Which implies that a first-striking enemy could render the subs unable to strike back by taking out the command authority. I thought the whole point of boomers was to make it impossible for an enemy to do that.
In short; “We maintain these weapons in prime condition and train in their use in the sincere hope that by being ready to use them, we will never have to use them.”
The point of boomers is to have a retaliatory capability left after a first strike that has taken out land-based missiles.
Wholesale nuclear retaliation makes sense if the overall environmental damage isn’t catastrophic.
So if North Korea launches 20 nukes at America, and America launches 200 back, that fallout still probably wouldn’t unleash nuclear winter. And the message of nuclear deterrence would have been strengthened that much more credibly.
If Russia launches 3,000 nukes at America, it wouldn’t be good for America to launch 3,000 back.
Not just “sincere hope”; the literal intent is that they never actually have to be used, because if they are, they have failed as a deterrent.
Stranger
Climate altering effects (e.g. “nuclear winter”) are not caused by fallout, which by definition is radioactive material that precipitates shortly after and downwind of a ground or low altitude burst. Nuclear winter is the result of lightweight residues drawn up to and suspended in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere, blocking incoming solar radiation and resulting in dramatic atmospheric cooling for an extended period. The production of this material is not primarily the primary blast and uplift effects of the detonation but the resulting firestorms which would result in extended production of combustion products–in essence, light ash and smoke–drawn up into the jet streams and distributed around the hemisphere.
The TTAPS report was the original presentation of the nuclear winter hypothesis, and it was based on a model with a number of limitations and assumptions, not the least of which was an even distribution of weapons around an all terrestrial globe. The actual persistence of suspended material resulting from a simultaneous full range nuclear strike is probably substantially less than predicated, and climate effects would likely be more regional or restricted to specified latitudes than a persistent multi-year global effect.
As a practical matter, North Korea does not have 20 nuclear weapons to deploy, nor could it strike the United States with its delivery systems, and there would be no reason for the US to respond with ten times the number of weapons, especially since the fallout would be deposited directly on some of the most populous areas of our ally, Japan. A targetted strike taking out the North Korean leadership, launch sites, weapon production facilities, and naval assets would suffice to assure a future lack of response by North Korea. The larger problem with such a counterattack, if performed with ICBM or SLBM weapons, is that it would have the appearance of potentially threatening both eastern Russia and China, both of which are nuclear-armed powers, and therefore a response would have to be negotiated to prevent the development of a wider conflict. In such a response the use of the B-2 bomber and B-61 variable yield gravity bombs would be the more rational response.
Stranger
You have mentioned the Scowcroft Commission many times. I have always wondered, how serious were the proposals? Considering that the US retained significant retaliatory capability with the SSBN force as well as theater missiles in W Germany.Mobile truck based ICBM’s (like the SS-27 and the Midgetman) would give plenty of survivability at a much affordable price and be actually technically feasible. Surely they knew that? Some of the proposals seem to be based upon “what the most cartoon like idea we can put forth”.
“Capability.” Doesn’t mean they launch automatically - though there ARE scenarios wherein they will launch after a set period of time after loss of contact. But those scenarios have to be set in motion by the NCA.
There are contingencies in place for survival of NCA in case of a ‘decapitation strike.’ If there’s a decapitation strike, the responsibility devolves on the surviving authority. Whom may then choose to retailiate - or not.
What you are saying is the contingencies are for the President to be dead…not a stooge?
Most of Scowcroft Commission concepts would have been ridiculously expensive and logistically complex to implement and secure. I have seen one cost estimate in passing on the Hard Rock/Hard Tunnel basing scheme that conservatively would have been in the hundreds of billions of dollars to base the requisite 200 missiles, and would also have been an enormous challenge to service (which is why our existing silos are all in flat farming land with few bridges or terrain to cope with). Even the ostensibly practical Peacekeeper Rail Garrison scheme that prevailed as the ultimate solution grew in cost and complexity (the original scheme had a steam-powered pop up erect/launch system which would have to be manually lowered by crane and refurbished after any erection; the final plan was a fully reusable EL capable of erecting and lowering on its own power) to the point that it probably would have been cancelled even if the Cold War didn’t end in 1991.
There are issues with the security of the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) force (improvements in Soviet passive sonar and quieter submarine propulsion potentially allowing them to trail Ohio-class submarines, magnetic anomaly detection satellites sensitive enough to track ferrous-hulled submarines even when submerged) but it was assumed that FBM would still be a credible deterrent against disarming first strike for the foreseeable future, and at any case, our early warning satellite system was expected to provide sufficient notice that land-based ICBMs could be deployed before a enemy weapons could intercept them in flight or destroy the silos containing them, provided the discrimination of a real threat and decision to launch could be made promptly.
Stranger
Once upon a time, we got a firing solution***** on an Ohio-class boat. We kept it for less than fifty seconds. They counter-detected us, started pumps and boogied. All we heard was check valves slamming, some brief cavitation, and they were gone. They broke contact, opened range, then went back to natural circulation, and became invisible again. The skipper was both happy, and pissed - We weren’t able to establish which boat it was for certain, so he didn’t know who to tease. But we were able to detect and (briefly!) localize the boomer. Which is no mean achievement.
*****Up Washington-way, Pacific Coast. IME, Submarine skippers are by nature aggressive, competitive, and will often try to get a ‘solution’ on any boat they detect as a matter of bragging rights, if for nothing else.
Thanks. Why did they not go for mobile launcher truck based ICBM’s as the Russians with the Yars and the Chinese with the DF41. Those have also demonstrated the capability to carry MIRV’s.
Or was such things outside the realm of feasibility in the 1970’s/1980’s (although the Commission did not seem too worried about “feasibility”!)
Two of the Scowcroft concepts (I won’t call them proposals because they never had sufficient detail) were Off-Road Mobile and Ground Effect Machine, both of which would have 220 transporters each carrying one missile (presumably the extra 20 were operational spares) capable of dispersing the missiles across a wide area. (The LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile is so large that even transporting the first stage by itself over the road can be a challenge, and transporting the integrated missile over public roads is just not feasible notwithstanding the security issues involved.). There are two essential problems with the mobile concept; one is that unlike the former Soviet Union with vast open tundra amenable to off-road dispersal, the United States is broken up by private land and elevated roadways. I suppose we could designate an area for dispersal such as Mojave or White Sands, but that it still a limited area.
The other is guidance; the Peacekeeper had some very precise requirements for targeting accuracy which required very high precision in measuring the trajectory, and that all starts from the launch point. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency actually tracks tectonic movement to assure high precision of silo locations relative to targets. You could designate flight positions that the vehicles would have to reach and align to before launch (which is what was traditionally done with mobile launch systems) but that would delay operational readiness, or use progressive refinement of GPS signals, assuming the GPS constellation is still operating. However, the requirement for off-road dispersal would reduce accuracy as well as arguably making the system more vulnerable and least available than silo basing.
The later Small ICBM (SICBM) MGM-134A ‘Midgetman’ was a mobile single RV which was both road mobile and capable of off-road travel using a futuristic looking “Hard Mobile Launcher”. SICBM was cancelled in 1991. The suggestion of using a mobile launcher was revisited in 2012 under the Ground Based Stategic Deterrence program. Jeffrey Lewis of ArmsControlWonk.com had an opinion piece on this a few years ago that essentially revisited the conrtroversies and costs of SICBM.
As far as I can tell, the Scowcroft Commission was given leave to come up with whatever concepts they could dream of that would improve survivability, ignoring the fact that a more critical element of deterrence is robust and reliable early warning capability, and command and control systems. The solid propellant Minuteman II and III, and Peacekeeper missiles could be launched within 90 seconds of an executive launch order following a prescribed plan. Surviving an attack–which the entire system exists to deter–is not really necessary provided adequate time and control to respond.
Stranger
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…one is that unlike the former Soviet Union with vast open tundra amenable to off-road dispersal, the United States is broken up by private land and elevated roadways. I suppose we could designate an area for dispersal such as Mojave or White Sands, but that it still a limited area.
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Forgive me, but why would dispersal in a continent-sized nation like the US be any more difficult or less effective than Pershing II dispersals in W Germany?
Pershing II is a relatively small MRBM, a bit over 34 feet long, and just about a meter in diameter. It was designed for rapid response, and it is easily transportable with relatively conventional transporter/erector/launcher units. Basically, it wasn’t a necessary part of the strategic triad.
Its relatively short range meant that realistically, only as far east as the Ukraine was threatened by it, and it was mostly intended to threaten to wreck the USSR’s ability to launch, support, and sustain an invasion of Europe - i.e. turn a conventional invasion of Western Europe into a potential nuclear war; Extension of the MAD concept down to a theater-level concept.
Pershing II was the counter to the Soviet SS-20.
Pershing II also used active guidance and was much shorter range, so the need for accuracy in the internal guidance system was much reduced. The operational assumption was that it would move into position in anticipation of a Soviet invasion force, and was really intended for more battlefield theater application rather than as a strategic deterrent. It also launched from surveyed locations with alignment features; the idea of a general mobile launch platform that can drive into the middle of a flat field and launch a payload 10,000 nmi away to hit with a CEP measured in feet without using external alignment references was and is not realistic. This was the reason that earlier SLBMs were of such limited accuracy, though the more recent FBMs us stellar-inertial navigation in addition to the high precision inertial location provided by the launching submarine.
Stranger