Minor nitpick: I believe by “Titan V” that you actually mean the Atlas V space launch vehicle (SLV). The Titan production line (and production of the gigantic Titan SRMU boosters) was stopped in 2002-2003, and the final flight of a Titan SLV (a “commercial” Titan IVB) occurred in 2005. This was largely due to the cost of Titan production and having to handle the corrosive and toxic fuel and oxidizer, and also the availability of heavy launch vehicles in the Altas and Delta families coming into production.
The American Space Transportation System, colloquially known as “the Shuttle”, consisting of the Orbiter Vehicle (OV), the [Redesigned/Reusable] Solid Rocket Motors (SRM, and post-Challenger, RSRM), and the External Tank (ET), was intended both to succeed the Saturn family of man-rated heavy and super-heavy SLVs, and to supplant (and later completely replace) the then ICBM and IRBM based SLVs; the Thor IRBM-based Delta family (Thor, Thrust Augmented Thor, Thor-Able, Thor-Ablestar, Thor-Agena, Thor-Delta, and finally the Delta), Titan (“commercial” Titan II, III, and IV, and the converted Titan 23 and Titan 34), and Atlas (Atlas E/F-G-H, Atlas SLV-3, Atlas-Vega, Atlas-Able, Atlas-Centaur). The ostensible reasons for this was that the weapon-based SLVs were expensive to operate and maintain, did not meet modern range safety standards, and use could cause conflict with SALT arms limitation agreements, but the reality is that even during the final concept phase it became apparent that the “reusable” Shuttle system would at best be cost comparable to existing expendable heavy launch systems, and that given only the aggressive 24 launches per year schedule. The real reason for shutting down expendable SLV production was to prevent comparison between ELVs and the STS, and force military, research, and commercial payloaders to use the Shuttle. (Laws in place at the time prohibited the use of foreign SLVs for US-based commercial payloads; and we obviously weren’t going to fly surveillance satellites on Soviet or Chinese launchers.)
The USAF, despite nominally signing up to use and even operate the STS “Blue Shuttle”, flying out of VAFB off of the infamous Space Launch Complex 6 (SLC-6 or “Slick Six”) and levying cross-range requirements for a once-around polar orbit return to launch site that drove the wingspan and amount of exposed leading edge, didn’t really want the Shuttle and continued to maintain low level development of a replacement ELV that could be brought on line quickly in case the Shuttle was grounded. Curiously, one of these ELV proposals was based on a five-segment the Shuttle SRMs, and is essentially what became the Ares I rocket for the Constellation program.
As it turned out, Shuttle launch costs and availability were prohibitive, and the destruction of Challenger 73 seconds into STS-51-L gave the air force the excuse it needed to abandon the STS and return to and expand the Titan, Delta, and Atlas based ELVs, and fund proposal and research for the next generation of expendable launch vehicles, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, which begat the current Delta IV and Atlas V (which despite the continuation of naming systems, have no hardware or design specifications in common with the original Thor-Delta and Atlas SLV ystems).
In addition to these systems, there are a number of other space launch systems used for satellite launch available today. Orbital Sciences Corporation produces vehicles for commercial and military use, including the air-launch three-stage Pegasus (Orion solid rocket motors), the four stage Taurus I (a Pegasus sans wing on top of a Castor 120 SRM), the Minotaur family (SLVs based upon surplussed Minuteman and Peacekeeper ICBM lower stacks with Orion upper stages and optional solid or liquid orbital insertion motors). Solid rocket motor manufacturer Alliant Techsystems and Lockheed-Martin offer launchers based on the Castor 120. Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) offers the Falcon 1 and Falcon 9, if you don’t mind taking a role of the dice on a nascent launch vehicle. And there are a number of launch systems from China, Russia, France, Japan, India, et cetera based on demil’d ICBMs or purpose-designed space launch vehicles.
As has been demonstrated, the STS hasn’t carried satellites or space probes to orbit in over a decade, and was never either cost-competitive or schedule reliable for that purpose; it exists today almost exclusively to service the ISS. The STS isn’t being taken out of service because of “age and normal flight stress”; in fact, the two oldest Shuttles have been destroyed, and the remainder of the fleet has seen half or less of the minimum design lifespan of 50 flights. The reason for retiring the Shuttle fleet is that there are a number of design deficiencies–and specifically, the elaborate and maintenance-intensive thermal protection system–which limits the reliability of the STS below what would be considered acceptable for man-rating on any other vehicle. In addition, it simply has not been competitive with purely expendable systems in terms of cost, even at the highest launch rates.
Regarding generating apparent gravity by designing a rotating station: in addition to the complexities mentioned below (stress, criticality in case of failure, the complexity of a non-rotating joint to attached to), the largest problems with a rotating station are assembly, and station-keeping. You couldn’t assemble a rotating station piecemeal for the same reason that you don’t let kids jump on and off an operating merry-go-round, which means you’d have to assemble the entire thing and then put it in rotation. We’ve been assembling the ISS for about the past twelve years, and still isn’t complete. It was designed to be modular and accommodate configuration changes during construction and development, whereas a rotation station would have to be carefully regulated by requirements and verification across all participants to maintain appropriate mass properties. And even slight inertial imbalances (from moving mass around inside) and tidal influences would cause precession and nutation, causing it to point and wobble and requiring thusters, flywheels, or both to correct its orientation and damp out gyrations which takes energy and propellant. There is nothing conceptually difficult about spinning a body to create internal centrifugal acceleration, but the engineering details of doing this with a large enough structure to serve as an operating habitat are really complex and haven’t been previously done on anything like this scale.
However inaccurate it may be in pure physics terms, “microgravity” is the jargon used in the aerospace community in regard to freefall environments where the only significant gravitational influences on an isolated body are tidal effects. Gravity at LEO is, of course, a substantial fraction of surface-level gravity, as can be seen by how satellites continue to orbit and how difficult it is to push things further away from the Earth.
I’m not going to delve into the whole “what innovations has the manned space program produced” other than to point out that most of the claimed innovations already existed and were implemented by NASA or subcontractors for use in the program. Microelectronics, inertial guidance systems, medical remote monitoring devices, et cetera were all adaptations, not innovations. There are compelling reasons to maintain and expand a space exploration program, but near-term fiscal return isn’t one of them.
Stranger