"In God We Trust"

Great Debates
101

NED –

NED, I truly believe that anyone reading this thread, my two-dozen posts to date as well and your three, can reach their on conclusions on who is employing logical argument and who is not.

MINTY GREEN –

MINTY, as I have said, I saw little in your posts to indicate you had read the case law. You assure me that you have. I accept that; I am by no means calling you a liar. Rather, I was attempting to show that my assumption, while incorrect, was nevertheless a reasonable one.

Ah. Now we have moved to asking whether it might remotely “have something to do with” religion. There we agree. Any mention of God may have something to do with religion; that is what triggers the analysis in the first place.

I’d ask you for a cite for that, but heck, you wouldn’t let “unnecessary legal clutter” muddle up a “logic contest” such as whether something is or is not unconstitutional.

Really? How so? Why does the person paid to pray for your elected representatives not speak for you? I don’t see the distinction you are drawing here. It is okay for someone to vocalize a government-sanctioned prayer today, but it is not okay for the government to continue to print on money a motto that has been in use continuously for over 130 years? You think the dollar bill speaks for you but the Congressional chaplain does not? This not argument for debate’s sake; I truly don’t understand this. It would seem to me that if IGWT is not okay, other ceremonial uses of similar verbiage would not be, either.

No, you were arguing what you thought was my definition (IGWT is not ever religious under any circumstances), but that is not “my” definition.

My mileage DOES vary. They do not define “religion” because they take the enactment through the Lemon test to see if it is okay or not. They are not such fools as to be drawn down the tangent of what is or is not an actual religion. That is a question that is so manifestly not obvious that even the IRS stays out of that quagmire.

Yeah, funny me – arguing law on a question of whether or not something is constitutional. No legal question there! And I have seen precious little in the way of actual argument about “whether the law makes any sense” – which, by the way, is itself a discussion about (gasp!) law – what I have seen is that it is “ridiculous” or “lame” or “intellectually dishonest.” If I have missed some argument about the substance of “whether the law makes sense,” please point it out.

“Jumped down your throat”? To the contrary, I made a very small clarification to an over-generalization. If by doing so I pissed you off, I certainly wasn’t aware of it. And I am not about to get into some argument about who did what to whom first. My point was that your encouragement to avoid posts that “do not advance the debate” cuts both ways.

Ah. Apparently, “advancing the debate” includes reiterating points that you are on notice someone else might find at least mildly personally objectionable. Rest assured that I too stand by my opinions of you and your posts – all of them.

Except that I never “defined away a practice as not being ‘religion’” in any circumstances, as I clearly have said several times, most notably in my last post. Therefore you may continue to consider my logic spotty so long as you willfully misinterpret what I say. There is not much I can do about that.

But this was MY point, as also must be clear from my lawst post. And – again – I NEVER said that IGWT could never under any circumstances be a religious statement. As I have already said, that is apparently what you wish I had said, and what you persist in asserting I said, but it is not in fact what I said.

Stay with me here: “Religious” is not the same as “religion.” A single belief may be “religious” but nevertheless not be a religion. Because they are not the same. A belief in God, without more, is not necessarily a religion. A declaration of a belief in God may be a religious declaration. Or it may not be, depending upon the context and the intent of the speaker.

Once more, with feeling: I have never asserted that generic monotheism cannot be a religion. Therefore, it is not incumbent upon me to show that it would fail the Lemon test if it is not. What I have said is that IGWT is not a religion and that, regardless of whether it is deemed to be a religious statement (which I do not consider it, but which it might be, insomuch as it mentions God, which is the trigger for the Lemon test), it is nevertheless not unconstitutional unless it advances religion. The establishment clause does not concern itself solely with religions. It is every bit as concerned about statements and actions that may be religous, and therefore maybe not okay. Really, I would think by this point my position in this would be clear.

I beg your pardon, but my example was certainly intended to be an in-the-alterative test. It would hardly parallel Lemon if it were not. I apologize if that was not clear.

But of course to prove this, you would have to address the cases and attack the judges’ actual analysis as it appears in those cases. Without doing so, the assertion that the reasoning of the judges (all of them) is rationalization and not logic is merely conclusory. But as we know, we don’t like to clutter up a logic argument with pesky little points of law.

102

MINTY –

MINTY, you are entirely omitting the not-unimportant detail that judges, not juries, decide questions of law. In particular, we do not submit questions of constitutionality and constitutional determinations to juries, or to the popularity contests known as “polls” that BRUCKNER recommends, because they are purely questions of law (legal interpretation), not fact. It would seem to me to be not unimportant to your argument to point out that we do not do this, since it appears to me to be clear that many things that are manifestly ]not constitutional would be found constitutional if left to majority opinion – school prayer, to name just one. If O’Connor is in error – and I believe she is, I would stick to Lemon until something better comes along – it is in introducing a factual determination (“what would the reasonable observer do?”) into a legal question in the first place, not in failing to send that factual determination to a jury to decide. I have great admiration for Justice O’Connor, but I think attempting to shoehorn a legal determination of into a quasi-factual inquiry is not a good idea. However, so long as questions of law remain matters for judges and not juries, it is not “hypocricy” to refuse to allow a jury to decide them. And – again – I note how it could not possibly be a judgment call you disagree with, which is what it is for me. No, it must be “hypocrisy.”

103

I’m going to ask this as directly as I think possible.
Jodi, what are your personal thoughts as to whether or not the phrase “In God We Trust” as shown on our money is a religious statement? What do you personally think was the intent of those who put it on our money? Do you have any personal feelings about the possible romoval of the phrase from our money?

104

CZARCASM asks:

  1. “Jodi, what are your personal thoughts as to whether or not the phrase “In God We Trust” as shown on our money is a religious statement?”

I think it is a statement that has lost its religious meaning as used on currency and to the extent it is used on currency, just as the pyramid with an eye on it no longer has the explicit meaning it once did. Today, it is just a decoration. And today, IGWT is just a motto that has appeared on currency for nearly a century and a half. More generally, I think the phrase IGWT may or may not be a religious statement, depending on context, history, and who is saying it. Just like “God bless you;” “God help you;” and “Thank God that’s over.”

  1. “What do you personally think was the intent of those who put it on our money?”

I think their intent was to adopt a national motto that would reflect what they assumed (probably correctly, at the time, which was the 1860s) was a national ethos that the nation, after the war, existed through the good offices of a higher power. I also think at the time they thought that “mistress” was a perfectly proper thing to call a woman, and that “varlet” was still a fairly grievous insult.

  1. “Do you have any personal feelings about the possible romoval of the phrase from our money?”

It wouldn’t bother me in the least if it was removed, which only makes sense since I don’t imbue it with much in the way of specific or particularized meaning. I think the ceremonialism of having a motto is a good thing, but I wouldn’t care if the motto was something else. That doesn’t mean I believe it should be removed because it is unconstitutional; I don’t think it is, for reasons that DSYOUNG probably articulated better than I have. It is an interesting intellectual question, but I frankly think there are hundreds of constitutional issues that are far more pressing. It is not a question I truly give a rat’s ass about on a daily basis, to be honest.

105

From this I presume that you can’t make the distinction any better than I can. Unsurprising because it is a distinction without a difference. Your attempt to distinguish between a religious statement and religion is equally spurious but at least you tried.

Here’s a real one. There is no god. Clearly that is not a religious statement but it sure as hell is a comment on religion and would be entirely innapropriate as a government pronouncement in a state with religious tolerance.

106

NED –

Again, I am not attempting to convince you that I have employed logic because I fail to see why such an effort would be worth my time. And I assure you that when I say that I believe that the readers can judge my use of logic for themselves, I really mean that they may judge it for themselves – especially in contrast to yours. Feel free to presume from this that I have fallen in love with you and your magical way with words; you apparently do not need any evidence to support your presumptions, and there is as little for that as for the other.

107

So you are prepared to write 20 posts but won’t address the central logical falacy of the argument you adopt because you don’t want to bother with an asshole like me. Yes, I am sure that is the reason :slight_smile:

108

Jodi, the trouble with your statement that IGWT no longer holds a religious meaning is that many religious/political groups are rallying behind it precisely because they believe it holds just such a religious meaning, and others are protesting the placement of IGWT because it has, is, and probably always will be used, rightly or wrongly, as a symbol against those who believe differently.

If the Supreme Court directly upholds the placement if IGWT on our money, it will not be status quo among many politico-religious groups. They will see it as a direct sign of support of their point of view.

109

IF, “In God We Trust” on our currency is FORCING “religious convictions” on someone, then removing it is forcing your atheistic convictions on me. Using your logic.

It’s silly to imply that IGWT is forcing religious convictions on anyone. Which “God” of which religion is it forcing on us anyway? Allah? Jehovah? Moroni? Buddah? The Great Alien? Zeus? Because I’ve made statements here about how our founding fathers believed in the God of the Bible, and have been told repeatedly that this isn’t true. They were Deists.

110

NOT having IGWT on money is forcing atheism on you?!?
Randy, on one hand you pretend not to know which “god” the phrase refers to(despite numerous references given in this thread alone), and on the other hand you claim that the mere removal of this phrase would be forcing atheism on you. If the phrase is refering to a religion you don’t believe in, then how could it’s removal affect you? In fact, if the phrase is so vague as to mean nothing, then it’s removal should bother no-one, right?

But you have shown exactly what you think it means by your previous arguments. The word games you are trying to play now to support your position are rediculous, to me at least.

111

Randy, seeking a change from “in god we trust” to “there is no god” would be forcing athiestic beliefs on you. Asking that the government respect both of our beliefs by remaining neutral is not forcing anything on anyone.

112

The beliefs of the Founding Fathers don’t really have anything to do with IGWT. Its use was first proposed during the Civil War (by a preacher who explicitly sought a contrast between Christianity and heathenism) and its position was cemented by acts of Congress in the 1950’s.

113

NED –

YOu see as my “central logical fallacy” the “fact” that I cannot “explain why an official aknowledgement of a state of affairs does not constitute an official approval and endorsement [religion].” This is, of course, the central question to whether IGWT is constutional or not, and I have been explaining it – at great length – for three pages now. In other words, you accuse me of failing to explain the precise position I have spent a great deal of time explaining. I mean no insult when I tell you that if you don’t get this buy now, I truly cannot help you. Moreover, you accuse me of failing to employ logic, and simultaneously conclude that because I am unwilling to explain my position AGAIN, and to you personally, I must be unable to explain it – which is not, with all due respect, a stunning show of logic on your part, at least not so long as “unwilling” and “unable” continue to mean different things. None of this has anything to do with whether or not you are an asshole, though I had not taken you for one.

CZARCASM –

I understand this. But as the courts have said, specifically in the quote from Gaylor buried on page two, the fact that some people consider it to be a governmental endorsement of religion (either approvingly or disapprovingly) does not mean that it is. In fact, it merely begs the question of whether or not it is, and is only relevant in a tangential and limited way, so long as we do not rely much on the opinions of the populace to decide what the constitution means. Many people believe the Second Amendment means you personally can own a rocket launcher. Many other people believe the Second Amendment believes that only the militia may have guns. There are lots and lots of people who hold one or the other of these positions, and both of them cannot be right. And the ones that are wrong – whichever ones are wrong – do not become more right for being popular.

They can see it as they like – just as they will see attempts to remove it as direct attacks upon Christianity. That doesn’t mean they are in either case correct. The Supreme Court cannot prevent certain “politico-religious groups” from assuming a ruling in their favor is an endorsement of their position, any more than they could prevent the NRA from taking any pro-gun ruling, no matter how narrow, to be an endorsement of their entire agenda. Surely you can see that the Court cannot regard how people might take its decision, or attempt to co-opt its decision, when it decides a matter of law. This would be the exact sort of politically-motivated judging so often (and correctly) deplored. All they can do is rule as they see fit under the law, and hope the decision is clear enough that anyone bothering to read it will see what it stands for – and what it does not.

114

No Jodi, you assert it over and over again without addressing the central issue of whether it makes any sense. When confronted with the difficult questions you assert the contradictory as obvious and then fall back on the words of the court. When you are asserting an interpretation that, on its face, contradicts the plain meaning and common understanding of a phrase the onus is on you to demonstrate that it is a logical distinction. You have not done so.

Here we have a simple declarative sentence which expresses a belief and trust in a deity. This is, on its face, an endorsement of religion generally. Somehow, according to you and the court, it doesn’t promote religion when its printed on money but it somehow does when posted in a school. Apparently impressionable children don’t handle money. Even more oddly, we are told that a simple 4 word sentence any child can understand can somehow lose its meaning over time.

The problem the court faced is that the Lemon test didn’t properly reflect their view of the demands of the establishment clause. Rather than screw with the test they contort reality to achieve the result they want.

This is hardly new. My favorite Canadian example from our Supreme Court allowed a prosecutor to cross a witness using prior statements after she asserted she hadn’t seen anything and didn’t know anything. The purpose of such cross was to test her credibility but since she hadn’t testified to anything relevant her credibilty was hardly at issue. There is no other way to see this sort of thing than intelectual dishonesty.

On another point, while you continue to argue that peoples perception of the meaning is irrelevant, you also continue to suggest this is some misguided minority. ACLU briefs include national surveys which show over 70% of people nationwide view the statement as an endorsement of religion. Of course they are all stupid and their opinion doesn’t matter. I agree that polls do not determine the opinion of a reasonable person but what reasonable person would not find this compelling? We are not dealing with the meaning of a contractual phrase here. What an odd thought that in the intensley personal realm of freedom of conscience and religion we would find irrelevant how the population actually percieves the phrase.

I am right with you on the importance of this issue. Though I do find it slightly offensive I couldn’t care less if it stays, it isn’t even my country. Its the rationalization that grates on me.

115

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Blackmun, Stevens, & O’Connor argue “coercion”; Rehnquist and Thomas argue for “nonpreferential” test)

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor first proposes her “endorsement/disapproval” test)

And how’s this for a pretty damn conclusive evidence that Lemon is all but dead? Allegheney County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (5 votes in favor of O’Connor’s endorsement test).

But I wouldn’t want to clutter up your legal arguments with actual law or anything like that.

116

MINTY –

Very interesting cases to choose. Let’s take a look:

Lee v. Weisman: The Court specifically and explicitly refuses to revisit Lemon, in light of which declaration, it remains good law. The majority decides the issue by determining that the enactment is “coercive” – not as a replacement for Lemon but as an alternative basis for decision – and Judge Bownes writes a concurrence showing that the enactment violates all three parts of Lemon as well. This to you means Lemon is “darned near dead”?

Lynch v. Donnelly: O’Connor proposes her alternative to the Lemon test, and the Court as a whole announces that it will not be bound by any single test in deciding establishment questions, but nevertheless essentially applies Lemon. This means to you that Lemon is dead?

Allegheney County v. ACLU: The Court applies what the dissent calls a “modified Lemon test,” a hybrid of O’Connor’s establishment query and the Lemon factors. That to you means Lemon is dead?

More proof of Lemon’s manifest “undeadness” – note the dates:

Altman v. Bedford Center School Dist., 2nd Circuit, March 27, 2001; our old friend ACLU-Ohio v. Capitol Square, 6th Cir., March 16, 2001; Johnson v. Economic Devel. Corp., 6th Cir., February 27, 2001; Doe by Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., Fifth Circuit, January 26, 2001.

Apparently in your mind a test that is being scrutinized but nevertheless applied in multiple circuits, as recently as last month is “all but dead.”

Well no worries then, because you didn’t.

117

SeIf you read my original comment again, you’ll notice that I said Lemon was darned near dead at the Supreme Court. So you cite a bunch of circuit court decisions to prove me wrong, as if the Supreme Court was bound by what test the Second Circuit uses. Why am I not surprised?

Anyone who has read the Supreme Court’s establishment cases over the last two decades would realize that Lemon is in serious trouble. Nobody much seems to like it (especially since its supporters like Blackmun and Marshall have retired), and the recent cases apply a hodge-podge of alternative theories rather than a straight application of Lemon, a fact that even Judge Reavley in the 10th Circuit Gaylor opinion partially recognized. Rather than being the be-all and end-all of Supreme Court establishment jurisprudence, as you apparently believe, Lemon is only one of several alternative tests that the various judges apply in an unpredictable and frequently shifting manner. In other words, Lemon is dead as the test of establishment clause violations at the Supreme Court.

118

Don’t ask me where the “Se” got in front of the “If” at the beginning of that post.

By the way, take a look at Part IV of the majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe. Notice how, when assessing whether the school’s policy is susceptible of a facial challenge, the Court inquires into the first element of Lemon: whether the statute lacks a secular legislative purpose. Amazingly enough, that analysis starts not with a determination that there is no secular purpose to the policy, but that its purpose is religious:

Hmmm, so maybe what is religious and what isn’t really does enter into the Lemon analysis, eh?

Incidentally, the Santa Fe Court invokes Lemon only in the facial challenge discussion, and not in the substantive question of whether there was an establishment problem. In those sections and without discussion of any particular test, the Court relies on other cases–including Lee and Lynch.

119

Allegheny is certainly an interesting case and only a hint more civil than the discussion here :slight_smile:

It does seem to say that a reasonable person test is only one branch of analysis and acknowledges that it is also important whether actual people may perceive the action as an endorsement or dissaproval of their religious beliefs.

I also liked Kennedy and Oconner’s spat over whether the lemon test required the creation of “artificial exceptions” in order to preserve traditional practices.

120

MINTY –

You have totally ingored the fact that I directly addressed every case you cited, and pointed out that in every case, the Court still discussed and applied Lemon, and that it has expressly declined to revisit the case and throw it out. Why am I not suprised?

“Serious trouble” is a judgment call which, even if accurate, is far removed from “darned near dead.” The Supreme Court is still discussing (and citing) Lemon; at least some members still advocate using it; others advocate modifying it, as opposed to throwing it out; and the Court has refused to revisit it. This, in your mind, is a case that is “darn near dead.” That, in my mind, is a ridiculous statement.

Ah. Now we have moved to a “hodge-podge” that you contrast to a “straight application” of Lemon – as if Lemon is dead if not applied strictly, and alone. Once again, ridiculous. Lemon remains good law and so long as it does, it is manifestly not “dead.”

Wouldn’t it be nice for you if I did? Much like it would be nice for you if I believed that IGWT cannot ever under any circumstances be a religious statement. It would be ever so much easier for you to argue with what you wish I said than to actually confine yourself to arguing with what I did say. YOU said Lemon is all but dead. That is WRONG. Period.

You can truly sit there and with a straight face argue that if a test is one of several tests that may be applied, then that test is dead? That is laughable. Presumably, in your world, if you could determine culpability through two alternate tests, either of which might be used in an evolving area of law, one or the other of the tests must be dead. The very idea makes me roll my eyes so hard they threaten to pop out of my head and bounce across my desk.

And yet – There it is. The Lemon test. Being cited and applied by the Court – I mean, Jesus, you’ve admitted as much yourself! Pretty big doin’s for a ruling that’s darn near dead.