here’s a hint: its extension does not include decartes’s cogito.
Proof is the standard for which Descartes reached, and that is the only reason his Meditations have ever been considered important. Do you really think people have remembered his work for centuries because he told them, “guess what, there’s a really, really, really good chance that you exist.”
A proof, specifically in this context, would be a sound, valid, and non-trivial argument that concludes with: “I exist”. Does that ring any bells? It is what you have been, mistakenly, claiming to possess for the last several pages of this thread.
This situation is not analagous to the one we are dealing with in important ways. Perhaps a moment’s reflection will reveal it to you because I no longer have faith in my ability to demonstrate even trivial points.
We’ve repeated it, bolded it, italicized it, used sentence fragments for emphasis, and yet we return here again. What on earth makes you think we are arguing for nonexistence?
I’m sorry you feel this applies in this case. I’ve no inclination to discuss a more general one.
Rocks don’t think. They exist. xD
I don’t, and haven’t said I did. However, what you all are arguing for is the possibility of non-existence. If there is no possibility whatsoever of non-existence, then existence is certain (aka proven). As you all continue to assert that nothing has been proven, you must be asserting that there remains the possibility “I do not exist.”
If no alternate explanation, which does not include my existence, can be determined that can explain my perception of reality, then my existence can be accepted with the strengh of scientific law. If it is proven that my non-existence cannot be reconciled with the appearance of the experience of reality, then I have proven that I exist (because, regardless of the mechanism behind it, I am in fact appearing to experience reality).
Greetings, pokua! Not to get contrary on you, but as we’ve already covered this: The proof, on the face of it, only applies to things that think. This is because Descartes’s argument can only be applied to attempt to prove the existence of the thing doing the arguement. Since rocks don’t think (cite? :p), there is no proof one way or the other.
Yes, it is every bit as certain as Newton’s Laws of Motion.
I do wonder when you decided that the standard of proof was that of scientific law, BTW. You started out arguing for the standard of formal logic, which is a bit more rigorous. You do like ot present a shifty target, don’t you.
What you argue now, of course, if proof by exhaustion. All of the explanations for your perceptions that you can imagine include your existence. Thus, you arrogantly decree that no explantion beyond your imagination is possible. “It has been proven,” you declare, “because I cannot conceive of an alternative.” In case you are wondering, the underluing assumption this time is that reality is bounded by your imagination.
I think that has only been mentioned once, and in passing at that. We have been arguing that it might be possible that there is no consistent self, but that is more tangential than anything.
When you construct that proof you let me know.
No, we’ve been arguing that “I am” was not proven, not that it isn’t true.
If your perception of reality tells you that, you are right: I can’t explain it.
Perhaps. If you do it like Descartes, however, it is certain that you assumed what you wanted to prove.
Here you go. (I tossed it out inexplicitly earlier, but what the heck.)
Things that do not exist do not have properties.
Variance is a property, or an aspect of a property.
Therefore, things that do not exist have no variance.
If there is “apparent” variance, then that variance was introduced at some point.
Any source of apparent variance is actually presenting some variation of some existing object’s actual variance.*
My thoughts/perceptions do not appear to be constant, either across time or in comparison to themselves.
Therefore, My thoughts/perceptions are actually presenting some variation of some existing object’s actual variance.*
- The generous verbiage merely means that you can’t tell the actual nature of the thing that exists, which is very very old news.
The sentence you quoted was immidiately followed by one that stated:
You do like to selectively pick apart quotes. Ramanujan was mantaining (in short) that “I exist” could be known only with the strength of scientific law. I demonstrate above a proof that adheres to the rigors of logic, and has as certain an outcome.
Now, this is and interesting point. My fabulous mindreading skills don’t work on dead people, and frankly, the quote you provided seems less than rigorious by any definition. Maybe it occured to him that his thoughts were certainly existant by the virtue of their variances; maybe he was merely so stuck on the inherent wonderfulness of of his own cognition that he could not begin to think of its nonexistence.
Nonetheless, wether he skipped the meditation on the nonvariance of nothingness, or merely didn’t bother to write it down, the process is otherwise the same. First: notice cognition. (The senses are uncertain, but thought is occuring. -Or appears to be.) State that thoughts are inconsistent with non-existence. (It woulda been nice had he bothered to prove this…) Conclude that the apparent thoughts are inconsistent with nonexistence. Proof of actual existence. Straightforward. Not circular. Full of skipped steps and unrigorous speech, but not circular. And, with a bit of spit, polish, and the bits filled in, the proof is as strong as Descartes thought. Maybe it was better in the French.
i beg to differ.
if you are admitting your existence before you start, who is noticing this cognition?
ahem. if you are not admitting your existence…
sorry for the confusion.
Why isn’t “invariant” a property?
Then how do you know they are all “yours”?
I don’t think it has been demonstrated that logic’s rigor is appropriate in this circumstance.
I’d be happy to. (Whoops, there’s that circle again!)
Hey begbert2. No prob. I only read a few entries before getting an opinion of my own. ^^ Obviously I don’t think before I speak (or this case right).
And you like to tell lies. We all have our faults.
Yes, it was, but you have offered no sound, non-circular proof that “I exist”. At the time of my post, you had most recently offered a vague attempt at proof by exhaustion. Since it is by no means reasonable to allow your imagination to form the boundary of possibilities for reality, said attempt was obviously inadequate to meet the standards of logic.
I even said so in that part of my post that you chose not to selectively pick apart.
You have an unusual idea of the rigors of logic. You have not used formal notation, a point I raise only because it makes it difficult to know how you intend certain elements of your language to be understood. Erl has already raised the issue of variance/invariance, but therre are others. The major problem with your proof, though, is that it never reaches the conclusion that you are aiming for: “I exist”. Even if we look past all of the other issues with your treatment, it never justifies “I”. The best it could argue is that “something exists”.
You seem to be hoping to bridge the gap with an unstated assumption that I am the cause of the thoughts that I perceive as originating from I. It is pretty difficult to support that assumption as reasonable prior to the conclusion that I exist. Thus, your proof is unsound (More precisely, it if is sound then it is circular.)
By the numbers:
[ol]
[li]Things that do not exist do not have properties. Is “having no properties” a property? This is a variation on erl’s question, but I hope it also recalls my earlier question to you (unanswered) “have you ever stopped to question by what right you so blithely assign properties to ‘nothing’, or exactly how you have built the dichotomy between “existence” and “nothingness”.” You seem inclined to pass over such issues without comment, or at most a claim of “definition”, but if you are going to build the concepts into your logical structure then they need a more explicit treatment. Consider, for instance, “Santa Claus” and “a method for squaring a circle”. Both English symbols represent “things that do not exist”, yet they both also point to “different things”. How does this map to the property of “having no properties”?[/li]
[li]Variance is a property, or an aspect of a property. First-order predicate? This is where informality of language becomes a problem, since I am uncertain which subjects you want to declare may validly possess the quality “variance”.[/li]
[li]Therefore, things that do not exist have no variance. See erl.[/li]
[li]If there is “apparent” variance, then that variance was introduced at some point. This, of course, represents an implicite assumption of causality. Right here, you are excluding possible realities in which causation does not hold.[/li]
[li]Any source of apparent variance is actually presenting some variation of some existing object’s actual variance. This really just extends your implication of causality and assigns it explicitely to a “source” of apparent variance. At least, that is all that would seem warranted or necessary given the structure of your argument. However, you further restrict your set of possible worlds by now declaring that the “presented” variance is necessarily a 'variation of some existing object’s actual variance. In one step you have asserted an existing object whose “actual variance” is being "presented " in some “apparent variation”. So, right here you exclude any number of solipsistic realities in which variance is a function of perception with no “existing” object. You also, it would seem, exclude optical illusions from your reality: Is the drawing a young girl or an old hag? What existing object varies when your perception changes from one to the other? Watch out for those circles, now.[/li]
[li]My thoughts/perceptions do not appear to be constant, either across time or in comparison to themselves. See erl.[/li]
[li]Therefore, My thoughts/perceptions are actually presenting some variation of some existing object’s actual variance. How, at this stage of your argument, do you justify assigning a single cause to the varying hpenomena that you are calling “My thoughts/perceptions”?[/ol][/li]
Wait – that’s the end of your “proof”. But we still haven’t reached “I”. At best you have reached: a source for this set of thoughts/perceptions exists. Really, you had that as soon as you assumed that causality held for thoughts/perceptions. That doesn’t mean “I” am the source.
Hello again.
Ramanujan, most people spend much of their time noticing cognition, or noticing things that, if you follow the Descartian argument, are effects of cognition. As I’m attempting to demonstrate that this apparent effect cannot occur without existence, it seems reasonable to refer to it.
I am not attempting to say, “Because we are observing it, we exist.” Just because you can find circular/fallacious arguments that approach a given conclusion, does not mean that that all arguments with that conclusion are fallacious.
erislover,
“invariant” can be a property, but it need not be. Note that "variance is more of a metaproperty; it refers to other proerties. If something has a measurable property which is invariant, such as the height of stormtroopers, then the invariance of that property is a property of that property, and of the existence thing(s).
Absolutely non-variant things, however, are what we call “theoretical”. We cannot detect any variance in the extrudence of things into the fourth physical dimension. This does not mean that there isn’t a fourth physical dimension, but we cannot know that it exists. However, we can see variances in the third dimension, which means that either there is a thind dimension, or that the apparent variances in the third dimension are merely variances in our two-dimensional vield of view which are being mistaken for 3-dimensional variances. The variance of a property indicates that that property exists, or rather, that there is some property which exists associated with some existent object, we know not what.
The concept “santa clause” and “method of squaring a circle” are variant (at the least they’re spelled differently) which means that they seem to be detectable, though you know not what as. In the case of pure ideas, their variance indicates that they do exist, as ideas in your mind. They differ from the other ideas in your mind and are distinct mental entities.
As for the presents you found under the tree being variant from normal, note that if you apply labeing from the end, you can prove that santa clause exists. Not to burst your bubble, but you’re probably descended from “him” (Noting that he’s actually a collective of millions of decieving people.) If you want to prove the existence of a specific santa clause of specific properties, too bad. All my approach proves is bare existence, of any sort. (Let me know when I start repeating myself. :rolleyes: )
How do we know that our thoughts/perceptions are all “ours”? Because we are the “one” having them. It’s a label. The theory that perceptions are actually the collective experience of a bunch of basic brain cells that are not experiencing anything like what we appear to be experiencing (that is, the theory that our brains are not just for show) doesn’t seem to slow down most people. Did you knwo that the text you’re looking at is the collective experience of a bunch of electrons and bits of magnetic media? If I have to demonstrate that you’re a single atomic (or subatomic, nowadays) particle, then I resign the arguement on account of a difference of definition of the existence of a being.
And now, to the silly protests.
We’ve demonstrated that when formal logic is used, 1) A lot of people seem to read it differently, and 2) You have exactly the same problems when you try and shove the terminology into and out of formal logic as you do now. I’m not going to wast my time writing a formal proof, since you wuold just tear up the premises and predicates the same as you do the english argument.
Perhaps I should have said “Variance is a property, or rather an aspect of a property.”? If that’s not you problem, I’m having a problem understanding the informality of your language.
I’m also not citing unicorn tails in my proof either. What are you talking about?
5 is messed up beyond belief:
It also just extends the lines above it (as in, builds upon. This line doesn’t even add anything new). Welome to the concept of “argument”.
He said “perception!” (huh huh, huh huh, huh huh). If the variances are in the perception then the perception is (or belongs to) something that exists.
What on earth are you talking about? The instability of perception is explicitly stated in the argument, right in the line that you’re supposedly reading. You can percieve what you like. The lines of the picture remain the same (and still vary from the white of the paper behind them.)
Simple: I don’t. For all I know, you might have a brain, which is merely a set of component parts apparently acting in concert. What do you want, proof of an immutable, indivisible soul? Right forum, wrong thread.
Gotta go; I’m late for class. Be back to read the reasoned protests and S.M. later.
i’m glad to see we agree that you can’t notice things without existing.
if you assume your conclusion, it is circular.
in order to observe your cognition, the existence of which proves your existence, you must first exist. it’s a simple syllogism, and we’re at a -> a.
one thing that may be confusing here (it’s confused me at times) is that you can’t use your conclusion to justify your premises. that you eventually reach “i exist” does not allow you to claim “i think” by itself.
as it’s gone for the last 5 pages, the cartesian argument is still ‘my existence allows me to think which allows me to prove my existence.’ and yes, it is circular.
I didn’t ask whether the concepts exist. I asked how your declaration that nothingness is invariant coincides with th eobservation that varying concepts can all refer to “nothing”. In short, I asked you to be explicit in your treatment of “nothing”.
You (shockingly) failed in the attempt. (Or faied to make the attempt. It is difficult to tell with you.)
Equivocation again. I am not entirely sure whether this time th efallacy indicates that you are being intentionally dishonest or simply too ignorant to understand the structuer of your own argument. Here’s a hint: the conclusion of your argument is not that a label exists.
True. Your formal proofs, like your informal ones, are flawed. I find it telling that you react to a request for greater clarity in expression with: “No! You’ll just make me look silly again.”
Too late.
Let me bold it for you: since I am uncertain which subjects you want to declare may validly possess the quality “variance”. Perhaps you can get one of the professors who think so highly of you to explain the language to you.
For the record, you seem to be arguing that variance is a second-order property, though in that case you shoud have said simply “variance is a property of properties”. At elast, that’s what you should have said if you understood what a second-order property was, and you wanted to exress yourself clearly.
I’m talking about the assumptions which underlie your proof. Unicorn tails are not necessary for your structure to be valid. Causality is necessary. You chose not to mention that fact. I chose to point it out.
Specifically, I chose to point it out becuase it is another example of your bounding the range of possible realities, yet you fail to express that limitation in your conclusion. Dishonest or sloppy, with you it is difficult to tell.
On that we agree.
This line does add something new–it explicitly asserts a source for the variance and implicitly assumes that this source also exhibits the property “exists”. But, as my phrasing above indicates, this extension does seem warranted within the structure of the proof (though, again, it would be more correct for you to make these assumption explicit rather than passing over them as if they did not bind the possibilities for reality.)
Sure thing, Beavis, so long as one has already assumed that perceptions of variance are always connected to an existing object that is varying. Now, you have not only assumed that variance is always tied to an existing object that is varying, you have also assumed that the perception of variance is precisely (though not necessarily acurately) bound to an existing cariance in an existing object.
Have you some reason for assuming that perceptions are necessarily bound to existing externalities? I mean, beyond needing it to be so for your “proof”.
The line I am reading states that changes in perception are necessarily tied to a “'variation of some existing object’s actual variance.” As clunky as that phrase is, it clearly establishes that a change in perception maps to a change in an existing object’s (second order) properties.
So: pretty girl, old hag. The perception changes. What is the change in the existing object?
Exactly. So your statement 5 is messed up beyond belief. I told you we agreed on that.
Ah–then you have not proven that “I exist”. But that was the very thing that you claimed that you could demonstrate. Do let us know when you have an argument that reaches the conclusion that you have claimed.
Red Herring. I have asked for no such thing. I only asked whether your proof could reach the conclusion that you had claimed. It cannot.
Very convincing. My credibility is demolished. :rolleyes:
Hmmmm.
Having gotten to the end of your post and seen that you don’t actually claim to reach the conclusion “I exist” (though that was the target you had earlier claimed to be aiming for), I have to withdraw my charge of equivocation in this instance. At least, I have ot leave open the possiility that the concluion of your presented argument is a label exists.
Your structure, then is overly elaborate. Try:[ol]
[li]Assert that labels may be applied to arbitrary targets[/li][li]Apply the label “me/my/mine” to a set of perceptions[/li][li]Assume that “my” perceptions exists. [/li][li]State that the perception of the label “me/my/mine” is a member of the perceptions labeled “me/my/mine”[/li][li]Therefore, the label exists.[/ol][/li]1 & 2 are inherent in your response to erl.
3 is already an assumption in your current “proof”
4 is justified by 2, though it might crack the door to Grelling and other paradoxes of higher order logics.
5 Q.E.D.
Not particularly revolutionary, and certainly not what Descartes was aiming for, but you are perhaps wise to set your sights much lower than he.
S.M. has (again) missed the point. Perhaps I confused him (again). Or, more likely given the frequency with which he puts out apparently distorted statements and accuses me of not comprehending them if not outright lying, he is merely speaking an entirely different language than I do, which I am mistaking for the version of (american) english I am using due to assumptions and mistakes in perception.
My argument is “a label exists”? Talk about red herrings. Try this: Something exists, which is labeled “I”. This something may or may not be a collective of things that themselves exist.
The “change” is caused by an internal state change in your mind; often, with your specific example, this change is assisted by the person showing the picture. The variance I’m speaking of is the basis of what we call “perception”, and in this case, it’s the variance between the lines of the drawing and the empty space around them. Without variance, there is nothing to observe. (And if you say, “the paper”, then I would point out that the only reason that you can believe that you’re observing the paper is that it seems to have a differing property, be it color, texture, shade, weight, or whatever, than the non-paper around it.)
Obviously you need this simple. My conclusion is, in large part, based on the notion that nothing does not look like anything. You, of course, are going to say that you can imagine that nothing looks like something, and I’m going to say that I’m happy for you, but we appear to be speaking totally different languages again.
S.M., please define:
“Exists”/“Existence” and “Not-exists”/“Nonexistence”
“I”
“Variance”
(and why not) “Observes” & “Appearance”
If these terms have no meaning to you (or too much meaning, in the case of “I”), then we are talking a different language.
(Oh, and you are correct in saying that Descartes was probably aiming high, in that he would have liked to end up with surety in the sanctity of his own consciousness. But then, philosophers are rather known for taking pride in the sensibility of their own thoughts. The idea that cogito ergo sum is demonstrative of coherence to your personal definition of self is “too much” of an overreaching assumption that the cogito is often "credit"ed with.)
Oh, and Ramanujan?
The argument that you seem to have already applied (“We could not observe, or appear to observe, without first existing; we appear to observe; ergo we exist.”), while valid and sound, is not likely to be enough to convince anyone of anything. Don’t ask me why not.
What, you protest you think that argument is circular? Don’t be silly; here it is again by contradiction.
P1) things that do not exist cannot appear to observe.
P2) assume we don’t exist for contradiction’s sake.
C3) Well then, since we’ve assumes that we don’t exist, we would neither observe nor appear to observe.
P4) MOST of us at least appear to be observing things.
C5) CONTRADICTION! Ergo we do not fail to exist. (Or we can’t use the appearance of observation to prove existence; your choice.)
As you can see, this ain’t circular. (Expect S.M. to quote some or all of this, hilight only part of this, and try to use it to prove that I said Satan plays with hand puppets.)
If you persist in accepting apparent observation as proof of existence (ie: P1), AND slamming your proven existence into the axiom set of any other argument I try to make, I’m going to be put into the unfortunate position of saying, “I can’t prove existence because you keep fiddling with my premieses.” (Oh, wait, I’ve already said that.)
NO argument can be discussed reasonably if you stick in extra premises.
Example: This argument is circular:
P1: Socrates is a mortal.
P2: Socrates is human.
P3: Anything that is human is mortal.
C1: Socrates is a mortal. (by p2 and p3)
But it’s only circular becuase the conclusion was jammed in as a premise!
However, I’m willing to be accomodating. If you wish to assert that the ability to appear to observe something is proof of existence, then I’ll be happy to agree that existence is proven. (I think we’re at the point where we can discuss any argument for existence, even if it differs from what Descartes said.)
I’m not claiming “I think”, I’m asserting that “we seem to observe things”, which is a frankly true fact if you’re aware enough to post at this message board. Wether the stuff we observe is observably not nothing, or wether proof of existence merely because we are observing it, either way, existence is proven.
if your argument isn’t circular, perhaps you could justify your claim “i appear to be observing things”. i suspect you’ll have trouble with that without at some point admitting that you exist.
i’m not sticking in extra premises. i’m explicitly stating the ones your proofs leave hidden.
how about this:
p1: socrates kicked a ball.
p2: anything that ever kicked a ball existed.
c1: socrates existed (by p1 and p2).
that is also quite circular. suppose you tried to justify that socrates kicked a ball, without admitting that he existed. it seems plain to me (and everyone else arguing with you) that you can’t. therefore p1 gives the unstated assumption “socrates existed”. without considering the other premises, you ought to be able to justify p1. you can’t justify p1 without first assuming the conclusion. sorry.
in order to observe, do you not have to exist? if not, then the conclusion can’t be reached. if so, then the premise can’t be stated without first assuming the conclusion.
You like to say things like this, but you never actually back them up with specific examples of where I parse your text incorrectly. I know you don’t like to actually provide cites, but I think I will ask for one anyway.
Of course, if it is simply that you do not write what you mean, then that’s just a personal problem. I’ll add it to your list.
The irony of Mr “the words appeared in your post” accusing someone else of distortion is almost too rich for words. Almost. Well, here are some words:
[ol][li]Please site some examples in which I distort your statements.[/li][li]Let me be perfectly clear. It is not “not comprehending them if not outright lying”; it is “not comprehending” and “outright lying”. You have exhibited both poor reading skills and a lack of personal integrity many times in this thread.[/ol][/li]
Talk about poor reading comprehension! Or is it outright lying? It is so hard to tell with you.
For the record, I never stated that you made that argument. I simply lacknowledged that you might be making that argument and thus not guilty of equivocation in your response to erl.
It is now clear that you were not, and thus you were. The I in your conclusion is never introduced in your argument. You rely upon a confusion of meaning between a freely bound label “I” and a causative agent of your thoughts. But at no time do you establish a correspondence between the two.
I explain this only for the benefit of others who might be reading this thread. I have no expectation that you are capable of appreciating either the distinction or the desireability of not basing an argument upon a logical fallacy.
And what is the relationship between that “something” and the agent that applies the label “I”?
I bolded that because I can hardy imagine you typed it with a straight face. Whose mind? And what have we already assumed in order to make that attribution?
How many times do you have to run in a circle before the terrain begins to look familiar?
As soon as I present a proof which relies upon those terms, I shall do so.
How interesting that you would ask me to provide what you have not seen fit to address. Is this how you normally approach intellectual endeavors? Have I mentioned that you should have gone to a better school?
And what, exactly, is your reformulated target? So far, it appears to be “Something exists which causes my perceptions,” which you derive from the assumption that all perceptions are caused by existing things.
Circular and trivial. As I said before, I prefer Descartes’ circle. At least he was trying for something significant.
Why not? Please provide a chain of reasoning rather than simply “because I define it so”. After all, you are asking that it be accepted as a premise.
Just for grins, I will make a vain plea: try to understand that I am not arguing that things which do not exist can appear to observe. I am asking exactly what assumptions about reality are inherent in our ability to have confidence in the premise (P1). What do we know about things that exist? About things that observe? About things that do not exist?
BTW
Just for more grins I think I will make the observation that you failed to even attempt to address the majority of the objections I raised to your “proof”.
BTW II
For flat out belly laughs I am going to post the following:
Contradict much?
Or are you saying that the “something” that exists and is labeled “I” is not the source of “my thoughts/perceptions”?
If so, then how did that “I” get into your proof? (Yes, I know that the answer is through equivocation. Somehow I doubt that that is the answer you will provide.)