No such decision has been made, and your conclusion is premature. The UN does seem to have decided, informally, that the interpretation of facts and demand for a particular course of action on the part of one of its members is not convincing, at l
Ewiser, I don’t see much point in a prolonged reply. You clearly believe what you believe, we differ widely in our beliefs, and so we are just repeating ourselves. Just to clarify one point though.
"Well, he is wrong, the world agrees that he is wrong and these were your words."
The “wrong” alluded to was not a moral wrong but a strategic wrong that you yourself had raised. You had written:
"“The pattern that he is following now is exactly the pattern he followed in the pre-Gulf war period. Slowly back off to attempt to create divisions in the enemy and hope that nothing will come of it. He was wrong in '91 and I think he will be wrong here too, but you never know.”
It was in response to that specific remark that I wrote that we must wait for the world to agree that he is wrong. Wrong, in other words, about his strategy.
Do I think Saddam is also morally wrong? Of course. And I don’t think that any country disagrees. The question remains, though, whether, at this point, the best (and most moral) way to address his moral wrongs is a rush to war.
Elvis:*
It is clear that the US could have also acted in accordance with international law in this issue. They could have charged the Sudan with illegal activity, demanded access to the plant, etc. They chose instead to bomb the plant, located on Sudanese soil – which is an act of war against the Sudan, technically.
Let’s not forget as well that US intelligence about the plant was scanty and wrong. The plant was not involved in the construction of chemical weapons; it was a pharmaceutical factory. Bin Laden had not invested in it at all; it was owned by a wealthy London businessman. Given that, why would the Sudan feel a need to do anything about it in the first place?
My original scenario was misleading, because I wanted to argue that even in the worse-case scenario (i.e., that the Sudanese were correct about the factory in North Carolina), Sudanese action would still be a crime under international law. To complete the scenario fully, we would have to add the following:
After the attack, it was discovered that Sudanese intelligence was completely incorrect. The company they attacked did not manufacture chemical weapons, and the Canadian terrorist had no holding in it whatsoever. Despite this fact, the Sudanese government blocked a UN investigation into the event, never publicly admitted its mistake, and never paid reparations to the US for material damages sustained during the attack.
Do these consideration change your assessment?
In this case, the US would know that the bombed-out factory was an aspirin plant, and that it had no connections to the Canadian whatsoever, being owned primarily by a wealthy Japanese businessman.
Is the Sudanese attack still justifiable?
erl:
Oh, there you are! I thought you didn’t love me anymore.
*Hmmmm…Mr. S no comprendé. “Information…equivalent to action”? Sorry, dude, you lost me.
I was referring to military action, yes.
The answer is not very clear-cut. With regard to genocidal like actions, or gross violations of human rights, I think the international community should have the right to probe as far as it needs to. In some cases, its full-force should extend the same length. But all of these issues are judgement calls, and are also “incommensurable;” we have no common, agreed-upon international standard of morality by which we can judge the “seriousness” of infractions. For example: in Europe, particularly here in Sweden, it is believed that the state does not have the right to take a life because of a criminal act. The US government, on the other hand, executes a handful of people a year. Is this a “crime against humanity?” Does it give the international community the right to intervene, militarily if necessary, in the internal affairs of the US?
The example is a bit extreme, admittedly, but just highlights the question, “Where do we draw the line?” With regard to that question, I’m afraid I have no clear answer.
Mr. S, if you want to discuss semantics instead of underlying realities, you’re welcome to, but don’t expect anyone to join in.
It should be clear that, if the assumptions I listed are true, then the US could not have gone through channels and still succeeded in eliminating the facility - it simply wouldn’t have been there anymore after asking Sudan for permission to bomb it, or, for that matter, if anyone else had known in advance.
Likewise, the faultiness of the intelligence is hindsight. One has to act on what one knows, or reasonably believes, at the time that the opportunity to act exists.
Now, do you recall the number of deaths in the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings by Al-Qaeda that triggered the attacks, as I asked you already? The military campaign was already on. Does that affect your assessment?
Elvis:
*Maybe, although it wasn’t my suggestion that the US ask permission to bomb the Sudan. I readily admit that confronting an international terrorist organization, one lacking direct ties to a state apparatus, poses serious difficulties for a state. (In fact, if I were to criticize the action in a broader sense, it would be from this perspective: that the US was attempting to deal with Al Qaeda as if it was embroiled in a conflict between states.) But I would suggest that an action akin to that take in Afghanistan after 9/11 – a request for the extradition of Bin Laden, wherever he might have been, backed up by threat of force – may have been more effective, and more in line with international law. But who knows? Maybe not.
The fact that the US had been attacked was serious, and under international law the US had a right to retaliate. That doesn’t give it the right to run around lobbing missiles at peaceful states on the basis of highly equivocal intelligence reports.
If my earlier citation is to be believed, the idea that Al Shifa was a chemical munitions plant connected to Al Qaeda was scarcely reasonable. Have you looked at it?
No.
Does the fact that many Iraqis died during the initial bombing of the Gulf War justify the Iraqi decision to launch SCUDs at Israel, a non-combatant?
Not a chance, good sir.
In a pure sense: knowledge of an attack is as good as an attack; with respect to self-defense, knowledge of an attack is better than an attack.
Do you consider this a problem or a blessing or mostly a mixed blessing? I consider it a mixed blessing, myself. On one hand, I think it is good to have everyone know where they stand relative to a forceful agent like the UNSC can be. On the other, the more clear the rules are, the more (possibly) unfair, unjustified, and exclusionary they are as well.
Hmm, good example. I think any country that has a military should not look upon the death penalty as a prima facie human rights issue. But this is a good point, and mine is a hijack.
And to make this point now more relative to world affairs, I agree we have no clear answer. And I think Bush is pushing to get one because he, too, doesn’t want to go against the UNSC. Sure, he’s hanking his horn like mad and giving everyone the finger, but at some level I have to ultimately trust the workings of our government or I have no way to judge any of it. I think he wants war… “wants it” wants it, I do, but I don’t think he does at any cost. I hope we agree within a few figures of that cost, I guess.
Mr. Svinlesha, you asked about the propriety of Iraq firing missiles at Israel. There is no question that they were targeting Israel and Israelis themselves, not US/Allied facilities that happened to be there.
The rest of your post supports my explanations to you, even if you haven’t said so. Are we done now?