# I Pit HOBBY LOBBY **URL:** \ **Category:** The BBQ Pit\ **Created:** [November 28, 2012, 2:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335 "2012-11-28T02:45:24Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 43
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/841 "2014-07-02T19:03:33Z")
I asked a similar question in another thread, but I’m curious: do readers of this dialog understand the difference between **Richard Parker** ’s cogent attacks on the precise weakest part of my argument, and **Shayna** ’s incoherent babble? Do people realize that I am having trouble completely refuting what RP says, and easily refuting what Shayna says? Or does it all seem like the same thing is going on? They say something, I say something, and the person that’s doing well is the person whose position you agree with? ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/842 "2014-07-02T19:06:55Z")
> [@Richard\_Parker](#): > > This is an evasion. Yes, obviously even textual arguments require some outside knowledge. > > But the question of whether it makes sense to say corporations have religious beliefs has nothing to do with the text of RFRA or the Dictionary Act. Your assertion that the answer to that question is in the text, or somehow available by common knowledge, is so silly that I find it hard to believe you really believe it. By it’s very nature, it isn’t a question that can be answered except by extra-textual reasoning and argument about the purposes of religious liberty and the nature of corporations, which is of course exactly what Alito did in the opinion. Why? The Dictionary Act says “person=corporation;” the RFRA says persons whose religious exercise is burdened are covered. Why must an extra-textual analysis answer “Can corporations have religious exercise rights,” when the statutes (read together) say they can? The opinion DID employ an extra-textual analysis. I concede that point. ---
**Author:** ![Richard\_Parker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/35a633/32.png) [@Richard\_Parker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Richard_Parker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/843 "2014-07-02T19:08:59Z")
> [@Bricker](#): > > Why? The Dictionary Act says “person=corporation;” the RFRA says persons whose religious exercise is burdened are covered. Why must the analysis answer “Can corporations have religious exercise rights,” when the statutes (read together) say they can? Because the threshold question is whether the Court should apply the Dictionary Act. And that question is answered, as a matter of settled law, by asking whether the Dictionary Act definition makes sense in the context of the other statute. Necessarily, then, the Court must decide for itself whether it makes sense to say corporations have religious beliefs. I think Alito makes a good and ultimately more persuasive argument for why they do. Ginsburg makes some counter-arguments. Neither of them are more or less textual than the other. ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/844 "2014-07-02T19:10:32Z")
> [@Richard\_Parker](#): > > Because the threshold question is whether the Court should apply the Dictionary Act. And that question is answered, as a matter of settled law, by asking whether the Dictionary Act definition makes sense in the context of the other statute. Necessarily, then, the Court must decide for itself whether it makes sense to say corporations have religious beliefs. Thought experiment, then: what kind of text could Congress have possibly employed to avoid this analysis, and definitively say that corporations have religious exercise rights? ---
**Author:** ![Richard\_Parker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/35a633/32.png) [@Richard\_Parker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Richard_Parker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/845 "2014-07-02T19:14:53Z")
Among the many ways, they could have defined “religious practices” in such a way as to make clear that it applies to the practices of a corporation and the beliefs of its owners. To drive home the point, consider a statute that says this (ignoring that this would be a criminal prohibition subject to different rules of interpretation): “If a person steals, the government shall cut of the person’s hand.” If Hobby Lobby has a policy of taking little old lady’s purses, do we cut off the hand(s) of the owner(s)? How would you answer that question relying solely on the text of that statute and the Dictionary Act? You might say that corporations don’t have hands, but of course they don’t have beliefs either. They have hands in exactly the same sense that they have beliefs. So would the law apply? ---
**Author:** ![Hamlet](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/hamlet/32/2818_2.png) [@Hamlet](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hamlet)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/846 "2014-07-02T19:24:53Z")
> [@Richard\_Parker](#): > > Among the many ways, they could have defined “religious practices” in such a way as to make clear that it applies to the practices of a corporation and the beliefs of its owners. Or, in the entirety of the legislative history, the debates, or the enactment itself, someone, ANYONE, could have said it covers for-profit corporations. Which, as Ginsburg points out, is very indicative that the imagined reading of RFRA by the majority is out of line of the legislative intent. It’s funny how the ignoring of the legislative intent in favor of the text of the document is exactly the argument **Bricker** would be making to disparage the idea that the 14th Amendment covers sexual preference or the due process clause covers sodomy. Funny how that argument doesn’t matter in this context. ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/847 "2014-07-02T19:28:07Z")
> [@Richard\_Parker](#): > > Among the many ways, they could have defined “religious practices” in such a way as to make clear that it applies to the practices of a corporation and the beliefs of its owners. > > To drive home the point, consider a statute that says this (ignoring that this would be a criminal prohibition subject to different rules of interpretation): > > “If a person steals, the government shall cut of the person’s hand.” > > If Hobby Lobby has a policy of taking little old lady’s purses, do we cut off the hand(s) of the owner(s)? How would you answer that question relying solely on the text of that statute and the Dictionary Act? > > You might say that corporations don’t have hands, but of course they don’t have beliefs either. They have hands in exactly the same sense that they have beliefs. So would the law apply? I’ve noticed that you keep talking about “beliefs,” and I keep saying “exercise of religion.” This was highlighted as I started to frame my answer about the lack of corporate hands to cut off. The RFRA says: > [@](#): > > Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability… So does it help to point out that, at least with respect to the RFRA itself, the issue is not whether corporations can have religious beliefs, but whether they can exercise religion. So with that in mind, i can more easily answer you: no, they don’t have hands at all, but they certainly can exercise religion. ---
**Author:** ![Richard\_Parker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/35a633/32.png) [@Richard\_Parker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Richard_Parker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/848 "2014-07-02T19:31:41Z")
It’s just obvious to you, without further argument, that a corporation can “exercise religion?” Really? I guess I don’t really have a rebuttal to that, except to say that I think it isn’t obvious on its face to most Americans. It may well be the reasoned conclusion we reach after examining the question closely (i.e., using reason and making judgments), but I just find it really hard to understand how you think it’s obviously true on its face. ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/849 "2014-07-02T19:34:24Z")
> [@Hamlet](#): > > Or, in the entirety of the legislative history, the debates, or the enactment itself, someone, ANYONE, could have said it covers for-profit corporations. Which, as Ginsburg points out, is very indicative that the imagined reading of RFRA by the majority is out of line of the legislative intent. So…if a Congressman, on the eve of voting for the RFRA, had said, “You know, by the terms of the Dictionary Act, this includes all corporations,” then you’d be on the opposite side of the question? > [@](#): > > It’s funny how the ignoring of the legislative intent in favor of the text of the document is exactly the argument **Bricker** would be making to disparage the idea that the 14th Amendment covers sexual preference or the due process clause covers sodomy. Funny how that argument doesn’t matter in this context. When the text is clear, the text suffices. The clear text of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws – read literally, that forbids virtually any classification that treats people differently. There has to be some recourse there to an external source, I admit, because the text alone is insufficient. But the RFRA/Dictionary Act pair suffers no such infirmity. ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/850 "2014-07-02T19:37:10Z")
> [@Richard\_Parker](#): > > It’s just obvious to you, without further argument, that a corporation can “exercise religion?” Really? > > I guess I don’t really have a rebuttal to that, except to say that I think it isn’t obvious on its face to most Americans. It may well be the reasoned conclusion we reach after examining the question closely (i.e., using reason and making judgments), but I just find it really hard to understand how you think it’s obviously true on its face. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore is a corporation. When I think of that, then yes, it’s obvious to me that a corporation can exercise religion. And I think most Americans, when reminded that the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore is a corporation, just like their own church probably is, would readily agree that corporations can exercise religion. ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/851 "2014-07-02T19:40:55Z")
> [@Bricker](#): > > The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore is a corporation. When I think of that, then yes, it’s obvious to me that a corporation can exercise religion. And I think most Americans, when reminded that the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore is a corporation, just like their own church probably is, would readily agree that corporations can exercise religion. Frankly, to expand on this, I think **Hamlet** ’s sticking point is probably where most Americans would have trouble: they’d readily accept a non-profit’s exercise of religion, but might have more trouble with a for-profit corporation claiming to exercise religion. ---
**Author:** ![Richard\_Parker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/35a633/32.png) [@Richard\_Parker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Richard_Parker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/852 "2014-07-02T19:46:42Z")
> [@Bricker](#): > > The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore is a corporation. When I think of that, then yes, it’s obvious to me that a corporation can exercise religion. And I think most Americans, when reminded that the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore is a corporation, just like their own church probably is, would readily agree that corporations can exercise religion. I disagree, but there’s no way to prove it one way or the other. I think most people would concede that reasonable people could disagree over whether a church can be said to “exercise religion” and that it depends on the context. A church cannot pray. It cannot be saved. No one would call McDonald’s an atheist. But I at least understand where you’re coming from if your mind finds no linguistic tension in saying that a church is exercising religion. If, on your reading, this is as simple as a statute that referred to “assets” or something else that obviously applies to corporation, then I see how you could believe it is solely textual. That said, I do think your position is even more radical than the Court’s. Alito at least acknowledges that it may not be sensible to apply RFRA to _all_ corporations. Do you think limiting the opinion to closely-held corporations can be justified by the text of RFRA? ---
**Author:** ![Iggy](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/iggy/32/3364_2.png) [@Iggy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Iggy)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 7:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/853 "2014-07-02T19:59:41Z")
> [@Shayna](#): > > _sigh_ yourself, asshole. The misinterpretation is spelled out in Ginsburg’s dissent, which I’m not retyping for your sorry ass. > > But again, this entire case relies on the assumption that Hobby Lobby is “paying for” these insurance policies, which they most emphatically are _not_. > > They may be writing the check, but **these are benefits _earned_ by the employees themselves by virtue of their labor**. But for the labor of the employee, the expense does not exist. But for the agreement between laborer and employer that the laborer will accept a portion of their earned income in the form of insurance coverage in lieu of cash, the expense does not exist. These policies are paid for entirely by the employees, not the corporation… A fallacy, at best, if we look at federal law. Suppose a company, say Hoppy Loppy - fine purveyors of gardening equipment used to harvest hops for the beer industry - decides to not pay its employees the wages which are due. The employee goes to court, sues and, and wins a judgment. The employee uses legal means to enforce that judgement. The employee is entitled to those wages. Suppose another company, say Lorry Holly - fine purveyors of Christmas decorations for semi trucks - decides to drop its health insurance for all employees. Absent a contract to the contrary an employee is just plain out of luck. They cannot compel the payment of insurance. Sure, the employee could sue but there is no chance of winning. Sure the company may now be required to pay [del]tax penalties[/del] a shared responsibility payment but those [del]penalties[/del] payments go to the federal government, not the employee. Many retirees have found out that absent a specific promise, their former company can legally eliminate their retiree health benefits. And it is[totally legal](http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/retiree_health_benefits.html)under federal law. But surely that employee worked for and earned those benefits! Well, he is not legally entitled to them _absent a specific promise to the contrary_. ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 8:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/854 "2014-07-02T20:05:12Z")
> [@Richard\_Parker](#): > > Do you think limiting the opinion to closely-held corporations can be justified by the text of RFRA? Nope. I think it is an almost inevitable consequence of the form, though – I think the more stockholders there are, the more seats on the board there are, the more dissenting opinions about religion will exist. But there’s nothing in the text of the RFRA that limits its effects to closely-held companies. Congress should fix that. ---
**Author:** ![Bricker](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/977dab/32.png) [@Bricker](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bricker)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 8:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/855 "2014-07-02T20:07:40Z")
> [@Shayna](#): > > _sigh_ yourself, asshole. The misinterpretation is spelled out in Ginsburg’s dissent, which I’m not retyping for your sorry ass. No, it’s not. I just gave you the actual laws in play. Tell me where the misinterpretation is. > [@](#): > > But again, this entire case relies on the assumption that Hobby Lobby is “paying for” these insurance policies, which they most emphatically are _not_. > > They may be writing the check, but these are benefits _earned_ by the employees themselves by virtue of their labor. But for the labor of the employee, the expense does not exist. But for the agreement between laborer and employer that the laborer will accept a portion of their earned income in the form of insurance coverage in lieu of cash, the expense does not exist. These policies are paid for entirely by the employees, not the corporation. Then let the employees decline the coverage and sign up for health care on their own. Problem solved. ---
**Author:** ![Snowboarder\_Bo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/snowboarder_bo/32/229_2.png) [@Snowboarder\_Bo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Snowboarder_Bo)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 8:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/856 "2014-07-02T20:15:25Z")
> [@Bricker](#): > > How does a corporation get free speech rights? The New York Times, a corporation, published the Pentagon Papers. Because the corporation had free speech rights, they avoided criminal penalties. But how? Didn’t that corporation legally separate the owners from the business? This is not accurate, and since is the Pit I’ll go ahead and say you know it and are deliberately trying to deceive people into thinking that the Pentagon Papers case invoked the same clause of the law that Hobby Lobby successfully exploited. [Cite. > [@](#): > > In February 1971 Ellsberg discussed the study with New York Times reporter Neil Sheehan, and gave 43 of the volumes to him in March. Before publication, The New York Times sought legal advice. The paper’s regular outside counsel, Lord Day & Lord, advised against publication,[8] but house counsel James Goodale prevailed with his argument that the press had a First Amendment right to publish information significant to the people’s understanding of their government’s policy. ]([Pentagon Papers - Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_Papers)) [Cite. > [@](#): > > The question before the court was whether the constitutional freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was subordinate to a claimed need of the executive branch of government to maintain the secrecy of information. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did protect the right of the New York Times to print the materials. ]([New York Times Co. v. United States - Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Times_Co._v._United_States)) That case was decided in favor of the NYT because the press is explicitly given 1st Amendment rights, not because the NYT was a corporation and thus, under the Dictionary Act, a person deserving 1st Amendment rights. What an utterly craven, immoral thing you did there: lying under the guise of authority in order to further your own political agenda. I thought you thought you were better than that, **Bricker**. [I’m not sure why I thought that, given your past](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?p=13662004), but there it is. ---
**Author:** ![bup](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/6bbea6/32.png) [@bup](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bup)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 8:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/857 "2014-07-02T20:21:00Z")
(back when \*\*Bricker \*\*was talking about corporations exercising religion - easier to identify than corporations having religious beliefs) But, if I understand things, there’s a test the court applies regarding the sincerity of the corporation in exercising religion. That is a test of the corporation’s religious _belief_, isn’t it? It’s not enough to observe what the corporation _does_, we have to get into its mind and know what its _true intent_ is. [del]Also, I don’t think you’ve addressed why this should apply to closely held corporations and not to private, but not closely held, or publicly traded corporations. Can’t stockholders vote on the corporation’s religious beliefs and codify them?[/del]Now you have. And that’s the most troubling part to me. This ruling applies to these special snowflakes, but not these, but we didn’t say why. ---
**Author:** ![SteveG1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/bb73d2/32.png) [@SteveG1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SteveG1)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 8:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/858 "2014-07-02T20:26:17Z")
> [@Bricker](#): > > Frankly, to expand on this, I think **Hamlet** ’s sticking point is probably where most Americans would have trouble: they’d readily accept a non-profit’s exercise of religion, but might have more trouble with a for-profit corporation claiming to exercise religion. And you’re correct… other than the additional fact that Hobby Lobby has in the past invested in the very birth control companies it “has issues” with now. ---
**Author:** ![SteveG1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/bb73d2/32.png) [@SteveG1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SteveG1)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 8:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/859 "2014-07-02T20:28:05Z")
> [@vinyl turnip](#): > > now that corporations are people, maybe you guys can organize a three-way. roflmao ---
**Author:** ![SteveG1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/bb73d2/32.png) [@SteveG1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SteveG1)\ **Post date:** [July 2, 2014, 8:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335/860 "2014-07-02T20:30:04Z")
> [@LavenderBlue](#): > > Gosh I’m Jewish and even I think of a particular something the New Testament says about a rich man, a camel and the eye of a needle. > > Ah. Found it: > > I’m perfectly happy to decouple health insurance from employment. We could join the civilized world in this arena. That would be good. Until then, it seems rather ridiculous for a company that does business with China – where they force abortions — and then pontificate about the evils of using the profits to help pay for birth control. Good points. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335.md?page=42) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/i-pit-hobby-lobby/642335.md?page=44)