Yes, of course we would retaliate. We’d retaliate in such a way that the government of North Korea would cease to exist.
Nuclear weapons are great as a diplomatic bargaining chip. We don’t want to invade countries with nuclear weapons, because they might use nuclear weapons. But they don’t help you defend your country from invasion by the United States when you use them, they help you only when you don’t use them.
Again, if the bad guy has a gun pointed at the hostages head, he’s got the upper hand. We can’t do anything to the bad guy because he might shoot the hostage.
What happens when the bad guy pulls the trigger, though? He just shot the hostage. That’s bad. But now he doesn’t have a hostage anymore. Shooting the hostage doesn’t make any strategic sense for the kidnapper.
And what is supposed to happen to the kidnapper afterwards? It’s not like we just shoot the bad guy and now he’s dead and we crack open a few cold ones, because “the bad guy” isn’t a plot of land that needs to be turned into a radioactive wasteland to kill them, the bad guy is the North Korean government. We kill them by killing them, not by nuking every square inch of North Korean territory. Just because the bad guy used a gun to kill the hostage that doesn’t mean we HAVE to use a gun to kill the bad guy or we lose all credibility. If we kill him with a knife he’s still just as dead, right?
Wouldn’t the more relevant question be: What will happen if NK sends a nuke our way and we intercept it and destroy it before it lands? In that case, no one is killed (assuming this all happens over the Pacific), but the intent was still actually there. I think we would strike their nuclear capability with one of those “surgical strikes” and maybe one or two bombs might stray onto Kim’s most likely residence, but we’re not going to nuke Pyongyang.
I’m sympathetic to the argument that if someone uses nukes on us, we must retaliate to preserve credibility of our nuclear deterrent.
However, there are two main reasons to not use nukes, one of which damages our credibilty, and the other that doesn’t:
We refrain from using nukes because we fear the Chinese, or because we cave to protesters who want a more humanitarian policy, in their eyes. That would be bad.
We refrain from using nukes because we can achieve our objectives easily enough without them due to North Korea’s relatively small size and weakness. Of course, this would mean we’d actually have to accomplish our objectives, so we’d better be sure we can do it conventionally if we choose that route.
Obviously the U.S. would and should retaliate but your last paragraph is a pretty silly assumption. Every other nuclear standoff wouldn’t be steered by the U.S. reaction to North Korea. Iran and India would not suddenly think Israel and Pamistan wouldn’t retaliate because the U.S. didn’t.
“mutually assured destruction” only held in the context of the Soviet Union, where both of us possessed a large enough arsenal where we actually could credibly destroy each other.
No President is forced to comply with some vague doctrine, which isn’t law or even policy. You’re talking about a theory of deterrence, which the President may or may not agree with.
I just can’t be 100% willing to agree with that. It sounds logical, but there is something about nuclear that evokes a visceral emotional reaction (at least here, I can’t say about other places) that is not evoked in conventional warfare. Psychological warfare, of a sort, I guess.
Plus you have to control NK after taking out the leadership and command. How many Americans want to put boots on the ground and risk American lives in order to not risk killing more civilians of the country that nuked us? Especially since we don’t really know the degree to which the populous actually is loyal to the ideology of the regime, and how hostile they might be. And they have a large (though ill-equipped and malnourished) army, and we don’t know many would be willing/able to desert. And China is very against an actual US invasion force, from what I recall (one article indicated they might be okay with strikes to take out NK launch capacity, even preemptively), though what they’d say after a nuclear weapon was launched might be different. Or do you think just bomb the leadership/launch facilities and leave?
My tendency is to agree - at least for the time being. I think the biggest threat may be if/when the regime feels insecure. Nukes make sense as a deterrent to keep other countries out. But it seems like they’ve been getting a lot louder (relative to 10 years ago) in the past three or four years.
I thought historians generally said there was no reliable record of him ever saying such a thing (though yes, I know people have said he did). Which doesn’t mean the statement isn’t accurate in regards to the outcome.
That’s always so variable. The entire scenario we’re discussing is interesting in the hypothetical, but none of us (myself included) and really treated it in a “realistic” sense. If they launch one nuclear weapon with intent to impact, they are likely to launch several. Most recently, I saw estimates of them having 1-2 dozen, but unknown size and I don’t know how many missiles they have. If they are launching nukes, they’re likely using artillery on Seoul. And so on, and so on. But we just discuss one lone nuclear strike with no other military actions being taken.
Retaliate with nukes? No, and here’s why: the response would probably be to go all in with conventional forces (with help from South Korea and whatever other allies want to join in) until Pyongyang is occupied and Korea is reunited under Seoul rule. It would not make much sense to make what would now be about half of one of our longtime allies’ countries a radioactive waste pile.
The only problem might be, once the troops go in, Chinese troops might come in from the other direction - not necessarily to defend the north, but to get its share of the land and keep Korea “bottled up.”
The Chinese would undoubtedly move in, not “might”. In fact the best scenario would be an insane conventional bombardment and then let the Chinese occupy the whole country after it’s done.
We have no way to verify the truth of that info about cold-war nuclear signaling, but I’m pretty sure the US and NK have nothing like this in place given the abysmally poor diplomatic and military relations.
Some of the cold-war scenarios I’ve seen played out like that. Usually, in Western planning, the Sovs would push into West Germany, NATO would hold the line (or, at worst, withdraw very slowly, sowing the field thickly with Warsaw Pact casualties in the process), and the Politburo would try to accelerate the push (or gain a breakthrough for their Operational Maneuver Groups to exploit) with a tacnuke or two; NATO would answer in kind, attacking the OMGs massing in the rear, the Sovs would escalate to a limited strategic “demonstration” attack against select non-critical NATO cities or rear bases, NATO would escalate… within hours, full strategic exchanges.
The other scenario was the “tensions rise, suddenly ICBMs, THOUSANDS OF THEM”. But the wargames I got to participate in tended to be scripted like the former as often as the latter.
There are two different questions, both worth answering:
What would the US, that is to say Trump, do?
What should the US do?
Most people seem to be focusing on #2, so I’ll take question #1: does anyone seriously think that President “if you hit me I hit you back ten times as hard” Trump would be able to resist responding in kind? I think he’d follow his impulse, and we know what that would be.
The only question for me is if he could be thwarted from an impulsive response due to logistical concerns. Some CNN commentator recently wrote a column about how much we’d need to do before we could actually launch a strike - for example, getting our troops (and civilians too, I would hope) out of South Korea. However, I am almost as ignorant as Trump on the subject of nuclear weapons, the main differences being that I know and admit I’m ignorant and would never want to be in charge of decisions like the ones posed in the OP. (I kind of like Shodan’s answer, though.)
You can nuke Pyongyang yourself and see the immediate effects. It’s a long way from either the Chinese or the South Korean borders. Not that I think China or South Korea would want a nuke exploding that close regardless.
I do wonder what China would do if the US responded to a NK nuke with nukes of its own - NK using a nuke would be such a blatant failure of China’s control over the little tinpot dictator.
Agreed. If some random CNN commentator actually said that, they’re betraying their ignorance.
If you’re going to attach NK, you’d bolster your forces in SK, with lots of Nuclear-Biological-Chemical protection drills and good dispersal. Because once the balloon goes up, expect DPRK’s Finest to charge across the DMZ (if only to escape the nuclear annihilation happening behind them).
Kimmy sends a nuke to America and wipes out a good portion of a city or completely destroys a town. Nukes are going to be used in reply, at least one. At this point its not about Korea anymore, its everyone watching what happens when you do that.
Sends the missile and it either misses or gets shot down in the ocean. Then its a conventional lay down. China may or may not be invited to participate, but its going to happen. NK might get it right the next time they try, so their ability to do so has to be destroyed.
So anything that does not involve mushroom clouds is a conventional response, but canned sunshine if the NK’s get it right.