crowd that is screaming vulgar things at them, rather than acting as a counter protester at the time.
If you are right, then next time someone being escorted into a clinic is called nasty names, then the escort has the right to assault them. How far do you guess that goes?
Since you are speculating on what you think the jury thinks people deserve I do have to point out that the 72 year old man was shoved to the ground. It is fortunate that he did not sustain serious injury but it’s quite possible that things could have turned out differently and injuries could have been severe or even life threatening. If the man had been seriously injured or killed, do you still think they would have thought he deserved it?
*And that is assuming that there was independent corroboration of the words used, and that they were admitted into court.
Obviously not. But ultimately, juries are gonna do what they do. They don’t need to explain themselves.
Nope, but if it goes to trial then the jury has the right to find them not guilty for whatever reason they want, or for no reason at all.
Possibly.
Why on earth would you think he thinks that when he clearly wrote “the jury felt”, not “the jury was instructed”?
Is that actually part of the statute? Or is that just how the statute has been interpreted? Because I don’t see that in the actual statute:

To be clear, I am not saying that escorts aren’t covered, I just think that, absent some pretty clear language, it might be the case that merely being violent towards someone who happens to be an escort, even engaged in escort duties, outside a clinic does not necessarily violate the act. Rather, it may be, that interfering with an escort can constitute a violation of the statute, provided that… all the other elements of the statute are met.
So, for example, “…because that person is or has been…” isn’t necessarily met just because the person is an escort or even a patient. A defense could perhaps be along the lines of “No, I didn’t attack him because he was assisting someone in accessing abortion services, I attacked him because he was using foul language around my son, who I brought with me to the abortion clinic to protest.”
In which case, it’s not necessarily fighting words doctrine or anything like that, just a very narrow statute that only covers behavior motivated by a specific purpose. If the attack is not for that purpose, then it doesn’t fall within the statute.
Consider, for example, if a state passed a law to the effect of “It shall be a felony punishable by up to five years in prison to punch a person in the face outside a school for the purpose of interfering with their education” and someone charged under the statute said “Well, yes, I did punch him in the face, and we were outside the school, but that was because he told me my shirt clashed with my trousers, not because I wanted to interfere with his education.” Whether such an explanation may be credible or not would, of course, depend on all the circumstances. I mean, if the victim gets onto the stand and says “Well, yes, I did tell him his trousers clashed with his shirt, and it was at that very moment he went off and punched me in the face. He even said ‘You SOB! How dare you question my fashion choices!’ when he did it” then that would actually be pretty good evidence it wasn’t about interfering with the victim’s education, maybe even if the perpetrator was there protesting some aspect of the school’s curriculum when he encountered the victim. However, that doesn’t mean the perpetrator didn’t commit assault or battery (however its defined), nor does it mean they must necessarily be acquitted on the same grounds for a charge of assault/battery, it just means… if you want to convict them of generic assault or battery, you’ve got to charge them with that. Turning back to the subject of this thread, it seems like a politically motivated prosecutor declined to do so, and the federal government does not (probably could not) have such a generic statute.
Not a lawyer, not offering legal advice.
So, you think the jury was instructed that it is acceptable to meet vulgar speech with violence
I wouldn’t think so, no. But I could see defence counsel asking the judge to remind the jury in the instructions that they were not sitting on a case of assault/battery, and should be careful not to decide the case based solely on the application of force. The issue would be whether the application of force breached the federal statute and was an offence.
But, not an American lawyer and no idea if Federal Court jury practice would allow such an instruction.
Is that actually part of the statute? Or is that just how the statute has been interpreted? Because I don’t see that in the actual statute:
It’s how it’s interpreted, but that’s kind of the same thing as saying it’s part of the statute for the purposes of what happens at the trial level. (Rather, how it is interpreted is in the narrow way you’re describing). Sharpe v. Conole:
Therefore, by its very terms, the FACE Act requires that a defendant act because the interfered-with person was seeking, obtaining, or providing, or had obtained or provided, or might obtain or provide, reproductive health services. The intent to injure, intimidate, or interfere is a separate intent requirement that must also be proved by a FACE Act plaintiff. But that intent alone will not suffice to make out a claim under § 248(a)(1) without a showing that the intent to injure, intimidate, or interfere existed because of the motivation specified by the statute. Our precedent is consistent with this plain reading of the statute.
No, that seems to be the case. Houck admitted to shoving the guy in retaliation for what he said to his son, that fact is not in dispute. The jury was okay with that.
Do we know what the prosecution’s theory was? Based on your description, it seems that the defendant did not commit the offense charged. And, the jury likely acquitted him because he did not commit the offense charged.
There is some wiggle room. From poking around it looks like there was a little bit of a dispute between Houck’s lawyers and the prosecutors about how exactly to instruct the jury on this point (“but-for” / “substantial factor” / “mixed-motive”), but no matter what, they would have been instructed that he could theoretically have had multiple reasons for what he did, and still had the required intent.
If he was only there to make trouble, if he specifically was seeking out altercations with people he knew to be affiliated with the provider, then he could still have pushed the guy “intending to injure, intimidate, or interfere with the right to seek, obtain or provide reproductive health services,” even if he was also pushing the guy because he said something mean. Maybe the evidence could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the guy was there to start a fight with anybody who he knew worked there, and he decided to start with this guy because this guy said something to him. Or maybe he was only there to “interfere and intimidate,” but then it didn’t work, and the guy said something to him, and that’s what prompted the assault.
Not a great case to take to trial, and easy to see how a jury would not find that. But they could have found it.