I think as metallic cartridges (and rifles that used them) became more common, use of the bayonet decreased.
So where do the logistics guys deliver the ammo to? Company? Battalion?
I mean, there has to be an organizational level where trucks/helicopters drive up and deliver crates of ammo from the railhead or port, and a level where it’s shared out and distributed internally by the unit.
Where’s that divide in the modern US army?
Each unit reports their required basic load to the Theater Materiel Management Center (MMC), which in turn contacts DARCOM (the “wholesaler”) for a shipment. At the operational level it’s not all that different from any other commodity. They pack it on a boat or train, send it to the nearest port, and then deliver it to the customer installation in a shipping container. How this is actually performed depends on the unit and location… for instance, receiving ammo shipments in Korea is specifically tasked to the ROK Army.
As far as distributing it, it goes from the Ammunition Holding Area (AHA) to the requesting unit based on how much they’ve asked for. From what I’ve seen, AHAs tend to be organized geographically (correct me if I’m wrong). As in, one AHA serves a large installation and the customer units just show up with their requisitions. The individual soldiers receive it from their Company armory (arms room).
This does vary, of course… In Iraq 2006 we had big buckets of ammo laying around the barracks and everyone just took what they needed. In Iraq 2009 we had to sign a hand receipt for our ammo and count how much ammo we used in a sworn statement. So… yeah.
And I bet every soldier had their own personal stash hidden away, right? Stupid system.
We always used the “buckets of ammo” method, even in basic training.
It wasn’t the metallic cartridge, but the rifling. Smoothbore muzzle-loading muskets (up through Napoleon, more or less) were so inaccurate that you could potentially run up and stab someone before they could get a shot on you. Rifles were so slow to reload that running up and stabbing also worked.
Rifled muskets (US Civil War), though, were accurate enough, far enough away, and reloaded quickly enough, that this didn’t work so well. Thus the huge casualties in the US Civil War when generals kept trying the ‘run up and bayonet’ approach.
And the key wasn’t metal cartridges, but rather specially shaped lead bullets (Minie balls) that were small enough to quickly shove down the barrel of the musket, but expanded when fired so they gripped the rifling in the barrel. This was well before metallic cartridges.
Asked my friend, who is just out of the USMC. He did a few tours in Iraq and a couple in Afghanistan, left as a SGT. On patrol he would carry 7 mags of 32 rounds each in 5.56 plus 2 mags of 9, when he was issued a pistol and 2 frag grenades. He made nice with the guys in the Armoury and his Lt approved, most guys are not allowed a pistol.
He was issued Arms and ammo from the Armoury.
He made an interesting comment when I asked about the 32 round mags. He said that the mags were 35 round but not fully loaded because the springs have the same issue as mentioned upthread. Also ammo still comes in the same cloth and 10 round box combo with a loading tool.
I would have thought this would have changed in the past 40+ years.
Capt
Does the US military use 35 round magazines now? We’re still using the metal 30-round ones - with 29 rounds in each, of course.
210 rounds is called the minimum basic load. Heavy emphasis on minimum. If you are going to be on the sharp end you take what you can carry.
I’ve only ever seen 30 rounds mags. Hasn’t changed in the last 25 years I’ve been in.
Never heard of 35, (20 back in the day) but is underloading still a necessary thing (aside from soldier superstition/memes)? Aside from large drum magazines (e.g., PPSh-41) or some generally mediocre magazines, but recent firearms? That last round is always a bitch to fill, though!
I was only reporting what I was told. In fact I thought that 30 rounds was the largest generally available. Possibly it is a USMC thing. I will get back with you all on this.
Capt
It really isn’t necessary as long as you take the time to do preventive maintenance. Taking apart the magazine. Cleaning it. Discarding mags with worn springs.
In Afghanistan soldiers were buying after market M4 magazines like the polymer PMAG. I know PMAG comes in a 40 round version but I have no idea if anyone was using them. In 2012 the military banned the use of after market magazines. I’m not sure if that was ever reversed. Of course Special Ops can use whatever the hell they want.
In my day, the word on the 30 round mags was never load more than 27 rounds in one, and never leave them sitting around in your hooch with more than 20 rounds. You wanted to top them off before you left on a mission.
We were told that the M-16 magazines were supposed to be disposable, and that the U.S. military would fill them with 30 rounds and then throw them away when they were empty; since we weren’t as rich as the Americans, we had to use just 29 rounds so that they’ll last longer. Obviously just another of those myths.
30 round magazines - 7 each - for the riflemen. Everybody else has a specific basic load plus extras like 60mm mortar rounds or additional SAW magazines.
Ammo supply breakdown for Desert Storm I.
We had Theater Supply Areas (TSAs) located near Daharan, around the corner on the Tapline road (MSR Dodge) TSA 2, and TSA 3 at King Kahalid Military City. Ammo from the port would go to the TSA or directly to Corps Support Areas (CSAs). Army had CSA or Log Base E for the 7th Corps a little west of Hafir Al Batten and Log Base C further west for the 18th Airborne Corps. The Marine Corps had their own TSA. Divisions would send their transportation battalion to go get ammo for their own Ammo Supply Point (ASP) then further distribution down to Ammo Holding Areas (AHAs) then to company level.
There were also FARPs - Forward Area resupply Points - for Helicopters. Ammo/fuel went from CSAs to DivisionSA to Ammo Transfer Points then to the FARP. The FARP moved forward. Ammo would be initially delivered by tractor-trailer (platform/stake) then on transport battalion/company 5-ton trucks/HEMTTs for the off-road advance.
There was this grand scheme for resupply logistic for the Great Left Hook around the Republican Guard. However, the Corps/Division commanders seized the last few supply convoys and when the advance kicked off - we had maybe a half dozen tractors and trailers available at the western TSAs and CSAs. Then there was the comical scene (in retrospect) of having thousand of tractor-trailer rigs stuck in the desert sand/mud (it was really rainy) over the first few miles of the advance. The M915 tractors were strictly over-the-road capable with the mild grooved tires. Trying to tow up to 32 tons across compacted dust mixed with rain doesn’t work. The off-the-road 5 ton tractors didn’t fare much better. Units would not download the trailers to get them to the off-road towing rating of maybe 12 tons. Stuck as well.
The only supply equipment that kept up - mostly - were the HEMTTs and 5-ton cargo trucks - the HEMTTs much better. A lot of helicopter slingloads were used to keep up with the fastest track and Airborne units. Fortunately, most of the shooting was over in 72 hours. Recovery of stranded / abandoned logistic vehicles took another 6 months.
In Afghanistan, ammo went to Bagram and Kandahar exclusively by air at the start. The ASPs there did the distribution to the outlying logistic / firing bases by helicopter and some land.We had an AHA at Jalalabad which became a higher level ASP due to supporting an additional 28 forward bases. Other main bases had AHAs support outlying posts. On a big picture level - not a whole bunch of shooting in Afghanistan. The outlying bases would have minimum supply levels of artilley, missile, and mortar ammunition. They would call down when approaching the limit and the next brace of CH-47s would have some pallets aboard. Bases along valleys would most often get road convoys for resupply.
At the soldier level - you may have thought you had “buckets-of-ammo” but somebody did sign for it. The biggest hassle was trying to get consumption figures from you so demand could be forecasted and deliveries scheduled.
Desert Storm II (The Occupation) had its own problems and logistics. The quick moving attack phase worked well based on the DS I experience. Lots of HEMTTs, helicopters and movement along hard surface roads meant supply kept up with the advance for the most part. Later, supply was from main bases at Balad, Speicher, and out of Kuwait. Usually convoy but helicopter as needed based on threats, accessability, and need. Still, everything got signed for down to company level. Linked ammo was in short supply at the start due to changes in the small arms contractor and more importantly, to the link manufacturer.
Things have improved from Grenada where the AHA was set up on the beach - at low tide:confused: and Panama where the commander grabbed a CNN camera crew to make an appeal for ammo at a specific location.
ps don’t bother complaining about the spelling of the locations above - it’s from memory and they are different depending on what source you use.
I am going to have to say that the 35 round mags are incorrect. There was a bit of drinking going on last night but it seems that 7 mags at 210 rounds is correct.
Capt
I was a Marine in Vietnam in 1969, so things have no doubt changed some. But, I carried about 600 rounds for my M-16.
I used up all of mine only one time. As was mentioned up thread in these sort of situations there is almost always going to be extra ammo to be had from the causalities. I ended up going through something like a thousand rounds in an hour or so.
As I was starting to get low our platoon sergeant crawled by and asked how I was doing for ammo. I told him I was down to my last couple of magazines and he tossed me a bandolier (enough for, I think, seven magazines) and crawled on off. This ammo wasn’t in magazines so I figured I’d better reload some of mine. I had shot up 500 plus rounds in about ten minutes or so (it might have been longer but it seemed like it went by pretty fast). While I was rolling around on my back to load my empties, I rolled over on the barrel of my rifle. It was extremely hot and left a major league welt which made carrying a pack a real trial for the next several days.
Some one asked above thread about somebody in the squad being assigned to carry extra ammo. That didn’t happen, with the exception of M-60 ammo where each squad carried six to ten cans. The reason for this was that there was just no way the M-60 gunner and his assistant could carry anywhere near enough to do any good.
For the most part running out didn’t happen much for several reasons.
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Most firefights didn’t last long. A half hour, I’m guessing, generally covered it. The one mentioned above was way above average in length and intensity.
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After the initial burst everyone was on the ground where it generally slowed down.
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We had helicopters that generally had only a short distance to go and could get out to us pretty quickly.
But that was then, I don’t know what they do today.
This boggles my mind…For this to happen, how many people had to be so stupid at the same time?
In civilian life, truck drivers know the limits of their vehicles. Their boss at the trucking company knows what kind of tires /snow chains to provide them for the terrain and weather.
Obviously, in a war, you don’t have the easy life of a trucking company on smooth US highways. But civilian truckers know how to anticipate problems such as snow storms on mountain roads, and they know not to drive on mild-grooved tires off-road on a sandy path (say, for a shortcut.)
How the hell can thousands of people make the same mistake within a few hundred yards of each other? If one driver gets stuck in the sand, doesn’t the guy behind him in the convoy realize that? And doesn’t he notify his boss? (ie. commanding officer)
One guy can make a mistake. But thousands?
FWIW, I’ve never seen a 35 round mag. When I was in Iraq I purchased myself an additional mag so that 210 / 8 = 26 or 27 rounds in a 30 round mag… as mentioned above, keeps them in shape. I also carried a 20 round mag specifically loaded with tracers for signalling.
Yup. But in the Army, the “boss” is probably an infantry commander who has never actually driven a truck in his life and is at echelons above reality.
Of course they do, but think about the big picture. The division commander orders an advance into Iraq. That means they’ve swept the area with an EW package, a wave of fighters, and strat bombers. The first brigade on the scene cleared a specific corridor to operate in. They laid on MEDEVAC birds, planned refuel points, and hooked up the arty. There is another division to the north and one to the south that are counting on you to control a specific sector of the battlefield. The TOPO guys printed off maps of that particular route and nothing else.
So what happens when the first guy gets stuck in the mud? “Excuse me, General, but Bob’s truck got stuck so maybe we should turn this whole thing around and find a different route.”
Ha. No.
And also, imagine being in Iraq and running into too much sand. What’s to the north? More sand. What’s to the south? More sand. If the highway is too hot or already in use by another division, what are your options? The Army has to advance one way or another, even if it sucks.
Oh, just the one. Shit rolls downhill, “I gave you a DIRECT ORDER” and all that :).
As a side note, I always wondered what an indirect order looked like.
Remember: It’s Army Strong, not Army Smart. 
An indirect order would probably be something like an implication or a request. “Gee, this office is kind of messy” would indicate that it should be cleaned. “Airman, clean up this mess” would direct the airman to clean up the mess.