There is some justice in what you say as to the slow response to changed conditions. However, many, if not most, of the logistic troops are reserves and national guards. Every brand new unit that is brought on board has to undergo a period of training before shipping out. So always bringing in new units and not recycling those who are experienced and already trained could easily strain our training command’s resources and require activating even more reserves for use as trainers. After they were trained for that, of course.
We need to remember that every combat outfit that is brought back to the states also has to undergo a period of retraining and reequipping so the logistic and training commands are already under considerable strain. Always bringing in new logistic support units would increase that load considerably.
The requirements for the war were understated by the Administration from the beginning. I think that was to ensure that there wouldn’t be a lot of opposition to such a huge projected task. Support for the war is beginning to fray a little around the edges and I think GW and the other political leaders don’t want to ramp the support up to the level that is really required in order to not accelerate that fraying.
It’s GW’s unnecessary war. He set the parameters at the outset and continues to do so. You and I still don’t know the constraints as to personnel resources for Iraq that define the military planners’ world.
Dunno. I suspect that the likeliest is some degree of civil conflict, ending with a three way partition. Seems to me the Kurds are committed to going their own way regardless, and are only interested in what formal terms their autonomy will take. I think the Turks can be bought off and that particular problem will go to the back burner to fester for a while. That leaves the Shia south and the Sunni center.
If we are truly serious about our stated goals, a federalized, democratic Iraq, then the Shia have only to wait patiently until the last American boot lifts off from their soil and they can pretty much do whatever they like. I suspect that the Shia cooperation with the US is founded entirely on this - smile nice till we go away. This is entirely projection on my part, being what I would do if I were they.
But heres the kicker: if there is going to be civil strife in Iraq, it will happen regardless. As it stands, we are transfusing our own blood into a body with a vien open, we are losing and nobody is winning. I am entirely sympathetic to the “we broke, we fix” school of thought, up to the point where I become convinced we cannot fix, we can only suffer. I am uncomfortably close to that point right now.
What I most fear is an admin. that simply refuses to confess failure, and seeks some sort of plausible cop-out. Which is why I believe that the coming election will be declared a success regardless, in much the same way as the “handover of soveriegnty” was trumpeted as actually being something more than a puppet theater.
This is not to say that the Bushiviks favor image over substance, but that substance is out of their reach, image is their only shred of hope for avoiding the blame for this fiasco. Avoiding the blame is priority one, everything else pales to naught. I can already hear it: “Well, we would have won in Iraq, but the liberals made us fight with one hand tied behind our backs, when Jeaneme Garafolo visited Baghdad, she stuck in knife in the back of our troops…and did you hear that Howard Dean spits on returning troops?..”
Thanks to the ever-awe-inspiring Tamerlane for slamdunking the historical questions. Just one point for you, though: You do, no doubt correctly, observe that Iraq is not bereft of a feeling of national unity. But IYHO is that anything much more than the well-known unity of facing a common enemy? Is there something to build on there that could survive the withdrawal of that enemy?
There’s this left over too:
Where do you get the idea that governments consist essentially of elections? I was referring to the entire bureaucracy, all the things and people that make an administration operate effectively day to day. Those were indeed left essentially intact in Japan and Germany, and dissolved, like the army, in Iraq.
Perhaps you could tell me when in history anyone has invaded a country with the ostensible purpose of letting them take charge of their own affairs democratically, but refused to allow them to democratically decide how to do it? You make no sense.
One thing you don’t make sense about is how you got that idea.
Gawdamighty. I’m one of the last people who can be accused of that.
Their own surrender, due to complete lack of morale, certainly had something to do with that. But that still didn’t eliminate it as a cohesive, useful, and yes, nationalistic organization. The Bush Administration did that with the stroke of a pen.
You were already asked what facts you considered in reaching that assessment.
I think you are missing something critical here - sure, the planners probably had contigency plans just in case. But the critical problem isn’t in the planning process(after all, planners aren’t concerned with actual people - all they care about are slots, people to fill certain positions for a required combat/support package); the critical problem is where do we get the people to fill the slots we want filled?. You can have a plan, but if you don’t have the people to fill the slots you need in order to execute the plan, then it’s not the fault of the planners (well, at least those involved in the development of the TPFDD).
A planner can plan to have X number of people fill certain positions. But the planner doesn’t have the power to take those bodies and fill the slots. That decision is made by people higher up the military chain of command. Some base commander in Germany where there are additional bodies is going to be very reluctant to give up people to go to Iraq if it somehow is going to affect his ability to do the specific mission he is tasked with at that base. Unless, of course, someone tells him otherwise.
For those interested, check here for an example of what the Army is doing to address personnel problems in Iraq.
Again, it highlights the problem of where does one get the personnel to fill the slots necessary? Because if you take them from one place, that can have an impact on other issues. It’s not just a simple matter of moving bodies from one place to another. It’s the matter of moving people from one place to another in the broader context of how that movement also affects the military’s other obligations.
Sure, you can rotate more people to Iraq from, say, South Korea. But in doing so, one may be greatly affecting the mission capabilities of the military in South Korea. And, ultimately, that kind of decision isn’t going to be made by base commanders, or even Pentagon personnel planners. It’s going to be made (ultimately) by the Joint Cheifs and Rumsfeld. Yes, the planners can make suggestions, but it’s the bigwigs that have to weigh the pros and cons of such actions. Remember, Rumsfeld has to consider decisions for the military as a whole, not just Iraq. And the decisions made regarding Iraq will have a ripple effect throughout the military as a whole. Which is what the linked article above suggests.
Were you looking to link to the Sunday Oct 17 article? Because that link dumped me into an article on a poll, but scrolling up I found one on a unit being moved to Iraq that had been previously used for training.
Yes, the one about OPFOR - the elite training regiment that was sent to Iraq. I especially liked this comment:
“deploying the OPFOR is like eating your seed corn. This unit is responsible for training other units and raising their level of expertise and combat readiness. The 11th ACR is being replaced by a National Guard unit.”
Which would make it an indispensable resource in maintaining a combat-ready peacetime army, but I don’t think it’s so important now. There’s no teacher like experience, and our troops are getting plenty of that. The majority who live through it will be much better soldiers than they were in 2002. Better, and ready to be used elsewhere . . .
Oh, but you and I and all those other skeptics are missing the point of how wonderful it will be when Iraq is a peaceful and productive democracy to acting as a an exemplary model for all those other Southwest Asian countries - like Saudi Arabia for example.
Isn’t that worth some sacrifice, as long as it’s someone else’s sacrifice?
I suppose, if you’re a chickenshit chickenhawk like Bush, Cheney, or Wolfowitz.
I hold to the hope that Powell will finally, once he’s free of these turds, redeem himself. Dum spiro, spero, as some people say.
You and I can see that. Bush and his team of hand-picked yespersons will see only that they now have this huge army of experienced combat veterans and how it would a waste and a shame not to use them.
Haha… come on Xtisme… you really think the only ones doing the “hunting” are americans ? You wish. Bagging a few GIs might not be easy… and certainly they are setting their aims on easier prey… but that doesn’t mean they’ve given up shooting americans by any means. They just pick their fights differently and with IEDs. No one is solely the hunter there.
Whats to be puzzled about? Your cite claims “The U.S. military suffered at least 348 deaths in Iraq over the final four months of the year, more than in any other similar period since the invasion in March 2003”
Ok, thats fair enough…more Americans died in the last 4 months than in any other 4 month period since the invasion. However, how many IRAQI civilians, police, National Guardsmen and military died in that period due to direct attacks by insurgents targetting them specifically? Well its hard to get firm numbers on that of course. For some odd reason no one seems to want to put THOSE figures together, though there are myriad links on google for projected American caused Iraqi deaths (with a fairly wide range of figures btw).
Being as I’m at work I don’t have time to search for this needle in the hay stack…perhaps someone else can find the elusive estimate of civilian deaths inflicted on the Iraqis by the Insurgents. If not, I’ll try and see if there is a compilation of those figures…and perhaps a full estimate on the total civilian, police, NG and Iraqi military loses to date from Insurgent attacks.
My point is (if I can find the data to back it up) that though the insurgents continue to attack US targets (I never denied this though you seem to be implying I did), they have shifted their focus in the past few months to civilian targets. Part of the reason its been such a bloody 4 months is due to our forces going after them in situations like Fallujah…and the spectacular success of a suicide attack on a mess tent. Take those out and my guess is the casualties have been relatively constant. However, at least from my impression of the news, CIVILIAN or other Iraqi type deaths from insurgent attacks seem to be on the rise…and their death totals from insurgent attacks are a lot greater than those of even our last 4 months.
So…whats so puzzling?
RM, let me ask you something…with the exception of the attack on the US mess tent, how many of the US casualties have been due to insurgents attacking us in our bases…and how many have been them attacking US patrols, or due to the house to house street fighting in situations like Fallujah?
And again…who said they have given up on attacking Americans?? What I said was that they have shifted to softer targets. Doesn’t mean they have given up completely on killing Americans, and I fully expect them to continue roadside car bombs…and even the occational suicide attack like that on the mess tent if they can get away with it.
-XT
(p.s. I’ll try and do somemore googling this afternoon, time permitting)