# Is it a fair assessment (in hindsight) that Japan feared the USSR more than US atomic bombs? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [May 31, 2016, 5:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-it-a-fair-assessment-in-hindsight-that-japan-feared-the-ussr-more-than-us-atomic-bombs/756152 "2016-05-31T05:09:54Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 32
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2016, 12:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-it-a-fair-assessment-in-hindsight-that-japan-feared-the-ussr-more-than-us-atomic-bombs/756152/32 "2016-06-03T00:09:48Z")
> [@davidmich](#): > > This question has been done to death but I want to get as objective an answer as possible. Was Japan going to surrender anyway prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? More modern research suggests it was. Why is this in GQ, and especially, why is this in GQ if you have factually incorrect statements? “More modern research” does not, in fact suggest such a thing.　It’s very well documented that they weren’t and to assert such a thing is absurd So, cite? > [@](#): > > What about Truman’s judgement or forthrightness in his reasons for dropping the bombs? Is there any evidence to suggest that he had any other motives to drop the bomb besides defeating Japan? The GQ answer is that no, there is no evidence which definitively suggests that. Squinting at tea leaves may provide a different answer. Certainly there were discussions of how the Soviets may react but the primary purpose was simply to end the war. Had there been no question of the Soviets, Truman would have made the exact same decision at the exact same time. To suggest otherwise is silly. > [@RealityChuck](#): > > The Japanese were already seriously considering surrender before Hiroshima. They indicated it to the allies, but a mistranslation (probably deliberate on the part of a Soviet agent in the German embassy) led the US to believe they had rejected the idea. No, this is all utter trash and not worth rebutting. > [@Chihuahua](#): > > If the war had proceeded past 15 August, the US could (conceivably) have nuked major ports, military installations, airfields, defensive positions, etc. In any invasion, we could have just nuked whatever piece of coastline we intended to attack and annihilated all opposition. The only real limit was how fast the US could churn out fissile material. We didn’t have enough material to do all of that. > [@](#): > > 1. Why would/did the potential Soviet invasion weigh more heavily than the atom bomb? If the Japanese cared nothing for the destruction of their cities, and were willing to suffer continued atomic bombings, why did **the threat of Soviet invasion** suddenly change their mind? Was it just that they knew they would get better terms from the US than the Soviets? My bolding. As the author which **kunilou** links to points out (I didn’t click on this particular article, but I’ve read a lot from him) it was not that the Japanese feared a Soviet invasion (which they would not have, since the Soviets lacked the ability to invade), but that the Soviet entry into the war eliminated the one excuse which the three hardliners in the Supreme War Counsel were using to dodge the question of negotiating an end. The hardliners never would have given up, had the Emperor not intervened (an act which was contrary to the Meiji Constitution) they would have prevailed. We’re so far out of GQ territory here, but IMHO, Japan was headed for martial law and then it may not have ever surrendered. The problem with this discussion, as with anything else this complicated, is that it really can’t be discussed in sound bites. For the discussion of the surrender of Japan, one simply cannot talk about “Japan” as a monolith. We talk about seven people. There were two rival groups of three each (the Big Six) in the Supreme War Council: the “peace faction” and the die hards who intended to do just that. The later never were going to give in. The Foreign Minister, and the only civilian, had seen the writing on the wall. He wanted to quit before everyone was killed. The not that strong Prime Minister and the Navy Minister were also on this camp. General Anami, the War (Army) Minister, and the most member of the government (outside of the Emperor, who had more theoretical power, but was usually unable to act on it) led the hawks. In addition there was the Emperor and then the people who he looked to for advice. The Big Six had been split before the bombing and neither the Soviet entry into the war nor the atomic bombs changed that. What did change was the Emperor’s decision to intervene. There are no GQ answers to that. Then after the intervention, Gen. Anami decided not the lead a coup for reasons again, which are not GQ. --- _[View the full topic](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/is-it-a-fair-assessment-in-hindsight-that-japan-feared-the-ussr-more-than-us-atomic-bombs/756152)._