What “wild assumptions” or misattributions did I make?
The consequence that you claim – that some evil government might try to ban political rallies – is true even without the original premise. So what? This is just an invocation of the facile “slippery slope” argument against perfectly legitimate regulations that exist all over the world to minimize the corrupting influence of money in politics. Constitutional principles have long held that rights are rarely absolute and have to be tempered by realistic considerations of the greater good. No one is trying to “silence” billionaires – money is always going to have huge influence over public policy, it doesn’t need any more help from libertarian ideology. Whether it’s placing limits on campaign contributions or limits on the tens of millions spent on advocacy ads or limits on the concentration of media ownership, the objective is to have a diversity of voices rather than one overwhelming version of PR spin that represents the position of the wealthiest interests.
Concentration of media ownership is a good example of the principle. No one seriously thinks they can or should prevent the wealthy from owning media and exerting their editorial influence, but at the same time it IS legitimate to prohibit such a degree of ownership concentration that one editorial position becomes overwhelmingly dominant in a given region. Of course Republicans have largely pushed that one to the wayside, too. Corporations own both parties in Congress and totally set the legislative agenda, and yet somehow we’re still arguing about the malign influence of money in politics as if this is something debatable.
Since we live in a nation of laws, we have to have, well, law. The courts have to decide how far Congress may go to regulate political speech that is paid for with money. Wolfpup, your assertion seems to be that paid for political speech is not protected as a matter of constitutional law. Is this accurate? If so, then there is no constitutional protection for paid political speech and so the government can ban any paid political speech. Which would include rallies. Grumman didn’t argue that the government WOULD do this, only that your interpretation of the 1st amendment ALLOWS them to do this. Whether you trust them to hold back on using this power is up to you.
And to reiterate to the OP, money is not speech, no court has ruled that it is speech. The use of money to create speech, however, is protected under freedom of the printing press.
No, that’s not my assertion – my assertion included the statement that “Constitutional principles have long held that rights are rarely absolute and have to be tempered by realistic considerations of the greater good” – you can protect free speech, including paid-for political speech, while still imposing reasonable financial limits on it so that one particular interest group doesn’t overwhelmingly dominate the dialog.
It’s really somewhat analogous to the concentration of media ownership example. Does it seem reasonable that one single entity should own all the television, radio, and newspaper outlets in a particular area – sort of a capitalist version of state media in the old Soviet Union? These cross-ownership issues have been regulated in the interest of diversity for at least 40 years, with the degree of regulation swinging back and forth with the ideologies of different administrations, but I don’t think anyone could reasonably claim that this is some ominous violation of fundamental freedom of the press.
While I think wikipedia articles are valid cites, you still have to distinguish between facts and editorializing. The statement you’ve highlighted is clearly the latter.
We can of course disagree on that, but I am not clearly wrong based on a sentence in a wikipedia article that does not refer directly to what was actually said in the decision.
Okay, that’s fine, at least the first part of what you said. The Citizens United dissent said pretty much the same thing: that expenditures could be limited in “time, place, and manner”.
The latter part though is simply not a part of our constitutional jurisprudence. In fact, in the Buckley decision, the majority said:
the concept that government may restrict the speech of some [in] order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.
The “drowning out” effect is often cited on message boards as a justification to limit campaign spending, but I’ve seen no evidence that this is actually a problem and it’s never been accepted by the courts, even before the court had a conservative majority.
I agree, mainly because while someone can be prohibited from buying a newspaper or radio station, nothing stops them from simply founding their own. So Rupert Murdoch could be prevented from buying the Times, but he couldn’t be stopped from starting the New York Right-Wing News if he so desired.
The media ownership laws only prevent the buying and selling of media outlets. They cannot stop the founding of new outlets, so there’s no constitutional problem. If right-wing billionaires want to “drown out” the mainstream media, they have every right to do so by starting their own newspapers.
The opinion is long. Are you familiar with it? It seems as though you are not based on your incorrect declaration. From the conclusion:
From the body:
This is the part that the court agreed with.
(my bold)
You are wrong. SCOTUS has ruled that money is speech. It has limited contribution limits due to other overwhelming issues, but the idea is not in question.
In addition, this quote from the wiki article, " It introduced the idea that money counts as speech, and eliminated any previous restraints on unlimited spending in US election campaigns" is factual, not editorializing. This is another item you are wrong about.
So then, to be clear, you disagreed with the book burner faction of the Supreme Court who held that the had the right to regulate books and movies that were deemed to oppose or support political candidates?
Bone, none of the quotes you offer say that “money is speech”. They say that campaign expenditures are a form of protected speech, but it doesn’t follow that every other expenditure is simlarly a form of speech.
In particular, spending money to corrupt the political process (e.g. bribing a public official) is clearly not a protected form of speech, any more than soliciting any other crime is a protected form of speech. And offering money for votes is plainly corrupt.
Where, exactly, does one draw the line? To me, it looks like a great deal of the lobby activity that goes on in government is perilously close to bribery. Some of it looks a bit like blackmail (e.g., why does the US have such difficulty with gun laws). Government vs. business looks to me like a quid pro quo swapmeet. From that perspective, selling my vote looks pretty trivial.
Bone, I’m afraid you are wrong. The only expenditures that are protected are expenditures that are used to pay for speech. Money is not speech, but speech is speech, even if money is used to pay for it. This is a very simple concept and I’m surprised so many people still don’t get it.
I’m not asserting that spending on illicit activity is protected. That SCOTUS decision clearly equates money as a form of speech. Every analysis of the decision draws that conclusion. Seriously - do a search. Money is speech and that opinion and you’ll find analysis that both agrees with the conclusion and decries it. Saying that no court has found that money is speech is factually incorrect.
Adaher - you are misreadig the opinion (if you’ve read it at all) completely.
Hardly. The opinion only addresses money used to exercise speech rights. It leaves in place all limitations on spending that does not purchase speech.
C’mon, this is basic stuff. No one is calling to limit the amount of money spent for non-speech purposes. Campaign finance reformers want to control the money used to buy ads, and only the money used to buy ads. The object is to censor political ads. The courts have correctly seen this for what it is.
The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order “to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Although First Amendment protections are not confined to “the exposition of ideas,” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948),
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates. . . .
It’s pretty clear here that they aren’t “equating money with speech”. They are talking about speech, period.
Campaign finance advocates try to claim that the spending of money is not “speech”, even if it’s used to buy speech, but “conduct”, which is not necessarily protected by the 1st amendment. the court rejected the view that electioneering was conduct:
**We cannot share the view that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment. **
Even if the categorization of the expenditure of money as conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not meet the O’Brien test because the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act involve “suppressing communication.” The interests served by the Act include restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have money to spend and reducing the over-all scope of federal election campaigns. Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to its regulations, it is aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and groups. Unlike O’Brien, where the Selective Service System’s administrative interest in the preservation of draft cards was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of communication, it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged “conduct” of giving or spending money “arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful.” 391 U.S. at 382.
Duh. Campaign finance reformers want the ads to come down. That’s the WHOLE purpose of regulating money in politics. The court says, “uh uh”, that’s not legal. It is a baldfaced attempt to limit political speech under the guise of regulating the money used to exercise free speech rights.
Well, if we’re using Buckley v. Valeo as a guide, it’s actually a pretty clear line. Conduct is not necessarily protected by the 1st amendment. Speech is. Whether money is used for either of them is not relevant.
To use your gun law example, what is blackmail? The NRA threatening to grade a vote? That’s not only speech, it barely even costs anything.
Lobbyists giving gifts is bribery. Lobbyists offering jobs to kin is bribery. Politicians offering earmarks in exchange for campaign contributions is effectively legal, and also bribery.
Actually, there is a legal way to sell your vote. Find out which party is going to give you more money and vote accordingly. They make no secret that they are trying to buy your vote with the promise of taxpayer money. The same people who decry the running of political ads by “undesired” speakers believe that this is called “democracy”.
It’s odd that you can read this opinion and conclude the exact opposite of what they are saying. Here is a decent article that summarizes the issue.
More from the Buckley opinion:
You quote the portion of the argument that was trying to say that donating money for political purposes was conduct, and therefore did not implicate speech. The court expressly rejects this. But the conclusion that you draw is the opposite of what that necessitates. If the action is conduct, then it does not enjoy protections of speech.
You made a specific statement, "money is not speech, no court has ruled that it is speech. " This was shown to be wrong. BUCKLEY v. VALEO established this principle. It was also done in FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON v. BELLOTTI
Together, Buckley and First National Bank were the basis for Citizens United. It is simply wrong to assert that no court has ruled that money is speech.
The question about whether to limit it or not is independent of the factual analysis of your claim. Your claim is false.
They found compelling reasons to do so. Just because speech is implicated does not mean that it is impossible to place limits:
Similar to subsequent decisions, SCOTUS has held that limits are permissible in so much as they are designed to prevent the actuality and appearance of corruption: