Nothing. I doubt they would need a sub. As far as I know, the only ships carrying armed guards are in locations with frequent piracy. The crew of one of those tankers would not be prepared if they were ambushed by an assault team of terrorists in some other location.
They would just need to board the tanker somehow and threaten the crew with assault rifles. The boarding part might be tricky - team terrorist would probably have a much easier time if they had a helicopter instead of a speedboat.
I guess they’d turn the oil tanker into a kamikaze boat headed for a major port, loaded with with explosives to ignite the oil on a dead man’s switch?
The interesting bit is that assuming the proper authorities were alerted, how would they stop the moving ship? If they couldn’t board the ship and retake control, using weapons to sink it would just cause a gigantic oil spill.
I had no idea the North Koreans had any Golfs, but then most of my knowledge of North Korea comes from wikipedia, and their article on the North Korean navy is pretty out-of-date. That said, the Golfs were eliminated by the Soviets (yes, pre-Russia, in 1990) as obsolete a quarter of a century ago. I have trouble imagining them surviving in a 21st century combat zone - they might survive for some sort of peacetime surprise attack, if you believe they’re seaworthy.
In that sort of scenario, assuming wikipedia is correct about the Golf’s 70 day endurance, a hypothetical North Korean Golf could cover the 4500 sea miles from NK to Seattle, WA in about three weeks, but getting to the US East Coast is beyond its endurance unless it can somehow pass through Panama (17000 sea miles from Hungnam to Miami via the Straits of Magellan, about 71 days, exceeding the estimated endurance.)
Such a thing is conceivable, and might make good fodder for a techno-thriller, keeping in mind the caveat that techno-thrillers are often more audacious in their villains plans than reality is.
This is important to keep in mind, the logistics of supporting a sub fleet mean that a poor nation like North Korea, even if it has 70 submarines, can’t afford to keep even half of them at sea at a time, fuel and maintenance are still very expensive and the more time spent at sea, the better trained and prepared a submarine crew would be for a real war. North Korean submarines are probably not completely unprepared for war, but definitely have a lot less sea time than their US counterparts.
It could be - the technical problem is control of the drones. Air permits easy use of radio transmissions, allowing real-time control of the flight of drones halfway around the world. Remotely-operated submarines, however, are usually controlled via cable from a surface ship or another submarine because of the limited ability of radio signals to penetrate water without distortion or loss of information, methods such as using Ultra-Low Frequency or Extremely Low Frequency radio waves or lasers or acoustic communications are needed to transmit information to submerged vessels, making real-time control of a submarine drone a bigger problem than real-time control of an aerial drone.
That said, the US Navy thinks it’s close to cracking the problem of either controlled the drone from afar or equipping it with sufficient artificial intelligence for autonomous operation:
This is true - it would be a much safer, more conservative way for an adversary to strike the kind of victory SenorBeef talks about through laying mines than through launching missiles or torpedoes.
The Soviets had a lot more money and resources to throw at their submarine force than the Iranians and the North Koreans do. It’s not that Iran or North Korea choose to leave most of their submarines in port most of the time, it’s that they might not have the fuel, money, spare parts, provisions, reliable crew time, to do otherwise with their submarines.
I dunno - I’d guess the only way a terrorist group controls a sub is through the patronage of a sympathetic nation-state - where do you dock a submarine so that no one notices? Is it really easy to obtain torpedoes or underwater versions of anti-ship missiles on the black market?
Is it worthwhile to try to take on the challenge of taking over an existing equipped sub owned by a nation-state versus adopting a less expensive and risky form of attack?
I’d think it’d be easier to do as Habeed says and attack the VLCC/Tanker directly.
Another advantage to minelaying is “plausible deniability.” As long as you don’t use mines with “If found, return to <your country>,” you can just say “gosh, I don’t know how those got there.” Even if the superpower knows you did it, you can at least extract propaganda value out of international doubt/uncertainty.
Prop foulers, as featured in the Whale Wars TV docudrama. basically lines or nets designed to be laid across a ship’s path, that entangle propellers. It’s hard to imagine that the authorities wouldn’t board the ship with special forces…but if they needed to stop the ship from suiciding in a major city without blowing it up, they’d definitely at least foul the props.
Yes. The first militarily practical submarine, the Holland boat, was basically an improved version of the Fenian Ram, expressly an asymmetric warfare weapon (although the term was not then in use).
Its inventor, John Philip Holland, was at one point sympathetic to the Fenians, a small group of terrorists/resistance/freedom fighters…take your pick, facing the superpower of the day (Great Britain).
The carriers do not carry anti-torpedo weapons because their protective fleet do instead. Carriers do not act alone. Sneaking a sub inside the protective circle of cruisers, destroyers, frigates and subs would be quite hard. Shooting from outside would give the ships and potentially aircraft a strong chance to defend the carrier.
The carrier strike group is designed to protect the carrier. All lesser ships are even considered potentially sacrificial.
No, nobody has anti-torpedo weapons. The U.S. Navy never developed them. There are various forms of distraction, but if the torpedo isn’t fooled, they have no way of stopping it from hitting a ship.
Although you’re right in a technical sense, there have been some ad-hoc countermeasures. In World War II, aircraft strafed and exploded torpedoes headed toward ships, and there’s one case at least of suicide-diving onto an approaching torpedo.
That analysis kind of breaks down in the Pacific in WWII, when the US submarine fleet had a fairly major impact on Japanese supply lines. The U.S. was larger and wealthier than Japan by pretty much any measure.
Well, yeah, but one could argue that Japanese land-based airpower prevented the US from operating significant surface forces in Japanese-controlled areas until very late in the war. Carrier task groups could enter such areas, but were too economically valuable to risk for that mission and too strategically valuable to spend time on station looking for shipping traffic.
So in a narrow sense, the US was conducting a sort of localized:o asymmetrical warfare around Japan until late in the war.
That’s true, and also simply because the US outproduced and outmanned Japan by such a significant margin, they didn’t have to choose one naval strategy - they could choose them all simultaneously.
You’re right - but a number of factors contributed to the US emphasis on its submarine campaign in the Pacific during World War II (as Sailboat and SenorBeef have mentioned) including:
The surprise attack on the US battleships at Pearl Harbor, sinking, damaging and disabling many components of the US surface fleet that would have fought a campaign against Imperial Japan if all had gone according to American plans for such a war. If I remember correctly, prior to Pearl Harbor, the US fleet had parity in the Pacific with Japanese battleships in a numerical sense, with additional reserves in the form of battleships stationed in the Atlantic. Pearl Harbor and the two-Ocean war changed that.
The Germany First strategy. Although the US had vastly more resources than the Japanese, the US committed to victory over Germany first diplomatically with its British and Russian allies. In fact, lots of resources went to the Pacific early in the war, even more than to Europe for some periods of time, but the US did not make destroying the Japanese fleet its highest priority immediately.
The Japanese dominance of island bases and the air west of Midway. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Guam and Wake fell, the air power of the US in the Philippines was destroyed early in the war, and the Japanese already controlled air bases in the Marianas and Gilberts. Given the examples of Pearl Harbor and the destruction of Force Z, bringing most of the US surface fleet into the battle area over Japanese convoy routes was (rightly) seen as extremely risky, so major surface actions would have to wait for the Guadacanal campaign.
For these reasons, the US used cheap submarines as a form of asymmetric warfare in the Pacific on the offensive for the first part of the war, until the more expensive battleships and carriers could be repaired, replaced, or built to give the US Navy parity or superiority over the IJN. After the initial early war period, the US pursued multiple naval strategies, including a submarine campaign (it was working, why quit it?) and island hopping in the Central Pacific, and support of land campaigns on New Guinea in the South Pacific.
True, not all uses of submarines in warfare are asymmetric (esp. the Falklands War comes to mind,) and your criticism is fair, but many are.
