Irrigation also runs the risk of salinizing the area, it’s not always sustainable in the long run. This is starting to become a problem in India, for example.
Also, Mesopotamia.
That’s certainly one of the factors in stressing the system, leading to the potential for periodic collapse.
Interestingly, in Mesopotamia salinization can allegedly be kept in check by periodic fallowing; the problems allegedly started when city-states began to insist on greater productivity in the short run (very useful for beating a rival), which cut down on using such techniques as fallowing. The gamble was one would assume that a city-state could increase yields, defeat its enemies, and then simply seize more productive land before salinization could become a concern … a very dangerous sort of gamesmanship.
I’m not aware of anyone making the case in your OP. Diamond’s book does indeed address geography as a cause, but only one of many. The first third of his book is just about plants and animals.
One of the reasons I have read for why civilization arose not in bountiful Europe or N America but in arid Iraq is that the climate gave incentives to develop agricultural techniques and thus lead to a surplus. In Europe, a farmer could easily produce enough for his family. In Iraq, he needed to continually improve his techniques in a battle for survival. This spurred the development of small and then large-scale irrigation, which reduced the number of people who needed to work agriculture, created an agricultural surplus, and professions such as merchant, engineer which did not need to exist elsewhere.
Another reason that Europe developed unlike other parts of Eurasia, is that Europe was spared the medieval nuclear war that was the Mongols. Black Death killed a lot in both Europe and Asia. But, Europe avoided Mongols for the most part. The Mid East, ub Continent and China were hit very hard. Mongols (and Tamelane’s) penchant for making mountains of heads might be eye catching, but it was at the end of the day, just another line of pillage and killing. Their wholesale destruction of the irrigation infrastructure especially in Mesopotamia and Iran on the other hand, was something new and something the region did not recover from.
Yup, this appears to make a certain amount of sense.
I agree that the impact of the Mongols (and later depredations) were key, but I would argue that their legacy was equally problematic in the social/political sense.
For example, the baleful impact of the Mongols is blamed in Mesopotamia and Iran for wrecking irrigation, leading to a collapse in relative progress (which is fair enough); but one could also point to the impact of the Mongols on the Kievian Rus - a culture-area roughly comparable in potential for progress to Western Europe prior to the Mongol invasion, but which was clearly at a relative disadvantage afterwards.
There, the mechanism of relative retardation of progress appears to have been that, in response to Mongol dominance, and partly inspired by the Mongol Khans (and continuing nomad threat), Muscovy developed a centralized, autocratic system of government completely alien to the Kievian Rus - and not the mere material damage of the Mongol invasions, as that area did not rely on intensive irrigation that could be wrecked.
It could be argued that Iran had something of a similar trajectory - for example, local rulers such as Nader Shah expressly patterned themselves on the Mongol rulers (he made towers of skulls just like Tamerlane!); the lingering-for-centuries attractions of Mongol style, in which autocratic cruelty and military prowess was considered all-important, was I submit as much of a problem for progress as damage to the irrigation system.
The destruction of irrigation systems in the ME is actually very pertinent to what you describe. The old infrastructure directly and indirectly, supported institutions which managed and maintained it, they spun off into other fields.You need excellent engineers to design and maintain these rather complicated systems and managers and administrators to make them work and distribute assets amongst peoples.
You need systems to train such people, which leads into centre and then institutions of learning, which then spin off into other fields, like philosophy, law .A quasi-professional class like this is going to lead to decentralization of authority and an approval of innovation and is going to be strong.
Centralisation is at the end of the day, the triumph of individual over institutions and the destruction of institutions is going to lead hampering of progress. Its interesting to note that the sub-continent, where despite multiple attacks, basic infrastructure survived, institutions remaned strong.
You raise an interesting point. I think you may be right.
That, and the rivers and mountains are also natural boundaries between lots of small enclaves, which means lots of competition, which means lots of stupid conflict BUT also lots of incentive to both be more efficient than the next guy over and an incentive to try and explore further.
By comparison, China has more or less always been huge and rich ; all the way to the XIXth century. And they enjoyed prosperity. But also stagnation. If you look at XVth or XVIth century China, they could have just plain conquered the world, had they wanted to. They were superior in terms or agriculture, craftsmanship, economy, military to Europe as well as their neighbours. They just didn’t capitalize on it, because they didn’t immediately *need *to. Unlike, say, Portugal.
Ancient Greece --> Rome --> Dark (Middle) Ages --> Renaissance --> Enlightenment
The real question is why were the Greeks so ahead of the curve, that they inspired and influenced the rest of history so profoundly.
Was it just seafaring trade and temperate weather? It seems a bit stupid to suggest so. They were curious, insightful, literate, and sufficiently militarily adept to produce the fountain of wisdom that still pervades much of Western society. Other kingdoms had wealth; Europe had intellect.