Iraq vs. Vietnam

McNamara has a documentary about his service in the government but mostly about Vietnam. I haven’t seen it but I have seen excerpts and 3 interviews of him and the maker of the documentary. McNamara now says we should have empathy for and understand the enemy to make better decisions. He finally understands what Sun Tzu said 2500 years ago.

“Know your enemy, know yourself and you will win 100 battles.” - Sun Tzu

The United States does not understand its own selfrighteous hypocracy. Double crossed the Shia in 1991 and got thusands of them killed and expect all of them to be loyal today. How many remember dead relatives? How many Arabs think about America being founded on the genocide of the Indians? Do Arabs watch John Wayne movies? I saw a program on THE HISTORY CHANNEL where an American sniper in Vietnam referred to being behind the lines as being in INDIAN COUNTRY.

Iraq and Vietnam are the same in that Americans assume they know best and don’t try to understand the people they are dealing with. Guess what? Unpredictable thing happen. Surprise, surprise.

I don’t recall hearing about suicide bombers in Vietnam tho.

Dal Timgar

Didn’t you watch Apocalypse Now?

I was in high school in the late 60’s. Saw the news about Vietnam every night. I was in the first draft lottery. #348 I have only seen pieces while channel surfing of most Vietnam movies. I read books about it.

Did you know that the US was allies with Ho Chi Mihn during WWII. We supplied his resistance to the Japanese during the war. Did we expect them to welcome the French back with open arms after fighting Japanese for years? Then we gave economic support to the French because he was a commie.

RIDICULOUS!!!

Dal Timgar

mainly on small arms sourced from former Iraqi army stocks, and there seems little or no sign that these can or will be replenished from bordering countries

don’t forget the vast pipeline that runs through the Iraqi “Civil Defense” Corps, courtesy of your friendly pentagon.

The Jaish’i-mahdi is sporting kevlar vests with “made in USA” on the label, and driving humbees we sent to the Iraqaui Police Force

There is an important dimension in which Iraq and Vietnam are quite different.

Iraq is naked aggression, cloaked in moral platitudes that are trotted out with complete conscious and cynical dishonesty. It was really undertaken because the neos were feeling “punked”, and needed to beat someone up.

Vietnam had at least the plausible elements of some geopolitical overview, a government in place (albeit the heir of a colonial regime) with at least half-assed legitimacy to ask us for help, and, most importantly for the moral evaluation, a slow and tortured escalation that at least gave some nod towards the concept of proportionality, if only in the sense that our involvement was always quasi-reluctant.

Compared to the crusading zeal in Iraq, Vietnam was a model of introspection.

Anyone else think he’s talking about Japan in the 40s?

Well, it’s not even second best to a cite.
But beggars cannot be choosers, now can we?
At least it’s a step above the “common sense” dodge.

Let’s see here…

No, the number’s been recently raised.

To start, primarily, fundamentally, crucially, and elementally, there’re a profound differences between “crush[ing] any pathetic, unorganized army of a few thousand civilians” and maintaining control in a “stability operation.”
If there’re pathetic, unorganized armies of civilians springing into existence and you have to “quell uprisings,” then you’re not maintaining control. (Except maybe in some Darth Vader/ Draconian sense.)

How do you reconcile Gen Shinseki’s assessment, (pre-war, he said we’d need more troops than we were taking) about troop level w/ your personal assessment?

How do you reconcile reports such as this one that,
“The existing 125,000 troop-level (currently at 135,000 because of replacements) is considered inadequate by the generals
with your personal assessment?

What about this study from Rand Corp that ironically calls for the same 500,000 peace keepers? How do you reconcile this additional expert assessment with your personal one?

**Burden of Victory The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations

Although numbers alone do not constitute a security strategy, successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants.
The population of Iraq today is nearly 25 million. That population would require 500,000 foreign troops on the ground to meet a standard of 20 troops per thousand residents.**

So, you’re saying that we’re keeping troops over there after their scheduled tour of duty has expired, even after their enlistments have expired, (miltary advocacy groups have taken to calling the stop-loss orders a backdoor draft), and despite the fact that their replacements have arrived, but we’re not doing so because the brass want more boots on the ground?

Why should I, (or you for that matter), value your “logic” more highly than the assessments experts in the feild?

The people like Kennedy who are trying to draw an analogy to Vietnam aren’t trying to make obscure points about tactical similarities or differences - they are trying to claim that Iraq is a ‘quagmire’ like Vietnam - one which will go on forever, consume tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers, and be unwinnable.

So when making the comparison, let’s look at the major reasons why the U.S. ‘failed’ in Vietnam, and why that won’t happen in Iraq.

First, the Vietnam was was fought under strict rules of engagement that severely hampered the U.S.'s ability to fight.

Second, South Vietnam was under assault from a huge army in North Vietnam, which the U.S. was not really able to go after in a major way for political reasons.

Third, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong were heavily supported by China and the Soviet Union. This, coupled with the U.S.'s strategic inability to occupy North Vietnam due to risks of drawing superpowers into the conflict, meant that the U.S. was fighting a war of attrition against an enemy with an almost limitless resupply capability.

The goals of the Vietnam war were different. The U.S. was not trying to destroy an army and pacify a country - it was essentially engaged in a battle of wills against a determined enemy to see who would quit first.

Vietnam was fought in mountainous and jungle terrain which is the natural fighting ground of guerillas, and which negated much of U.S. air power.

If the Soviet Union and China had not been in the picture, the U.S. could simply have bombed the industrial infrastructure of North Vietnam, invaded, destroyed the North Vietnamese army, and South Vietnam would have survived.

If you read about the Vietnam war, what strikes you is that it was fought almost as if the U.S. didn’t want to win it. For example, the Ho Chi Minh trail, which was a primary enemy resupply conduit, was largely off limits to strategic bombing. Operation “Rolling Thunder” did bomb one of the passes leading into the trail, but the purpose was not to destroy the supply lines, but to put pressure on North Vietnam to come to the negotiating table. This theme persisted throughout the Vietnam war - military power used as a negotiating tactic rather than to achieve a military outcome. People like Curtis Lemay were quite upset about this, because they believed that once you go to war you fight to win, and he wanted to bomb all the entry points to the trail, turn the trail itself into a free-fire zone, and bomb the North Vietnamese infrastructure.

This politicization of military power was the prime motivator behind the 'Powell Doctrine", which the U.S. operates under now, which essentially says that you do not go to war unless A) you are willing to do whatever it takes to win it, and B) you have an exit strategy. That doctrine came right out of Powell’s experience in Vietnam.

And consider the quality of the average soldier at the time. Vietnam was fought by a conscript army that didn’t really want to be there. In Iraq, the armed forces are comprised of an all volunteer professional force with high morale and unsurpassed capability.

Look at the difference in technology - There were no ‘smart bombs’ in Vietnam. The only way to hit strategic targets from high altitude was to carpet bomb it. Urban warfare was immensely destructive.

Now look at today. Iraq is a desert - there is nowhere for Guerillas to hide other than within the population in the cities. There is no superpower supplying them. The lessons of Vietnam HAVE been learned, and as a result ground commanders are given wide lattitude in how and where to engage the enemy. Precision bombing, satellite imagery, unmanned drones, and the like give the U.S. military huge advantages, even in urban conflict. Today, advances in sensor technology and smart weapons allows air power to be used in urban warfare by striking precisely on targets illuminated by lasers from ground forces, minimalizing collateral damage.

Look at the war in Fallujah so far. Less than ten U.S. soldiers killed so far (I think the number is five or six), vs at least 450 dead insurgents. They don’t have a chance. And they can’t sneak out of the city, and they can’t sneak in supplies and ammunition. The U.S. military totally controls the area around the city, and can maintain that control indefinitely.

So almost none of the things that caused the Vietnam war to be a failure exist in Iraq. The biggest being that Vietnam cost 58,000 American lives, and the toll after a year in Iraq is just over 600. Huge difference. In WWII the U.S. lost 12,000 soldiers just taking the island of Okinawa. The total loss of soldiers so far in Iraq was lost about every six days in WWII. So on a historical scale, the Iraq war is a tiny conflict. It’s clearly within the U.S.'s capability to do whatever it takes to win.

Now, that’s not to say there aren’t other difficulties in winning in Iraq - there are plenty. The point is that the Vietnam analogy is pointless and wrong, and is only being employed as a scare tactic.

Which brings us to the only real valid comparison between the two - the U.S. lost in Vietnam in part because the media constantly mischaracterized the nature of the war, and because opponents at home sapped the will of the country. Take the Tet Offensive - it was a massive military defeat for the Viet Cong - they essentially ceased to exist as a fighting force after that. The American military mopped the floor with them. But the media portrayed it has a victory for the Viet Cong, and as a defeat for the Americans.

The same thing could easily happen in Iraq. Take the current uprising - it’s not a widespread Shiite uprising - it’s a band of radicals with an illegitimate ‘cleric’ as a leader, who has cast his lot in with various terrorist factions and ex-Saddamites. The U.S. military is going to crush them like bugs. They will heavily lose every battle they fight, and they will continue to be destroyed until they stop fighting or there are none left. But the media may wind up portraying it as a general uprising, and show every civilian casualty, the execution of every hostage (I believe there will be some), and in the end it could wind up as a ‘loss’ for the U.S.

The main lessons of Vietnam are being used by the enemy. They are going to fight this war in the media. In that sense, a better analogy is the Palestinian intifada. They know they can’t win against U.S. forces, so they are going to make this war as grotesque as possible, hoping that the American media’s sensational reporting causes the population to lose its stomach for the conflict. Hence the hostages, the bodies hanging from bridges, etc.

Comments like Kennedy’s are exactly the kinds of responses they are looking for, and comments like that from high-ranking lawmakers are simply going to embolden them and encourage them to do even more despicable acts. This is why Colin Powell broke his policy of not getting into political commentary and basically told Kennedy to shut his mouth. His comment was irresponsible.

Are these the same expert generals who thought it would be a good idea to piss off the Shiites? I dunno, I guess my “logic” was ultimately trumped by their “expertise” in that case, since it has all worked out so peachy keen.

Were these the same expert generals who believed that they would be down to 30,000 troops in Iraq by last November?

The same expert generals who declared Iraq secure last year?

The same expert leaders who thought that once we overthrew Saddam, the people would happily welcome us?

Is this the same Rand Corp that said we’d need 500,000 troops for Kosovo? They seem to like that number. (Granted, the Kosovo operation was never completed.)

I don’t recall a time when the military WASN’T calling for 500,000 troops to clean a latrine, so forgive me for being dubious when they state that they need more “boots on the ground.”

That’s my belief, I’m sticking to it until I see some evidence for something else. It’s not that I don’t trust the government… … yes, it is. Like I’m going to believe anything the MILITARY, of all people, says to me. The military ranks are chop full of infighting morons who masturbate over their grand schemes and sink billions of dollars into outdated programs because they refuse to adapt to a changing world. The military, that is in charge of the mess in Iraq? The military, that is so perfect in its capabilities that it clusterfucked Afghanistan while magically letting most of Al Qaeda AND the Taliban slip away, leaving a country 70% in control of warlords? The same military that it thought it would be a good idea to invade Afghanistan and arrest Osama in the '90s without enough evidence to convict him? The same military that thought the Bradley, Crusader, Commanche, and Stryker programs were genius ideas? The same military who said that the future of warfare was in the sky? The same military that decided that a missile defense shield was the most important thing to spend money on? The same military that thought the Office of Strategic Influence was a brilliant concept?*

The only branch of the US government that I dislike and distrust more than the military is those genocidal (and apparently inept) maniacs at the CIA - and I’m not even a conspiracy theorist.

  • Note that I am not implicating the soldiers themselves of doing bad things (though they do more than we like to admit), I’m talking about their leaders.

Yep. I think it has to do with the fact that they aren’t getting new recruits, and are facing a long term operation. If they start letting all the brave chaps who volunteered after 9/11 out, they’re going to be facing a mighty painful shortage of individuals.

Maybe I’m wrong. Maybe part of it is that they do think they need more people. shrugs

In any case, comparing Iraq to Vietnam literally is stupid.

Didn’t you just contradict yourself?

Comments like Kennedy’s are exactly the kinds of responses they are looking for, and comments like that from high-ranking lawmakers are simply going to embolden them and encourage them to do even more despicable acts. This is why Colin Powell broke his policy of not getting into political commentary and basically told Kennedy to shut his mouth. His comment was irresponsible.
Right. That’s what they need to get pissed. Because collateral damage ( six year old with both arms blown off), is just not enough to embolden them.

These are all from civilian, political appointees to the Pentagon, not generals.

I’ve never this bneing said, so I cannot tell you. Perhaps if you provided a citation, I could render a more informed judgement.

Rand consults for the Pentagon regularly.

Here’s there’s some conflating of civilian, political appointees to the Pentagon with professional military personel.

Historically, the State Dept has been in charge of things like the Marshall Plan and other foreign aid/ reconstruction projects. For some reason, the Pentagon was put in charge of Iraq reconstruction even after State spent considerable time and effort to prepare for it. Interestingly enough, State’s preparations were initially discarded and the preparers shunned by i]civilian, political appointees* to the Pentagon, despite requests from CPA authorities for the assistance of some of the preparers.

Some key civilian, political appointees to the Pentagon have made some egregiously wrong decisiosn in this matter in spite of the assessments of the pros.

I think that the comparison is most at home when one considers the domestic aspects rather than the military ones.

There’s no reason to assume that the two wars actually equal one another. However, there’re instances where there’re similarities that can be used for the purposes of furthering a discussion.

What lessons from Viet Nam are we using?

No. Making a generalization - US soldiers do horrible things - is quite different from saying, “US soldiers do horrible things more often than we like to think”

If you want a cite, I can point to the high instances of rape and abuse around military bases overseas (read up on Okinawa) and against female members of the military - and that is just one area. I won’t even bring up the atrocities that we’ve done, if that makes you sleep better at night.

And the generals just smiled and nodded? How come they have so much ability to call for more troops, but so little to say, “um, hey, that’s stupid.”?

I looked through the resource, and it defines 500,000 troops for long-term occupation. It is also secondary, so I’m looking for a primary.

Yes, they do. I’m sure they generally do a good job of it, too, but as I said, the military isn’t the sharpest knife in the drawer.

So, Generals aren’t in charge of their programs?

shrugs It still translates to a military that frequently appears inept and wrong - and you can’t say that the expert generals have absolutely no say in what happens to their forces.

I don’t. No draft, no massive opposition, no civil and social unrest and street demonstrations, much shorter term. In fact, domestic life is hardly affected at all, aside from the economic effects and a bunch of people sitting around arguing about it on message boards. I visited my old fraternity today - in Berkeley, nonetheless - and did a impromptu poll. Most of the people were vaguely against the war, but did not feel that it affected their lives - and these are smart, motivated, and up to date people. I called my mom and talked about it, and she barely knew anything about the situation. I would hardly compare the domestic aspects between Vietnam and Iraq.

The only similarity is that both involved sloppy intervention into foreign civil matters that can be loosely defined as a “quagmire.” Any comparison beyond that is stretching it (unless you want to count “the enemy had AK-47s” in both as concrete correlation).

More “literally stupid” comparisons. This time from Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the run-up to the Iraq war, and Maj. Gen. William Nash, a commander in the Persian Gulf War and in Bosnia.
Generals’ Assessment
Retired Generals Liken War in Iraq to Vietnam

April 7 [2004]

Peter Jennings: One of the things the public doesn’t get is that the U.S., with the largest, most potent military force in the world, continues to be killed almost at will.

Nash: That’s true because they are in an environment that is not war. It is an insurgency against a public security mission that the soldiers are trying to perform for the people of Iraq. So they are not able to engage regular military forces using the strengths that we have to attack their weaknesses.

Peter Jennings: Is it intelligence that drives your operations in a situation like Iraq? And does that sound like Vietnam?

Nash: It does sound like Vietnam. It sounds like a classic case of fighting an insurgency where you are behind the power curve with respect to information because it’s mostly human intel, not electronic fact. It’s impossible to have the necessary situational awareness of the environment as you conduct operations.

Peter Jennings: Does this resemble, Gen. Newbold, Vietnam in any way?

Newbold: It does because it’s an insurgency. It does because so much of the fight is determined by means other than military means. They continue to insist it’s not [based on] how many troops they have [or] the types of forces, but it’s a large country and very difficult to control.

vs

Because there’re similarities to and differences from the two foreign policy ventures, (Iraq and Viet Nam), I’m sure that these generals could also come up with a lengthy list of ways that Iraq is signifigantly unlike Viet Nam if you asked them to.
Even though, no doubt, these generals could do so, the generals chose to specifically point out the “insurgency” as a key similarity between Viet Nam and Iraq.

Unless you have some pretty substantial points you’re about to rebut with, the “counter-insurgent security occupation” is a similarity between Iraq and Viet Nam.

It’d be better if some one with more military background, (I have none), answered this one. However, IIRC, in part, the issues at hand involve civilian control of the military and the additional set of laws one must abide by when one is a member of the armed forces. While I suspect that general speak freely to the civilians when necessary, I don’t think that generals may call press conferences to discuss their grievances with their civilian bosses.
one by one:

I’m not sure who “thought it would be a good idea to piss off the Shiites,” or what event your referring to.

IIRC, the “down to 30,000 troops” bit is from an unamed source in the Pentagon quoted in WaPo. Could be civilian or may be military. It’s more characteristic for the civilian side of the Pentagon to leak things to the press.

As to who “declared Iraq secure last year,” I’m not entirely certain what you’re talking about. The closest I can think of is when GWB said that “Major combat operations” were over.
If you could clarify the incident your talking about I would give you a more appropriate response.

The “hugs and flowers” Iraqi reception committee idea came from members of the Defense Policy Advisory Board and Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. IIRC, Ken Adelman (sp?), of the DPAB is the guy who said “cakewalk.”

one by one:

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III is the Presidential Envoy to Iraq.
civie

civie decisions transferred resources from Afghanistan to Iraq.
The military doesn’t pick the wars it fights. The civilian side does that.

Depending on what you mean here, as far as “good idea” as a policy measure, then I’d have to say no. The professional military doesn’t decide what is a “good idea” policywise. If policy makers suggested a plan to invade and arrest, the military would render their assessments of costs and consequences and the civilian leadership would decide whether the idea was worth it’s costs and consequences.

These’re all also funding decisions, policy decisions. The civilian side sets the policy on budget priorities.

They do the best they can with what they have… as always. Their options can be strictly limited by civilian overseers.

This really doesn’t do much in the way of rebutting the idea that generals qualify as experts on warfare.

Unless you have some pretty substantial points you’re about to rebut with, the opinions of US generals, about US military matters, still seem have signifigantly more weight than can be displaced by Zagadka’s aspersions on select decisions of the civilian leadership.

Again, just because there are differences between the two situations doesn’t mean that there’re not also similarities.
I was referring to the allegations of crimes in high places and the similarities between the Gulf of Tonkin and the Iraq WMD-> UbL story. Both turned out to be substantially different than they were initially presented to the public and Congress.
However, in reference to what you brought up, people had years of the Viet Nam war. We’ve just had our first.
Thanks for your anecdotes. They are touching, but unecessary.

There’s only one, single, solitary, (yet vague), reasonably noted similarity between Iraq and Viet Nam?
Are you sure only one?

Vietnam was a security operation? Oh, right, it was a “police operation.” Maybe, in loose terms - but the kind of insurgencyu that is happening in Iraq and that in Vietnam is still a different beast. The Viet Cong was a much more organized and methodical enemy - they were a national government’s army with more structure and operative planning. The Iraqi insurgence is rather small private armies. The similarities are that they use guerrilla tactics, which can be said of almost any modern force (exceptions would be an older-styled military like the Iraqi military of 1991, which did resort to some guerrilla tactics anyway), which makes any modern war a “counter-insurgent security occupation.”

This general seems surprised that the situation turned into a security operation:

Personally, I would have expected that to happen - but apparently, I don’t know anything compared to the expert generals. :-p

Have you read the news in the past week?

shrugs Military is military. if the generals let horrible estimates like that get by, they deserve taking the rap. I would resign in disgrace.

So you’re saying that the US military went into Iraq prepared for an extended guerrilla campaign against insurgent forces?

I again ask the question: If the expert generals don’t decide or influence policy at all, how is it that they are demanding more troops?

It still failed in its goal to caputre Osama, eradicate the Taliban, and dismantle Al Qaeda.

Half of the bitching done by Republicans is that the military forces that were specially trained and funded for this operation were upset with the Clinton administration that he decided to use a cruise missile attack instead of the units.

Please don’t pretend like the military is an impartial tool to be used.

And the poor helpless expert generals have to follow along completely, having no imput in the process. Gotcha.

Nope, I’m more than happy to accept your theory that the expert generals are hapless tools with no will or opinions of their own, nor an ability to express their desires, fears, considerations, or considerable opinion, to be used entirely as the fist of the civilians.

Is that about right?

OK, good. In that case, the expert generals have no say in who adds troops where. That would be, of course, in the realm of the civilians in the Pentagon.

I don’t even remember why we are going in circles about this. I think it was something to do with the OP saying something vaguely about troop increases?

Yep, they both involve people shooting at people. And airstrikes. Definitely air strikes.

Oh, I guess that means that the war in Iraq is just like the Spanish-America War… not to mention, well, every other war, including the psuedo-war with France in 1799. OK, except maybe the Civil War.

Thanks for your broad and sweeping (and incorrect) generalizations about the social climate in the United States. I thought it would help by explaining that I’ve talked to people who, amazingly enough, proclaimed that the war is not on a level of social rebellion on the level of Vietnam.

No, like I said, you are free to make the assertion that it is similar in that we are, indeed, fighting someone, that th enemy, as stressed in the OP, uses AK-47s, and that we are using aerial bombardment. I’m sure there is also a soldier named “Tim” in each conflict.

In short, other than the fact that they are both guerrilla wars fought by the United States in foreign countries that we do not understand the culture and intent of, there isn’t much between the two that is directly comparable in any relevance.

One could go to lengths to make comparisons between Korea and Vietnam, as well. They were fought differently, but the reasoning, politics, and structure behind them is more similar.

In what way?

There’s ample evidence that most people, (outside key figures in the Pentagon’s civilian command structure) expected it too.

Shutting the newspaper down, etc was Bremer’s call.
Bremer is a civilian. He is not a member of the military.

Still does nothing to rebut the idea that American generals are experts when it comes to issues of American warfare.

Our armed forces are prepared for even worse.

“[G]enerals don’t decide or influence policy at all,” is not something that I’ve said.
You referred to specific incidences.
I also referred to these same specific incidences.
You’re making a generalization based on an inference that has not been implied.

Still does nothing to rebut the idea that American generals are experts when it comes to issues of American warfare.

Oh, so, you mean that the Republicans “thought it would be a good idea to invade Afghanistan and arrest Osama in the '90s without enough evidence to convict him,” not the military.

You referred to specific incidences.
I also referred to these same specific incidences.
You’re making a generalization based on an inference that has not been implied.

This is the similar to those other things I didn’t say.
You referred to specific incidences.
I also referred to these same specific incidences.
You’re making a generalization based on an inference that has not been implied.

No, it’s not about right.
You referred to specific incidences.
I also referred to these same specific incidences.
You’re making a generalization based on an inference that has not been implied.

I was enjoying our dialogue, but your tone’s starting to come across as sorta snipish.

I’ll just talk to you later.

… This comparison is absurdly stupid, I’m sorry. Where are the two nuclear-armed world powers supplying an opposing Iraqi state with arms, equipment, training and food? How can people not realize that?

The conversation would be better served if we were to discuss specific instances of comparison rather than the broad category of comparison in general.
To note that two things have similar attributes is not equivalent to saying that the two things are the same thing.

Obviously, you can compare just about any two things in the universe.
Despite the phrasing of the saw, there are some meangingful comparisons of apples to oranges.

All that’s really at issue’s the value of a comparison.
Does a particular comparison communicate the idea that the author intends?
That’s the way to judge comparisons between the US’s recent Iraq experience and the US’s former experience in Viet Nam.

There’re are useful comparisons and useful contrasts to be made between the two experiences.
Not all comparisons and not all contrasts that’re made are useful.
Some are useful, some aren’t.