In regards to radical skepticism

Consider the fact that most people don’t obsess over myriads of possibilities and “truths” while living productive and satisfying lives. What are they missing by not prevaricating over the minutia of daily living by having to examine every decision from first principle? I submit, nothing. Because there are more interesting things in life than contemplation of the “truth” of honey and looking for reasons to take the enjoyment out of it’s sweet taste.

Religions have basis in truth to some extent. Some of the characters described in the bible may well have been real. Does that mean we are required to accept the entire premise, hook, line and messiah?

I’m addressing the philosophy and I’m saying it fails applied living.

On review, what Expano Mapcase said.

This kind of explains further the final points that are bothering me about it:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/skepanci/#H3

So, skepticism is an ability to discover opposed arguments of equal persuasive force, the practice of which leads first to suspension of judgment and afterwards, fortuitously, to tranquility. This makes Sextus’ version of Pyrrhonian skepticism dramatically different from other Western philosophical positions, for it is a practice or activity rather than a set of doctrines. Indeed, insofar as the skeptic is supposed to live without belief (adoxastôs), he could not consistently endorse any philosophical doctrine. But how is it possible to live without beliefs?

The short answer is that one may simply follow appearances and withhold judgment as to whether the world really is as it appears. This seems plausible with respect to physical perceptions, but appearances for Sextus include evaluations, and this creates a complication. For how can the skeptic say “this appears good (or bad) to me, but I don’t believe that it is really good or bad”? It seems that there is no difference between evaluative appearances and evaluative beliefs.

One possible response to this problem is to say that Sextus only targets sophisticated, philosophical theories about value, or about physics or logic, but allows everyday attitudes and beliefs to stand. On this view, skepticism is a therapy designed to cure the disease of academics and theoreticians. But it seems that Sextus intends his philosophical therapy to be quite widely applicable. The skeptical life, as he presents it, is an achievement and not merely the recovering of a native innocence lost to philosophical speculation. (See Burnyeat and Frede [1997], Brennan [1999] for the debate regarding what the skeptic is supposed to suspend judgment about.)

Any answer to the question about how the skeptic may live without beliefs will depend on what sort of beliefs we think the skeptic avoids. Nevertheless, an elaboration on living in accordance with appearances comes in the form of the fourfold observances. Rather than investigate the best way to live or even what to do in some particular circumstance, Sextus remarks that the skeptic will guide his actions by (1) nature, (2) necessitation by feelings, (3) laws and customs, and (4) kinds of expertise (PH 1.23-24). Nature provides us with the capacity for perception and thought, and we may use these capacities insofar as they don’t lead us to dogmatic belief. Similarly, hunger and thirst will drive us towards food and drink without our having to form any explicit beliefs regarding those physical sensations. One need not accept any nutritional theories to adequately and appropriately respond to hunger and thirst. Laws and customs will inform us of the appropriate evaluations of things. We need not actually believe that the gods exist and that they are benevolent to take part in religious ceremonies or even to act in a manner that is (or at least appears) pious. But note that the skeptic will neither believe that the gods exist nor that they do not exist-he is neither a theist nor an atheist, but agnostic in a very robust sense. And finally, the skeptic may practice some trade or profession without accepting any theories regarding his practice. For example, a carpenter need not have any theoretical or geometrical views about doors in order to be skillful at hanging them. Similarly, a doctor need not accept any physiological theories to successfully heal his patients. The further question, recalling the dispute explored in Burnyeat and Frede [1997], is whether the skeptic merely avoids sophisticated, theoretical beliefs in employing these observances, or whether he avoids all beliefs whatsoever.

I’m torn though, part of me knows that the more I analyze this the less sense it makes. And yet there is the other part that is looking for “that one thing” that I am missing for some reason. I really would like to be done with this though, but it seems like I get daily reminders as to the truth of it’s premises.

What the IEP notes is that one and only one truth exists: the world works. Considering the immense obstacles to the world working - its physical variation, the number of humans living on it, the limitations of sense data, the inadequacy of vocabulary, the immensity of possible interactions, the constant appearance and disappearance of individual humans and their memories and perspectives, the rate of daily change in all these factors - this should not happen. At the edges, where these diverse elements intersect, both at the micro and macro levels, conflict continually arises, often serious conflict. Yet those conflicts are always mere rounding errors compared to the uncountable trillions of moment-by-monent interactions that assume underlying compatibility.

No amount of philosophical handwaving about the non-ideality of conditions can contradict this. The world works. All the billions of historical moments and contemporary actions that involve the simple act of our being able to converse this way around the world in a common language on a global electronic platform using advanced physical sciences and technologies prove this at a basic level that is incomprehensible if our individuality did not contain an overwhelming proportion of commonality.

Whatever philosophical overview you take must account for this. Whatever amount of skepticism you personally armor yourself with must account for this. Whether you even need a philosophy is questionable in the face of this amazing truth. You’re just a carpenter. “Philosophies? We don’t need no stinkin’ philosophies.”

Perhaps the skeptic considers his opposed arguments to have equal persuasive force, but you do not appear to have persuaded the rest of us. Or even the skeptic, who does not truly act as if he has suspended judgement, but rather as if the world does indeed exist.

Consider this from your cite.

You do indeed form a belief about these sensations - that you have them. I’m famished, ergo I nosh. You hardly need nutritional theories - for almost all of humanity’s existence there were none. That nourishing food looks good to us is clearly the result of our evolution (which skeptics I assume suspend judgement on also) and not because of an inner analysis of fat and protein content.

So… have you read the Dennett book yet?

I would estimate >= 80% chance this question of the result of an anxiety created and blown out of proportions due to obsessive thinking.

You see how I made that judgment without having faith in either direction?

I still don’t get what bothers you about it.

That wall-o’-text you posted smoothly points out that you can eat while hungry and drink while thirsty – or, one supposes, you can appear to eat and drink when you appear to be hungry and thirsty – and the sensations you feel follow accordingly: regardless of what else may or may not exist in some faraway realm beyond mere appearance, and regardless of your beliefs on the matter.

It adds that a carpenter hanging a door – or a carpenter who seems to be hanging what seems to be a door – can appear to get the job done, with the same type of apparent success enjoyed by a trained doctor who appears to administer first aid: guiding his actions by mere appearance, right here in a realm of mere appearance. And he can do that, skillfully, regardless of his beliefs about whether the door ‘really’ exists as something other than a mere appearance.

If you hadn’t posted that, I’d maybe point you to it; but since you did, and it already goes on and on about living in accordance with appearance, what’s left?

I was astonished to see you write this. You usually seem to beat the drum of solipsism, but this is the antithesis of solipsism. This is the counterargument to solipsism. This belief, the belief that consistency is truth, utterly destroys the philosophy you’re concerned about.

Even solipsism agrees that honey consistently appears to be sweet and light consistently appears to be bright. Other people consistently appear to exist and the emotions and personality that they consistently present (which vary from person to person) are presented consistently.

If consistency is reality, then all these things are in fact actually real and solipsism just went in the trash bin.

Let’s talk about “appearing to be sweet” for a moment. Sweetness is a sensation - it’s something that is, in its entirety, a sensory reaction. Which means that if you taste something, and it appears to taste sweet, then it really is sweet, even under solipsism. Because “sweet” only describes a person’s sensory perception itself, and even solipsism admits that there indeed is a sensory perception.

Now, not all people have the same tastes - I might find something that you think tastes sweet actually tastes nasty to me. But this doesn’t change the fact that, to you, it’s sweet. Because sweetness is about the taste as it tastes to the taster. It’s subjective, not objective.

Even if you know nothing else, you know that things that taste sweet, taste sweet.

That…is actually a good point. It works. Why can’t it be that simple?

It’s a matter of feeling. Not just simply going through the motions as if one is some kind of robot which is what that implies. It’s the kind of life one would have if they had to accept this.

likes and dislikes go out the window with this one, since they claim that labeling things as bad can cause us suffering. Like when you admit you did wrong or didn’t measure up in some manner. Even preferences and desires go out as well. It’s almost like wiping the slate clean. With desires, preferences, and dreams, what is life then? It’s like you just exist until you die. They don’t seem to answer why one would get a job or continue living?

It is that simple. You just are resisting the most likely case for some reason.

I don’t follow you.

Like I’d said, the bit that you posted – the bit you’re now saying sounds like some kind of robot – involves appearing to eat and drink when you appear to be hungry and thirsty, and appearing to work skillful carpentry on what appears to be a door. What changes if you are eating and drinking when you are hungry and thirsty, and that is skillful carpentry you’re working on what is a door?

What makes one of those more robotic than the other?

Again you’ve lost me. Imagine a man who thinks he has preferences and desires; and, to all appearances, he does. Imagine a man who has preferences and desires; what’s the difference? Why would one be less likely to “get a job or continue living”?

Yep. A tool is helpful…until it’s not. Philosophy is a tool.

Skepticism is the impulse that ultimately has led to the scientific method.

Radical skepticism? I don’t believe it exists.

Life is all those things and more. Life is in the living.

It’s EXACTLY like that. What you do with it is up to you.

No, they don’t. Do your own homework.

Probably better to give a list of what they are saying.

According to the Pyrrhonists, it is one’s opinions about non-evident matters that prevent one from attaining eudaimonia.

The main principle of Pyrrho’s thought is expressed by the word acatalepsia, which connotes the ability to withhold assent from doctrines regarding the truth of things in their own nature; against every statement its contradiction may be advanced with equal justification.

And this:

These tropes or “modes” are given by Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. According to Sextus, they are attributed only “to the more recent skeptics” and it is by Diogenes Laertius that we attribute them to Agrippa.[15] The tropes are:

Dissent – The uncertainty demonstrated by the differences of opinions among philosophers and people in general.
Progress ad infinitum – All proof rests on matters themselves in need of proof, and so on to infinity.
Relation – All things are changed as their relations become changed, or, as we look upon them from different points of view.
Assumption – The truth asserted is based on an unsupported assumption.
Circularity – The truth asserted involves a circularity of proofs.
According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement. In the mode deriving from infinite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another such source, which itself needs another, and so ad infinitum, so that we have no point from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgement follows. In the mode deriving from relativity, as we said above, the existing object appears to be such-and-such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together with it, but we suspend judgement on what it is like in its nature. We have the mode from hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infinitum, begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue of a concession. The reciprocal mode occurs when what ought to be confirmatory of the object under investigation needs to be made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.[16]

With reference to these five tropes, that the first and third are a short summary of the earlier Ten Modes of Aenesidemus.[15] The three additional ones show a progress in the Pyrrhonist system, building upon the objections derived from the fallibility of sense and opinion to more abstract and metaphysical grounds.

And their ten points:

The ten modes of Aenesidemus[edit]
“The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in animals.”[3]
The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among human beings.[4]
The same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences among the senses.[5]
Owing to the “circumstances, conditions or dispositions,” the same objects appear different. The same temperature, as established by instrument, feels very different after an extended period of cold winter weather (it feels warm) than after mild weather in the autumn (it feels cold). Time appears slow when young and fast as aging proceeds. Honey tastes sweet to most but bitter to someone with jaundice. A person with influenza will feel cold and shiver even though she is hot with a fever.[6]
“Based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects appear different.” The same tower appears rectangular at close distance and round from far away. The moon looks like a perfect sphere to the human eye, yet cratered from the view of a telescope.[7]
“We deduce that since no object strikes us entirely by itself, but along with something else, it may perhaps be possible to say what the mixture compounded out of the external object and the thing perceived with it is like, but we would not be able to say what the external object is like by itself.”[8]
“Based, as we said, on the quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, meaning generally by “constitution” the manner of composition.” So, for example, goat horn appears black when intact and appears white when ground up. Snow appears white when frozen and translucent as a liquid.[9]
“Since all things appear relative, we will suspend judgement about what things exist absolutely and really existent.[10] Do things which exist “differentially” as opposed to those things that have a distinct existence of their own, differ from relative things or not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative; but if they differ, then, since everything which differs is relative to something…, things which exist absolutely are relative.”[11]
“Based on constancy or rarity of occurrence.” The sun is more amazing than a comet, but because we see and feel the warmth of the sun daily and the comet rarely, the latter commands our attention.[12]
“There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned with Ethics, being based on rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions.”[13]
Superordinate to these ten modes stand three other modes:

I: that based on the subject who judges (modes 1, 2, 3 & 4).
II: that based on the object judged (modes 7 & 10).
III: that based on both subject who judges and object judged (modes 5, 6, 8 & 9)
Superordinate to these three modes is the mode of relation.[14]

The five modes of Agrippa[edit]

Sorry about the copy paste, but I just wanted to give a complete picture of what bothers me.

The bit about the robot is that you don’t truly believe in the reality, just acting in accordance with it. like a robot or machine. I just acts and behaves. They are essentially asking one to dispense with dreams and the like, to hold beliefs on nothing. To me that’s like being dead.

And yet in my head I don’t buy it. Like when it comes to judgments about good and bad. Aren’t we increasing suffering by making “bad” things worse by labeling them bad?could that be the main source of suffering behind painful events?

No

I still don’t get it.

You mention that the problem might be One’s Opinions About Non-Evident Matters. You then relay how Honey Tastes Sweet To Most But Bitter To Those Wih Jaundice.

So let’s say that, when next I want to enjoy something sweet, I’ll taste a little honey and perceive it to be sweet; and let’s say that someone else is, right then, disgustedly spitting out a spoonful of honey while perceiving it as bitter. And let’s say you then ask me whether I’m acting in accordance with the world as I perceive it; and I reply, well, yeah, I guess; I perceive this as sweet, just as I’d hoped; that’s what I was going for, and as far as I can tell, that’s exactly what I got.

And if you ask whether I truly belieeeve in the reality behind that appearance, then maybe I’ll say yes – or maybe I’ll say no. Or maybe I’ll say maybe? Or maybe I’ll say that I’m not sure, but I’m pretty sure I don’t care.

Would I, in your view of things, somehow be less “like a robot or a machine” if my reply is a “yes” instead of a “no”, there? Do you think a “maybe” would be more robotic than an “I’m not sure, but I’m pretty sure I don’t care” response?

Spell this out for me: is my opinion about that non-evident matter relevant? Why?

Because truth is something stable to build a foundation on, too much subjectivity just ends up proving their position to be correct and that one must suspend all judgment (which seems like a life of inaction).

Though looking at the ten points, I can’t say I come to the same conclusion. Science seems to explain why those things happen. But at the time I can see why people would doubt their senses if an object at a distance looks different up close.