posted by begbert2
That’s totally not the point. The point is, Thinking does not constitute existence, awareness does.
Absent thinking there is awareness.
Absent awareness there is no thinking.
suppose for now that we define thought such that a thought must have a thinker. suppose, further, that by “i”, i mean “a thinker”.
then, to say “a thought exists” does indeed necessarily imply a thinker. now all we have to do in order to prove that a thinker exists is show that a thought does indeed exist without assuming that a thinker exists. any references to my own “thoughts”, or your “thoughts”, or anyone else’s are no such instances. it seems to me that there cannot be a thought that does not assume there is a thinker by our current definition.
now, suppose we have something i will call a thought’. this thought’ is very like a thought, except that it does not need a thinker. anyone observing a thought’ might be tempted to say “oh, it looks like a thought, there must be a thinker”. but since it does not require a thinker, it might very well be caused by something else, which has no relation to a thinker. a brain, for example, might be capable of having a thought’, but there is in fact no way of saying what it is that causes this thought’.
so we have thoughts, which require thinkers. can you give me an example of a thought that does not first assume there is a thinker to have it? or can you show me that any given thought is not actually a thought’?
erislover
I’m not sure I see the analogy you’re getting at here, but to try and answer your question (realizing that I may be missing your point), numbers are defined in terms of set theory. The “definition” (axiomatic system) of sets does presuppose sets (one of the axioms of set theory is that there is a set, in the first place). On that foundation, the definition of numbers doesn’t presuppose numbers–once you have defined “number”, then it still remains to be seen if there are any sets that meet that definition. For a similar example, I could define a number to be “crazy” if it’s odd and divisible by 2. That doesn’t presuppose that there are any crazy numbers, and in fact, it should be easy to see that crazy numbers don’t exist, even though I’ve defined them.
Part of the point I was trying to make earlier, however, is that Descartes’ argument is fundamentally different from mathematical arguments. But more on that later.
But my point was that this begging the question is an artifact of the wording of the argument.
A mathematical argument has certain, basic properties. It has an author (whoever wrote the proof), and it has an audience (separate from the author), those who read through the proof. The mathematical argument must be written in a language in order for the author’s ideas to be communicated to the audience. Sure, I know you could create a mathematical argument and keep it to yourself (thus eliminating the separate “audience”), but the point is that the mathematical proof is communicable. Whether you actually do communicate it is irrelevant.
An individual’s “Descartes’ argument” (by that I mean an individual using Descartes’ argument to prove his own existence to himself) is entirely different. Take me for example, using Descartes’ argument to prove my own existence to myself. I am the author and I am the audience. Is the argument communicable? I claim that it’s not. I can use the argument to convince myself that I exist. Now suppose another person comes along. Can I claim to this person, “I can prove to you that I exist.” Of course not. My proof of my existence depends on direct experience with my own thoughts and perceptions; the new person has no such experience. What I can do is try to convey enough information to this person so that he will be able to construct his own argument that will prove his existence to himself. Ultimately, however, my argument will be unconvincing to him just as his argument will remain unconvincing to me. A person (assuming they actually exist, like I exist:D) can convince his or herself that they exist, but they cannot convey that knowledge to another.
The argument is not dependent on language. As I mentioned before, a mathematical argument is written in a language (or can be, anyway). But translating Descartes’ argument into language seems to actually weaken it somewhat. Language, after all, is a (sometimes crude) way of expressing thoughts. Let’s instead try to look at Descartes’ argument with the language stripped away.
As I’m sitting here, I’m seeing my computer screen, feeling the keyboard at my fingertips, hearing the TV in the background,…, among other sensations (in fact, for me, a more persuasive wording of Descartes’ argument would be “I sense, therefore I am”, but that just may be my personal taste). I would imagine that you are seeing your computer screen, and hearing and feeling various things as well. This is not dependent on language, I would have the sensations all the same with no knowledge of language. Unfortunately for the argument’s sake, proper use of language, so that I may be understood, dictates that I write the sentence as “As I’m sitting here, I’m seeing…” I need a subject for the sentence to be understood; however, strip the words away and just think of the meaning–that sensations are being felt. This doesn’t presuppose anything, the sensations are just undeniably there. And once we understand that much, your self becomes evident, as the “thing”/“entity” that the sensations are pouring into.
Again, remember that this argument is really a personal, non-verbal analysis of what’s going on. To attack the argument on how the argument is worded, and that it’s words seem to presuppose this or that, is to miss the fundamental simplicity of the argument in the first place.
The verb doesn’t matter. Any verb will do. For “I” to do anything, “I” must exist. “I” is defined only as that which is doing the action. For Descartes “cogito” was just a convenient verb to encompass all conscious phenomenon. Prerhaps it could better be phrased as “Sentio ergo sum” (I experience, therefore I am).
this other person should, though, be able to see the validity of your argument. i do not see the validity of descartes’s argument.
it seems to me that if your proof is valid, i ought to be able to apply it myself, to prove that i exist. i can simply doubt that i exist, and the whole proof falls apart, in the ways i’ve tried to lay out previously.
It’s been a while since my Phil 101 cource, but here’s the story as I was told…
The difference between ‘I think therefore I am’ and ‘I shop therefore I am’ (or ‘I eat therefore I am’ or whatever else) is not in the ‘therefore’ implication, which in all cases is a pretty obvious statement, but in the concept ‘I think’.
[Bedtime story] Descartes was chipping away at what was doubtable in an attempt to reach that which was not doubtable, and thus was knowable. The idea is to find an onjective truth, if any exist.
Now, eating and shopping and the like are all doubtable. First you deny the truth of your senses. If you are being fooled into thinking that you eat, do you really eat? Your brain could be in a jar with all the nerves hooked up to a computer that simulates all the sensations of life. (As I recall, Descartes posited an evil god, but a computer works as well.) I could say, “I kill hordes of demons, therefore I am” but the basic assumption is invalid, evein if I’m playing Doom, because I’m not really killing demons. Who can say thet their life is not really some advanced simulation, a la the Matrix? Every action that you take can be faked; all your senses are at the mercy of the evil one. Your memories in fact are doubted, for they would be memories of the simulation, or perhaps were simly ‘loaded in’ like a saved game. Every aspect of the identity, of the life, of even being recognizable as a lifeform is dependent on the accuracy of your memory and sensry information.
Questing for objectivity, you discard any belief in that which the senses have given you. There is nothing that you can do, for you have doubted anything. You even begin to doubt that you exist at all. After all, there is no memory of life, of existence, no empirical evidence whatsoever that can be relied upon.
But wait! You are doubting your existence. You can wilfully doubt whatever you choose, believe, imagine, think! With nothing, assuming nothing, without any additional information, you can think, and you can know that you think. It is a fact knowable beyond doubt. (Yes, Iamthat, you have the skill of doubting that; it looks to me like you try to undefine the issue to death.)
Okay, so we now know something beyond doubt. Is there anything else we can conlude? Any other objective facts? Well, there is that ‘duh’ statement, the ‘the act of thinking implies the existence of a thinker’, which normally wouldn’t be any more interesting than ‘the act of shopping implies the existence of a shopper’, except we can’t prove that anybody’s really shopping, but we can determine that somebody’s really thinking! Myself! Tack the implication onto the known fact and viola! We have another one: ‘I think, therefore I am’. Hey this also objectively proves existence so maybe I can make a buck selling it to the philosophy weekly. And so the easy to say, hard to explain phrase entered the collective consciousness, and has found us here today. [/Bedtime story]
The novelty of ‘cogito ergo sum’ is that it is an observation that is not based on observable reality, and which proves existence objectively to boot. Also it sounds important and, in english, is in iambic tetrameter, making it fun to rattle off. I won’t be back for a while, so a few comments:
Iamthat: You’re defining past the point. (self-)awareness is thinking for the purpose of this exercise. It’s not necessary for us to ‘force you to exist’ by guaranteeing you think all the time. This is a way that humans can use to objectively verify their existence.
bluemoonz: Sadly we started out by assuming the nonexistence of both monkeys and chairs. Dunno if you’ll miss the monkeys, but you have to stand now. 
Wether monkeys can prove (to themselves) that they exist depends on wether they can conceve of a thought (by engaging in metathinking). Chairs can’t verify to themselves that they exist. (That doesn’t mean that they don’t; they just can’t know it.)
erislover: 1) here’s what I think he did say; 2) as you can see, the choice of the verb ‘think’ is far from random, as it is the only objectively varifiable action.
Cabbage: Descartes denied the senses, ibelieve, but you could check that…
Ramanujan: Can you convince yourself that you don’t think? Cause as above existence is pretty simple from there. Think about it. 
Diogenes: Swapping out the verb has negative effects on the objective reality of it all though…
Like I said, this is Descartes as he was presented to me; feel free to look him up and refute. No offense meant to anybody; of course. Perceive yousrself as having a nice day!
the problem doesn’t lie in convincing. it lies in the inability to convince. i cannot convince myself that i do think. i can’t convince myself that i don’t think. these are both because, in order to do so, i have to be convinced beforehand that there is an i which does both these things.
and i maintain there is no proof of that.
I know what you mean - particularly about trying to re-experience the thought - and I’ve never heard it better put!
I’ve always called it (to myself) ‘mental vertigo’ - it’s as if just for a second you step outside the boundary of yourself, external reality and even the limits of your own mind. It happens most often to me when a thought of death floats into my mind while I’m thinking of or doing something else - perhaps it has something to do with the extreme contrast between the mundane concreteness of the world we’re immersed in and the simultaneous knowledge of personal non-existence in the future.
There was an interesting documentary on Horizon (BritishTV) a few weeks back about the reported experiences of people who have technically died. Some serious scientists are apparently considering the idea that consciousness may not be a product of the brain, but something absorbed by the brain - the brain could be seen as a sort of radio-receiver. Not sure what I think about this, but it’s an intriguing sidestepping of the mind-body problem
If the statement is a proof of “I exist” and not an axiom, then It shouldn’t presuppose an “I.” Can someone translate the Latin more effectively? If it is an axiom then: shrug, so what? I can make up all sorts of unproven axioms.
These excellent points have yet to be refuted:
erislover said: “But I need to know that I am aware of myself to make the statement that “I think”—that this is me thinking.”
Ramanujan said: “i cannot convince myself that i do think. i can’t convince myself that i don’t think. these are both because, in order to do so, i have to be convinced beforehand that there is an i which does both these things.”
Many good points and good thoughts. I am afraid that too many people get caught up in the words and dont just stop and look at the statement yeah it sounds redundant but it fits …i (I) personally would like to (think) that because i have thought and that i acknowledge that i am thinking.
I think therefore I am.
Cogito ergo sum.
It’s already completely literal.
As if I haven’t said enough about this… oh well.
Satasha seems to have collected up the details:
My ‘imitation-Descartes’ tale boils out to this logical argument (forgive my terminology/notation, it’s been a while since Logic 101):
1 I think :by observation
2 if any thing ‘x’ thinks, then that ‘x’ is) :axiom
3 if I think then I am :Specification of I for x in 2
:. I am :modus ponens on 1 & 3
‘I’ isn’t presupposed; (somewhat) straightforward observation brings ‘I’ into the picture when the philosopher decides that he (‘I’) is unequivicably capable of independent thought. The only thing taken axiomatically is the assumption that if we find something that is thinking, then that something exists.
As per my lengthy description earlier, the novel idea Descartes put forth was that “I think” could be concluded by nothing more than self-awareness. If a person refuses to entertain the idea of thought without being first presented with evidence of their own existence, then they’ve come to the wrong place; cogito ergo sum does things in the opposite order.
Seriously though, can anybody seriously claim that they think they don’t think? It is of course possible to postulate a world in which onesself does not exist, but how do you explain your own postualtions? if you trace them back to the root, even “i cannot convince myself that i do think. i can’t convince myself that i don’t think. these are both because, in order to do so, i have to be convinced beforehand that there is an i which does both these things.” is a coherent thought, that had to come from somewhere. Would it not be the case that your thoughts come from you?
So… what happens if we invent a superpowerful computer that can slowly run a simulation of the earth and everyone on it from, say, 0 BC. When it finally gets to Descartes, and the simulation comes up with “I think, therefore, I am”, the simulation isn’t thinking, since it’s only a simulation.
“I think, therefore, I am” doesn’t account for the fact that this may have already happened…
It wouldn’t make any difference how it originated, it would still have the same validity with regards to “I.” It doesn’t matter if Descartes thought or “was”. The axiom only pertains to the solopsistic “I.”
I think/feel, therefore something exists.
that certainly seems more plausible. it may not be what i consider to be “i” that exists, but certainly it is evidence of something existing.
note, however, that you cannot logically prove that something exists. In order for the existence of that thing to be implied, the existence of something else must be assumed. so what implies the existence of something?
I can’t do the sensation argument justice here, Cabbage, that topic would take me into a debate itself.
Can you explain this just a tad more? I’m sorry, but the sentences don’t work right to my head.
While many times I am concerned with such things, I honestly am not in this case. I don’t feel that proving a subject exists by assuming said subject is merely an artifact of clumsy language.
While I agree with your presentation, I would only find myself led inexorably to Hume’s exposition on the Self, not to Descartes, where he writes,
Which is, to clearly say, if we have a clear idea of self, we must have a clear impression of self (we must quite literally sense a self); but, since evidence of self is only obtained through indirect means, in the case we’re dealing with in this thread we have a distinction—thought and self—without a difference. Coupling this with his argument against existence as a seperable property and it demolishes any attempt, IMO quite successfully, to demonstrate an [introspective] self.
This is all that can be semantically rendered from…
** I Think. Therefore I Am.**
- What thinks? What is thinking, and what is am-ness?
Since it is impossible for the human mind to comprehend the absence of everything without the existence of something to provide contrast, all that can be discerned is that…*
** There exists something as opposed to nothing.**
posted by ** begbert2**
Yes I remember philosophy 101, or 103. plump professor Schwartz standing up front and asking,
“So are you your body or your thoughts?”
In retrospect I think Schwartz and his question were rather naïve, especially considering his PhD status. I guess most do not distinguished between thoughts and awareness.
No!
It’s pointless starting with a false premise.
The problem is the ”you” that the thoughts might come from cannot be found, perceived, or thought of. If you cannot find the “self” how can you use the word “ I “ except as a convenience?
It’s not that you don’t think, it’s that you are not what you think.