“I have to ask, do you have some personal relation to Mark Clark? The man was an incompetent butcher of the highest caliber, placing the lives of his men beneath his desire to make the front page. He deserves all of the scorn that history has placed on him…” --Dissonance
Sorry, but I regard that not as an objective assertion of historical fact, but a controversial interpretation you present as settled history to support a nuclear attack on Clark’s character. Your recital of this is not a bland assertion of history but a strong point of view, even when backed by cited evidence. You cannot claim that such a strongly negative view of a man with Clark’s record is THE final historical word on the matter (Eisenhower hand picked Clark, promoted him, and supported him repeatedly throughout the war).
When you ask me if I have some relationship to Clark, that sounds personal, like a challenge to defend Clark if I disagree with you. Of course, I have no connection to Clark whatsoever, other than having read his account of his service in World War II.
“Great Debates” is the right place for this; the problem is that I’m not as intently interested in this issue as you are. Your point that Clark got a bad reputation in the Italian campaign, particularly from the Cassino/Anzio battle, culminating in the capture of Rome, is valid (minus full explanation of the difficult circumstances that surrounded it). I also agree that he overruled his British commander, Alexander, in giving up pursuit of the retreating Germans and taking Rome instead, that he played to the media, and that he fudged on it a bit in his book to put the best face on this decision.
I have an entirely different understanding about WHY he did all of these things, however, taken from both his own account and from Eisenhower’s “Crusade in Europe.” I find his reasoning, which he reports in detail, valid in the difficult context in which it occurred.
Wartime decisions are messy. Different commanders take the same elements and come to differing conclusions on how to proceed. There are few flawless campaigns. Command in war requires results; no excuses are accepted. In my view, if you get it basically right, handle your resources well, and have the required strength and energy, you have a chance to get those results.
Some mix of ego, strong disagreement, and command politics is always present in war (consider the circus dramas of Napoleon’s court of marshals). In close paraphrase, General MacArthur said of Eisenhower, “Best clerk I ever had.” Eisenhower once replied to a reporter’s question, “Do I know General MacArthur? I studied dramatics under him for three years.” The Germans were as bad. Field Marshal Von Rundstedt once remarked of a rival, “Field Marshal Model would make an EXCELLENT regimental sergeant major.” It doesn’t surprise me, then, that Clark had bitter detractors among his staff, subordinates, and wartime superiors, exacerbated, no doubt, by the bitterness of the Italian campaign.
Eisenhower had two great worries as Supreme Commander: working effectively with our allies (which is why an American army was in Italy: it was a British demand, run on a shoestring), and keeping U.S. casualties to the absolute minimum, given the demands of winning the war. He kept Clark in command in Italy to the end of the war; post-war, Clark was entrusted with command in politically-sensitive Austria. If Clark been a “vainglorious” media hound, arbitrary in defying his British superior, and “a butcher” to boot, in the manner claimed, Eisenhower would have replaced him and sent him home. Eisenhower also kept on the repeatedly controversial General Patton, knowing he would produce needed results at an acceptable cost when unleashed.
It might be interesting to compare Clark’s campaign losses and bloody-minded determination to that of U.S. Grant in the final campaign to take Richmond, from “The Wilderness” to the trenchlines at Petersburg. The three disastrous charges on entrenched Confederate works at Cold Harbor might be particularly apt. Prior to the third, U.S. soldiers were pinning bits of paper to their tunics with their names and the addresses of next-of-kin. I seem to recall that Grant later said the only thing in the entire war he regretted was ordering that third attack at Cold Harbor. Richmond fell at the end of this bloody and controversial campaign (Lincoln nearly lost re-election over the casualties). After securing Richmond, Grant pursued the Confederate army in earnest, cutting it off near Appomattox Court House. This successful bloodbath is considered one of the great campaigns in American military history. Just food for thought.
Regarding the authority of congressional investigations: I seem to remember that Congress officially found at least one other gunman was present at the JFK assassination in Dallas. Yet, no massive search has begun to uncover the identity of this presidential assassin. Congress most often puts an official stamp on political hot air; it is not an ideal finder of fact.
If readers want a good beginning account of the campaign in Italy, read Clark’s “Calculated Risk.” It is quite clear in it’s explanations, and has some of the best visual illustrations, in the form of understandable maps, that I have seen in a military history. Judge the man for yourself from his own words, then read his critics for additional dimension.