If you can’t explain what you assert to be the critical difference between taking a course of action because your organization’s culture and traditions require doing it, and because there’s a written document on file saying so as well, then there’s no point in your continuing to claim you have a case.
What *do * you have to say, btw, about the ball’s previous owner *explicitly * giving ownership to the individual in question?
You don’t infer from the existence of a written contract that they’re contractors?
Culture and tradition != law. And thank god for that, too.
I have already explained that, having abandoned the ball, MLB had no authority to “give ownership” to Mientkiewicz or anybody else.
Not at all. All kinds of employees are employed under the terms of written contracts. The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor does not depend upon a written contract, but rather the right of the principal to control the conduct of the person in the performance of his duties. And since it’s pretty clear that the Red Sox have the right to control Doug Mientkiewicz in the exercise of his duties as a player, it’s pretty clear that he’s an employee and not an independent contractor.
Ah the key to your mistake is “unclaimed”. Using your scenario, the owner comes forward and tells the cop the money is now his. The department can’t say no. There is no impropriety.
You’re better than this, or so we’ve been used to thinking. Please stop evading the question - we’re all smart enough to see it. You made it clear that the existence of a *formal * organizational policy vs. its customary conduct made all the difference somehow, even though it’s a conscious action in question either way. You have made no attempt at explaining why that matters, despite the smartass remarks. Why should we give you credit for having a point?
You can’t take both sides there. If you didn’t in the above paragraph give MLB credit for having made a conscious decision to abandon ownership of the ball, you can’t in this paragraph claim that they did.
As if the Uniform Player’s Contract does *not * control the player’s behavior? Don’t be silly. The fragments of it available online make it clear that they do, in ways that most of us in other jobs would find intolerably intrusive, in fact. But of course, you don’t have any more recourse to the terms of the contract than the rest of us.
“The course and scope of his duties” required that he do his best to catch the ball, btw, which he did - and that’s all.
Is it acting within his scope of employment when (1) after he has completed his duties, to (2) acquire and take possession of a ball, (3) take it to Major League Baseball to have it authenticated? I’d argue that it isn’t.
A UPS driver, while making a delivery to a house, steps out of his van onto the public road, and finds $100 lying next to his foot, picks it up, pockets it, and then goes on with his duties. Under agency law, was that $100 the fruits of his labour? Was it acquired in the course of his duties? Does it belong to his employer?
You can make an argument either way on this, Minty, but your tone is unlawyerly. Recognize that they are just arguments and you might find more agreement.
I believe that there’s a good argument that the fact that MLB authenticated the ball and awarded it to Doug defeats your argument that they “abandoned” it.
Can the common law of agency be overridden by a contractual agreement between Doug and the Red Sox that permits MLB to adjudicate all matters not addressed in the contract?
And are you arguing that “industry custom and practice” never influences interpretation and application of law, specifically, employment law, agency law, and contract law?
Elvis: Would you please dial back the snottiness? You’re at about a seven, and we need you at about a three.
Mientkiewicz did not acquire the ball after he completed his duties. It was on the field of play during the last game of the World Series.
No, because it is not part of the UPS driver’s duties to pick up money lying around on the ground. (That’s why in my example, I used a policeman.) In stark contrast, it is Mientkiewicz’s duty to catch the balls thrown to him at first base.
WTF? I have not denigrated anybody for holding a contrary position. I am merely explaining why they are wrong.
Property is “abandoned” under the law when the owner voluntarily relinquishes his rights to it, expressly or impliedly, without intention of recovering it. E.g., Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995). At that point, it ceases to be the property of that person, and may be claimed by any person who reduces it to possession. E.g., Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1995).*
MLB’s policy (seemingly, since these things are apparently not written down anywhere for easy reference) is that it no longer owns balls that are hit into the stands or caught by the players. MLB has no intention of recovering those balls; instead, its position is simply finders-keepers. It may be happy to “authenticate” the ball for the possessor of the ball, but it does NOT claim ownership to the ball. In what way can this be construed as anything except abandonment?
Almst certainly. But that’s almost certainly not in their contract, as the MLBPA would shit a brick at the very notion that MLB would have the power to resolve disputes between players and owners.
*Yeah, they’re shipwreck cases, because I’m citing federal law, and shipwreck cases are among the most common kinds of abandoned property cases in federal court. The state law principles are identical, but you probably don’t care about the Texas cases involving abandonded oil well equipment and such.
No, I am not making that argument. In this instance, however, I see no reason why the past indifference of individual baseball teams to the question of ownership of game balls – particularly since that indifference has never even been enshrined in any kind of official policy – should overcome the default legal principles governing the relationship between employers and employees when the employer’s attitude ceases to be one of indifference due to the extreme monetary and emotional value of one particular game ball.
Hypothetical question time. We know there’s money in game balls. What if Doug Mientkiewicz next season decides to keep every single game ball he catches at first base? He’s got a bucket right there by first base, and so he’s collecting them by the boatload and selling them to the public for $50 each. Still think there’s nothing his employer can do about that?
Yes, but he took possession of the ball after completing his duties with regard to that ball. Did he have a duty, once completing those duties (basically, to take action to make an out), to return the ball to the possession of the Red Sox? Here’s where industry custom and practise might be taken into account. Let’s take a look at history and the record – historically, do MLB clubs behaves in a way that would lead you to conclude that a player’s duties with regard to a particular ball continue after that ball is no longer relevant to play?
It could be construed as the “customary” way of determining who owns the ball. If the rule is “finders keepers,” then that’s an argument that the ball doesn’t belong to the club.
So about a hundred years of informal practise in which no MLB club has ever tried to claim ownership of a ball based on agency principles is not compelling to you. I don’t think this is as easy an argument as you think it is.
Cannot the common law be construed as tradition? And we are talking about common law here, right? I don’t see any cites to Missouri agency or employment law statutes in this discussion.
Nor are you going to see any, unless you go out there and find them yourself or write me a big fat check for my professional services in conducting the legal research you’re demanding that I perform. The law is as I have stated it to be (and varies hardly at all from state to state), with supporting citations. If you wish to prove otherwise, I suggest that you do the research yourself.
Also, note that Missouri law is only one possibility for the applicable law. Mientkiewicz’s contract was entered into in Minnesota, his employer was in Massachusetts, and it’s likely that the contract (or the labor agreement between MLB and MLBPA) provides for the law of a specific forum, such as New York, to govern the dispute. Please be sure to let us know the results of your research.
I’m sorry, but I’m not the one claiming that I know for damn certain what the applicable law is and that I know for damn certain how it might be applied by a court. All I’ve done is offer some arguments and questions regarding some statements you’ve made. So as far as I can tell, I’m not the one making factual claims and conclusory statements that cry out for some kind of support other than “Believe me, I know what I’m talking about.” That’s what I mean by “unlawyerly.”
Where’s Bricker or one of our other resident lawyers?
You’re not helping your position at all here. Try answering the questions posed to you, please.
He completed his duties by catching it.
No, you have not done so, and I’m not going to repeat the questions you’ve evaded, nor the denigrations you’ve falsely made, including in this very post (see above).
So you do acknowledge that this is an official policy after all. Thank you. :rolleyes:
Both the management and the union resolve such disputes, through grievancing and less formally. Nothing new there.
There’s money in historically-significant game balls. Others have nominal souvenir value only as they’re quite common and easy to get. In your hypothetical, the bucket on the field would present a hazard and the umpire would require it to be removed. Since those balls would have little worth anyway, then Doug would look like a dick. But MLB would still have a policy that they give the home team game-used balls (that do not go into the stands) for batting practice.
And stepping on the bag, yes. But he acquired the ball when he caught it. It’s not like he chucked it into the stands and some fan gave it back to him a week later.
Yes, “abandonment” appears to be the official policy of Major League Baseball. I’ve been saying that all along, since my analysis is totally dependent on MLB’s intentional relinquishment of its ownership rights via its finders-keepers policy with respect to whoever happens to pick up the ball.
So :rolleyes: right back at ya.
That’s all very nice, but would you mind answering the question I asked?
Incidentally, I thought $50 was quite reasonable. I think the Texas Rangers sell game-used balls for like $100 at their gift shop at the Ballpark.
It may have escaped your notice, but I have in fact provided citations to the Restatement (Second) of Agency and federal case law regarding abandoned property, which I believe more than adequately support the handful of legal principles I have discussed in this thread. Yet for some strange reason, none of my opponents want to discuss the fiduciary duty that an agent owes to his principal, or the notion that the agent has to account to the principal for all profits arising out of the employment. Ah well, hope springs eternal, and only five weeks 'til spring training.
You have stated a general principle of agency law. That cite does not say, “a ball that has been used in a professional baseball game and has been retrieved by a player is the property of the club that employs that player.”
What you’ve done is construct a legal argument, one that is set alongside other arguments, such as “Doug was not acting in the course of his duties when he retrieved the ball and kept it for himself.” You’ve also constructed an argument that MLB has abandoned the ball and therefore it belongs to the Red Sox. That stands alongside the argument that the MLB has set up a policy that played balls belong to whoever has retrieved them. You’ve dismissed out of hand the argument that industry custom and practise is that played balls do not belong to the club as a matter of agency law. You haven’t given any definitive authority on why your arguments are winners, but you’ve adopted a pretty high-handed tone about it.
An agent owes fiduciary duty to his employer! Hah! Therefore, Doug has the duty to hand the ball over to the Red Sox!But what is the authority that says that the club has the right to a ball retrieved in this manner, especially since they’ve never asserted such a right in the last 100 years?Why won’t you recognize that an employee owes his employer a fiduciary duty!
Profit obtained by an employee within the course and scope of his duties belongs to the employer! Hah! Therefore, Doug has the duty to hand the ball over to the Red Sox!But what is the authority that says that Doug was acting in the course and scope of his duties when he retrieved the ball and kept it for himself? There is 100 years of evidence that implies that a player’s duty ends with regard to a particular ball when the play ends.Why won’t you recognize that employees owe their employers profit arising out of an action taken in the course and scope of his duties!
What about the industry custom and practise?Hah! It’s overruled by agency law.But you haven’t definitely shown that your interpretation of agency law is definitive.Hah! I cited the restatements! Why won’t you recognize the rule of law!
*Is there any statutory authority?*Find it yourself! You can’t afford my services! Hah!
You’re not connecting the dots here, friend, and you’re getting shirty about it. This is an appeal to people whose posts show a history of answering legal questions with equanimity and who tend to lay out their reasoning, giving due consideration to valid arguments and, where appropriate, giving explicit reasons for disregarding alternative arguments.
As a disinterested third party (well, somewhat interested, as I’ve bothered to read this thread, and post this response) I’ll play judge:
Based on the arguments and cites presented, and giving due consideration to the principles of agency law, as well as the (unsubstantiated) claims of “industry custom and practice”, Judge Shelbo hereby decides as follows:
Mientkiewicz was acting as an employee of the Boston Red Sox organization at the time the ball in question was thrown to him (by another empolyee of the Boston Red Sox).
His catching the ball was an act taken during the course of his employment, and was an action taken within the scope of such employment. The ball has a material value, and is therefore properly characterized as the “fruits of his labor”.
Therefore, under the laws of agency and the corresponding fiduciary duties owed by an agent to his principal, as well as as a matter of public policy, the ball is the property of the Boston Red Sox organization, and must be returned to an authorized representative of the organization as soon as reasonably practicable. To rule otherwise would be to endanger the very future of professional baseball (we don’t want the post-victory team-pile-up-on-the-mound to morph into a battle for the baseball for god’s sake!).
So ordered. I note that the usual avenues for appeal remain available to the repondant – but you’d better bring some better cites and arguments than “it’s always been that way, I swear”.
Cannot the common law be construed as tradition? And we are talking about common law here, right? I don’t see any cites to Missouri agency or employment law statutes in this discussion.