The followis is regretably rambling and I am not sure I entirely agree with my own first cut analysis of how to address the tensions between past secular failures and present demands, versus my own preference for a longer term rather more secular state.
As such the following is something of my first cut ideas, I reserve the right to contradict and even overturn this initial analysis on the issue of gov’t structure.
Reconstructing Iraq for the long term:
Primo:
Any reconstruction of Iraq has to win Iraqi support. Long term Iraqi support.
As such it has to respond to Iraqi concepts of legitimacy, in the plural I would hazard the guess, and as such has to respond to current aspirations.
That first means that we have to grapple with the results of the failure of secularism in the Arab world. I believe I have adequately argued this ground in my prior thread, and if one has serious arguments against this, then I invite them, footnoted.
I note that there is a clear reaction against the imposed ‘secularism’ of the prior regime – something that should have been expected. The challenge now is to engage that. In answering this question there are several subsidiary questions, first, what form of government is required – and I mean here both state structure and philosophy. Second, what form of society. Third, what kind of economy and economic system. Given Iraq is a fragmented state with only a weak and highly contested national identity (and indeed in the context of the Kurdish minority, even contested existence and boundaries), there are no easy answers as the long term answers contradict many short term answers. No small degree of statesmanship and vision will be required to manage what is, as Thomas Friedman said, a long bomb play. The United States has engaged in a highly risky play in a region in which it has little deep expertise, nor despite some 50 or 60 years of relations, deep experience.
Among the most important observations but perhaps not terribly obvious to the outside observer are the following:
(a) The secular model of government is deeply damaged in Iraq at present. A future government, if it is to be successful in the long term, will have to address popular reaction against the failure – to date – of secularism, which it must be admitted has generally been excuse for a corrupt form of dictatorship in most Arab and Islamic countries, with ‘secular’ elites playing to the ignorance and fear of Western powers and donors. Moves such as banning religious parties, on the lines of rules in place in many countries in the region, likely to have negative consequences for legitimacy, however expedient it appears. One can not point to any real successes in this realm, while at least in Turkey the first two experiments with integrating ‘Islamist’ parties is far more encouraging than the suppression seen to date in the Arab world. For Iraqi, carefully constructed rules constricting pure religious politics is the best to be hoped for, if one wants to respond to genuine popular will.
(b) The Shiites will not easily back down from their play for power, and any compromise will be driven by internal dissension. Enormous care will have to be taken in these areas, for Shiite demands run directly into Sunni concerns and Kurdish desires.
© A centralized government with federal characteristics is absolutely necessary for a stable Iraq. Centrifugal forces, communal tensions and lack of overall legitimacy make any state solution highly unstable and problematic, an artful compromise is necessary.
Suggestions that a kind of decentralized model is appropriate for Iraq are rather naïve. First, in this region, government has always been centralized with modest aspects of local responsibility. Real local autonomy usually meant the state was in the process of dying. While one can legitimately argue that past errors should not be locked in, my experience tells me that too rapid a move away from past experience never proceeds well, habits snap back to ancient attitudes and patterns. Further to that, given a substantial minority, the Kurds, are against the very idea of Iraq, versus their dream of Kurdistan, de-evolution of powers early on in the game will only lead to a state-crisis and regional war with likely interventions by Iran and Turkey. While it is perhaps cynical realpolitik, the creation of a Kurd state calls too many things into question and opens more Pandora’s Boxes. The cost versus benefit is clear, warfare w/o clear end versus internal compromises.
However, at the same time, in order to preserve the state in the long run, and even in the short run, certain kinds of powers need to be devolved. Limited ones, but the ones of importance in terms of culture. The Kurdish identity movement was very much a reaction of Arabism or Turkism (not 100% to be sure) meant at wiping out minority ethno-linguistic groups’ identities. As such, while the Iraqi system must be centralized for long term stability, it should devolve educational functions to regions, with clear allowances for linguistic minorities. For example, in regards to education, while a standard Iraqi curriculum set in the center is necessary and desirable, regional and local implementation should allow for non-Arabic speakers and regional inputs. While it seems theoretically attractive to Americans, used to such things, to have local control, in a society riven by tribalism and local particularisms that deny the overall Iraqi identity, it is quite simply unwise and inappropriate to allow decentralization of an American sort. At the same time, allowing say a Kurdish curriculum based off the centralized curriculum, assuages Kurdish sense of being threatened by Arabization. Similarly certain kinds of personal or civil code terms might be wise to have regional applications, insofar as Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite traditions in re the personal code differ in sensitive manners.
In this vein, the Civil Code applying to personal statute will have to have recourse to Shi’a and Sunni Shariah, or Islamic Law. That means perhaps less-than-recent-ideal-rights in the West in many instances, it may mean unfair divorce laws at first. This is an absolute necessity in order to respond to the rebound in religiousity and the clear role the religious establishment will have in reestablishing order. If that means something less than ideal civil rights, including women’s rights, so be it. Attempting to continue a pure secular state when the failure of the Iraqi state and the Sadaam regime are so closely tied to secularism will simply reinforce the sense that this is not a “liberation” but a changing of dictatorial caps, for an American palatable quasi-dictatorship. This is fatal, and will represent a long term failure of the project.
However, heading the movement to establish a more Islamic state at the pass by incorporating a liberal reading of the Shariah (there are such) and also including recourse to secular Code Civil should allow a new government to simultaneously respond to popular desire for a re-Islamization of society in reaction against Baath secularism, while also preserving the means for government and society to move towards a more digestible modernization and ‘secularization’ of society when it feels ready. I warn people that you will see Western Journos quoting “Iraqi intelligentsia” etc bewailing the loss of secularism. All well and good, but knowing the sociology of the region, I can also observe that these people are generally foreigners in their own country, with lives, values and habits fundamentally divorced from the masses. They are, to illustrate, the “East Coast Elite” of the Arab world, of a similar relationship to larger society
In order to build a real secularization of society, it has to build off of internal developments in the society. Very clearly there will be a genuine reaction against secularism in Iraq, after so many years of imposed and often false secularism – something that will now be associated with the humiliating defeat at the hands of ‘infidel’ Western invaders. Rather than trying to “stop” such, something that will work against legitimacy, a new government should attempt to channel this in ways that will not undermine the long term stability of society. To build a democracy of any sort, one should not start on terms that are larger contra the ‘will of the masses’
Naturally flowing from this is the question of who should lead this government. I frankly have no idea at present. Or better, I believe that I have some negative ideas, but no positive suggestions. On the negative side, I first of all suggest that this Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, upon whom it appears those masters of diplomacy, the Pentagon, are placing bets, is a monster error.
First, Chalabi has all the appearances of being dirty. His involvement in the collapse of Petra Bank in Jordan about a decade ago is shrouded in controversy, and having spoken to people directly connected with these events, I have not heard very much positive in this connection. Everything about Chalabi says wheeler and dealer of an unsavory type. The man has spent 40 years outside of the country, has been responsibly connected with a serious fraud and essentially an asset stripping of what was a significant bank – none of these items recommend themselves to entrusting this fellow to any role in reconstructing a country and establishing a government run on something approaching ‘best practices.’ Rather, I predict a Chalabi government would be yet another Egypt of Mubarek, a country of corruption, insider dealing and enrichment of an elite disconnected from the people. My phrase is “Egypt on the Euphrates” – that is a pliable, corrupt ‘pro-Western’ regime with little popular legitimacy but much muscle, and that is what I see in Chalabi.
What does that leave us with? Well, that is a real problem. The ancien regime of the Baathists – I strongly suspect that despite cautions from people like myself we will see a Baath restoration under another name, with the excuse they have the experience and are secular. I say this is “game over” from the start in terms of having even the vaguest credibility in Iraq or in the region. In short, it will be a gift to the Islamic radicals, however much it may appear to be superficially comforting on a short term basis.
The problem is there are few if any genuine national leaders that can be identified at this stage. While it is superficially attractive to allow the Baath back in, the example of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union is not very encouraging on this point, in terms of regaining legitimacy and in purging the system of past errors.
Ideally an interim international administration would take over Iraq for a defined period, and some degree of civil discourse and society could begin to emerge such that a ‘hand over’ of power could occur in the context of Iraqi validated leaders. The obvious problem with this is the clear Iraqi nationalist response to the Anglo-American occupation and the memories of colonial rule that this provokes ( naturally and via the often overheated commentaries in the Arab media ). A free Iraqi press is unlikely to be supportive of an Anglo-American administration in any form for any length of time. However, simply bugging out and handing over to the first convenient and politically palatable administration simply compounds the problems as it is inevitable that such a process will end up discrediting all involved.
The ideal choice would be to institute an international administration with a strong Arab presence. The United Nations would be an ideal vehicle, to help keep things more or less honest, and allow a spreading of responsibility in order to help take away the sting of defeat from the Arab point of view. A strong Arab participation brings several advantages. First, the language barrier is lowered, and as someone who has done business and studied in the region, I am of the strong opinion that if one really wants to establish institutions with survivability and durability, one has to really understand what is happening at the grass roots, and on the margins. That only comes through knowing the language and culture. Second, it helps take away the sting of defeat by making the project of reconstruction an “Arab” and to an extent “Islamic” project, which works both on the Iraqi level – so long as it is temporary – and on the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic level where both constituencies feel a part of the project. While the results might not be 100% pleasing to American observers expecting a little Middle Eastern America to emerge, I hazard the opinion that it will be more durable. A risk that emerges is that a pan-Arab input antagonizes the Kurds. Very clearly there needs to be a framework that helps restrain Arabism and allows minority voices and concerns. Regrettably pan-Arabism is notably tone deaf and blind to the concerns of non-Arabs. Thus, the United Nations framework is useful to help bring in other points of view and restrain Arabism. At the same time the UN framework helps other actors buy into the results. France, Russia, Turkey, Iran, even Syria need to feel they have at least some stake in the success of a new Iraqi model if we are to see medium to long term stability. Given the clear structural weaknesses in the Iraqi state and society, it is far too easy for neighbors to begin to play the role of bomb throwers and destabilize the reconstruction and remaking of Iraq. While short termism and some what grade school peevishness has led many American commentators to call for excluding “non-members” of the famous although often anonymous “coalition of the willing” if one takes a long term and objective view, it is clearly better for all that all potential actors feel they have a stake in the process.
Let us take, for example, the issue of whether Russian and French oil firms (most notably TotalFinaElf) should take part in any reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry. Quite clearly for the Iraqi people, they are harmed by the political exclusion of any private sector actor. Given TotalFinElf has no small experience in similar situations (for example TotalFinaElf’s fair degree of success in operating in Algeria in the past five years helping remake the sector in cooperation with the talented Algerian Hydrocarbons Minister Chabib Khalil), Iraqis are deeply disserved by a political exclusion of TotalFinaElf, and further such an exclusion rather goes against the medium and long term policy goals of America – transparent, economic and business based decision making in regards to economic policy. We are ill-served in undermining our position by engaging in transitory fits of political pique. We are best served by establishing a transparent and level playing field in which the best (in economic and business terms) competitor wins. In this manner we not only make a powerful point in regards to setting an example in terms of best practices in general, but also a powerful rebuttal to the charges of colonialism.
In the same vein, it is necessary to be careful in remaking the Iraqi economy. While it is abundantly clear that an economy based on a transparent private sector is the surest path to sustainable economic growth, the lessons of post-Communist Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union should be heeded, in conjunction with the lessons of decolonization. After roughly three generations under a kind of quasi-socialism, and never having had any genuine ‘capitalist’ organization of the economy, there will be a number of fundamental challenges to overcome in order to obtain a healthy, sustainable and above all popularly and politically supportable Iraqi economy.
First, acceptance of foreign investment and ownership will have to be won. The politically sensitive hydrocarbons sector has to be dealt with on Iraqi terms. No pressure should be brought to bear on the Iraqis regarding nationalization a good generation ago, nor a hasty privatization of assets. From a business point of view certainly the Iraqi nation would be foolish to engage is a distressed assets sale if it does not have to, and from a political point of view a quasi-forced privatization will simply be seen as a new colonialism. In place of forcing such changes, a system that allows public-private partnerships allowing foreign participation on reasonable bases and on transparent grounds, from both sides, should be instituted. With time, perhaps with a flexible time table, the sector might be privatized on terms acceptable to all parties.
In the same manner, the privatization of other sectors of the Iraqi economy should be designed in a manner that helps build confidence in the system and in the legitimacy of the process. A problem that will arise in the beginning is that Iraqis themselves may not have the capital, or at least liquid capital, to make fair bids for privatized assets. Care must be taken that the Iraqis do not feel that either the old Baath apparatus or foreigners are buying out the country at unfair fire sale prices. This will not be easy, but studying the history of Eastern Europe and FSU (above all the less ‘westernized’ states) and post-colonial reconstruction in the Middle East and North Africa should provide lessons on pitfalls to avoid.