“Potential” is irrelevant. It means nothing. It’s imaginary. It doesn’t exist. A “potential” person cannot exist, since a person who exists, by dfeinition, cannot be “potential.”
This “potential” thing is a red herring. It’s an attempt to create a *hypothetical" person and then retroject that “personhood” onto a fetus as if it has any reality.
A four year old is potentially an adult, that doesn’t mean you give a four year old a driver’s licence, and if that four year old dies, the adult never existed.
Two things, Yeticus.
It’s incorrect to call a woman a “parent” if she terminates a pregnancy before a child is delivered. If she aborts, then there never was a child and she never was a “parent.”
When you call such a woman “selfish,” there is an implication that she is putting her needs above the needs of another person. Since there is no other person, then it makes no sense to call her selfish.
A few weeks’ worth of memories of sloshing sounds and dim red light are not enough to form a personality. The next fetus, if this woman conceives again, will have almost the exact same memories, because it will grow in the same place. I would draw the line at its first face to face interaction with a person.
Selfish decisions aren’t necessarily bad; our whole economy is based on them. A fetus has no right to suck nutrients from a woman’s body; it is there at her whim, and if she wants to kick it out, the reason is irrelevant. Even if it were a person, that wouldn’t change - it would still have no more right to use her womb than I have to use your kidney.
Now this just doesn’t make sense. If you tell your kid “I don’t want you skating without a helmet because you might get hurt”, is that selfish? People get hurt all the time, it’s part of being human, right? And yet it’s still a case of you looking after your kid’s interests, not a selfish choice that you made because you, er, hate skating or something.
Everyone suffers a little, but not to the same degree, and it’s perfectly sensible to want to minimize that suffering.
I’m sorry, but I do not adhere to the same definitions (of personhood) as you do. The question in the OP is a moral one, not a legal one, when it comes to deciding whether or not you should keep or abort a baby with severe disabilities. If a person decides to only keep “normal” and “healthy” babies and abort babies with severe disabilities, then it does come down to selfishness; not about whether it’s a baby or fetus, person or non-person and who has what rights or lack of rights.
So now you’re saying it’s not about memories, but personality that determines a blank slate from a non-blank slate. Mothers singing to fetuses/babies in-utero does have an effect on the fetus/baby and personality.
Just like DtC, you are still stuck in the legal muck when the OP was asking for a moral decision, selfish or not.
I’m talking about pain thoughout the entire life of a person, not just as a child. It can be extremely painful throughout someones life who was born a “normal and healthy” baby while another person with a severe disability may have experienced life with little or no pain at all. Who are we to say that terminating a pregnancy because of a severe disability that we may incorrectly decide is painful, let alone “the right thing to do”?
The same goes for the severely disabled along with the rest of the human population. It all varies from person to person, disabled or not.
More specifically, I said it before and I’m still saying it now. Memories are important too, but that’s because they contribute to a personality.
Sure. And if you can sing to one, you can sing to another. There are more fetuses where that one came from, to put it bluntly.
No, I’m talking about moral rights. A woman has no moral obligation to host another creature inside her, just as you have no moral obligation to give me your kidney if I need one.
Sure, it’s a prediction and it may be wrong. But I’d rather mistakenly abort a fetus that wouldn’t actually have lived a life of pain, than mistakenly not abort one that does go on to live a life of pain.
Are you saying that the average disabled person is not likely to suffer more than the average non-disabled person?
If you read carefully you’ll see that I wasn’t comparing them. A fetus needs part of a woman’s body to live; I hypothetically need part of your body to live. Neither the woman nor you are obligated to supply those parts.
I am reacting to the notion that sentience is a defining characteristic–perhaps the defining characteristic–of “personhood.” This is not a quibble, then; it’s pointing out a glaring non sequitur. “Something” is there, of course. “Something” is also there with a fetus. That “something” does not mean that either entity at that moment has a personality or sentience, especially when that’s impossible.
Sorry, the point remains that there is no existing person to regain the “something,” not if you accept that sentience marks the boundary of “personhood” (I do not). This is where this syllogism collapses, which is my point. Consistency demands, it seems to me, that the temporarily vegetative entity be deemed a non-person, as much as one might emotionally want it to be otherwise. In his current state, he is identical to some fetuses–i.e., a mass of cells without the capacity for sentience, lacking the ability to value a past, present or future.
It is this point that has yet to be addressed adequately by anyone in the “a fetus without sentience is not a person” camp, IMO.
[q"Potential" is irrelevant. It means nothing. It’s imaginary. It doesn’t exist. A “potential” person cannot exist, since a person who exists, by dfeinition, cannot be “potential.”
This “potential” thing is a red herring. It’s an attempt to create a hypothetical" person and then retroject that “personhood” onto a fetus as if it has any reality.
That last note posted before I was completed. Premature postification, I believe that’s called.
Diogenes, to close out the thought, does your “potential” conclusion apply to a temporarily vegetative patient? If it does not, can we the conclude that sentience is not a defining characteristic of “personhood”?
Please, work with me here. I have “something” in a jar in my refrigerator, and the cable company brought “something” out to my house when I signed up for internet service, but that doesn’t mean pasta sauce is the same as a cable modem.
A fetus has never been a person, has never interacted with another person in any significant sense, and no one remembers it as a person. When it is born, people won’t say “Hey, Junior’s back!” OTOH, when a guy in a coma wakes up, he will regain a personality that he has already had before, and people will recognize him as the person they knew before.
What it means is there’s a personality to be regained. A person definitely existed before, and whether he exists now may be debatable, but we can agree that the same person will exist again if he wakes up.
The difference is that he has a past, and even if he can’t value it at the moment, there’s a reasonable expectation that he’ll be able to value it again once he wakes up.
If that puts me outside the “a fetus without sentience is not a person” camp, then fine. I don’t like camping anyway.
Don’t take this the wrong way, but I’m growing weary of having my point ignored so that someone can lecture me on points I have not contested. Let me make absolutely clear, since apparently it’s not, that I do not disagree with the thought that some fetuses (early in their development) have never had anything that could arguably be called sentience, and that a temporarily vegetative adult did at one point have a personality.
Now, do you agree that sentience is a defining characteristic for “personhood”? (Please, work with me here. ;)) If you do not, the question I have on the table is not apropos for you. If you do agree, then I posit that logically you must hold that a temporarily vegetative patient, lacking said defining attribute, cannot be considered a “person.” Please explain to me what is wrong with this logic, which, you’ll notice, does not in any way depend upon an assertion that a fetus is a person; or that a fetus had at any point possessed sentience or a personality; or that our recovered patient won’t be ever so happy he’s once again conscious, remembering all sorts of wonderful memories.
No, I guess I don’t agree. Sentience indicates personhood but is not absolutely necessary for it. Otherwise, we would all stop being persons for a few hours every night.
Although… I don’t think personhood is incompatible with abortion either, so this doesn’t really shed much light on anything.
I am using “sentience,” perhaps too narrowly, to mean human self-awareness, an attribute that does not disappear with sleep. Can’t think of a better word at the moment, but I see that you’ve clarified that it wouldn’t make a difference.
