If the Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga were at Pearl Harbor

Great Debates
21

They might have been, but then again the Atlantic fleet carriers might have been sent to the Pacific that much sooner to compensate; Yorktown transferred in Dec 41, Hornet in March 42 but probably couldn’t have been sent sooner as she was undergoing her shakedown cruise at the start of the war, and Wasp in June 42. If it came down to it Wasp and Ranger could have been sent in December 41, and by March 42 we’re back to the USN having 4 carriers in the Pacific, the same number as historically available (with poor old Sara either sunk or undergoing extensive repair from having been torpedoed). The US Navy was surprisingly bold with its carriers early in the war, using them in raiding operations that could easily have been termed ‘foolhardy’ had they been unlucky and run into substantial opposition. There’s a list of them here:

It wasn’t a viable strategy though; they could not force the US into decisive battle and they could not stay on the offensive forever. They were going to break sooner or later from stretching themselves further than they could go logistically if not from effective opposition. Japan’s merchant marine was stretched perilously thin as it was supporting the troops where they were and keeping Japan’s economy running. A lot of the logistical weaknesses of Japan early on were compensated for by use of what they dubbed the “Churchill Ration”, i.e. captured enemy supplies. All three of the mentioned targets (Ceylon, Hawaii, and Australia) were realistically beyond Japan’s reach for logistical reasons if no others. That alone might not have stopped Japan from trying (the victory disease) but they would all have been the one gamble too many from a card player who had convinced himself he couldn’t lose. The possibility of invading Australia was considered, but there was no answer as to where the 12 divisions needed for the operation were going to come from, much less the transport needed to lift and then supply them.

22

You’re right that they couldn’t continue it forever (and history proves it). It was, though, probably their most viable solution. What strategy had a better chance, assuming that starting the war in Dec '41 was a requirement?

23

That’s at odds with what I’ve read (The abovementioned Shattered Sword).

24

Ah- don’t attack America. Limit your attacks to the UK, Dutch, and make the French roll over and surrender (like they did). You get oil from the DEI, etc. America will scream, yell, and do nothing in reality. Make your “ally” Hitler happy by putting enough forces on the Soviet border to make Stalin keep many divisions there keeping an eye on you. Your forces sweep the DEI, Siam rolls over & becomes a protectorate (as happened), then into Burma/India. Many Indians flock to your side, making it more of a civil war than a invasion. (This actually happened to an extent see the Indian National Army)

You have all of Indochina, Malaysia, Borneo, Indonesia, and India. You want more oil? Saudi Arabia, Iran will fall to you like ripe plums. Meanwhile, Hitler & Stalin are bogged down into a ten year war. Britain starves. America sulks. *Whatever the fuck you do, leave that fucking sleeping giant alone. *

25

We’ve been down this road before; your basing this fantasy on having played Axis&Allies, not on reality in any form. Attacking the British or the Dutch East Indies means attacking the United States, the US Asiatic Fleet had dispersed from Manila to Balikpapan and Palawan and 4 destroyers were heading to join British Force Z off of Singapore. The idea of invading India is pure fantasy, there was no realistic threat of civil war and the Indian National Army was an ineffective force formed from POWs. More importantly, you’re ignoring why the Japanese stopped in Burma in 1942: it was logistically impossible to support an invasion of India. When they tried it in 1944 in the U-Go Offensive they starved to death. That was only just across the border at Imphal and Kohima, the idea of occupying all of India is absurd. Iran and Saudi Arabia falling like ripe plums isn’t possible outside of science fiction, and very little oil was being produced there during WWII in any event. The Middle East only became a major supplier of the world’s oil after WWII, in 1941 the US was the worlds largest producer and exporter of oil.

26

As Dissonance wrote, we’ve had this debate before. I happen to agree with you - I feel the United States wouldn’t have declared war short of an attack on an American possession. Dissonance, as you can see, disagrees - he feels the United States would have declared war based on a Japanese attack of European colonies in East Asia. Rather than reopen that argument, let’s just assume that Japan is committed to an attack against America and take it from there.

On that basis, I think Japan’s best hope was to stick with the pre-war plan. Capture territory in the west Pacific and then set up a defensive perimeter. Build up your bases as strong as you can while the Americans are building up their military. Make the Americans come to you. Hopefully you will defeat the American offensives and eventually they will decide it’s not worth the effort.

The problem for Japan is that while even though this was probably the best plan they could have come up with, it still was unlikely to work. It was based on the premises that island-based defenses were stronger than navy-based offenses and that America would have to fight its way through all the rings of the Japanese defensive line.

Both premises were disproved during the war. Japan was never able to build up its bases as much as it wished due to inter-service rivalry and a poor grasp of logistics. The Americans on the other hand were able to build up its carrier and landing forces to such a degree that they could achieve local superiority over its targets. And the Americans also developed the strategy of bypassing and isolating the strongest Japanese bases.

27

Yes, we’ve done this a couple off times and it’s the issue which I feel you are the most wrong about.

In addition to the strategic reason why Japan was compelled to neutralize the US in the Pacific, this is similar to the alt histories where it’s suggested that Hitler could have won if he hadn’t have invaded the USSR. Nope. That was the the whole reason Hitler was Hitler and the reason for the war was to clear out breathing space where scores of millions of Slavs were living.

Against the advice of his Secretaries of the Navy and State, Roosevelt had approved crippling sanctions on Japan in the summer of '41, including the oil embargo which the IJN was totally dependent upon.

The Japanese had 100% faith that it would be a short war, and that the allies would capitulate early, within a year. The alt histories where Japan doesn’t attack the US would require an understanding that they could not win and that concept did not exist in Dainippon in the fall of '41.

Agreed. We’ve all said our piece.

IIRC, the combinedfleet.com site makes the argument that Nazi Germany had paths which they could possible have won, or at least done better, but there simply was no way for Japan to have won. Once the US was committed to the fight, it would win.

The other problem was that no matter how much better Japan would have done in the early stages, the US was rapidly building up its strength and forces in the Pacific. With a production base of more than 10 times that of its enemy, America was fated to win.

But that’s boring, so my wild idea for this still uncaffeinated morning would be for the Japan to skip to the end game. Realize that their nation is going to be destroyed, so build massive bunkers for airplane fuel, ammunition and such and then wait for the US to come. Do the kamikaze thing with the transports and make it really painful for the US.

The US will bomb the cities and nuke them back to the stone age, and Japan would wind up a nuclear waste, but would have arguably caused more American lives.

Hmmm. OK, time for coffee.

On that basis, I think Japan’s best hope was to stick with the pre-war plan. Capture territory in the west Pacific and then set up a defensive perimeter. Build up your bases as strong as you can while the Americans are building up their military. Make the Americans come to you. Hopefully you will defeat the American offensives and eventually they will decide it’s not worth the effort.

The problem for Japan is that while even though this was probably the best plan they could have come up with, it still was unlikely to work. It was based on the premises that island-based defenses were stronger than navy-based offenses and that America would have to fight its way through all the rings of the Japanese defensive line.

Both premises were disproved during the war. Japan was never able to build up its bases as much as it wished due to inter-service rivalry and a poor grasp of logistics. The Americans on the other hand were able to build up its carrier and landing forces to such a degree that they could achieve local superiority over its targets. And the Americans also developed the strategy of bypassing and isolating the strongest Japanese bases.
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28

Of course. However, my questioning is if the US had lost carriers on the 7th, would they have been a little more cautious?

That of course ignores the US Navy sentiment which was to ensure that Japanese was only spoken in hell, so yeah, you’re probably right about moving Atlantic based carriers in sooner.

29

Obviously, I needed to follow my advice. Looks like I didn’t trim the rest of the quote.

30

I’m not seeing the equivalence. I agree that Hitler was committed to an invasion of Russia. It was, as you note, his central goal and he only pursued other plans in order to achieve that central goal.

But I don’t feel that the same situation existed with Japan and America. Japan’s central goal was the conquest of China. They only started a war with America to further that goal.

31

Nitpick: Siam changed its name to Thailand in June 1939.

32

Not to revisit this, with which we will have to respectfully disagree, but to clarify my position: a Japanese attack on the European colonies in East Asia would have necessitated an attack on US Navy warships which were deployed there, though I do also believe that an attack by Japan on the European colonies in East Asia would draw the US into the war sooner or later regardless even if US warships weren’t in the Dutch East Indies and on their way to join up with British Force Z which was searching for Japanese troop transports on their way to Malaysia. More importantly the powers that were in Japan did not consider it possible to take the DEI without it leading to war with the US if not immediately than shortly thereafter, and if the Philippines was bypassed and the best hoped for, the US would be able to completely cut Japan off from the oil of the DEI at a moment’s notice due to the location of the Philippines astride the sea lanes from the DEI to Japan.

Even more important though is that the idea of Japan being able to conquer India, much less Iran and Saudi Arabia is pure fantasy and completely absurd. When pushing plastic figures around a map in Axis&Allies it might seem possible, but one thing that even the most complex wargames such as War in the Pacific: Admiral’s Edition which models individual ships down to LSTs and submarine chasers and ground units down to independent companies have problems truly accurately modeling is logistics. The reality is that when Japan tried to invade just the border areas of India, they could not even supply their troops with enough food to prevent starvation, bolding in the last paragraph mine:

In any event, to answer Deeg’s question, Japan simply did not have a viable military solution to the problem it faced at the close of 1941. In a saner world Japan’s best solution would have been to cave to American pressure over its war in China and accept the loss of its conquests in China in exchange for America turning the oil back on. In the real world though, no nation would accept such a humiliating solution, much less Japan with ultra-nationalists at the wheel.

33

I fully agree with this. As I posted above, Japan was already overextended. Trying to conquer India and the Middle East would have been far beyond their abilities.

34

If you take the behavior or American sailors and pilots at Clark and Pearl Harbor on December 7, those carriers would have been blasted to bits and no one would have thought of launching planes even if Japanese planes were spotted.

35

This is certainly the crucial point: not the presence (or not, as the case was) of a division’s worth of old destroyers with the British, but rather the Japanese inability to understand either the political realities in the United States or to conceive of a way of taking the DEI without simultaneously shouldering aside the U.S. Perhaps the problem here is, in part, that the Japanese had a long history of planning for war with the U.S., but only a comparatively short history of planning a movement into the DEI. Japan conceived of the U.S. as the primary opponent, both politically and militarily (and rightly so); but it’s not at all clear that a movement south without neutralizing the Philippines was impossible.

It’ll always remain a counterfactual, of course, but I can’t see Roosevelt getting a declaration of war out of Congress if Japan goes south into the DEI. It’s a gamble, to be sure, but the Japanese fully realized that war with the U.S. was itself a gamble, a gamble that they were very, very unlikely to win. So why not take a slightly greater gamble to avoid war? Eri Hotta gives a complicated but convincing answer in 1941, which I thoroughly recommend.

Lastly, while I sympathize with the reading that says given U.S. industrial power, having the three carriers at PH would merely have delayed the inevitable, I would still say that it would have been a different game. Seeing how history played out, I would tend to assume that the Japanese would have more swiftly overextended themselves, given a much greater “victory disease;” no U.S. movements into the South Pacific would have occured, simply because the opportunity after Midway would not have been there; and the U.S. would have slowly ground the Japanese to bits in a campaign that would have looked very much like the one planned in the ORANGE and RAINBOW plans. But, of course, there’s many fine details that would have come up. No amphibious experience before 1944 is one; less experience in carrier operations; more chance for the Japanese for fortify their outposts.

36

Yes, so? You just don’t bomb those ships. I am basing this not only on Wargames (including large scale University vs University computer scenarios) but on actual history. Don’t discount wargames- the USA and Japan both planned out the war based upon wargames. The USA still does.

What the alternative? Under no circumstances whatsoever could Japan have succeeded?:rolleyes: Deeg asked “What strategy had a better chance?” This strategy is the only one with *any *chance. So, rather than simply disagree with my strategy- What strategy had a better chance?

37

Not answering the question.
What the alternative? Under no circumstances whatsoever could Japan have succeeded? Deeg asked “What strategy had a better chance?” My “Don;t attack the USA” strategy is the only one with any chance. So, rather than simply disagree with my strategy- What strategy had a better chance?

38

Why? Rather than attack them in port, just wait for them to sail out against you. Or, once you have declared war, the USA must leave, since it’s a neutral power.

39

Yesbut you see- why were they starving? Because it was 1944. The American Submarine offensive had been sinking every merchant ship in sight for three years now. 90% of raw materials were being interdicted. The Sub offensive also cut war material production, too. Also, both the sub offensive and Allied air superiority meant that the IJN couldn’t support or do a end run for the Army.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/pac-campaign.html

The loss of raw materials and petroleum and inability to transport items to the front lines lay at the heart of Japan’s weakening ability to maintain effective military strength. Munitions Minister Toyoda said as much when interrogated after the war: “the shipping shortage and the scarcity of oil were the two main factors that assumed utmost importance in Japan’s war efforts”…The breakdown of the Japanese merchant marine placed grievous logistical constraints on the ability of the Japanese Empire to supply her army deployed throughout the Central and Southern Pacific. Japanese logistical problems first became apparent in 1942 during the Guadalcanal campaign, when an overstrained logistical system and relentless U.S. air attacks resulted in frontline Japanese units receiving only 10% of the supplies comparable American units received.(41) U.S. submarines attacks directly affected the ability of the Japanese to move troops and supplies into important combat zones. For example, concentrated submarine attacks on shipping delivering the experienced 32nd and 35th Infantry divisions to the New Guinea theater resulted in the Japanese convoy disembarking the surviving troops over 500 miles from their destination. As a consequence, the Japanese barged ineffectual penny packets of troops to combat McArthur’s forces in Biak and Hollandia.(42) In another case, U.S. submarines destroyed 6 transports loaded with troops destined to boost the defenses of the Marinas before the U.S. invasion of those islands, and sank ships loaded with vital concrete and wire needed for the islands’ fortification.(43) The rate of successful delivery of military supplies to front line units averaged 96% in 1942, declining to 83% in 1943, 67% in 1944 and 51% in 1945.(44) These statistics fail to capture the extraordinary indirect effects of both U.S. submarine and air attacks on Japanese merchants as the Japanese had to resort to carrying much of their supplies within the combat zones by slow, inefficient means such as barges, fishing boats and the like. These direct and indirect effects of U.S. attacks clearly impacted Japanese army units. Throughout the war, munitions deliveries were 15% below front line needs, and 33 to 50% of all food sent to the front was lost due to attack or spoilage.(45)

No war with US, no USA sub offensive.

40

I agree in that a “Don’t attack the USA” strategy was unlikely, given the Imperial mentality. But, what was asked is “What strategy had a better chance?”. I think the “Don’t attack the USA” strategy was the only chance. Unlikely, sure. And still not a sure thing by any means.