Sorta. When the first resolution didn’t give him the result he desired, he claimed that he would demand a further resolution from the UN, one more in line with his, ah, reasoning. IIRC, that was Friday. Chin jutting like a real President, he swore he would make everybody “show their cards.”
By Monday, he decided that a closer reading of the resolution that passed was actually everything his little heart could desire. Apparently, the word “talk” was waterboarded until it confessed to being “kill”.
Or, as some skeptics will aver, someone did a quick count and realized that Bush was about to perform a high dive face plant into an empty pool. I lean towards that.
I am driving, parked for the moment, and about a hundred miles from home, but I will initiate a response, which will by no means be complete.
in order to ‘use’ the authorization to engage military force, the President still must do what the authorization tells him to do:
Read those carefully and put, in calendar/timeline order, that Determination “B” was written prior to knowing if the UN would act or not act to produce an unknown UN Resolution such as 1441 and whether Iraq would respond properly.
Had the UN or Iraq or both not acted to reduce the continuing threat from Iraq as it did, Bush could make that determination and justifiably so.
But once UN Resolution 1441 eventually was passed, it became part of the “ALL” UNSC Resolutions, mentioned in my previous posts, and therefore Bush is not relieved of the Authorization “1” language that has an “and” not an or, or an and/or that ties Bush to using military force only to ENFORCE “ALL” UNSC Resolutions.
I’m not a lawyer either, nothing close, but I am not messing with the written word, or inserting some biased subjective interpretation.
Let’s review what has been stated in the past regarding ‘enforcing UN Resolutions’.
Have we established, or are we in agreement that the language in the AUMF, under the Authorization “A” clause, requires Bush to **ENFORCE relevant UN RESOLUTIONS **with regard to Iraq?
Nonsense. There are numerous peripheral reasons that one might consider part of the full context of the war, including the hope for ancillary material and geopolitical gains. But such peripheral considerations are immaterial to the central discussion of its legality and legitimacy if they do not themselves form part of the casus belli of the war.
Indeed, it is a matter of settled history that the Bush Administration argued something akin to the Caroline doctrine of anticipatory defense in international law – citing specific material violations as part of the supposedly overwhelming nature of the threat posed by Iraq. That was the whole point of pressing the invasion instead of allowing further inspections to take their course.
That supposed threat included, inter alia, Iraq’s allegedly active chemical weapons programs (supposed hundreds of the tonnes of chemical agents, precusors and mobile labs), its attempted acquisition of uranium from Niger, aluminum tubes said to be capable of centrifuge, and the possibility of leakage of said WMD to al Qaeda. That was the totality and primary justification for the immediacy of action.
This matters because we know that each of these claims was false and exaggerated through faulty stove piped intelligence, and without such a threat there is no case against it being flagrant aggression contrary to the UN Charter system founded and ratified by the US. Had these threats been real, there would at least be an argument under nascent international law.
Humanitarian arguments were not part of the casus belli and could not be without any contemporaneous (2003) humanitarian crisis or genocide. Not even the recent expanded emerging doctrines like R2P could provide justification for regime change of this nature.
And that is the most generous interpretation possible. Even with the above, you have huge problem of the proportionality principle and the fact that the UN Charter system does not permit delegated enforcement of Security Council resolution. Such concerns make the Iraq War patently illegal according to most serious international law scholars.
Instead of re-writing history which I have been accused of doing, I hope that I am at least seen as trying my best to record the correct history based upon everything we know, and can read and bring into consideration the most accurate depiction of the mood and conditions and all that was going on at that time a full ecade ago.
I would like to revisit Post #006 which drew my attention to this forum and thread in the first place:
I responded to Tony’s summation with the following:
This is to put into context what started this duscussion about the UAMF and it’s language and why “IF NECESSARY” is so badly needed because the public’s perception of what happend has been improperly swayed by the reluctance by so many, high up the journalism and politics ladder from all sides of the political spectrum reluctuance to attach "if necessary’ to ‘voted for war’. I understand why the rightwing media do it, but I am beginning to see why the left media and audience don’t like to use the phrase “if necessary” to “Voted FOR WAR”.
I consider all of this to be very important in order to acquire a better understanding of what happened and why people from all sides think what they think about the ramp up to the US and UK invasion of Iraq in March 2003 that took place right now ten years ago.
This has been very interesting so far and hope it continues.
Unlike the more pacifistic anti-war liberals, ten years ago at this time I was ok with the ‘immediacy of action’ security concerns primarily because the argument that Saddam Hussein was in violation of international law at the time which post the September 11 attacks the prior year justified action by members of the UNSC such as the US and UK to put an end to that ‘perceived’ threat for once for all.
So in October the THREAT was high.
And we all pretty much know or can know the history of what happened because the threat was high at the time of all this WMD hyping by the government and the media.
But I cannot comprehend how Bush got away with making a case that the threat was HIGHER or WORSE or more “IMMEDIATE” in March 2003, with 250 US WMD inspectors on the ground in Iraq finding nothing but cooperation as never recieved before and finding all intel provided by the belligerants in this case to be flawed, than it was in October 2002 with zero inspectors inside Iraq doing anything.
The topic of this thread is MSNBC’s Hubris Documentary which did not address what to me seems to be the better charge levy against the Bush White House for dastardly war deeds than the ‘hyped the intel’ PR blitz that set everything off.
By March the US intel didn’t matter much in the decision because no matter what they said in 2002, the threat of all that was alledged to be in Iraq’s possession was being dealt with in ways never seen before.
But Hubris made no mention of inspections and the success of them.. Just didn’t have time to do it.
The PBS documentary on Iraq was the same way if I recall it correctly.
Skipped from the Vote by Congress in October to Powell’s Speech at the UN and then Powell being ticked off at DeVillipain and then Boom… Shock and awe Began as if Blix, El Baradai, and Amir al Saadi had never had much to do with anything.
Ok, here’s the problem I see with your take. If the resolution only authorized Bush to use force in Iraq to defend the national security of the United States AND to enforce UNSC resolutions, meaning that BOTH conditions must be satisfied:
Then the U.S. could not legally use force without a UNSC resolution authorizing it. We know that’s not true because that idea was explicitly rejected by Congress. That was the Levin Amendment, which stated:
You’ve already quoted HRC’s rejection of tying use of force to the UN, she didn’t then vote for an amendment that did exactly that, she voted for one that allowed the use of force to either protect the U.S. or enforce UNSC resolutions.
Then the U.S. could not legally use force to carry out a UNSC resolution unless it was also needed to protect the U.S. from a threat from Iraq. We know that’s not true because UNSC resolutions are enforced on their own merits. Had Hussein’s troops taken a UNMOVIC team hostage, for instance, and the UNSC passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to rescue them, under your reading the U.S. would have been unable to do so, because it was not in response to a threat from Iraq to the U.S.
Read it one more time:
Note the dash and the semicolon. (1) and (2) are continuances of the sentence that starts with “The President is”. Thus, it should be read as:
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq;
and
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
Again, though this is all domestic law. The case for the war being a violation of international law is much stronger, and yet much more difficult to actually make, owing to questions of jurisdiction and statutory limitations.
Requires? No. Authorizes. Congress cannot require the President to use military force, that’s the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief. Congress can allow or not allow the use, that is all (and even that is legally hazy).
If the authorization to use force required that the use protect the U.S. AND to enforce UNSC resolutions, the certification required of the President would not require the President to determine that just one of these was in effect:
If the authorization consists of two conditions that both must be met, why does the President only have to certify that one condition has been met? It makes perfect sense if there are two authorizations. The President must certify that diplomacy alone will fail to achieve one of them, but not both.
Not true. Read A and B and specifically how they are tied together. The AUMF language is saying that force can legally be used (US) if the ongoing diplomatic efforts fail at the UN and no new UN Resolution could be achieved.
Bush is free with the ‘and’ in the Authorization “A” clause making perfect sense that Bush could use force to enforce ALL UN Resolutions that existed and Iraq was violating at that moment and time, October 2002.
When UN Resolution passed a month after the vote, that Resolution superceded all the previous Resolution and Bush willfully and boastfully tied himself and the USA to that Resolution both as a permanent member of the UNSC.
Bush boasted often that 1441 was a unanimous vote of the 15 member body including the USA and UK.
Therefore Bush accepted the languange of the AUMF, supporting the efforts to get there, plus Bush accepted the language of UN Res 1441, wide awake and alert and aware of what it said, we must presume.
So essentially Bush satisfied the will of the AUMF when he accepted the language of 1441 that said essentially if Iraq did not take its final opportunity, the UNSC should have been convened to determine what steps would follow that including use of force.
Bush accepted the language of the AUMF and the UN 1441 when it came about. He bought that language and both documents and bound the USA to it when he did.
When he defied 1441 at the last minute because the majority of the UNSC would not go with regime change because inspections were working, then Bush at best deviated from the ‘agreement’ he made with Senator Clinton and others and was clearly on his own.
Or, force could legally be used if the President determined that reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone would not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq. Which is what he determined, and he used his authorization to use military force from (a) to invade.
Seems like you may support the Levin Amendment after all, since you’re arguing for an authorization that required a UNSC resolution before force could be used. Sadly, that’s not the authorization that was passed.
Superceded all previous resolutions? How so? 1441 doesn’t say anything like that, it actually explicitly refers to the previous resolutions several times.
If you want to make the case that the war was illegal under international law, that’s much more solid. The UN charter forbids the use of military force, except in cases of self-defense and when enforcing UNSC resolutions. The Administration claimed that the invasion was enforcing Resolution 687, and that they were legally able to enforce 687 under 678. This is pretty shaky, but that’s what the administration claimed.
I don’t think “accepted” has any legal meaning, here, not does “bound the USA to it”.
It was the act of a scoundrel, perhaps, but it was legal under American law. He was used the authorization he was given, in accordance with the conditions of it.
Under international law, it may have been illegal.
After reading my preceding post, think about this also that if “A.1” and “A.2” were connected by ‘or’ instead of ‘and’ then the JAMF is not really necessary. You must recognize that A.1 is generic and is there in the event of some realization of an immediate threat that might arise during the time that it takes to be able to determine if diplomatic efforts fail.
It is a simple test to substitute words to see of the original document makes sense or not.
Using ‘or’ or ‘and/or’ where you want to put it, makes the entire AUMF a worthless piece of paper, because of course the President can use whatever military force he needs to defend the national security of the United States should some situation arise that he thinks warrants it. You know, Iraq could have decided to defy the UNSC and launched that armada chemical weapon laden drones from off the coast of the Carolinas at any time soon.
In that case ‘enforcing UNSC’ resolutions is off the table and who cares. Otherwise, the intent of the AUMF was clearly to approve use of military force to enforce UNSC Resolutions including the one that might come about in the very near future or else… Bush gets to invade Iraq to enforce UNSC Resolutions That Iraq was in violation of at the time.
And I agree with HRC and Kerry and all the other Dems who at the time wanted to force rigid inspections by the threat of force and voted for an AUMF that said that.
I do not agree that Bush should be allowed to wiggle out of the language of the AUMF that he agreed to when it told him he was authorized to use force to “ENFORCE UN RESOLUTIONS” unless there was some other threat to our security from Iraq unbeknownst in October 2002.
When Bush agreed to the language of UN Res 1441, he was saying that he know of no ‘urgent’ threat that would cause him to ‘throw out’ the requirement to "ENFORCE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.
Again, it’s not “the President can use force if this AND than happens”, it’s “the President can use force if this happens, and if that happens.”
Nope, not generic at all, a specific authorization to use force in certain conditions against a particular nation. The conditions, though, being subject to the determination of the President alone.
I’m not adding anything to the next, I’ve quoted it verbatim multiple times now.
You say that “of course” the President can use whatever military force he needs to defend the U.S. if he thinks it’s warranted. This is not true. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 allows the President to use military force only pursuant to:
Here is a key point: in your scenario, when Iraq launches chemical weapon drones at the East Coast, that constitutes an attack upon the United States per (3) above, and he can use the military.
But what if the President merely suspects that an attack will come soon? What if Iraq is a threat to the U.S. in the long term, but not an immediate one? Then he must rely on (1) or (2), and in the case of Iraq, he got (2): specific statutory authorization, to use force to protect national security from Iraq, even in the absense of an attack by Iraq on the U.S., it’s territories, or armed forces.
In fact, let’s return to the Iraq war resolution again. What do we see in Section 3(c)?
That’s right, the war resolution was statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution, meaning that it authorized the President to use the military in situations other than in response to an attack, and specifically in Iraq, and more specifically to protect the U.S. or to enforce UN resolutions, should the President determine that force was needed to achieve either one.
As for the idea that the war resolution is a worthless piece of paper? Now, are you seeing why myself and others consider it exactly that? It allowed the President to use force against Iraq, based on his sole determination that it was necessary to protect the U.S. from Iraq.
If you maintain that the invasion was a violation of the war resolution, under American law, I challenge you to find a cite that agrees with you. I should also note that unlike the question of legality under international law, the legality of the war resolution was upheld in a court, in Doe v. Bush.
On thing I would like to point out, is that in my arguments I am not changing languange from part A to part B and visa versa. All language and interpretation remains as written.
You are still using ‘or’ from the Determination Clause “B” which is tied to the "Authorization Clause “A” which of course uses ‘and’ instead of ‘or’ connecting the two parts. You are trying to change or modify the context of “A” by reading in “B” what is not there
Clause “A” is binding both and two explicit conditions of the drafters intent that 'use of force is being authorized ‘if necessary’. It is very clear and is not subject to change by Clause “B” and if Clause B was intended to change it, they would have changed it. That is unless you can show that the drafters of the legislation made an error on a fairly straghtforward legislative document.
Clause “B” is addressing (see below) **reliance upon diplomatic or other peaceful means **
Use of “or” is proper here, just as “and” is proper in Clause “A”.
Determination Clauses “B.1.A” and “B.1.B” do not separately negate the requirements in THE Authorization clause whatsoever.
In the case of "B.1.A, if Bush determines that reliance on diplomatic efforts will not protect the national security of the United States he is still obligated to enforce “ALL” UN Resolutions Regarding Iraq which would be all those prior to UN Res 1441 unless of course Bush agreed to participate and enforce UN Resolution 1441. When Bush decided to embrace 1441 he had to have determined that diplomatic efforts were sufficient to protect the national security of the USA at that time, otherwise he wouldn’t.
In the case of "B.1.B, if Bush determines that reliance on diplomatic efforts will not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions then Bush can still ‘enforce’ UN Resolutions in place in October 2002. So Bush also determinied that the language produced in UN Resolution 1441 could likely lead to peaceful disarmament, so he bought into UN Res 1441, because the UN appeared to be determined to act.
The “and” connects two parts that are both continuing the same same sentence, and supply two distinct authorizations.
That is, once more:
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq
and;
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
This is not what I’m saying. The Determination clause doesn’t change the Authorization clause, it supplies a condition for use of the authorization.
Do you mean obligated in order to use to force he was authorized, or what?
But under your reading, if Bush determined that diplomatic efforts alone was not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, he couldn’t use force unless he also determined that force was needed defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq. Either 3(a)1 and 3(a)2 are linked conditions that must be mutually satisfied, or they aren’t. You can’t have it both ways.
Bottom line: I’m not a lawyer, you’re not a lawyer. I again challenge you to find a cite that agrees that the war was illegal under domestic law. I provided Doe v. Bush. If the case for the war being illegal under domestic law on this basis is so apparent, this should be quite easy for you.
There is one statement on what exactly Congress has authorized that Bush may use military force against Iraq, and it is "IF Bush Determines that it is necessary to (1) Defend National Security AND (2) Enforce ALL relevant UN Resolutions.
The language in the Determination Clause B, does not change the **and ** in the Authorization Clause A.
It just does not, IF you still think it does, please explain why.
Wrong. The statement has **only one **“IF Happens” and that is the phrase “as he determines to be necessary and appropriate” which means in the event “IF” Bush determines that is necessary and appropriate to defend US Security and enforce UN Resolutions then Bush has the authorization to use force from Congress.
And it was Bush not Congress that afterward obligated the USA to UNSC Res 1441 as Iraq’s FINAL OPPRTUNITY to COMPLY.
Bush did invade Iraq after he and he alone, determined in his own little disconnected from reality world, that the successful inspections going on as a result of 1441 were not going to lead to “enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq” and so he abandoned his commitment to UN Res 1441 and defied the active UN Resolution that most of the world saw as leading to a completion of Iraq’s disarmament obligations within a few months.
I do not find a way to say that the UAMF did not require Bush to work through the UN to try and exhaust every possible peaceful effort to avoid war and I do not find a way to say that Bush **did in fact **‘enforce’ UNSC resolutions with regard to Iraq when I read the language of the UAMF and UN Res 1441and what happened during four months of UN successful inspections.
The determination is under 3(b), and it says either necessary to defend U.S. national security, or to enforce relevant UNSC resolutions.
I am not now, and never have, saying that it changes what’s in 3(a). It’s evidence that 3(a) contains two separate authorizations, not one, because the determination required to use the authorization can be either of two conditions, without regard for whether the other condition is fulfilled.
The structure of the statute is quite simple.
(a)
The President is authorized to use force against Iraq to defend U.S. national security.
The President is authorized to use force against Iraq to enforce UNSC resolutions.
(b)
Before using the authority granted him in (a) or within 48 hours of doing so, the President must make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either
will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
It’s “either” and “or” because there are two different authorizations, (a)1 and (a)2. If the President were using his authority under to statute to launch an attack with a UNSC resolution authorizing that in hand, he STILL would have to supply Congress with his written determination that reliance on diplomacy would not lead to enforcement of relevant UNSC resolutions. TO USE HIS AUTHORITY UNDER 3(a) AT ALL, the President must supply this written determination. There are two possible determinations because there are two authorizations.
Irrelevant, that’s international law.
Correct.
Even if it did, it gave Bush to sole power to determine whether the UNSC resolutions, including 1441, could be achieved without the use of force. His determination was that it could not. You can disagree with that finding, as I do, but legally it was his alone to make. That is what the war resolution did, it gave the President that sole power.
Unless you can provide a cite backing your interpretation, I suggest we just let this matter rest. For one, we are not lawyers. For two, this is going in circles. For three, even if you are right, the statute’s reference to “relevant UNSC resolutions” applies to 678 and 687 as well, it says nothing of which resolutions, or what dates, and 1441 did nothing to revoke 678 and 687. So, 678 and 687 fulfill your interpretation’s requirements anyway.
You have changed the structure if the Authorization Clause. I am reading it as it is written. Are you still trying to claim the drafter if the document meant to write that as an either Defend or Enforce or both? It is not written that way and this is what is authorized.
I have explained why the ‘determination on peaceful efforts clause’ does not change the ‘determination on authorization’ clause.
If you have explained why you think does please advise what time that was.
I thought you replied that you were not changing “A” but you are - to match “B” because “B” uses the word “or” and “A” dies not.
Jesus, this is going nowhere. No, I don’t mean the statute has a typo, I mean you are misinterpreting the statute, and I’m trying to illustrate that in a way other than quoting the statute over and over.
Even though I never said that it did…
See above.
No, I am not.
Surely you can’t be the only one to find the war illegal under domestic law. Why not cite someone else who does?