roryaxis:
I can think of a few . The British in Malaysia comes to mind. But the general tenor of your point is well taken .
Sam Stone: I disagree that the comparison between China and Iraq is that apt.
a.) China is vastly larger. Even if you cut out peripheral, lighty populated areas you still have a region equivalent to the U.S. east of the Mississippi.
b.) The terrain and weather are far more complex and much more difficult.
c.) Probable staging areas compared to the theatre of operations are much more restricted. The Phillipines and Japan ( no guarantee of use for either one ) are pretty far out. Taiwan is pretty small ( reltively speaking ) and only really has close access to South China. And with the limited choice of U.S. staging areas ( all in the East ) they could always pull the old Soviet WW II stunt and relocate war materials factories and such out West in the Tarim Basin or other inaccessible areas.
d.) The Iraqi army was ridiculously overrated. They never qualified for 3rd or 4th largest army unless you included every single 60-year old reservist. If you did that for every single army in the world they woud have ranked 30th or 40th. I see that game being played all the time by the press. I remember a decade or so ago when there was controversy about U.S. troops in Korea, the argument was made that the North Korean Army was much larger than South Korea’s. Except it wasn’t. It’s just they included the reserves for NK and omitted them for SK. In fact SK’s standing army was larger by about 100,000 troops ( and better armed to boot ).
Furthermore most of Iraq’s troops were poorly trained and indifferently led. Their quality as soldiers was minimal, their loyalty to the regime only marginally above that. Even their best didn’t amount to much more than average for better armies. Despite a terrible equipment situation ( which eventually lost them the war ), the Iranians regularly kicked their ass in most close combat actions ( and the few armored exchanges as well ). The Turks would have chewed them up and spit them out.
Saddam regularly eliminated the most competent officers for fear of coups - Either they were shot or stuck in the engineering corps ( the one fairly imaginative and professional branch of the Iraqi army ).
e.)The PLA is likely underrated. Unlike the Iraqi’s, they are not tomato-cans. I’d put them more on the level of the Serbs. Strong military tradition, solid discipline, significant ideological motivation and loyalty to the regime, good ( and resilient ) morale, reasonable training. Moreover they are more philosophically tolerant of high casualties.
They are technologically and logistically deficient, too be sure. But as someone else mentiuoned they are also less dependent on C[sub]3[/sub]I than their Western counterparts. In a purely defensive posture they would be dangerous ( I agree they have virtually zero chance of forcing the Taiwan straits in the teeth of U.S, opposition any time soon ).
f.) I think you’re giving too much credit to airpower in the Gulf War. Not to minimize the impact of the bombing campaign ( it certainly had a major effect ), but the the ground army would have chewed up the Iraqi’s regardless ( they just ended up having a much, much easier time of it ). Fact of the matter is that all those precision munitions turned out to be rather less effective in post-war analyses than reports at the time indicated. It was actually quite a bit less surgical than the military was claiming during the war. Furthermore they represented only a very small percentage of the total tonnage dropped on Iraq. Smart bombs are pricey, missles more so. They do not now and probably never will make up the majority of the munitions used by any air force. Dumb bombs get the job done just fine. Most of the bombs dropped were as carpet bombs.
And Iraq would not have fallen to air power alone, no matter how many Air Force generals claim otherwise . They were dug into bunkers and they would have just squatted there indefinitely. They were prepared to ride out a siege. Most of the Iraqi losses, even to air attacks, occurred after the ground forces flushed them out of their defensive fortifications ( or buried them in them ). Not in the weeks of bombing beforehand.
At any rate, as I’ve said, China ain’t Iraq . In an area as large as China, against a foe as dispersed, low profile, and equipment light as the PLA, in much more rugged and varied terrain, they will be considerably less effective. Air power will be, period. The armor-heavy Iraqi’s in the desert were sitting ducks ( once they started to move, anyway ). The Chinese light infantry in the woods won’t be ( as much ).
Not to say any of the above answers the OP’s question - I don’t know the answer. But you’re giving the impression ( to me, at least ) that you think this would be a simple affair. I don’t think that’s the case .
Just MHO .