# Iranian Nucear Enrichment Faciity

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [September 29, 2009, 7:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022 "2009-09-29T19:29:52Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![hobscrk777](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/a6a055/32.png) [@hobscrk777](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/hobscrk777)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 7:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/1 "2009-09-29T19:29:52Z")

</div>

I’m surprised there hasn’t been a thread on this yet. Recently it was discovered that Iran has a secret (not secret anymore, of course) [nuclear enrichment facility.](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/middleeast/30tehran.html). They have promised to let inspectors in, but it has yet to happen.

How big of a deal is this? Should the US be worried? Should the West be worried?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![FinnAgain](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/finnagain/32/12500_2.png) [@FinnAgain](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FinnAgain)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 8:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/2 "2009-09-29T20:36:44Z")

</div>

For years now Iran has been blocking the implementation of the Additional Protocols and has behaved more than suspiciously, doing things like stonewalling the IAEA and then bulldozing a site that the IAEA had wanted to investigate. The US’ recent intel report stated with a high degree of confidence that Iran was working on nuclear weapons until they halted it, and with only a moderate degree of confidence that the halt to their nuclear weapons program continued until the present day.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions have also threatened to touch off a regional arms race and Iranian Hezbollah military forces have a presence in much of Europe and the United States. Even assuming that Iran would not use a nuclear weapon directly, or indirectly via its proxy military forces, we can be fairly certain that nuclear weapons would prevent any conventional military responses should Iran get more aggressive with its use of Hezbollah (Lebanon, in partcular, would have significant cause for concern on that count).

So, yes, it’s not a good thing and yes, we should be concerned. It’s fairly basic logic that one doesn’t conceal something that there’s no need to conceal. And there’s no need to conceal a purely peaceful nuclear program, as it’s allowed and can be verified by the IAEA via the Additional Protocols.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![John\_Mace](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/john_mace/32/185_2.png) [@John\_Mace](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/John_Mace)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 8:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/3 "2009-09-29T20:42:28Z")

</div>

> [@FinnAgain](#):
>
> So, yes, it’s not a good thing and yes, we should be concerned.

Agreed, although I’m skeptical there is much we can do about it.

> [@](#):
>
> It’s fairly basic logic that one doesn’t conceal something that there’s no need to conceal. And there’s no need to conceal a purely peaceful nuclear program, as it’s allowed and can be verified by the IAEA via the Additional Protocols.

As much as I hate to defend Iran… it is credible that they did fear an attack on a facility either by the US or Israel. We have given them much to fear from us, and that has nothing to do with however good or bad they are. I personally think they’re “bad”, but we have allies in the region who are much, much worse.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![FinnAgain](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/finnagain/32/12500_2.png) [@FinnAgain](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FinnAgain)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 9:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/4 "2009-09-29T21:01:28Z")

</div>

> [@John\_Mace](#):
>
> Agreed, although I’m skeptical there is much we can do about it.

Short of tactical nuclear bunker-busters (which would probably start WW III), no, probably not. Sanctions, if Iraq and NK are any indicators, will have a devastating impact on innocent civilians while the ruling clique dines in comfort. I still feel that the best course of action would be to, somehow, help along a grass-roots Iranian revolution, but the ‘election’ seemed to be our time to act and I’m not sure if we’ve got that chance anymore.

> [@John\_Mace](#):
>
> As much as I hate to defend Iran… it is credible that they did fear an attack on a facility either by the US or Israel. We have given them much to fear from us, and that has nothing to do with however good or bad they are.

I don’t think this argument holds much water.

Iran could have, for instance, given the US and Israel (and the rest of the world community which strongly opposes Iranian nuclear weapons programs, don’t forget)  
highly credible assurances via the IAEA of total non-diversion and the absence of any and all nuclear weapons programs.

They’ve blocked that for years.

Now it turns out that they have an entirely separate secret nuclear facility as part of god only knows what.

I contend that if Iran had submitted to the Additional Protocols years ago and put all their cards on the table right away, there would have been no real reason for fear. It is precisely their years-long history of obfuscation, non-cooperation and dishonesty that has prolonged rumors and failed to debunk claims of nefarious intent.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Squink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/b5e925/32.png) [@Squink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Squink)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 9:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/5 "2009-09-29T21:22:14Z")

</div>

> [@John\_Mace](#):
>
> As much as I hate to defend Iran… it is credible that they did fear an attack on a facility either by the US or Israel.

Yup, they’d have to be nuts _not_ to fear an attack on their nuclear facilities, even if those facilities were built for entirely peaceful purposes.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Der\_Trihs](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/der_trihs/32/233_2.png) [@Der\_Trihs](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Der_Trihs)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 9:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/6 "2009-09-29T21:27:39Z")

</div>

> [@FinnAgain](#):
>
> Iran could have, for instance, given the US and Israel (and the rest of the world community which strongly opposes Iranian nuclear weapons programs, don’t forget)  
> highly credible assurances via the IAEA of total non-diversion and the absence of any and all nuclear weapons programs.
> 
> They’ve blocked that for years.
> 
> Now it turns out that they have an entirely separate secret nuclear facility as part of god only knows what.
> 
> I contend that if Iran had submitted to the Additional Protocols years ago and put all their cards on the table right away, there would have been no real reason for fear. It is precisely their years-long history of obfuscation, non-cooperation and dishonesty that has prolonged rumors and failed to debunk claims of nefarious intent.

You assume that they fear us because they have a nuclear program; whereas I find it much more likely that they have a nuclear program because they are afraid of us. Eliminating or never starting their nuclear program would make us no less hostile to them.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![gonzomax](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e8c25b/32.png) [@gonzomax](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/gonzomax)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 9:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/7 "2009-09-29T21:42:07Z")

</div>

There are endless articles about the Israelis running a strike on their nuclear facilities. If they can get far enough along ,they can stop that forever, assuming a weapon is what they are after. If not, then they risk getting bombed for trying to build a future of nuclear energy. We need a real diplomatic sitdown with them.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 9:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/8 "2009-09-29T21:51:16Z")

</div>

> [@Squink](#):
>
> Yup, they’d have to be nuts _not_ to fear an attack on their nuclear facilities, even if those facilities were built for entirely peaceful purposes.

If IAEA inspectors were camped in their nuclear facilities, as the international community wants, it’d be foolish for Israel or the US to bomb those facilities.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![XT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xt/32/456_2.png) [@XT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/XT)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 9:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/9 "2009-09-29T21:55:26Z")

</div>

[QUOTE=Der Trihs]  
You assume that they fear us because they have a nuclear program; whereas I find it much more likely that they have a nuclear program because they are afraid of us. Eliminating or never starting their nuclear program would make us no less hostile to them.  
[/QUOTE]

What do you base this on though? Many countries, some fairly unfriendly to the US historically, have no nuclear program and don’t exactly live in constant fear of some mythical US attack. Iran fears an attack from the US BECAUSE they have a covert nuclear program. If they have a nuclear program to supposedly thwart a strike from the US, then it’s fairly circular logic that has put them in precisely the position of having said attack actually become a possibility, no?

-XT

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![FinnAgain](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/finnagain/32/12500_2.png) [@FinnAgain](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FinnAgain)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 10:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/10 "2009-09-29T22:01:32Z")

</div>

Yes XT, but you have to remember that the US is a comic-book villain. We want to attack Iran (and in fact, we attacked Iran many times during Bush’s administration, or at least we were going to if not for the keen eyed vigilance of watchdogs) because we’re Evil. If Iran didn’t have a covert nuclear (possibly weapons) program, didn’t support international terrorism and allowed the IAEA 100% access according to the Additional Protocols, then we’d still want to attack them, because we’re Evil.

Just like, ya know, we want to attack Egypt. And Jordan. And Saudi Arabi. And the UAE. And…

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Henrichek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/5daacb/32.png) [@Henrichek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Henrichek)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 10:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/11 "2009-09-29T22:24:05Z")

</div>

Well, that’s what happened to their neighbor country, so it’s not that far fetched (though I don’t think the US will attack as it is).

The point of contention seems to be the Additional Protocols, which apparently never were ratified by the Iranian Parliament, but followed voluntarily prior to 2005, at which point Iran suspended the implementation of the protocols due to not getting guarantees for their right of a nuclear fuel cycle. So in that sense they don’t seem to be obliged to implement the Additional Protocols.

Other than the AP’s, the latest IAEA report seems to conclude (I just did a cursory reading) that the enrichment plants and research reactors run according to declared specifications, and the amount of nuclear material is accounted for, as well as contained and under surveillance by the IAEA.

I haven’t found the specific requirements regarding the declaration of new sites under the NPT safeguards, but from what I’ve heard elsewhere, a nation is only required to report new facilities 6 months before fissile material is introduced, and this new plant is even 18 (?) months away from that.

What other issues are there?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 10:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/12 "2009-09-29T22:34:40Z")

</div>

> [@Henrichek](#):
>
> I haven’t found the specific requirements regarding the declaration of new sites under the NPT safeguards, but from what I’ve heard elsewhere, a nation is only required to report new facilities 6 months before fissile material is introduced, and this new plant is even 18 (?) months away from that.
> 
> What other issues are there?

Well, they buried it.

Hard to see why they buried a peaceful nuclear processing facility if it is all just, you know, peaceful and all.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![XT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xt/32/456_2.png) [@XT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/XT)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 10:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/13 "2009-09-29T22:39:52Z")

</div>

[QUOTE=Henrichek]  
Well, that’s what happened to their neighbor country, so it’s not that far fetched (though I don’t think the US will attack as it is).  
[/QUOTE]

The devil is in the details…and the details for our attack into Iraq were fairly unique. Unique circumstances and a fairly unique response from the US. Note that we haven’t exactly had good relationships with Iran since the late 70’s…and yet we never attacked them in all that time. You might want to consider why that is the case, and why and how we did end up butting heads with Saddam and Iraq. Just a thought.

[QUOTE=FinnAgain]  
Yes XT, but you have to remember that the US is a comic-book villain. We want to attack Iran (and in fact, we attacked Iran many times during Bush’s administration, or at least we were going to if not for the keen eyed vigilance of watchdogs) because we’re Evil. If Iran didn’t have a covert nuclear (possibly weapons) program, didn’t support international terrorism and allowed the IAEA 100% access according to the Additional Protocols, then we’d still want to attack them, because we’re Evil.  
[/QUOTE]

Good point. It WAS a classic Der Trihs statement after all. 😉

> [@](#):
>
> Just like, ya know, we want to attack Egypt. And Jordan. And Saudi Arabi. And the UAE. And…

Don’t forget Belgium…

-XT

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Henrichek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/5daacb/32.png) [@Henrichek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Henrichek)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 11:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/14 "2009-09-29T23:00:46Z")

</div>

> [@xtisme](#):
>
> The devil is in the details…and the details for our attack into Iraq were fairly unique. Unique circumstances and a fairly unique response from the US. Note that we haven’t exactly had good relationships with Iran since the late 70’s…and yet we never attacked them in all that time. You might want to consider why that is the case, and why and how we did end up butting heads with Saddam and Iraq. Just a thought.

Well, I can’t say you’ve acted in a very friendly manner towards Iran either. I think the important question is whether your argument is convincing enough for the Iranians.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![XT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xt/32/456_2.png) [@XT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/XT)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 11:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/15 "2009-09-29T23:15:43Z")

</div>

[QUOTE=Henrichek]  
Well, I can’t say you’ve acted in a very friendly manner towards Iran either. I think the important question is whether your argument is convincing enough for the Iranians.  
[/QUOTE]

I’m fairly certain that the keen eyed Iranian would have noted one very important thing…despite the fact that they took US citizens hostage, and despite the hostility you have noted (that goes both ways btw), we haven’t exactly showered Iran with bombs or missiles. And this despite the fact that Iran wasn’t nuclear armed.

There were a number of reasons we DID attack Iraq, and while I think that our invasion of Iraq was wrong, I think that people on this board have convinced themselves that it was entirely out of left field, ignoring the historic context of the previous decade and the first gulf war.

Personally, I think we need to be careful in hand-waving away this potential threat, or minimizing it. I’m not sure whether military action (by the US) is in order, necessarily, but I think this needs to be taken seriously, and I’m at least marginally encouraged that Obama seems to be doing so, even if many 'dopers seem to want to just hand wave it all away as simply US paranoia (ignoring the fact that it’s not JUST the US who is concerned by all of this).

-XT

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![FinnAgain](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/finnagain/32/12500_2.png) [@FinnAgain](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FinnAgain)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 11:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/16 "2009-09-29T23:26:17Z")

</div>

> [@Henrichek](#):
>
> Other than the AP’s, the latest IAEA report seems to conclude (I just did a cursory reading) that the enrichment plants and research reactors run according to declared specifications, and the amount of nuclear material is accounted for, as well as contained and under surveillance by the IAEA.

They do confirm non-diversion of known material, but note troubling activities like the type of simultaneous explosive devices needed for detonating nuclear weapons, and reiterate that there are issues that must be cleared up by the AP’s.

> [@Henrichek](#):
>
> What other issues are there?

The fact that Iran’s secret, underground facility which hasn’t been monitored by the IAEA hasn’t yet been certified ‘clean’.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Henrichek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/5daacb/32.png) [@Henrichek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Henrichek)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2009, 11:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/17 "2009-09-29T23:39:53Z")

</div>

> [@FinnAgain](#):
>
> They do confirm non-diversion of known material, but note troubling activities like the type of simultaneous explosive devices needed for detonating nuclear weapons, and reiterate that there are issues that must be cleared up by the AP’s.

I must have missed the part about findings of other tech related to nuclear weapons. The AP’s however appear not to be ratified by Iran, so why would they be applicable?

> [@FinnAgain](#):
>
> The fact that Iran’s secret, underground facility which hasn’t been monitored by the IAEA hasn’t yet been certified ‘clean’.

That is true. However, the new plant seems to be open for inspections like the known facilities, so that should be cleared up soon enough. I doubt it will be found to be in violation of the safeguard protocols.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![FinnAgain](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/finnagain/32/12500_2.png) [@FinnAgain](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/FinnAgain)\
**Post date:** [September 30, 2009, 12:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/18 "2009-09-30T00:04:59Z")

</div>

> [@Henrichek](#):
>
> I must have missed the part about findings of other tech related to nuclear weapons. The AP’s however appear not to be ratified by Iran, so why would they be applicable?

[

> [@](#):
>
> E. Possible Military Dimensions
> 
> 1. As referred to in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in GOV/2009/35, para. 17), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, it is essential that Iran re-engage with the Agency to clarify and bring to a closure questions related to the alleged studies, the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document, and the procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related as well as the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.
> 
> […]
> 
> 1. In connection with the outstanding issues, Iran has provided to the Agency: (a) its overall assessment of the documentation related to the alleged studies (GOV/2008/15, Annex A), and (b) partial replies and a document, in response to specific questions presented by the Agency (GOV/2008/15, Annex B). Iran has indicated further that it has information which could shed more light on the nature of the alleged studies, but has not yet provided it to the Agency (GOV/2008/15, para. 23). In the meantime, the Agency has studied the information provided by Iran thus far, but has not yet been given the opportunity by Iran to discuss its findings in detail owing to Iran’s insistence that it had already provided its final responses. In the view of the Agency, however, there are still matters which need to be discussed based on the documents and information provided by Iran itself or which relate to information which the Agency has independently corroborated. Examples of information included in the documentation that Iran has not disputed as being factually accurate are provided below.
> 
> 2. Although Iran has challenged the allegation that it has engaged in nuclear related high explosives testing studies, Iran has told the Agency that it has experimented with the civil application of simultaneously functioning multiple detonators (GOV/2008/15, para. 20), and was asked by the Agency to provide it with information which would prove that such work had been for civil and nonnuclear military purposes (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(c)). Iran has not yet shared that information with the Agency. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran the possible role that a foreign national with explosives expertise (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(d)), whose visit to Iran has been confirmed by the  
> Agency, played in explosives development work.
> 
> […]
> 
> 1. In respect to the alleged missile re-entry vehicle studies, the Agency still wishes to visit the civilian workshops which Iran has indicated to the Agency exist and which are identified in the documentation as having been involved in the production of model prototypes of a new payload chamber for a missile (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(e)). In addition, while asserting that the documentation on the alleged missile re-entry vehicle was forged and fabricated, Iran informed the Agency that it was well known that Iran was working on the Shahab-3 missile. In light of that, the Agency has reiterated the need to hold discussions with Iran on the engineering and modelling studies associated with the re-design of the payload chamber referred to in the alleged studies documentation to exclude the possibility that they were for a nuclear payload.
> 
> 2. In light of the above, the Agency has repeatedly informed Iran that it does not consider that Iran has adequately addressed the substance of the issues, having focused instead on the style and form of presentation of the written documents relevant to the alleged studies and providing limited answers or simple denials in response to other questions. The Agency has therefore requested Iran to provide more substantive responses and to provide the Agency with the opportunity to have detailed discussions with a view to moving forward on these issues, including granting the Agency access to persons, information and locations identified in the documents in order for the Agency to be able to confirm Iran’s assertion that these documents are false and fabricated. The Agency has reiterated its willingness to discuss modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive information related to its conventional military activities.
> 
> 3. For the Agency to be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran take the necessary steps to enable the Agency to clarify and bring to a closure the outstanding issues and implement its Additional Protocol.

]([http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf))

> [@](#):
>
> 1. Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not been able to engage Iran in any substantive discussions about these outstanding issues for over a year. The Agency believes that it has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency. However, the Director General urges Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency so that it could share further documentation with Iran, as appropriate, since the Agency’s inability to do so is rendering it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification process.
> 
> 2. It is critical for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and clarify the outstanding issues in order for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

I trust that answers both the ‘what’ and the ‘why’?

> [@Henrichek](#):
>
> That is true. However, the new plant seems to be open for inspections like the known facilities, so that should be cleared up soon enough. I doubt it will be found to be in violation of the safeguard protocols.

1. Unless I missed a story (possible) then it’s not actually open, Iran has just promised that they’ll let the IAEA in at some point. If the IAEA isn’t in them yet, then they’re not, in fact, open for inspections.
2. Without knowing how long it was in operation, let alone existence, it’s hard to say whether or not any material was diverted. I’ll leave it to the IAEA to determine, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the AP’s were required to determine such non-diversion.
3. It is quite likely that even if there was something forbidden going on, it won’t be found, especially if Iran has time to cover its tracks (like it did when bulldozing a previous site that the IAEA wanted to inspect that Iran stonewalled on for quite some time, before granting them permission right after the bulldozed it).
4. The fact that a secret facility exists makes it much more likely that there are others. Iran has been trying (not very hard) to convince the global community of its entirely peaceful intents. Now we see yet another secret/undeclared facility, this one buried underground. And the AP’s still aren’t implemented.

Iran is doing a very poor job of convincing the world that it has nothing to hide.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Henrichek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/5daacb/32.png) [@Henrichek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Henrichek)\
**Post date:** [September 30, 2009, 12:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/19 "2009-09-30T00:29:15Z")

</div>

> [@FinnAgain](#):
>
> [
> 
> I trust that answers both the ‘what’ and the ‘why’?

Thanks for quoting the relevant sections. I did find them myself when I went for the second read though. It doesn’t answer the ‘why’ in regards to them being held accountable to the AP’s, as it seems strange to me to hold them accountable for a treaty extension that they have not ratified.

> [@FinnAgain](#):
>
> 1. Unless I missed a story (possible) then it’s not actually open, Iran has just promised that they’ll let the IAEA in at some point. If the IAEA isn’t in them yet, then they’re not, in fact, open for inspections.
> 2. Without knowing how long it was in operation, let alone existence, it’s hard to say whether or not any material was diverted. I’ll leave it to the IAEA to determine, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the AP’s were required to determine such non-diversion.
> 3. It is quite likely that even if there was something forbidden going on, it won’t be found, especially if Iran has time to cover its tracks (like it did when bulldozing a previous site that the IAEA wanted to inspect that Iran stonewalled on for quite some time, before granting them permission right after the bulldozed it).
> 4. The fact that a secret facility exists makes it much more likely that there are others. Iran has been trying (not very hard) to convince the global community of its entirely peaceful intents. Now we see yet another secret/undeclared facility, this one buried underground. And the AP’s still aren’t implemented.

[http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE58S0W220090929](http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE58S0W220090929)]([http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf))

While you are right that it has not yet been inspected, I think it’s not a fair point. The site is under construction and timetables for inspections are being worked out, so they will have access soon enough.

Maybe you dispute their information that the site has not yet been in operation, but I am fairly confident that IAEA would be able to easily notice this during the coming inspections. I haven’t heard anybody put forward that claim yet anyway, so I don’t think it’s relevant. The safeguard protocols seem to have reporting deadlines, and this site does not appear to be in violation of them.

I haven’t found the authoritative source for the requirement of 6 month notice prior to introducing the uranium hexafluoride which I claimed earlier, but I have seen it quoted in the news. Ahmadinejad says that the site will be operational in 18 months, so that would make them a year early with regards to their treaty obligations.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![XT](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xt/32/456_2.png) [@XT](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/XT)\
**Post date:** [September 30, 2009, 1:07am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022/20 "2009-09-30T01:07:47Z")

</div>

Out of curiosity Henrichek, why do you think that the Iranian’s would have gone to the trouble of building this thing in secret if it’s on the up and up? I mean, if it’s simply for the peaceful pursuit of nuclear energy, why the secrecy? Why not just build the thing in the open and allow full and complete inspections right from the start? Seems fishy to me, but what are your thoughts?

-XT

[Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/iranian-nucear-enrichment-faciity/512022.md?page=2)
