Iraq Reconstruction

[Eva_Luna]

*Originally posted by december *
**Fisk is so anti-American, anti-Israel, anti-west and so inaccurate that his name has become a verb. Fisking and article is going through phrase by phrase and pointing out the flaws, usually in an entertaining manner.

I won’t give Fisk’s article a full Fisking here.**

Oh, but please do! I need a good laugh.

**
Fisk thinks he doesn’t need sources and facts. The cause of what’s occurring is simply obvious to him.

Fisk says the Iraq situation is going badly. That’s a good reason to believe it’s going well. **

It’s an interview, not a news article; interviews rarely come with footnotes. Fisk was asked for his general impressions, and he provided them.

FTR, I have not yet formed my opinion about Fisk; I am reading this interview without preconceptions. Anyone else care to provide some balance here?

[system]

Iraq Reconstruction iii
I revive my old Iraq Reconstruction Thread since
(a) several persons such as Mace, in my mind rightly, have noted the issues of reconstruction have been neglected
(b) this article may be of general interest and the issues have been neglected
© as usual, the progress of events sadly proves my cynicism and pessimism well founded. I wish it were not so, it would be, on some level, nice if the dewy eyed optimism expressed after the fall of the Taleban, after the fall of Sadaam’s formal administration had been misplaced. Regrettably, neither was the case.

Regardless, this thread is about the current reality, not the lead up.

But before we get to the article, let me restate my thesis – it’s always helpful to be clear – that motivates these comments.
(i) The war was misplaced and mis-executed in a strategic sense. I mean not the strategy of the combat, I mean the grandest sense. However, this is stated as an issue of context, the assumption being that better strategic positioning vis-à-vis the political framework would enable a better context post war. I do not wish to re-debate the war justifications nor other fine points. I consider it a clear fact that at minimum, the international political context was, at best less than ideal. And I mean that in a real sense, not in some idealized set of contexts, but in the context of what is realistically achievable.
(ii) Based on a strategy of minimization, the present American Administration has adopted a consistent policy of minimization in regards to both
a. the potential threats, domestic and regional including
(1) military requirements and
(2) political engagements and
b. economic or financial in regards to resources necessary to achieve a reasonable exit based on both stated and implicit policy goals, above all long term.
(iii) The policy in (b) is doomed to failure and that a post WWII full on commitment is required, even at the cost of some short term domestic pain induced by the implied deficits.

So, the article: “Postwar Window Closing in Iraq, Study Says: More Funds, International Force Recommended to Improve Security Situation” By Vernon Loeb Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, 18 July 2003; Page A09
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8445-2003Jul17.html

First, the context.

A team of outside experts dispatched by the Pentagon to assess security and reconstruction operations in Iraq reported yesterday that the window of opportunity for achieving postwar success is closing and requires immediate and dramatic action by U.S. military and civilian personnel.
The team concluded that the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority in charge of reconstruction efforts is isolated and underfunded, and it recommended that U.S. officials move immediately to internationalize the daunting task of rebuilding Iraq, particularly in light of “rising anti-Americanism in parts of the country.”

I suppose it would be ungenerous of me to point out that I have been saying this for, what, two or three months or that this should put paid to our “Usual Suspects” claims that “all is fine” in Iraq. I further find it fundamentally frustrating that opportunities are being lost.

Let me give context. I am going to be frank, the evil inner-me said, as far back as April, “I hope it goes badly for that will preclude stupid and in the end counter productive adventurism.” The other side, that is reality, wanted things to go well. As I said, I am working on efforts to put together really funds for regional and specifically Iraqi investments. However, even high risk investors are rather averse to Iraq in the present state, for the ElDerado depends on some modicum of stability and above all clarity.

I am sad to say the hopes of the evil and highly theoretical me have come true. My more real and greedy self is frustrated. Now december has characterized me as a Bush Basher. I don’t see this as fair. First, because I rather think I am a pragmatism above all, I would do business with Shaitan if he held the right cards. Second, because I am perfectly willing to give credit where credit is due. For example, the initial Afghan efforts. Brilliantly done in many respects, and better than I thought. Pity we dropped the motherfucking ball on that afterwards, again the same domain of follow-through. This administration has no follow through.

Now further to the report, first let me note that I find it pitiful that it received so little press. And not because of its small bones thrown to the symbolic “significant progress” and similar things to make people like december happy, no because it hits on some key points.

First finding:

“The ‘hearts and minds’ of key segments of the Sunni and Shi’a communities are in play and can be won, but only if the Coalition Provisional Authority and new Iraqi authorities deliver in short order,” the experts said in 10-page report to Pentagon officials, which they released at a news conference.

I suppose this is what I have been saying in my interventions and reporting since two months, there are possibilities, but empty spin mongering and political posturing for a notoriously ignorant and short sighted American electorate (esp. one that has such khayali bullshit visions of MENA wealth, as even displayed by otherwise moderately well informed …. personages if one will, here) will kill medium and long term gains, and indeed end up with a deep net negative result.

As I have said many time, time to push for pony up and kicking in.

Context:

The team, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, traveled to Iraq at Pentagon expense between June 27 and July 7. It was led by John Hamre, who served as deputy defense secretary in the Clinton administration and is now CSIS president.

Further to that.

It implicitly faulted the administration for failing to adequately involve the international community and the United Nations in reconstruction activities. “The scope of the challenges, the financial requirements, and rising anti-Americanism in parts of Iraq argue for a new coalition that includes countries and organizations beyond the original war fighting coalition,” the report said.

See my own arguments dating back two months or more.

The report also noted that the administration, by vesting virtually all reconstruction authority in the Pentagon, chose a new model for postwar management that cut out many agencies more experienced in the field and relied on the Defense Department’s “relatively untested capacities.”

In other words, they don’t know what the fuck they are doing and are not coordinating properly with the people who do.

The Defense Department and the Military are not repositories of deep knowledge of other countries, regions, cultures or even worse, basic and fundamental economics or business principals.

… the experts singled out security as Iraq’s primary problem and said “volatile” conditions must be dealt with over the next three months to prevent the window of opportunity for success from closing.

The U.S. military, despite the presence of 148,000 troops in Iraq, the report said, is not visible enough at the street level, particularly in Baghdad, and must reassess its force composition and tactics in response to a “steady deterioration in the security situation.”

Frederick Barton, a team member and CSIS official, said that while there probably were not enough troops on the ground when the war ended in April, increasing the U.S. military force in the country now would be problematic, given the growing resentment of its presence.

If I may restate, Catch 22 generated by the Administrations own idiocy in wedding itself more to ideology than to rational analysis.

Thousands of forces guarding military bases and Iraqi installations, he said, should be redeployed to increase their visibility and augmented by private security contractors and Iraqi police. But the job of rooting out remnants of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party now waging a guerrilla war, he said, must remain primarily with U.S. forces.

Wonderful, how many private contractors want to die for $2.5 a day?

Barton said he now believes the Iraqi insurgency is more sophisticated than the military initially appreciated. “We came to the conclusion while we were there that thousands of [Baathist fighters] just don’t go missing as an accident – that it probably was a coordinated effort,” Barton said. “It’s really not hard to travel around the country, and it’s not hard to [communicate by] word of mouth.”

Well, this suggests that our dear Rumsfeld and Bush may have been suckered by Sadaam. That is that at some point Sadaam et al realized that they could not hold and so decided to prepare a guerilla effort.

And our dear Jingoist Crowd went for this hook, line and sinker – that body of person duped regrettably includes a large number of current SDMB commentators.

Further to that:

Another team member, Bathsheba Crocker, a former State Department attorney, said officials she met with in the southern city of Basra now believe the looting there was orchestrated by Hussein’s regime. “This wasn’t just the result of overexcitement or venting or whatever it was we thought it was at the beginning,” she said. “The devastation is unbelievable.”

True or not, the myth has begun, the Americans have been outsmarted.

Beyond security, the report said, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the agency in charge of reconstruction headed by L. Paul Bremer, must improve communications with the Iraqi people and decentralize its structure by opening 18 regional offices.

I can personally report that it is almost impossible, even for someone such as myself with close contacts, to get in touch with these people.

Isolated, without good intel or even resources, how the fuck are these people supposed to get their jobs done?

The authority will soon be in desperate need of funds and must be freed of bureaucratic restrictions so that it can rapidly commit money for essential improvements, the report says, particularly those related to the country’s water and power systems.

Have I not been saying this since fucking May? Why does it take a special mission to get this across? When will people like Mace, Sam, December, etc stop making fucking excuses and start beating the Neo-Conservo-Idjits doors demanding things be done right, ideology be damned.

The reality is that for this ill conceived and ill advised adventure not to be a disaster of Vietnamesque proportions, funds and support to a rational and highly international reconstruction need to be mobilized. The ideologues game of trying to prove “we” can do it alone is going to fail, and very clearly all those chest beating claims about “we” can do it “better” were rather ill-conceived. Now if I were some ungenerous foreign official I might very well say to myself, “let them be hoist on their own petard, their arrogant short sighted fools.” Let us hope that the world will be more generous, with some climb downs by the arrogant, ignorant and short sighted fools.

What I would like to see is an engagement on the part of all American political parties to pony what will be necessary and end this myth that somehow or someway the war will, in the short term, “pay for itself.” I mean ponying up around $30 billion a year for three years or so to get things kicked off. Tax payer dollars, in addition to my money. I mean risk capital. Do it right, you get a return, multiples on the dollar. Do it wrong and you are all fucked.

[system]

Now, as it happens the Wasington Post and The New York Times carried the first whiff of climb downs by the Administration.

U.S. Considers Returning to UN for Help in Iraq
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14624-2003Jul19.html

and

U.S. May Be Forced to Go Back to U.N. for Iraq Mandate
By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS
The New York Times

AFTER THE WAR: OCCUPATION; U.S. MAY BE FORCED TO GO BACK TO U.N. FOR IRAQ...

Interesting reporting for it raises the possibility that there will be internatinalization along the lines I have called for, however it also raises the possibility this will be blocked by the anti-UN ideologues. In any case, once more our dear anti-UN unilateralists see why the UN remains relevant, despite the smear campaign.

Relevant sections:

The Bush administration, which spurned the United Nations in its drive to depose Saddam Hussein in Iraq, is finding itself forced back into the arms of the international body because other nations are refusing to contribute peacekeeping troops or reconstruction money without United Nations approval.

With the costs of stabilizing Iraq hovering at $4 billion a month and with American troops being killed at a steady rate, administration officials acknowledge that they are rethinking their strategy and may seek a United Nations resolution for help that would placate other nations, like India, France and Germany.

Lessons, easy lessons that need not have been so expensive in lives and lost opportunities.

Key reasons.

The administration’s quandary deepened today, when Russia announced that it would consider sending peacekeeping troops but only with a United Nations mandate that set out a specific mission and timetable. …. Mr. Powell said Security Council Resolution 1483, which was approved in May and calls on all members to assist in Iraq’s reconstruction, should be enough “cover” for countries to claim an endorsement from the United Nations. But he acknowledged that the nations that matter most are not buying that.

Indeed, hardly is the US in a strong position on this, with a degrading position as its own fact finding team indicated, and not enough resources. Well, can’t own the whole game if you don’t have the oomph or don’t want to shoulder the costs. Indeed why should other nations spend their money and their lives on a game that few thought was well-considered or reasonable, and after this Administration spent the last six months acting like the cowboys and claiming the US could do it alone.

…. The discussions reflect a growing sense that the reconstruction of Iraq will require a new international alliance. For all their rapid success in the military phase, the American-led forces are struggling to establish stability and normalcy in Iraq. …. Even supporters of the administration’s policy say its efforts are in jeopardy, and minute military planning gave way to disarray once the major combat ended. …

Our Dear Blog Spotter Extraordinaire, however, has not gotten the Spin Memo yet, however.

Mr. Saunders [nb noted elsewhere in article: director of the Nixon Center, a nonpartisan research organization whose honorary chairman is Henry A. Kissinger] said there were two reasons for the United States to go back to the United Nations.

“It would be helpful to diffuse responsibility for this massive undertaking, and share any dissatisfaction with others and not be the sole target ourselves,” he said. “Externally, it’s also helpful in rebuilding some of the relationships that were strained in the dispute over going in.”

Fairly obvious conclusions actually, obvious to anyone familiar with the situation since April. But the Neo-Cons wanted to show their fine little ideas, pure as driven snow, worked just like they thought they did.

The article also notes:

Several nations have chafed at the idea of submitting their troops to American-British control. Others, which clashed with the United States and withheld support for a resolution authorizing war, want to tweak Washington for disregarding them.

India dealt the administration a sharp blow this week, refusing to send peacekeeping troops unless they operated under the auspices of the United Nations. The administration, which had lobbied New Delhi strenuously, had been hoping for a full division of 17,000 peacekeepers, which would have made India the second largest military presence in Iraq after the United States. …. (article later notes India is a bell-weather for other developing nations, give political cover)

But why the Admin thought the Indians would want to blow their prestige being Pentagon Lackeys on the cheap I don’t fathom, must be the same kind of navel gazing jingoism that led the Administration to alienate the Turks and blow that game as well.

In essence, as the article argues, except for some piss-ant East European nations almost no one wants to pony up troops or material, and as I noted elsewhere, the offers by the Eastern Europeans have been thin gruel. For example the Hungarians offering truck drivers but no trucks or mechanics.

The famous “coalition of the willing” then is this:

Currently, 19 nations have a troop presence in Iraq, and Pentagon officials say 19 more have promised to send forces. About 13,000 non-American troops are now in the country, most of them British, compared with about 147,000 Americans.

Nice balance that.

Further, the article conveys the argument, as I made earlier in this thread, that internationalization would reduce the political backlash (although it may be too late)

…. “Iraqis are extremely sensitive about being occupied,” said Robert C. Orr, the Washington director of the Council on Foreign Relations, who took part in the Pentagon’s advisory panel. “It just doesn’t feel the same if an Indian or Pakistani soldier is on the corner than if it’s an American in Kevlar.”

However, the question is why should Indo-Pak or other forces put their lives on the line for something the Pentagon still clearly wants to run – despite its incompetence to date – as its own show? Why should others put their reputations and lives on the line for something they have no say in?

Indeed as the article notes

… Apart from the bad blood, administration officials worry that United Nations participation might force them to cede operational control over Iraq, even as the United States continues to pay most of the cost. ….

Well, it probably does hurt to have to eat crow, beak and all.

And as to raising money:

The administration would particularly like help in covering reconstruction costs. It has set up a donors’ conference for October but risks falling far short without a diplomatic breakthrough.

Again, they want to own the game, but get others to pay.

….
“They’ll disguise it; they’ll find ways to excuse it,” Mr. Nye said. “For some of them — in particular those who celebrated that we didn’t use the U.N. — it will be painful.”

My hope then is that pride does not get in the way of national interest.

[system]

I thought I might provide further analysis from the Economist
“Life under the coalition: Dodge City on the Tigris” The Economist 17 July 2003.
Again further reporting on the issue of reconstruction that I feel is relevant. Of most note is the cynicism that now greets American efforts and December-like happy talk (which insults those who have to hear it):

Baghdadis fired their guns into the air in joy when the power came on, but were thunderously let down when the system crashed late last month.
The Americans’ sanguinity about the situation is greeted cynically. Recently Lieut-General Ricardo Sanchez, the senior commander of American forces in Iraq, said that Baghdad’s crime rates were “comparable to a major American city.”“Maybe Dodge City,” sniffed a local businessman, on hearing the comparison.

Given that random violent crime in the region and in Iraq were almost non-existent (corruption and other forms of crime are the problems elsewhere, not generally US style random violence) and given the absurdity of the comparison (no crime stats are collected, and frankly there are no American cities where the carrying of military arms in self-defence is de rigeur. (An aside, of course, we also have living proof that a merely armed populace is not a guarantee of liberty. Arms are a tool, and no guarantee at all without the social underpinning)
The article further notes later:

Baghdad’s problems are reflected elsewhere. Obviously, there are regional variations. Basra, for instance, suffers particularly from a shortage of clean water. Several smaller towns complain less about street crime, and more about the rough treatment meted out by American troops. However, throughout the country, most of the problems can be tracked down to two basic, intertwined causes: the lack of power and the lack of security.
No lights makes it easier for criminal gangs or anti-American resistance fighters to operate. No security means that precious money needed to upgrade existing infrastructure is instead spent on replacing stuff that has been stolen. Insecurity makes civil servants reluctant to go to work, and deeply discourages private investment from outside.
…. A source at the CPA says that Iraq currently generates around 3,300 megawatts of electricity, compared with 4,400 at the time of peak demand last summer. ….
The CPA and the Iraqi Electricity Commission are bringing in new equipment to patch up some installations, even as other facilities are stripped away by pillagers. Progress is not always forward. On one of Iraq’s two major south-to-centre high voltage lines, 17 towers were down by the end of the war. Thanks to the gangs who topple the towers to smelt the copper cables for sale abroad, the total down is now over 60.

Not encouraging at all, a vicious negative cycle that needs to be broken, desperately, for the US begins to look ever more incompetent and ridiculous given the pre-war and immediate post-war posturing and bragging.
Now the article does raise another issue, one which I admit I had not encountered in analyses before, that of Sadaam having privileged certain areas, power wise. Note, Baghdad area is the single densest and largest population center in all Iraq.

Iraqi electricity officials hope that they can reach pre-war levels of output by the end of this month, though others are not so optimistic. But even that level of power will not satisfy everyone. Saddam Hussein starved the provinces of power to feed Baghdad. Before the war, the capital received 20-24 hours of power a day, while the rest of the country got 8-15 hours. Now, because of the downed transmission lines, some provinces have more power than they had before the war. CPA officials say that their aim is to distribute power more equitably than in the past—news which will be badly received in Baghdad.

While it is probably good to be more just in power distribution, it may not be entirely wise, given, as noted, (a) Baghdad area is the single densest and largest concentration of population in all Iraq and center of economic activity (b) urban regions such as Baghdad tend to be centers of unrest more than the provinces.

Regardless, again it should be clear that more resources are needed, fast.

[system]

I’d also like to reproduce this post here to centralize the information:

“Just a Dribble of Oil Exports as Iraq Struggles”
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/17/b...ness/17OIL.html

In a further indication of the troubles facing its once mighty oil industry, Iraq plans to export only eight million barrels of oil this month, industry officials here said, a small fraction of its prewar output.

It rather appears as if the Admin. assumptions re Iraqi oil paying for efforts is, as appears now to be habitual, badly off.

The unexpectedly slow revival of this pillar of the Iraqi economy, which has been plagued by looting and sabotage, has helped keep oil prices hovering around $30 a barrel on world markets for weeks. The industry’s difficulties may also derail some of the plans of the allied authority here, whose budget for the year assumes sizable oil revenues.

“Certainly for this year and most of next year, the vast majority will come from oil,” L. Paul Bremer III, the American occupation administrator in Iraq, said of budget revenues at a news conference last week. “That is a fact of life we cannot get away from.”

American officials said recently that Iraq’s budget for the rest of 2003 would be $6 billion to $7 billion. Half or somewhat more — about $3.5 billion — would come from oil exports, they said.

That is far below the $15 billion to $20 billion in annual Iraqi oil revenue that the Bush administration had projected before the war.

At $20 a barrel — the price that the allies are using, despite the much higher average price of oil this year — Iraq would need to export about 800,000 barrels a day to deliver such revenues to the budget, said Raad Alkadiri, an expert on Iraqi oil and a director of PFC Energy, a Washington consulting group.

The eight million barrels to be exported this month amounts to only 258,000 barrels a day. Before the war Iraq exported, legally and otherwise, about two million barrels a day.

Rather clearly this is not going to be self financing as the Administration seems to be betting on. As I have warned and predicted since April, betting on the oil to jump start things is a bad, bad bet, although this situation is far worse than anyone thought might be, ex blowing the wells.

As for Bremer, I have sympathy for him as his efforts are being starved for resources. Fact of life… only because some people back in Washington do not wish to face up to the real costs as Election year rolls up.

[december]

*Originally posted by Collounsbury *
When will people like Mace, Sam, December, etc stop making fucking excuses and start beating the Neo-Conservo-Idjits doors demanding things be done right, ideology be damned.

Glad you reconstituted this thread, Collounsbury. It’s an important topic. A few comments and questions.

– Do you have a link to the 10-page report itself?

– It’s normal for a unit of government or business to claim that they need more funding. Is this report more than usual bureaucratic greed?

– What specific things are not being done that need to be done? That is, what is the additional money needed for?

– The headline Just a Dribble of Oil Exports is typical NY Times spin. The opposite spin would be,
Oil Exports Resume More Quickly than Expected.

[system]

Wonderful, back to spinning I see.

*Originally posted by december *
– Do you have a link to the 10-page report itself?

I’ll get a copy of it shortly.

– It’s normal for a unit of government or business to claim that they need more funding. Is this report more than usual bureaucratic greed?

Look at the bloody numbers I have cited above, esp. in re reconstruction capital needed and come to your own conclusions.

For the past several months I have not encourated any sign of fat in the CPA-I efforts, only signs of capital shortage.

– What specific things are not being done that need to be done? That is, what is the additional money needed for?

Capital available to jump start massive infrastructure reconstruction. Funding available to begin massive public works projects to soak up unemployed Iraqis and begin to make immediate dent in unrest. Facilities -and financing- to give insurance to any and all foreign investors, to help jump start initial capital flows.

Etc.

– The headline Just a Dribble of Oil Exports is typical NY Times spin. The opposite spin would be,
Oil Exports Resume More Quickly than Expected.

Only you could possibly write such a completly fact free sentance. In fact, oil exports are well behind schedule and well below initial targets.

[system]

For reference of all, I believe the following report may be of interest in putting Iraq Reconstruction and economic rebound in context:
WEF’s “The Arab World in the Global Market” http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/AWCR_2002_2003/Trade.pdf

[system]

Just found:
BBC report which confirms my uncited numbers given last month or so. Slightly different, but I would expect my source got it from the same analyses.
Iraq rebuilding ‘could cost $90bn’
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3071159.stm

Also for those of you interested, the CPA-Iraq has its own website up, with all the Propaganda you can want in a day. Business information here: http://www.cpa-iraq.org/business/index.html

[elucidator]

I wonder if all the emphasis on resuming oil production isn’t a bit of an illusion. Oil production is not that labor intensive, you drill the hole, you pump the goo. Once production is up, its mostly a matter of maintenance.

As has been noted, Iraq ante bellum was an oddly twisted form of socialism, intermixed with a smallish, mom-and-pop sort of private sector. Presumably, with considerable numbers of “make-work” employment which is one of the chief banes of socialist economies: providing unproductive work to avoid social unrest and misery.

Those jobs must necessarily be gone. Presumably, the mom’n pop culture may revive with the return of ordinary economic activity. And many will be employed in the reconstruction of the oil fields (if sufficient “risk” capital can be obtained,though I fail to see how this might be done without America essentially indemnifying that risk…). But once the oil is flowing, there will yet remain some unknown mass of unemployed and virtually unemployable Iraqis.

The irony of our neo-con leaders providing welfare, food stamps, and universal health care to unemployed Iraqis while giving stern “boot-strap” lectures to our own people is palpable.

The Bushistas simply must…must…go hat in hand to the UN, NATO, the Arab League, anyone who might remotely be inclined to help. If they serve us a turd sundae of humiliation, we must put a cherry on top and gobble it down, yummy yummy. We wrecked it, but we cannot fix it alone.

Common decency demands nothing less.

[Eolbo]

*Originally posted by december *
**

– Do you have a link to the 10-page report itself?
**

Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction

[system]

*Originally posted by elucidator *
I wonder if all the emphasis on resuming oil production isn’t a bit of an illusion. Oil production is not that labor intensive, you drill the hole, you pump the goo. Once production is up, its mostly a matter of maintenance.

That’s an absurd understatement.

Oil production is highly capital intensive and technically challenging.

Aside from that, Iraq has not had proper maintenance - not a trivial matter in any case - for at least ten years.

No, the problems are not an illusion, they are very, very real.

Those jobs must necessarily be gone. Presumably, the mom’n pop culture may revive with the return of ordinary economic activity. And many will be employed in the reconstruction of the oil fields (if sufficient “risk” capital can be obtained,though I fail to see how this might be done without America essentially indemnifying that risk…). But once the oil is flowing, there will yet remain some unknown mass of unemployed and virtually unemployable Iraqis.

To the italicized part, yes, you get a medal. Unitl there is insurance coverage for sovereign and related risk, and even insurance on likely ‘acts of war’ – sabotage-- not even people like me can seriously invest, and I’ve worked on investments where site visits required armed guards.

I am not so down on the employability of Iraqis. Iraqi skill levels in technical fields are actually very good, not world class perhaps but very good.

They do utterly lack good management and related “soft” skills - the situation is highly reminiscent of Eastern Europe c. 1990 (and specifically Yugoslavia). That is the value add people like me bring, when the time comes.

The Bushistas simply must…must…go hat in hand to the UN, NATO, the Arab League, anyone who might remotely be inclined to help. If they serve us a turd sundae of humiliation, we must put a cherry on top and gobble it down, yummy yummy. We wrecked it, but we cannot fix it alone.

I am not sure I entirely agree, but climb downs from the high horse are in order.

Well, I am still disappointed at the defeaning silence - except for december’s ever more wilted forays - from the War Hawk and related crowds. Where’s the outrage over the wilted efforts so far?

[system]

*Originally posted by Eolbo *
**Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction **

Thanks.

[elucidator]

…No, the problems are not an illusion, they are very, very real…

You misunderstood.or I wasnt clear. I am referrring to the number of persons who can be meaningfully employed by the oil industry. It is not the problems I regards as potentially illusory, it is the rewards, esp. as regards employment of Iraqis.

Thanks for the medal.

[system]

*Originally posted by elucidator *
You misunderstood.or I wasnt clear. I am referrring to the number of persons who can be meaningfully employed by the oil industry. It is not the problems I regards as potentially illusory, it is the rewards, esp. as regards employment of Iraqis.

Ah, yes, I see now.

Well, there are (a) a host of service industries and the like and (b) the wider Iraqi economy would be aided by the confidence that sustained production brings.

Still, yes, getting oil production in gear does not end the problems.

[qoute]
Thanks for the medal.
[/QUOTE]

It’s free.

[London_Calling]

Hearing quite a lot more about the growing problems associated with US troop morale in Iraq. Example:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3072899.stm

One assumes that undermining the morale of the occupying forces has to be the primary goal of any ‘guerrilla-type campaign’. It can’t help, in that regard, that the attrition rate is currently about one US soldier a day and that, at least in the past couple of weeks, the US hasn’t been able to deal with the attackers.

IMHO, quite soon Bush is going to have to let the UN get into some meaningful nation building or his waning domestic popularity may start to impinge on Nov 2004.
Is the morale issue aired much in the US at present ?
Tough business this ‘white mans burden’ stuff. Not convinced it works in the fully democractic era . . . .

[system]

Shamefully neglected so far in the American press, we now have Bremer on the record. From the Financial Times, so far I may add the single best source in regular media for keeping tabs:

“Bremer sets timetable for rebuilding Iraq” By Marianne Brun-Rovet in Washington 24 July 2003
Free content at: http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1058868118197&p=1012571727088

Key items are:

…a reconstruction plan … that would restore electricity and water supplies to their pre-war levels within 60 days.

Keep tabs on this. I doubt it is going to happen but perhaps he got special funding in.

Note

Mr Bremer presented a “detailed timetable and clear benchmarks” to restore security, set the economy back on track and lay foundations for democratic government.

I’ll do a summary analysis of this shortly, have to anyway for real world purposes.

I do note that

But he added that even then there would be a “significant shortfall” because of 35 years of chronic underinvestment in infrastructure.

35 years is an exageration 20 years is reasonable. Short fall or not, it is dangerous.

Note further:

The US civil administration estimates it would cost $13bn (E11bn) to rebuild the electricity infrastructure, while the United Nations forecasts it would take $16bn over four years to restore water supplies.

Not far off the early figures I provided.
Further

On the economic front, the US plans to create tens of thousands of jobs and prepare the Iraqi economy for the launch, on October 15, of a new currency for the whole of Iraq.

By next week, Mr Bremer said, the two largest state banks would be fully operational, allowing Iraqis to cash cheques. Management contracts would be given to foreign banks.

About fucking time on the last, and one would have thought insofar as it was obvious there were issues even back in May, that there would have been more aggressive planning. However, the CPA-Iraq boys I met did not seem to have their bosses ear until recently.

The US will spend $211m in the next six months on healthcare and inject an additional $200m a month into the economy through the payment of salaries, pensions and emergency payments.

$400 million… Well better than nothing but pouring water into the sand.

Further to the issue of resources, note

But Mr Bremer emphasised the US’s reliance on international co-operation and outside financial support to pull off his ambitious targets.

Immediately raises the issue in my mind, are we talking phantom funding once again, based on wishes, maybes and promises from that “coalition of the willing”?

A sign of climb downs, the following statement?:

He said it would “take time and a great deal of outside assistance to rebuild the economy of Iraq”, adding that reconstruction was already an internationalised affair but that the US would welcome additional support.

Or is the Adminsitration still hoping that somehow others will finance without them having to give up precious control.

[Aldebaran]

This is an excellent informative thread.

May I congratulate Colounsbury for his clear insight. Not only in the matters he clearly is specialized in (which I’m certainly not) but also for his knowledge and understanding of regional and local sensitivities with their related problems.

As for the problems the occupation forces face:
Everyone with some little bit of insight could predict such evolution and everyone was aware on forehand that those in charge in the US government and military weren’t able to forsee this, let be to prevent.
Incredible arrogance meeting unthinkable ignorance is what asks its toll right now in Iraq.

Sadly enough the UK, with its historical experience in the region, wasn’t able to put the weight of this advantage into the scale.
Although one could easily distinct the clear difference in approach by the UK military from the very first days of the invasion. (The reported incidents of UK soldiers allegedly torturing/humiliating prisoners put aside here. If found to be true, I tend to consider this seperate incidents, not representative for the mentality and behaviour among the UK troops and/or their leadership).

And we see surfacing every day a bit more the events that were most likely to happen if the brutal power of the Baath regime was overthrown the way it was done = from the outside by people with complete ignorance and complete lack of interest to become or be informed of and about the reality inside.

It is an almost impossible job and it shall need more then some little miracle to stabilize this virtual instable country “peacefully” (God, forgive me the word).
Because if one thing you could say about the Hussein regime, it is that at least it could keep these things under control at the surface.
Yet beneath it all those tribal, ethnical, linguistic, religous and cultural differences with the related problems and possible tensions remained and will always be there.
These forces are on the loose right now and each of them is on a quest to search ways to gain influence on the future of the nation.

The only thing one can hope for is that the voices calling for religious and ethnical unity - becoming vocal in the first period after the fall of the regime - will be able to gain support. The tricky thing in this for the occupyers is that the majority of those voices at the same time focus on getting rid of the invaders as soon as possible.

I find no reason for not remaining as sceptical about the final outcome as I was before this unhealthy adventure of US colonialism started.
The unrealistic US boasting that this illegal invasion and occupation by non Muslims of a sovereign nation with a more then 97% Muslim population would bring the “whole region” in motion towards “democracy” is for crying your eyes out with laughter, if it wasn’t so dramatically sad seen the outraging cost of human lives and misery.

One remark on an early post of you in this thread, Colounsbury:
The introduction of some shari’a laws in a state’s constitution doesn’t ** necessary** imply bad divorce laws or that women’s rights in general are endangered.
You surely know that one state is not the other and that one madhab is not the other and that most countries of the MENA region have a constitution based on European examples with in several cases a very reduced influence of the shari’a. (The practice is an other case, but let’s be for once a bit over-optimistic for what considers the future of Iraq, no?).
And you surely know that the “secularism” of Turkey is about the most bad example of what “secularism” can mean for describing a working democracy. Which is one of the reasons why it completely failed to have influence on especially rural communities, with all the consequences.

Salaam. A.

[system]

Reconstruction:

One remark on an early post of you in this thread, Colounsbury:
The introduction of some shari’a laws in a state’s constitution doesn’t necessary imply bad divorce laws or that women’s rights in general are endangered.

It may not be necessary, however the reality is that most of those who advocate sharia law per se also have fairly retrograde attitudes towards women’s rights. I am well aware, of course, of the potential for more liberating readings, however that is not the reality.

You surely know that one state is not the other and that one madhab is not the other and that most countries of the MENA region have a constitution based on European examples with in several cases a very reduced influence of the shari’a. (The practice is an other case, but let’s be for once a bit over-optimistic for what considers the future of Iraq, no?).

Your paragraph is unclear here. However, as I understand you’re noting that there are several schools of jurisprudence, that application varies from country to country and that most countries in the region have constitutions in part modeled after European models, above all French. I am well aware of this, however in general the personal code is sharia’ – in the broadest sense – based for Muslims, in whatever aspects the local state felt appropriate. In general the personal code is conservative and more custom bound than the general Code Civil for non-personal matters, e.g. commercial law.

And you surely know that the “secularism” of Turkey is about the most bad example of what “secularism” can mean for describing a working democracy. Which is one of the reasons why it completely failed to have influence on especially rural communities, with all the consequences.

Secularism and working democracy are not synonyms and never have been. One may come without the other. As for the success or failure of Turkish secularism, well, it certainly is healthier than most any Arab secularism, and while the Turkish system is flawed, perhaps in the long turn fatally, the conservatism of rural areas has nothing to do with this per se, it is a typical sociological phenomena. The ability of the Turkish system to handle this fact in the long run is another matter.

Now this past weekend I had the occasion to speak with several of my contacts who were returning from Iraq. It was not encouraging.

First, one of my friends, perhaps friendly acquaintance is a more accurate term, has been evacuated to Germany after her convoy was attacked by guerrillas and her driver killed. It appears that Iraqi guerilla forces are developing new strategies in attacking convoys, making it harder for security to intercept (or requiring relaxation in the rules of engagement, implying more accidental civilian deaths) .

Speaking with a UN area official I know well, I came away with the impression that they feel that the situation is substantially degrading. The same official, who has accurately forecast developments in the past, noted to me that he felt that the situation in the South was becoming more and more problematic with heavily armed gangs essentially controlling the Basra region, and beginning to engage in kidnapping of businessmen and the like. Coalition forces and international forces have not yet become targets, but he noted a similar pattern had occurred in the North. He expressed concern for generalized resistance movements arising as well given a continually crappy security profile and substantial frustration on the part of the Iraqis.

Similar views I heard from an American major and regional specialist (Arabic) I know well, who indicated he felt the situation would get worse before it got better. When I expressed my interest in opening an office in Baghdad, the major suggested that would not be a prudent idea at present. Recounted a fine account of how he and his team move in Iraq – at full speed, damn the torpedos driving style to make it harder for the AKs and RPGs to lead them. Every day is like that, and every car that seems to overtake is considered potentially hostile. The major, who had also served in peace keeping operations was bitterly critical of Rumsfeld et als planning to date and expressed frustration that troops were not receiving peace keeping training, which tended to feed into further incident generation. (See e.g. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48589-2003Jul25.html )

Further to this, we have the recent news that the Bush Administration is considering trying to get James Baker on board for further upgrading of efforts, amid reports that Bremer was just in Washington lobbying for more support.

Again, my challenge to all the war hawks, is where is the reconstruction beef? I heard all these happy scenarios before the war, and during, on reconstruction. What we have seen is continued bumbling, slouching forward with greater concern for the day to day politics in the states and ideological purity (no internationalization except on our terms).

[system]

I also would like to draw attention to this fine article raised by Simon in this thread http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?postid=3759766#post3759766

Senator Lugar Denounces Reconstruction Efforts:
http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/206/nation/Senator_denounces_reconstruction_effortP.shtml

I highlight the following:
The gap between the cash needed to rebuild the country’s economy and revenues from oil, estimated at $14 billion in 2004, could be as high as $16 billion a year, Lugar said. However, he said that assistance from other countries and private investment could substantially reduce that figure.

Other analysts say it would be a mistake to expect oil revenues to cover much of the reconstruction. Edward C. Chow, a former Chevron Corp. executive serving as a visiting scholar at Carnegie, estimated that one-third of Iraq’s oil revenues need to be reinvested into an oil industry that has fallen into disrepair. The remaining two-thirds need to be spent on importing basic necessities.

‘‘In my mind, there is no oil money available to go into any sector but oil,’’ Chow said in an interview.

So far, the administration has declined to put a full price tag on the cost of the military operation, or the civilian costs of reconstruction. Already, original estimates of the military operation, at nearly $4 billion a month, are double projections made last spring."

I note that the highlighted analysis has been my own as well, fairly clear to anyone who looks closely, yet every CPA plan I see somehow wants to back Recon efforts with oil. Securitized oil receipts for this, for that. I think they’ve budgeted every oil dollar five times plus.

By the way, Mods, I believe it has come time to change title, if I may ask for “Iraq Reconstruction: Sloaching Towards Disaster On The Cheap.”

I no longer can maintain neutrality on this, disaster looms.