I wonder if there is a correlation between Nietzsche/Randist “objectivism” and purpose of self, and the thought process behind, “my vote won’t change the outcome, therefore it is not worth voting”
Just to be clear, I’m not saying it’s irrational to vote. The “paradox of voting” does not mean
it just means that (if people are mostly rational) they’re doing it for reasons other than to try to change the outcome of the election for their own selfish or altruistic interests.
In the case of AHunter3’s fishing trip, of course, the numbers are small enough to make voting rational if you care much at all. The argument is all about large numbers (I posted a formula in the thread I mentioned yesterday - plug in some numbers if you like).
Both InvidiousCourgette and erislover talk about duty - although maybe IC is getting towards shows of duty as part of the story. I was impressed that erislover managed to avoid mentioning the name Kant in his post - that took some doing. 
I don’t think so. It just means that if everyone only had instrumental reasons for voting, the outcome would be confusing and suck. There are lots of cases where people doing rational things lead to bad collective outcomes.
But I do agree that the Kantian question “What if everyone did that?” has a powerful hold on the mind. My guess is that people do vote out of duty and they vote for what they think is right - but that what people think is right is influenced by self-interest (broadly defined) through cognitive dissonance reduction.
Heh, I didn’t even notice the Kantian overtones there. Yikes!
hawthorne, I was less focusing on the duty aspect and more on the aspect that a criterion for rationality should be universally applicable–that there is no reason, in principle, that we can’t all be rational. The problem with statistical insignificance is that it is not universally applicable. If everyone tried to follow it, it would cease being rational. You suggest that this is normal, that purely rational behavior on the part of all parties can indeed lead to bad outcomes (likely analogous to pure market failures). But I think you’re switching things around. In one case, people acting rationally, however they do that and it needn’t be equivalent criteria, affect a poor general outcome–but they never stop acting rationally in doing so. In this case, we are in fact determining what is rational in the first place, and leaving it up to people to act rationally or not (but I will assume that, given a compelling enough rationale, all people will act rationally). As people start to act rationally (if this is the criterion), eventually the criterion fails or changes.
You stress, it just means that (if people are mostly rational) they’re doing it for reasons other than to try to change the outcome of the election for their own selfish or altruistic interests. I’m not convinced this is the case. I have a paper at home (so I can’t quote it here at work) that details three kinds of voting behaviors, one of which is sincere voting, or voting one’s conscience–a person votes for the candidate they feel will do the best job based only on their preferences and not on any information about the election. Other voting would be an attempt to vote based on information one obtains, either about the popularity of a figure or actual votes cast or whatever private information one could obtain. This latter voting is what interests me here. The goal, per se, is not to purely align one’s vote with one’s ideals, but rather to tilt the outcome in one’s direction, given what information is available. The classic example being whether one should vote for Gore or Nader in the 2000 election. The sincere voter might well vote for Nader, but another voter might use the information available to determine that Nader is not a viable candidate, and so a vote for Nader will not affect the election in one’s favor. Thus, the voter would align with a candidate more likely to win, like Gore.
The question, I think, that needs to be asked of your criterion is, “How do I know if I am acting rationally by not voting?” In fact, the more general question is, how can any group of n people know whether or not they should vote, if they want to act rationally? As far as I can tell, they cannot know in advance of the election results, because in any election where we have voter turnout similar to what America faces every four years, there is always some number of voters (say, Gore supporters) N that, if they voted, would make a difference. It is rational for these people to vote by your criterion.
We do not escape the problem by suggesting that any individual i in N doesn’t know that the other N-1 people are voting, and so must still come to the same “no vote” rational decision, because if we are to ignore the N-1 potential voters, then we should also be able to discount all voters in general, about which we have the same information, in which case it would still make sense to vote. In principle, if we knew that we were a member of the N people that would swing an election in our favor (however we determine “our favor”), then we should vote in order to achieve our ends. Then the question is: how do I determine if I am a member of N? As far as I can tell, one cannot determine this. The counter question, then, is, “How can I determine if I am not a member of N?” As far as I can tell, this cannot be answered, either. Because of this, it remains my contention that this criterion is not a “good” one.
Your post in the other thread mentions,
Also the formula:
P = 3e[sup]-2(N-1)(p-1/2)[sup]2[/sup][/sup] / 2 [2[symbol]p/symbol][sup]1/2[/sup]
Again, there is no way I intend to question the validity of this formual, only its doman. From what I can tell, every single voter can apply this formula to their own decision to vote, come up empty, and not vote–except that one guy who thinks math is bullshit and votes and single-handedly decides the election, even though the argument clearly applied to him, as well. The problem here remains, for me, that there is no way to tell when to apply this formula and when not to for any particular voter. As such, it should apply to all voters, where we encounter the situation just described.
The question I ask above is, “How do I know if I am acting rationally by not voting?” Apparently, by plugging numbers in this formula, N for the number of voters, and [symbol]p[/symbol] for the expected proportion of votes one’s candidate will get. Which voters can actually answer this question, using your criteria, assuming all potential voters wish to act rationally?
Sorry, don’t know how that slipped in there:
There’s more meat in that than I can deal with at this hour, but some preliminary comments:
I disagree, but so what?
Kind of. How do people come up with ‘p’? Clearly a lot of people are going to be voting. I don’t think it’s plausible for someone who is deciding how/ whether to vote considering that they will be anything like the only voter.
Again, let me stress I don’t think this is how people behave. It doesn’t make sense. It could not possibly account for past behaviour. Something else is going on. All this stuff is saying is that people don’t vote as an investment.
This is a more sophisticated question than the stuff I’ve been talking about allows*. The instrumentally rational voter in my story takes the world (including the opaque behavior of other voters) as given and applies his/her known ordering of outcomes to the options and… decides not to vote (or indeed to be informed). These questions of self-knowledge and reflection don’t figure.
I’m looking forward to continuing this discussion. It’s interesting, it’s important, and I don’t know how it goes.
*[sub]And that’s the point of it: people don’t vote for the bundle of policy outcomes they prefer, something rather complicated is going on.[/sub]
Just thought I’d add my great insight here.
I basically agree with Hawthorne, I think it was.
One vote doesn’t decide elections, so in a sense, it is pointless to vote.
“But what if everyone felt that way?” Well, I’m not everyone, I’m one person. If enough peole felt as I do, it might swing an election, but since I’m not everyone and have no control over those other people, me deciding, on my own, and holding all other variables constant, will not affect the election one iota. Florida was decided by 900 or however many votes…and if I’m in Florida and I didn’t vote (and I’m a Gore supporter) well then it would have been decided by 899 if I had voted, so who cares?
Is it “selfish”? Not really, since the outcome won’t depend on my vote, why is my duty to vote? I guess you could say that by propagating these ideas of “your vote doesn’t count” you could be causing people to lose interest in politics in general, and that could be a bad thing. That makes some sense.
So why vote? For the psychological fun of it, I guess. It feels good to vote for your guy or vote against the other guy. It makes you feel “heard”. And you are “heard”. Your vote won’t be decisive, but you have been “heard”.
I’m torn, should I reply now and start a side discussion, or wait for the full reply and tackle it all at once? … well, I’ll say this:
Well, so it might be important in answering the question, “Is it rational to vote?” ;j Seriously, I figured that, while what is rational might be contextual, that determining whether something was rational or not should be universal. For instance, what is in my self-interest is subjective, but that I should act in my own self interest (whatever that may be) is or can be rational, so much so that we often lump it all up in the descriptor rational self-interest. We to not pretend to know what is rational for each party per se, only that they are 1) acting rationally with respect to 2) their self-interest.
Nor do I, but then, I don’t expect that most people will be swayed by this argument.
Is it not a given that there is some group of people N who can change the outcome in their favor, though, and would vote if only they knew they could get their way? Without a method that tells us which group we are in (n suckers or N dictators), shouldn’t we instead seek a different criterion or set of criteria?
There is a little confusion about ‘N’: it’s the (expected) number of people who vote, not the pool of potential voters.
The main thing here seems to be about what we mean by “rational”. I’m using it in a very narrow sense to mean pursuit of whatever goal one happens to have. Preferences “just are” and a decision is rational if it gets you the best outcome according to those preferences given those available. Erislover is talking about something much broader than this standard homo economicus bare bones rationality. In this story people think about their preferences and ask themselves whether they are defensible. I agree that this is what politics is partly about - appealing to people’s higher level ethical preferences and persuading them that in order to be happy one must not merely follow whatever preferences you happen to have but examine your preferences in order to change them for the better somehow.
I think it’s interesting that erislover casts “rational self-interest” in this light. I hadn’t really thought of it this way. The way I tend to think of it is that (in competitive markets) rational actors* just happen to reach a good outcome (given the inital distribution of endowments). But it’s still private vice leading to public good. But the way erislover is thinking about it (I think) is that people understand that competitive markets lead to good outcomes and therefore decide that their actions and motivations are ok.
That might well be a good way to behave but is it a sensible criterion for rationality? I think I’ll stick with my narrow definition but call it “individual rationality”. But the idea that “collective rationality” may cause people to reflect on their preferences and change them or at least their behaviour seems reasonable, and ties in with what I said earlier about duty. I wouldn’t want to push it too far though - people are ill-informed (“rationally ignorant”) and often stupid, opportunistic and selfish.
But - and it’s a big but - the point is that the standard economists’ conception of rationality doesn’t get us too far here. The standard way economists explain things is to assume everyone is the same, that they follow some goal and that the different things they do are due to prices and income. Institutions are all about coordinating behavior through the use of incentives. But there is no obvious incentive to vote. The standard way to explain behaviour doesn’t work. To say that it’s consumption behaviour rather than investment behaviour doesn’t get us very far. It’s a cop out. We need a richer theory (and of course, behavioural economists are busy building it).
The other parts of erislover’s posts are about strategic behaviour and bloc voting. This is the same story again: if we want to explain individual behaviour we have to say why an individual should vote. Whilst it is the case that a bloc of voters could be decisive if they as a group voted, we still have to explain how the bloc overcomes the free-rider problem. And how does the bloc get organised? On the one hand we have the appeal of the Kantian question “What if everyone did that?”, on the other, Yossarian’s response “Then I’d be a fool to do otherwise!”**
Finally, kennybath’s comment
is interesting. It ties up with what erislover was saying about rational self interest, too. It’s a worry. I’ve tried in these threads to say that I don’t think voting’s irrational and that even though voting as an investment doesn’t make sense it doesn’t make you a sucker if you vote. But I do think that economists have to be careful to say that “rational” means something technical to them and is not in this narrow form an attribute to be desired. (In experimental economics, the people who are least likely to behave pro-socially are those with graduate economics training, which suggest we’re doing a shit job.) I do think that some of what economists have had to say about voting, contributing to public radio appeals and giving blood have given the impression that you’d have to be a a sucker to do it.
- Why ‘rational self interest’ rather than just rational or self-interested? It sounds tautological. I suspect this comes partly from the long-standing confusion between ‘selfish’ and ‘self-interested’; and partly just to note that that the self-interest is what is being persued.
**A fair bit of this - including that paraphrase - comes from Jon Elster’s remarks on these topics. Anyone interested in this topic could do worse than read Ulysses and the Sirens, Sour Grapes, and The Cement of Society.
I’m not sure it needs to be a higher level necessarily; I’d probably just say broader or more holistic. We both agree that there are going to be some number of voters who will simply not consider these issues, for whatever their reasons are (and only economists would assume they even have reasons, by which I mean defensible reasons; surely they have preferences, though). But someone willing to ask, “Is voting rational?” is already at a phase where they are seeking to either justify behavior they have a preference for, or they have no preference and are looking for a reason to do one thing or another. In either case we are at least flipping the standard economists’ rational man on his head: this man wants to act rationally and will align preferences as such, or he has his preferences but needs to find a more objective measure of their worth through an appeal to reason.
Presumably, I think it is safe to say that people will still vote with a side of conscience and a serving of self-interest. Compromise on some issues, withdraw compromise on other issues–the core of a vote is still based on preferences that stand without justification. I think it is important. But a preference will only answer the question, “Which candidate do you like?” We’re focused on, “Do I vote for them?”
I think this latter question is larger than strict rational self-interest, and a part of the reason for this is the nature of government and politics itself. Rational self-interest in a market is still restricted by a culture’s ideas about rights–I am free to act within certain boundries, those boundries being others’ rights. Politics, however, shapes, defines, or destroys those boundries. By participating, we are automatically entering ourselves in a different game than strict rational self-interest. While I still feel my argument above is a sufficient counter to the probability angle of voting, this might also serve as such.
When I act within my rights in a market setting, it is true that I necessarily affect others, but I do not change or threaten to change our respective boundries. Government, nearly by definition, is the very agent which defines, limits, and protects those boundries, so any political act is an act aimed at everyone. Presumably, if I buy food from a grocer, it is for sale because he wants it to be so; and if I affect him it is not strictly my doing but his own as well. If I vote for a politician that will change grocery laws, however, there is no guarantee that the grocer agrees. (Please forgive the somewhat simplistic presentation, but these things can get too cumbersome if we hander all technicalities.)
This is what gives us the “universal” scope I am essentially demanding we bring to the table when estimating rationality. A rational voter[sup][/sup] cannot be acting only out of self-interest*. A rationally self-interested person can prefer wheat to rye, commuting versus smaller housing within walking distance to work, deciding whether or not to work at all, who is the best candidate, and so on and so forth. But I suggest that there can be no purely rationally self-interested person who can decide to vote: either there is not enough information to trust the equation you give, or there is and the odds are always against him (at the very least).
It cannot, because there is not meant to be an organizational element. Any voter in N (my italicized N, the number of like-minded voters necessary to turn an election, not your N, the number of voters period) does not know whether or not the other N-1 voters will vote. As I said, there is never enough information prior to the election results to determine whether or not a person should vote if their goal is to decide the election. A voter cannot determine whether he is in a decisive group or not, so while the existence of this group is interesting, and might be used for other a priori reasoning, it is not in itself a reason to vote (or not vote) because membership is unknown (the election isn’t over, and votes are private/anonymous).
Some questions to think on.[ol][li]Which voters feel that their vote would be decisive (i.e., is this a reason anyone actually uses)?[]If politics is global in scope, can we analyze it from the perspective of an individual voter? (That is, can we construct an election from rationally self-interested individuals?) I believe the Austrian school is keen on suggesting that all aggregate action is the result of such choices, but here is an example that might just withstand such a treatment indefinitely.[]Can we help understand whether an individual should vote or not by analyzing the purpose of voting, the voting system, what is being voted on, etc.? Do these things change the reasons for voting, or are they independent?[/ol][/li]
*[sub]For my own purposes, I consider that a rational voter would be any person who uses univerally applicable reasons for voting, even if subjective preferences would dictate for whom the rational voter would vote.[/sub]
And if all four of you have the same opinion, no one will vote and none of you will go fishing. You all will spend the time in a bar somewhere drinking and griping about the fish you’re not catching because none of you had the balls to make a stand.
Love the logic.
One version of Kant’s ‘Categorical Imperative’ is the ‘universelizability’ criterion. It’s somewhat similar to the plaint of, “What if everybody did that?” But it cuts a little deeper. The argument runs like this: If a maxim (rule of behavior) is rational, and the argument that X is rational doesn’t include any restrictions that prevent it from being universal (applying it to everybody), then it obviously must be rational for everybody. Then, everybody would be being rational if they all followed the maxim. But if the argument that made the maxim rational would no longer be valid in that circumstance, then following the maxim is not rational or moral [sometimes its hard to pull these apart in Critique of Practical Reason ].
This is easily applied to the current case. My vote doesn’t make a difference; therefore, it’s not rational to vote. Therefore, it’s rational for everyone not to vote. But if that happened, one vote would make a difference …
Note that, under this analysis, the only rational choice is to vote for the best available candidate. Gadarene, in Hawthorne’s first link, makes a similar argument; but I would have phrased it differently. You’re throwing your vote away only if you vote for someone other than the best available candidate …
One question you have to raise - are you talking about rational for the self, or the communal self? When you are talking about rationality, you can’t isolate an individual - his actions affect others, and the actions of others affect him.
In one scenario, you are stuck in a collapsed building after a major earthquake. You have enough water to for a a week. However, there are a few other people stuck in this situation with you. You know that you will probably be discovered at some point, but you don’t know when.
With individual rationality, the type you are using to justify not voting, you keep the water for yourself because you will live longer. With communal, you share the water to keep everyone alive longer.
Either choice can be said to be “rational”, and either choice can be said to be “irrational”… as I said, the conclusion I make about people who use the rationality argument about voting are shortsighted and selfish. I certainly wouldn’t want to be trapped in an earthquake with them O_o
So anyway, they may be individually rational, but it certainly isn’t socially rational. Given that the individual is merely a part of society… the rationality breaks down in real life.
Since I can see into the future and look at people using the water scenario above, let me put it this way: If you horde the water for yourself, you have only your mind working on the situation, given that a community of individuals is smarter and stronger than a single individual, and may find a way to hasten their rescue. Neverminding the fact that they might just get really pissed at you, beat you up, and take your water, which is analagous to what can happen if you decide not to vote and end up getting screwed by the new administration.
I think we mostly agree that being purely rational and purely selfish when deciding whether or not to vote is not a very positive outlook. I think it can, however, crystalise some interesting ideas.
In the last US presidential election, everything boiled down to Florida as I understand it. I am not that familiar with the US electoral system, so forgive me if this is an over simplification. Imagine that our voter, with his voting criteria as previously defined, was a Florida elector who had been led to believe that this was a likely scenario. He/she also believed that it was going to be close call. In this specific case, can our voter cast a vote with any reasonable expectation that the result will boil down to a single vote?
It is difficult to decide by assuming that the entire electorate will be choosing whether to vote by using a rational/selfish criteria as SCSimmons indicates. By using historical precedence, however, some form of numerical data can be arrived at.
Population Florida = 17 million
Electorate Florida = 12 million say
Likely Voters = 6 million say
Then using Mueller’s equation quoted by Hawthorne, assuming p=1/2, we can say that a single vote will decide the election with a probability of 1 in 4000. Given what is at stake, our rational voter might decide that this is a sufficiently large probability that he/she will indeed vote.
Of course this is just about as high a probability that any individual voter is ever likely to see. In different circumstances the same selfish, rational voter would likely not vote. Equally, in the local election scenario painted by Anson2995 and particularly in the fishing scenario that AHunter postulates, our voter can be fairly sure that his vote will be much more statistically significant, and will therefore choose to vote.
I think what Pasta has to say about voter motivation rings true. In most cases, voting out of rational self-interest does not make sense. Is there, however, a significantly higher turnout in swing states vs. “safe” states? If so, it might suggest how many people choose to vote only if their vote has a chance of making a difference, that is with rational self interest being their primary motivation. Demographic considerations might swamp the data, however.
Is this not a selfish reason to choose to vote?
And we’re struggling with it too. I think the Catch 22 bit I noted above is a fair riposte. Whilst you might argue (although I wouldn’t) that following a universalisable (ugh!) rule of conduct in a world where lots of people aren’t following anything like that rule is moral, I find it hard to see how it could be characterised as rational if it fails and always was going to fail to advance your interests as you see them.
InvidiousCourgette’s calculation is good but slightly misleading because it ignores the US Electoral College. Being decisive in that election required that a voter would not only be decisive in Florida but also that the Florida Electoral Collge votes would themselves be decisive. I’m guessing that this would make the average voter’s probability lower, but I’m not all that confident. Certainly it would make p vary considerably between states. In a small state that is expected to vote strongly one way or the other, p would be very very small. But it’s already tiny. So I doubt that being in a swing state affects turnout throught this channel - I’d be more inclined to think of stronger calls to do your duty.
To Zagadka’s
, InvidiousCourgette asked
I suppose someone has to be the first to say “Don’t blame me, I voted for Kodos.” The “regret” motive for voting doesn’t seem too strong because, once again, you’d have to have been the potentially decisive voter.
Otherwise, this cuts both ways. It’s hard to say which is more disappointing: voting against the winner and feeling righteous but impotent, or voting for the winner and having to deal with them letting you down.
I’ll reply to the methodological individualism issue raised by erislover and others in a minute.
[QUOTE=erislover]
Some questions to think on.[ol][li]…[]If politics is global in scope, can we analyze it from the perspective of an individual voter? (That is, can we construct an election from rationally self-interested individuals?) I believe the Austrian school is keen on suggesting that all aggregate action is the result of such choices, but here is an example that might just withstand such a treatment indefinitely.[]…[/ol]I’d like to take a moment to expand this question, hoping to drive home more clearly why I feel voting is not sufficiently analyzed as an economic behavior. “Normal” economic behavior is self-interested behavior that just happens to affect a greater good–the invisible hand, for instance, or increasing demand for services creating more jobs (no one demands a service because it creates jobs!). But an election is, in fact, something designed only for affecting a “greater” or “higher” good, specifically an outcome wherein we are necessarily thinking of the greater good, even if we selfishly consider that the greater good maps to our own opinions on how to live an individual life.[/li]
Quite often, rational individuals have personal preferences that they accept and admit are not a rule they’d like to apply to universal behavior. I might desire that my girlfriend have an abortion, but I would never compel all people to have abortions. Similarly, my girlfriend might never consider an abortion an option, but this doesn’t mean she must therefore wish RvW be overturned. These kinds of questions necessarily come into play in rational voting, though they need never come into play in rational behavior (how I live as an individual).
This is why I feel voting is at least one behavior which stands immune from the treatment of individual praxes.
In fact, I would be interested in hearing if Liberal has anything to say on that matter, as someone who finds individual actions paramount.
It’s not just the Austrians [a school of economists paid some lip-service by the mainstream, but not well understood by them] who like the idea of methodological individualism. Most economists do, and - if you’re prepared to interpret the idea the way they do - it’s less controversial than it seems at first blush. I’ve been around the block a few times on this issue myself, BtW.
All methodological individualism requires is that we consider that the only political actors are individuals. But that doesn’t mean that those actors are not influenced by social factors. Where a methodological holist departs from a methodological individualist is not in saying that culture or history or family or social norms influence an individual’s decision - it is in regarding those factors as being something other than the product of current or previous individual actions. Saying that voters in New Zealand are pretty likely to turn out to vote because of the effects of social cohesion and the prior institution of compulsory voting doesn’t require us to depart from the individual as the font of all action: we just have to recognise that those effects have their effects only by their influence on individuals and that they were/ are produced/ sustained by the actions and interactions of individuals (many of whom may now have carked it).
What this is is reductionism (obviously). Classes, electorates and political parties don’t have preferences or behave: they are phenomena that arise from individuals interacting. But this is mere methodology: the individual is just a convenient staging post on the way to the physics of voting. 
I wouldn’t want to be too doctrinaire about this. It’s just that a satisfactory understanding of the whole of political behaviour seems to demand how the parts work.
Where I’ve weakened on this in recent times is due to evolutionary psychology and that whole non-linear dynamics business as it applies to crowds. When we’re talking about a riot for example, I’m not so sure that understanding the individuals’ “decision” explains what’s going on. There does seem to be a point where the mob becomes an actor.
I’m not quite sure where erislover’s most recent substantive post takes us. In the first paragraph “self-interest” and “selfish” seem to be used interchangeably - which I think is confusing in this circumstance. My self-interest can be anything - it’s just whatever happens to be my utility function. The decisiveness problem applies just as much to a person whose preferences are perfectly aligned with the public interest as to anyone else. Perhaps I don’t understand that paragraph.
The second paragraph I also find a bit confusing. Neither of the political stances seem unusual, nor I think are they at odds with a view of consistent preferences over states of the world. That in the ordinary course of economic life these preferences would never completely be revealed doesn’t seem too strange either. But I do take - and endorse - the point that political choice is, much more than the choice to buy oranges, about other people.
Hmm, I didn’t think that I used the two terms interchangably. I definitely had one thing in mind when using one and not the other.
Right. But I would suggest that politics is precislely one area where this fails. JThunder prefers birth to abortion absolutely; how does he vote? Politics is precisely the area where we make decisions so that we affect greater outcomes.
How, if they are rational? It seems you’ve presented a pretty solid argument against this very notion, hawthorne. We must either scrap reductionist perspectives, or accept that there are no rational voters. What other options are there? Duty? Would you accept that we only have morals out of a sense of duty, as well, in a realm like stealing from work or being a lazy employee?
InvidousCourgette
Even if you achieved the “oh so thrilling” feat of casting, by some miraculous quirk of fate, the ONE SINGLE VOTE that put the politico you worshipped, over the top.
What then?
You have no power over him or her.
In those circumstances, do you really believe that you have achieved something of any great significance or value?
Accept the fact that you live in an elective dictatorship.
Live with it. Learn to love and admire it (actually, I think you already have).
Do not ever delude yourself into believing that you (as one of the people) actually rule or that your opinions are taken into consideration at Government level.
I quote Churchill