If the Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga were at Pearl Harbor

Great Debates
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There’s also the issue (which I’ve brought up in previous threads on this topic) that Japan sank an American warship during its invasion of China. And German submarines sank American warships when they were escorting Atlantic convoys. In neither case did the United States respond with a declaration of war. So America apparently had accepted the idea that when it sent its warships into a warzone they might get sunk.

There’s also the question of whether the United States would have stood by while British and Dutch colonies were invaded. My response to that was that America stood by when French colonies were invaded. And of course they had stood by when France and the Netherlands were invaded. So America was apparently willing to tolerate other countries being invaded without declaring war.

I stand by what I’ve said in the past. The United States would have extended its economic and diplomatic sanctions against Japan if Japan had attacked British and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia. But absent a Japanese attack on American possessions, I don’t think the United States would have declared war against Japan.

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I wasn’t claiming it was an ideal solution, but the Ranger certainly could have been sent to the Pacific had it come down to it. As far as not being a fully capable fleet carrier, compare her to the IJN Hiyō class and she comes across quite favorably: Ranger was faster and carried a larger air group. As far as a lack of storage for aerial torpedoes goes, that was frankly a blessing in disguise given the performance of the Devastator torpedo-bomber and the poor performance of American torpedoes.

As I said, she was undergoing her shakedown cruise and could not have left for the Pacific before March. I’m afraid I don’t understand what you mean about not being a truly serviceable carrier until September-October 1942; Hornet had a full air group at Midway in June:

and departed, again with a full air group, to join operations at Guadalcanal on 17 August 1942.

Yes, this is in DrDeth’s hypothetical where the war begins not on December 7th with an attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines but rather with Japan opening the war with an attack on the Dutch East Indies and British possessions, ignoring the US completely. The Dutch and British bases that were bombed much later historically would be the first things bombed in the opening moves of this hypothetical. The destroyers at Balikpapan were accompanied by the tender Black Hawk; Balikpapan was just a stopover before moving on to Singapore which didn’t occur due to the outbreak of war:

The problem in DrDeth’s hypothetical is that those ships are going to be either bombed in port in the DEI or attacked with Force Z when Japan starts the war.

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Not to rehash this too much, but the sinking of the gunboat Panay was accidental, Japan was tripping over its own feet apologizing repeatedly for the attack and it still soured US-Japanese relations badly. German U-boats and the USN were already fighting an undeclared naval war from summer 1941 on. There may not have been a de jure state of war between the US and Germany, but there was a *de facto *state of war; the American warships escorting Atlantic convoys had orders to shoot on sight any German U-boats, planes, or ships, and had depth charged U-boats on numerous occasions while escorting these convoys prior to war formally breaking out.

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Why? You have said this over & over again for a long time now, and you have never supported this statement. Why should the IJN bomb US ships? Why not waif for the Dutch fleet to sortie or the US ships to leave a belligerent port?

So, ya got nuttin. Thanks.:rolleyes:

Hmm, I provided the cite which you were clearly unaware of and even quoted it. While it’s true the uS had issues with it’s torp, they still had sunk a very significant % of Japanese shipping by 1944.

I quoted "The loss of raw materials and petroleum and inability to transport items to the front lines lay at the heart of Japan’s weakening ability to maintain effective military strength. Munitions Minister Toyoda said as much when interrogated after the war: “the shipping shortage and the scarcity of oil were the two main factors that assumed utmost importance in Japan’s war efforts”…The breakdown of the Japanese merchant marine placed grievous logistical constraints on the ability of the Japanese Empire to supply her army deployed throughout the Central and Southern Pacific. Japanese logistical problems first became apparent in 1942 during the Guadalcanal campaign, when an overstrained logistical system and relentless U.S. air attacks resulted in frontline Japanese units receiving only 10% of the supplies comparable American units received.(41) U.S. submarines attacks directly affected the ability of the Japanese to move troops and supplies into important combat zones. For example, concentrated submarine attacks on shipping delivering the experienced 32nd and 35th Infantry divisions to the New Guinea theater resulted in the Japanese convoy disembarking the surviving troops over 500 miles from their destination. As a consequence, the Japanese barged ineffectual penny packets of troops to combat McArthur’s forces in Biak and Hollandia.(42) In another case, U.S. submarines destroyed 6 transports loaded with troops destined to boost the defenses of the Marinas before the U.S. invasion of those islands, and sank ships loaded with vital concrete and wire needed for the islands’ fortification.(43) The rate of successful delivery of military supplies to front line units averaged 96% in 1942, declining to 83% in 1943, 67% in 1944 and 51% in 1945.(44) These statistics fail to capture the extraordinary indirect effects of both U.S. submarine and air attacks on Japanese merchants as the Japanese had to resort to carrying much of their supplies within the combat zones by slow, inefficient means such as barges, fishing boats and the like. These direct and indirect effects of U.S. attacks clearly impacted Japanese army units. Throughout the war, munitions deliveries were 15% below front line needs, and 33 to 50% of all food sent to the front was lost due to attack or spoilage.(45)

But apparently you know more about WWI US sub warfare than the **Chief of Naval Operations:Submarine Warfare Division ** does. Please inform them their data is wrong. I am sure they will be overjoyed to hear from you.

Destruction of this level means not only the raw supplied themselves are destroyed, but so is the ability to move them to the front, as my cite pointed out. No trucks, no airdrops, no roads, no railways. No war with US, none of these are an issue. The ocean is a IJN pond.

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Thank you for saying what I have been trying to explain- but you have done it better.

True, Japan could not have “occupied” India- if the “Native” troops has resisted. However, if the Japanese had promised them independence, they might well have rebelled with Japanese aid and pressure, not to mention control of the sea and air.
A very large % of captured “Native” troops went over to the Japanese side.

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Exactly. If the USA thought they could prevent invasion of Neutrals by stationing a few ships there, they would have done so in the Netherlands . This was never an issue. In fact the Allies sank French ships to keep them out of the hands of the Nazis. Those few ships would have just left harbor, and they certainly would not have sallied out with the Dutch navy, which would have been promptly sunk- as actually happened.

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I said nothing of the sort, in fact the opposite. Those naval forces were so pitiful there’d be no need for a Pearl Harbor style sneak attack. The Dutch fought bravely, but they had only 3 lt cruisers (one of which was WWI Vintage) and 7 destroyers. List of Dutch military equipment of World War II - Wikipedia

At the Battle of the Java Sea the Dutch/British* combined forces were beaten decisively by a small IJN squadron, then less than a tithe of the IJN. If the Angl-Dutch navy had sailed against the mains forces of the IJN, with battleships and aircraft carriers (all of whom were busy fighting the Yanks) it would have been even more of a slaughter.

No, if the IJN was worried about the political issues, they’d have simply waited a day or so for the American forces to leave. As a Neutral, you can’t stop an invading force with your ships. It just doesn’t work like that.

*even with the addition of an American Hv Cruiser and a couple of destroyers.

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I get you want the option of saying that there would have been four carriers in the Pacific in March if only the USN had had need. But Ranger would not have been one of them, and if she had, she would have made 3 1/2 at best. As several sources attest, even in some moderate weather conditions, she was bucking so much in the Pacific swells that she couldn’t operate her planes. And the aerial torpedo thing is a bit silly–nobody in March 1942 felt that they could dispense with either the TBD or aerial torpedoes.

For a number of reasons Hiyo is not a good comparison. She was admittedly also marginal as a carrier, but then she was a liner conversion, which I’d hold to somewhat lower standards.

The performance of Hornet’s air group at Midway–not just the air group, but also the deck handling and the aerial operations as a whole–was so abysmal that Hornet spent two months in what’s probably best called remedial training. Hard to fail her, since this was essentially her first combat operation; but this is why it is unlikely she could have given a good account of herself short of June or so–without the Doolittle Raid, presumably. I’ll say that I find this a minor point, however.

Another marginal note: the destroyers deployed to Balikpapan were deployed there with an eye towards using them with the British, that much is true. But Balikpapan was not merely a stop-over, since the actual deployment with the British was not settled until December 5th or 6th–it was a holding spot to see what could be done.

This hypothetical is a bit too hypothetical for my tastes then–I’m not sure why we would assume the Japanese would have bombed Balikpapan and Tarakan of all places on day 1. But, see a separate post to follow for more.

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So here’s the thing, if we’re playing hypotheticals. I’m assuming, and I think DrDeth is saying, that just about the only thing that changes on December 7th is that Pearl and the Philippines don’t get bombed, but that instead, the Japanese use their carriers somewhere in the DEI. Right?

The question what these carriers would have done cannot really be answered. I’m inclined to say that they would have been used tactically, because of the impossibility of a strategic deep strike–they would probably have been used to hit Singapore, the most obvious and most important target in the south-west Pacific. There’s very little else of worth around–certainly not Tarakan and Balikpapan, either of which the Japanese would need to take intact for their oil and refineries.

But the more interesting question I think is whether the U.S. would have sat idly by, and this question is a bit more complicated than I gave it credit. The U.S., the British, and the Dutch had been in discussions about their mutual defensive prospects. There had not been official word from Washington on whether the Asiatic Fleet would be permitted to cooperate directly with the others, but Admiral Hart (CinCAsiatic) decided on December 6th to do so–to make the destroyers at Balikpapan available to Admiral Philipps of the Royal Navy. That’s unusual, given that there was no official alliance or indeed war at the time.

However, Hart apparently was appraised by the USN representative at Singapore that Washington expected to be able to get a declaration of war out of Congress even if only the British and Dutch were attacked–or, at any rate, that the possibility had been implied that the US would support the British and Dutch. Furthermore, on Washington’s orders, the Asiatic Fleet had deployed three light vessels in the way of Japan’s southern invasion forces, perhaps (as Hart’s biographer speculates) to get another “incident” going. Roosevelt had not, of course, promised intervention–he could not, as he well knew–but had implied that the possibility existed and the Hart was to use his initiative to decide what to do. This brings a lot of pressure on him, but apparently (as noted above) he had decided to intervene. So what would he have done on December 7th, with Singapore in carrier-produced shambles and his ships not actually yet engaged? I’m inclined to think he would have tried to get into the scrape, and then the problem becomes, how does this change politics in the US: if Americans get killed because a subordinate commander decides to commit his forces without clear guidance from above, is this war? I don’t know. But I’m inclined to say that no hypothetical attack on the British and Dutch would have passed without the U.S. losing men and ships.

I’ll still say that the Japanese should have gone for even this unlikely event, tried hard to get the U.S. to stay out, and only accepted war with great hesitation, not sought it themselves.

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I have heard this quite a bit over the years, but looking at the ship’s operational history, I am thinking that that is overstating the Ranger’s weaknesses.

Respectfully requesting a cite.

Bolding mine (USS Ranger (CV-4) - Wikipedia ):

I don’t think she would have been used in the Pacific for four years if she could not operate in anything other than perfect weather.

Ranger was designated a training carrier on 3 January, 1944, while still in the Atlantic.

Again, I don’t think a carrier that can’t operate aircraft in the Pacific is going to be used for a year and a half training new pilots in the Pacific. (IMO, she could/should/would have been left in the Atlantic/Carribean to do this training, if this was the case.)

http://www.history.navy.mil/DANFS/r2/ranger-ix.htm seems to be the source of a lot of the wikipedia info.

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This is from Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History, p. 77: “As the debate over the *Yorktowns *and then over the *Wasp *shows, her major defects were obvious even beorfe the war: beside physical limits on air-group operations, low speed, and a total lack of protection, she could not operate in common Pacific swells nearly as comfortably as could the larger ships. […] They though the *Langley *quite efficient, not realizing until the advent of the two Lexingtons just how much a carrier could accomplish in moderately heavy seas.”

Similarly, with regard to her air group operating capacity, p. 113 (quoting Bureau of Aeronautics commentary): “In regard to the Ranger, because of her shorter and narrower flight deck [compared to Wasp], the Bureau is of the opinion that the increase in speed obtainable will not result in an effective carrier unit…” That is to say, BuAer in 1940 did not consider *Ranger *“an effective carrier unit”.

p. 136, quoting Frederick J. Horne of the General Board (and formely, unless I’m mistaken, ComAirBatFor): “…experience with the *Ranger *shows that a sea-way tends to reduce her operating ability considerably.”

*Ranger *also, reading between the lines, seems to have been unable to execute deckload strikes, as was customary for the larger carriers and indeed tactically relevant, since it reduced air operations time.

It also bears pointing out that neither peacetime experiences (which, as noted above, spoke against Ranger anyway) nor her role as a training carrier say much about her capacity to operate as a fleet carrier in the Pacific in 1942-3; the training role, in particular, is far less taxing on air operations than actual combat.

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This is a great post. Yes, I agree, FDR would have tried really hard to get the USA into the war- and it’s hard to predict his level of success.

Right, the carriers would likely be used against the British, with one small task force, with maybe one of the smaller carriers and heavy cruisers going against the Dutch. No need for a “Pearl Harbor” against the tiny (but very brave) Dutch squadron.

My point remains- this (even tho not terribly likely) is the *only *way the Imperial Japanese could have “won”.

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Yet they utilised the CVL’s and CVE’s extensively… :confused:

Ok, thanks.

I think I get the picture now, reading other military history forums. Let me explain how I have come to understand it, and I’m sure one of you will correct me. :slight_smile:

The Ranger’s problems wasn’t [exactly] hull size, per se, but her light construction. After all, Wasp (of similar size) and the Independence class CVL’s (which were physically smaller).

The US Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair (C&R), responsible for the design details of all Navy ships, went through great pains to save weight on ship designs to stay within treaty limits. As a result, for example, the Pensacola class cruisers actually came out underweight. cite

I think there was a similar great effort to keep the Ranger within (or below) treaty tonnage limits, and this made her handle differently (say, with lighter hull scantlings, for example) in heavier seaways, compared to Wasp, which looks similar (in brief) on paper. Also, her flight deck was built too light for later aircraft designs, and this probably affected her ability to utilize the “deck park” operational regime.

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The CVEs at least had some similar problems with sea-state operations, as far as I can tell; but then, they were second-line units. The CVLs were at least faster and, given their smaller airgroups, could operate them with greater ease. I suppose a 40-plane Ranger might have been possible…

I think that just about sums it up; I’ll also say that I take back my misremembered belief that Ranger could not operate aircraft at all at some medium sea states, for which I’ve not found a cite. But she was very clearly hampered badly as a carrier.

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You have to remember that a war with Japan was not the war Roosevelt was thinking about. He regarded Germany as the real danger and worried that a war with Japan would divert American attention away from the real threat.

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Heck, even Roosevelt underestimated American economic power.

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Thank you for the info on the Ranger. While nobody felt they could dispense with the TBD or aerial torpedoes in March '42 before they had seen much real action, the fact remains that they performed miserably when they did see combat, so as I said if anything it would have been a blessing in disguise. While it might have been regarded as a weakness at the time, it really wasn’t. While less than stellar and liner conversions, Hiyo and Junyo were used as fleet carriers by the IJN out of necessity; they were originally designated as auxiliary aircraft carriers but were redesignated as a regular carriers after Midway.

You are again making the absurd assumption that the Japanese would be able to identify American ships as being American and attack all of the British and Dutch ships around them while avoiding the US ones. You are also assuming the Japanese are aware that there are even US ships there. What happens in your alternate timeline when Force Z is attacked either by land based bombers as historically happened or carrier based planes from the kido butai only this time unbeknownst to them there are 4 US destroyers with them?

This is just silly. You either did not read or do not understand your cite. You’ll note nowhere does it say that 90% of the raw materials headed for Japan were being interdicted in 1944 as you claimed, or that US submarines had been sinking every merchant ship in sight for three years now as you stated. “Issues” is the understatement of the century in describing the problems with the Mark 14, as anyone with actual knowledge of the submarine campaign would know.

No, it means you don’t understand what your cite actually says.

It means absolutely nothing of the sort. The submarine campaign had nothing to do with the reason the Japanese Army was starving to death when it tried to invade India in 1944; your cite doesn’t say it does and is in fact utterly irrelevant to your factually incorrect claim that the submarine campaign was the reason the Japanese could not even supply enough food to their troops just over the border from Burma to keep them from starving to death. Again, the problem wasn’t the lack of supplies in Burma. The problem was moving the supplies from Burma to the troops advancing into India; the troops that were starving to death outside of Imphal and Kohima weren’t starving to death when they were in Burma.

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I wonder if the US Plan Z would have played much more into Japanese hands. Declare war, but no Pearl Harbor attack. Instead, lure the naive US fleet out into the open where superior Japanese doctrines and tactics at the start of the war will lead to a 2nd Tsushima. No POed Americans either. A lot depends on whether the Musashi would have been ready tho.