I don’t suppose you care to elaborate?
Crash of a Nigerian MD-83 airliner in 2012, eventually determined to be directly the result of faulty maintenance and the crew not following safety procedures.
The flight had two working engines only for the first 17 minutes of the flight…. The rest of the flight used only one engine… nothing was said to atc about being on one engine. Wasn’t until on final, when the second engine stopped working, that atc was notified that they had any problems of any kind…. Also the American pilot may not have had a legally valid license to operate that aircraft in Nigeria. Let alone the United States because the FAA suspended his license for repeated hard landing and poor airmanship…
If you think MBAs rather than BSMEs or BSAEs are designing planes, again, your knowledge is painfully inaccurate.
He’s got a half-point in that a lot of the management hierarchy of Boeing was once engineers promoted and trained to be biz managers. All the way up to the senior VP ranks.
They were all hoe-ed (hoed?) out and replaced with MBAs not from the aerospace industry.
This is a common refrain all over every US industry. Folks that knew the business of making or delivering [whatever] were replaced by folks that only understood metrics and finance. A profound alteration of company priorities all up and down the management chain follows pretty immediately.
I think the point being made is that bean-counters and business-folk hold the purse-strings for decisions that can affect final technical design, from rivet material on up to fully-assembled engines.
I’ve read more than one article on the recent troubles at Boeing that laid the source of its troubles on its merger with McDonnell-Douglas and a subsequent shift from engineering to financial performance.
It seems to me like comparing auto deaths per mile (or per trip) to plane deaths and drawing any conclusion about relative safety is a hugely flawed piece of reasoning. It assumes that all driven miles carry the same risk, and that all drivers are equally at risk.
Surely a core difference in understanding safety is that as a driver I can mitigate (not eliminate) my own risk in various ways: driving safely for conditions, avoiding distractions, following rules and regulations, choosing routes or driving times in response to weather conditions, etc etc.
I look at it this way. Odds are high that all of us personally know someone who has been seriously injured in an automobile crash, and quite a few of us know someone who died in one. But, relatively few of us personally know someone* who’s been injured or killed in an airliner crash.
*- Technically, pretty much all of us here know someone who’s been injured in a small plane crash, as @Qadgop_the_Mercotan has shared his story about it here.
Said plane was a Boeing Stearman N2S-3. 
The answer is “no” – no one should have the slightest concern about the type of plane they’re getting on, whether it be Boeing, Airbus, Embraer, De Havilland Canada, or Bombardier.
But in the spirit of holiday levity, here are a few quotes from Dave Barry’s Year in Review for 2024: 
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In a troubling aviation incident, an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 Max 9 flying at 16,000 feet suddenly develops a refrigerator-sized hole in the fuselage when an improperly attached panel blows off, terrifying passengers who have reason to wonder whether the airline crew, instead of making a big deal about the position of everybody’s tray table, should maybe be checking to see if the plane has been correctly bolted together. As a safety precaution, the Federal Aviation Administration grounds all Max 9s and advises passengers on other Boeing aircraft to “avoid sitting near windows.” For its part, Boeing states that “at least the plane didn’t lose a really important part, like one of the whaddycallits, wings.”
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In aviation news, a Boeing plane flying from Australia to New Zealand suddenly goes into a nosedive, injuring 50 people. Another Boeing plane, taking off from the San Francisco airport, loses a piece of landing gear. A Boeing spokesperson says that the company, after conducting an in-depth review, has tentatively identified the root cause of the recent problems. “We think it’s gravity,” said the spokesperson. “It seems to be getting worse.” As a safety precaution, Boeing is advising pilots to avoid taking off, and simply taxi the planes from city to city, which the spokesperson says “may result in delays, especially to overseas destinations.”
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Two astronauts are stuck aboard the International Space Station when the Starliner spacecraft that was supposed to return them to Earth develops mechanical problems. You will never in a million years guess the name of the company that built this spacecraft.
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In space, a large communications satellite unexpectedly explodes, creating debris that threatens other satellites. In the spirit of mercy we will not name the company that made the defective satellite, other than to say it rhymes with “blowing.”
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Sorry, that was a brain fart on my part, the plane we crashed in was a Fairchild PT-26. Our NEXT plane was the Boeing Stearman, still uncrashed to this day (but no longer belonging to me).
And how much control do you have over someone running a red while you’re in the middle of an intersection or suddenly changing lanes on the freeway?
I can stop if I don’t like the traffic or conditions. I can take a different route if I feel like, or turn around and go home. I have no choices on the plane.
It is completely normal and at least partly rational to fear the complete ceding of control inherent in riding in some company’s plane vs driving your car.
In the plane your control and your influence are zero or a rounding error away from zero. In the car your control is far short of total. But overall statistically far more than zero. Your influence is also far greater than your control.
Most of all, the amount of control & influence you have while driving is familiar. It is human nature to over-fear novel or unfamiliar risks, while under-fearing routine risks.
Did someone say McDonnell Douglas was a better engineering company?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Airlines_Flight_98
The last, particularly, was a design. fault.
Well, I mentioned McDonnell Douglas as its merger with Boeing is seen as the start of Boeing’s decline. In other words, no, I don’t think it was a better engineering company.
Why is that “at least partly rational”? I mean, I’m just some amateur who got a driver’s license thirty years ago, after a fairly half-assed series of tests, and I haven’t had any sort of refresher course since then. Pilots are trained professionals with much more rigorous licensing requirements. I want them, not me, to be the one in control.
(I admit that I may be irrational in the opposite direction, in that if I’m the one driving the car I’m going to have a white-knuckle grip on the steering wheel the whole time because I know how fallible I am and how easy it would be for me to screw up, whereas if someone else is driving I just kind of assume they know what they’re doing, even if I have evidence to the contrary.)
Anecdata (albeit from a couple of people I know who worked for Boeing through the merger): they both said that while on paper Boeing acquired McD, in practice — and especially when it came to corporate culture — it was very much the opposite. To Boeing’s detriment.
I’ve read a variety of articles which have stated exactly that. My understanding is that McDonnell Douglas had already become a financially-driven company, rather than an engineering-driven company, and when the merger occurred, most of the senior management in the merged company came from the MD side of things. Boeing’s engineering leadership was forced out or marginalized, in the name of profitability.