Intelligence report: Iraq going to Hell in a handbasket

Great Debates
61

Of course, what Rumsfeld actually said was “*If you’re suggesting, how would we feel about an Iranian-type government with a few clerics running everything in the country, the answer is: That isn’t going to happen.” *

And what Powell said was "*Russert: In those free, open and fair elections, if the Iraqi people choose an Islamic theocracy similar to what we have in Iran, we would accept that?

Powell: We will have to accept what the Iraqi people decide upon. But right now, I think most Iraqis understand that in order to live together in peace as a single nation, they have to have a nation which understands the role of the majority but respects the role of minorities within a country. And they know they have to have, for international acceptability, a country that preserves human rights, that is founded on democracy, that respects the rights of all individuals and respects the rights of women, that respects basic tenets with respect to open speech and meeting fundamental needs of the people and the fundamental standards of human rights that all of us believe in.

Russert: But, Mr. Secretary, if the Iraqis opt for an Islamic theocracy, which could easily become a haven for terrorists, how then do we explain to the 782 who died or the nearly over 4,000 who were wounded or injured that this was worth the fight?

Powell: I don’t think that’s going to be the case. I think that those who have given their lives in the cause of freedom for the Iraqi people will see that the Iraqi people are interested in creating a democracy. If you look at the same kind of polling that you mentioned earlier, that’s what they are interested in, that’s what they’re looking for.

If you talk to some of the Shia leaders, such as Mr. Sistani and others, Ayatollah Sistani, they are talking about openness and freedom. Surely everybody understands it is a nation that rests on the faith of Islam, but they also know that in order to be successful as a 21st-century country, they have to respect the rights of all individuals and not allow a purely fundamentalist regime to arise in the country. And my sensing of what the Iraqi people want is a democracy with a majority, but with respect for all the minorities, all working together to create the kind of country they’ll be proud of.*"

So, we have Powell saying that Iraq is not likely to become an Iranian style theocracy and we have Rumsfeld saying that it won’t happen. But yea, they might be disagreeing. :wink:

More to the point, however, neither party says that if the Iraqi people decide to create a theocratic government we would put a stop to it.

62

Ask, and it shall be given…

(emphasis added)

http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/powell-no-wmd.htm

63

Thank you very much. But what changed? Come on, you know. Yes you do.

64

Hmmmm. Colin Powell surrendered the last shred of his credibility and integrity? No, that was sometime later… Oooooh! Oooooh! I know! Gotta be 9/11! I get a cookie, right?

If you are going to invoke the Terror Spell, you ought to at least take a swipe at showing the relevence. Are you positing that Powell was convinced of Iraqi involvement with 9/11? Or that something happened on 9/11 to make the Iraqi sanctions regime instantly porous? According to Mr. Powell, from the time abovementioned to the time he gave his presentation at the UN, Iraq’s situation are regards to its potential threat changed dramaticly. How, in your estimation, did 9/11 bring this extraordinary circumstance about?

65

Yes you do! What a good doggie! :wink:

Well, given your usual posting style, I thought you would appreciate an irreverent swipe.

But just for you I will. Notice in the pre 9-11 statement that Powell did not say perfectly safe, or that there is no danger at all. He specifically used the phrase “strengthened the security” of the region. What changed on 9-11 is that our assesment of how strong the security needs to be changed. Under the old cold war mentality the primary considerations were armies and missles. Since Saddam’s army could not invade any of his neighbors and his missles could not reach the U.S., he was not a significant threat. After 9-11, the thinking changed. It was no longer necessary that a country (or organization) have a sophisticated military industrial complex capable of producing ICBMs to be considered a threat.

Now before we start flinging straw at one another and hijack this thread, let me say that I am not going to argue whether this new view of Iraq is correct or not. All I am saying is that the change is not a result of anything other than a change in the international security landscape which resulted from the 9-11 attacks. One could certainly disagree with it. And while denying it or ignoring it makes for very quippy posts, it does not make for reasoned debate.

Just to answer the specifics questions:

No.

No.

Explained above. The way we measure threats changed. Thomas Barnett called it a system perturbation resulting in a rules set change. Think of it this way. Pre 9-11 Iraq was “safe enough”. After 9-11 it was not. Iraq did not have to change. Our tolerance for risk did.

66

All very well, but that’s not what you asked for. What you asked for was provided. Apparently at the time you thought it was a significant point. If you are now pleased to explain why it isn’t a significant point, you are entirely free to do so.

He very well may. Myself, I think of it as the trajectory of the shit intersecting the locus of the fan. Either that, or its a paradigm shift. And, as has been pointed out before, if this shit perturbing event suddenly made Iraq too much of a risk to tolerate, it also made a number of other nations at least as threatening, if not more so. Thereby, it buggers the question of the urgency and immediacy of the threat from Iraq. The nonexistent threat from Iraq, I hasten to add.

67

Yes, partially. But the fact that the sanctions worked well enough before 9-11 does not prove that they should have been adequate after 9-11. Nor does it prove that they would have done so for long enough to vacate the policy of regime change. Finally, what I said to someone else was “Not unless you are willing to suggest that sanctions were functioning exactly as planned and that they were going to do so into the foreseeable future.” Your quote certainly proves that Powell thought the sanctions were having a positive effect. It does not prove the other things. It made a good springboard for you to drop the context of those statements and later ones as a cheap shot at Powell though. Well done on that.

Well, a paradigm shift is similar but not exactly the same thing. 9-11 caused an abrupt change in the international security landscape. Not only for America, bot for many other countries as well.

Quite. But the urgency and or immediacy of the threat is not the only aspect one must consider. Surely you understand that. Nuanced policies and all that. :wink:

68

Yes, this is only coming from CNN, no one else has the same view of the National Intelligence Council’s assessment. And we all know how “bleeding heart liberal” Fox News and the Houston Chronicle are:

“U.S. Stance on Iraq Contrasts with Intelligence
The U.S. National Intelligence Council’s assessment of Iraq’s future is less optimistic than the scenario drawn by the Bush administration.”
“US intelligence report reveals pessimistic outlook on Iraq
The report is clearly at odds with the optimistic assessment the President, George W. Bush, has been putting during his campaign speeches, and today it prompted the Democratic challenger, Senator John Kerry, to accuse President Bush of dishonesty over Iraq.”

“US report predicts gloom in IraqThe BBC’s Nick Childs at the Pentagon says the report is at odds with the more upbeat public statements which continue to emerge from the Bush administration.”
“Kerry looking for new advantage on Iraq. Lack of stability could strengthen campaign message
Bush used his radio address Saturday to argue that his policies are working and to address concerns about Iraq and Afghanistan … There is currently plenty of dissonance that threatens to undercut his message … The classified national intelligence estimate revealed last week said a worst-case scenario would have Iraq plunged into civil war, with hopes for stability tenuous under the most optimistic scenario.”
“A classified National Intelligence Estimate (search) prepared for President Bush in late July contains bleak forecasts for Iraq, which experts said could remain in a tenuous political and security situation for the unforeseen future, FOX News has confirmed.
So, while the White House talks about progress in Iraq, our intelligence community is painting a dark picture of prospects in that country.”

69

Some Republican Senators, supporters of President Bush, are beginning to express concern about his lack of forthrightness about the situation in Iraq and about his incompetence in handling the restructuring.

Senator John McCain spoke to the issue of Bush’s timing and evasiveness:

http://start.earthlink.net/newsarticle?cat=0&aid=920012551_5301_lead_story

McCain was asked about a report in Sunday’s New York Times that U.S. commanders were planning a drive in November or December to retake areas where insurgents have won control. Such a timetable would place the operations after the Nov. 2 election for the White House.

Isn’t this essentially saying that Bush is putting human life at risk for campaign and reelection purposes and that he is being deceitful about it?

Also, Republican Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commitee made note that 18.4 billion was appropriated a year ago for reconstruction of the infrastructure. Only a billion has been spent. Lugar commented on This Week on ABC that this is “the incompetence in the administration.”

(According to the article, this is the same funding that Kerry is being criticized for flip-flopping on in his vote.)

Are these guys just more pessimists?

70

I think this is the sort of thing that really burns me up. Zoe is perhaps just being nice by using padded phrases but statements like the above are really just weasely ways of saying “he’s lying”. Kerry needs to start calling Bush’s lies directly to his face (preferrably during a debate) as well as point out his full-reverse spin on the matter.

71

Well, yes, the news report does seem to imply that. Unfortunately the evidence for it si woefully lacking. This is unfortunate. There are some legitimate complaints about Bush’s Iraq policies in that report. That this one is a so thinly veiled smear is regrettable.

The evidence that Bush is hiding something regarding the timing of upcoming offensives? They are in fact upcoming. That’s it. No other evidence except that there might be a motive for such disseminations.

No. The funding in question is different. What Senator Biden was trying to say was that Bush is criticizing Kerry for flip flopping on Iraq spending while Bush has failed to spend Iraq spending. Sort of backhandedly implying that Bush is hypocritical or something.

C-SPAN is the only source of news left in the country. Sad really.

Just for the record, guys, read those article very carefully. Note how they use the phrases “contain bleak forcasts” rather than predict a bleak future. The report contains forecasts which are bleak. The fact that it mentions the possibility of civil war is enough to satisfy this sort of language. If the report said that civil war was unlikely, it would still satisfy this sort of language.

72

Are they setting themselves up for runs in 2008 by distancing themselves from the Bush administration?

73

Right now there are ~140k US troops on the ground in Iraq. The generals who have spoken on the issue (both Shinseki pre-war and Franks recounting his opinion in his book) felt that 250 -300k or more troops would be required for occupation. At the outset of the war the administration felt that by a year ago (Sept '03) they would be able to draw down troop levels to about 30,000 or so in Iraq. My cite is a NATO summary of the situation. I would have preferred a contemporary cite of those projections but google is so weighted towards recent citations that i take what I can get.

Cite: http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:67uot0o6z30J:www.naa.be/Docdownload.asp%3FID%3D56+Iraq+troop+levels+pre-war+reduction+30000+projections&hl=en

Prewar cites of the wars costs varied. Wolfowitz put the cost at $100 billion for both war and reconstruction in the (absolutely nightmarishly ridiculous) worst case scenario ($10 billion in the best case). THe administration stated that the Iraqi oil industry would pay for reconstruction, although USAID allowed that maybe 1-2 billion of US taxpayers dollars might be spent. Wolfowitz: “To expect we’re going to pay for it all is just wrong.”

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2003/0228pentagoncontra.htm

When the administration publicly mocks those (including its own professional soldiers) who suggest that an extended occupation with large numbers of troops might be required I personally have no recourse but to assume that the administration believes the occupation will be relatively short and uneventful. When the administration projects that post-war reconstruction will consume no more that 2 billion of US money I have to assume they believe this.

74

Can you cite this for me or quote the part of Frank’s book which says this. Thanks.

I found this in your cite. "Earlier Pentagon plans to reduce troop levels in Iraq to about 30,000 by the autumn have been much too optimistic." Is that what you meant? Does it really say the the one and only plan assumed this? Or does it imply that at least one estimate suggested this?

Wolfowitz and Shenseki have been battling each other for a long time. Before the war during it until Shenseki retired. They conflicted over changes Wolfowitz wanted to make in the force structure of the armed forces. Can you find for me an instance of a general requesting troops and them being denied? Alternatively can you find me an instance of a sitting general saying he was ordered not to ask for more troops?

Look. I agree that many mistakes were made in the runup to the way. Many mistakes were made in the way the aftermath of the war was handled. Partly this is due to the fog of war in general. Partly this is due to the fact taht we really did not expect the Iraqi defence force to crumble so completely so quickly. Partly this is due to the fact that America does not like to be occupiers. So, we are not good at it. And, yes, partly it is due to political bias.

But it is simply disengenuous to suggest that the Bush administration put blinders on and refused to listen to any dissenting voices. You guys don’t like it when conservatives suggest that Kerry will “outsource the security of America” why do you insist on making the same mistake in regards to Bush’s policies. Both are unnecessary over simplifications.

75

In a thread like this, it is inevitable that questions will be raised about what various leaders and organizations believed at past dates. And to back up assertions about such questions, cites will be provided telling us exactly what was said at what times. But if you respond to any such cite by saying ‘Yes person X did say Y at time Z. But how do we know that’s all they said? Maybe at time Z, X was also considering some alternate position and they just didn’t tell us about it’, then you’ve essentially said that you’ll never believe anything about what positions were held by certain people in the past.

You’ve seen a reference showing that the Pentagon planned to reduce troop levels to 30,000 by Fall of 2003. You say that this fails to qualify as proof because maybe that was just one of many plans under consideration. I think the ball is in your court. Do you have some proof that there were alternate plans developed prior to the invasion, which called for maintaining well over 100,000 troops in the country for many years?

Oh, and if anyone’s in the mood for comic relief, try this article to see what the hawks were really telling us 20 months ago.

76

:smiley:

Here’s Chatham House’s recent take on Iraq. They’re all doomy and gloomy too; and it’s not just a theoretical exercise.

77

Shinseki Feb 2003 Congressional testimony referenced:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-25-iraq-us_x.htm

http://www.dailyiowan.com/news/2003/02/26/Nation/Postwar.Occupation.Force.In.Iraq.Could.Be.In.100000s.General.Says-379293.shtml

On Tommy Franks: (via intel dumP ( http://www.intel-dump.com/archives/archive_2004_08_14.shtml#1092580373 ))

So 250k troops is the ballpark occupation force level CentCom required. Speaking to the highest levels of the Government. He didn’t get it.

Don’t know exactly how to respond to this one. I remember the 30k number, that’s why I googled for a reference. I don’t think I have access to the full litany of Pentagon plans. However, nothing I have seen dazzles me with the variety and depth of contingency planning for OIF. Can you find a cite from Administration/DOD sources in the first half of 2003 publically offering the distinct possibility of an open ended commitment of the majority of the combat brigades in the US military and significant portions of the NG and reserve.

Yes, the new SecDef and his staff clashed with the old school army over transformation. On this issue, Shinseki testified to what he thought force levels for occupation would be - basically what we had in theater at the time, though he said he would defer to theater commanders as to exact force level. Wolfowitz laid the smackdown on him - the admin knew better. As to finding a quote from a general I am not sure there have been a great many generals since Maclellan to publicly berate the CinC for more troops.

The chasm between our positions with respect to you last paragraph is probably unbridgeable. However, as I have shown you what indicators I had that the administration thought war would be quick and cheap, with (most of) the boys home by Christmas, it is probably fair for you to show some cites of why you thought administration was selling the war as a tireless, thankless and costly (but oh so necessary) slog over many years.

78

And that the ‘relationship’ mostly consisted of a decade of failures to form a relationship. They’d been trying off and on for more than a decade and failed to accomplish anything significant and meaningful.

What does the conclusion that Husein realized the inspections made it was too risky to expand what little was left of his poor excuses for WMD programs demonstrate?

79

If you don’t mind, I’d rather nto rehash the Shinseki debate again. I will if you insist, but otherwise, lets simply agree to disagree as to his motives.

No. Re read your quote. General Franks said “…and the Hybrid Concept all project Phase III ending with a maximum of two hundred and fifty thousand troops in Iraq.” That is, the shooting war (phase III) would end with a maximum of 250,000 troops. That is not the ballpark occupation force level. It is the maximum for the shooting war.

Well, Does March 2003 count? “We cannot know the duration of this war. Yet we know its outcome; we will prevail. The Iraqi regime will be disarmed. The Iraqi regime will be ended. The Iraqi people will be free. And our world will be more secure and peaceful.” Of course this is just George Bush, so he might not be senior enough.

Well, your cite is a review of a review of General Franks book. The original review suggests that Franks himself asked for the troop levels they had. do you have the book itself so we could confirm this?

That is unfortunate. I meant it as an attempt to bridge that gap. I meant it as an acknowledgment that mistakes were made and things could be better.

Well, I admit I did not follow the news closely enough to have many cites on hand. I quoted the PResident’s speech above. The portion I quoted is typical of what I remember him saying during the period in question.

80

Well, wht is meaningful and what is irrelevant may vary from one person to another. What I was trying to do was dispell the ignorance that Iraq and AQ had never heard of each other.

Exactly the same. That he was biding his time until he could begin work on them again. Containment in the coldwar sense is no longer acceptable. For reasons with which you are certainly familiar.